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GLOSSARY 
CIt Bespredel- means without limits, given to Boris Y eltsin' s period as President. 
• Consciousness - totality of attitudes, opinions and sensitivities held by individuals or 
groups. 
• Hegemony - process through which 'dominant' ideology is transmitted, consciousness is 
formed, and social power is exercised. 
CII Ideology - a system of ideas. 
• Infosuasion - to influence the viewers' attitude to the content in the direction established 
by the sender. Mixture of verbal and non-verbal cues are used. 
• Managed Democracy - maintenance of outwardly democratic forms, while ensuring that 
those in power are not actually challenged by serious opposition or criticism. 
• Mediacracy - concentration of media into fewer hands. Inhibits alternative points of view 
from being expressed. Media eventually become a big player in politics. 
• Zachistka - means cleaning-up operations in Chechnya, designed to flush out the rebels. 
• Zakazukha - the selling of stories, which appear in the media. Often in the form of hidden 
advertising. 
• Zastoi - means stagnation, attached to Leonid Brezhnev's rule. 
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ABSTRACT 
This work focuses on the tumultuous and rapidly evolving environment of Russian media 
and society, from the era of Gorbachev' s reforms of glasnost to just before the 2003 - 2004 
electoral cycle. Over this time, there have been three Presidents - Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris 
Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Three leaders who have a different managerial style, although 
both Gorbachev and Putin have legal training, which seems to have some impact upon the 
way they try to manage a transforming society. 
Vll 
Media organisations, individually and as a collective body, have been a major actor in the 
changes that have and are occurring. A role that the mass media have retained throughout this 
period of tremendous upheaval and change is the role of educator or motivator of the public. 
The property that has been attached to the mass media and is a reason for political and 
business interest in gaining editorial control is that, as they conveyor of image as reality the 
media hold to power to influence the actions and opinions of the audience. 
Gorbachev used the Soviet mass media as a tool with which to rally the public's support, 
which he turned against his political opposition. Those who opposed the proposed reforms 
were demonised as being die-hard communists who were trying to prevent progress, so as to 
secure their comfortable existence. An inference in Gorbachev's method and use ofthe media 
was that those who opposed him also opposed the will of the people. 
Yeltsin also manipUlated and used the mass media to his advantage, firstly to topple 
Gorbachev and the Soviet Union and then to keep himself in the Russian presidential seat for 
eight years. He was a leader who initially revelled in the media gaze, but as time and troubles 
built up he became increasingly frustrated. One of the legacies of his years in power was the 
association of a free media being allowed to flourish under his leadership. In reality however, 
the legal framework for stifling and silencing the press was gradually established and then 
consolidated. 
In a well executed change of the President, Putin took over from Yeltsin and a very and 
noticeable change began. The old relationships between the Kremlin and the oligarchs (who 
owned a lot of the private media) broke down and open conflict ensued. The resurgent central 
State began to regain control over mass media, beginning with privately owned TV stations 
that were broadcasting nationally. Alongside the struggle for editorial control came a raft of 
new images and an ideology of the strong State, which has been labelled as Great Russia by 
Russian academic Ivan Zassoursky. A series of measures, some reminiscent of the Soviet 
period and others taken from Western PR practice are being used in this struggle. 
V111 
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INTRODUCTION, 
No research groups are currently engaged in the study ofthe Russian media in New Zealand. 
The 'cutting-edge' nature of my research necessitates my travelling overseas to obtain current 
and relevant information. Several of my overseas academic contacts are based in Moscow and 
Stockholm. Research institutes have been established at their universities (Moscow State and 
Stockholm), which give me access to leading edge theory and more information. 
The primary objectives of my thesis are to examine major ideological trends in politics and 
society in Putin's Russia, as reflected in the media. I intend to refer to events of change in 
Russian society, dating as far back as Gorbachev's reforms of glasnost and perestroika (the 
mid-1980's). A simultaneous analysis of politics and the media needs to be conducted to 
achieve a greater understanding of why events occur. Neither of these two entities operates in 
a vacuum. As author John Downing notes, "No serious analysis of media communication can 
divorce it from the character and operation of the political regime within which it operates."l 
I want to compare and contrast the essence of Russian reforms throughout this tumultuous 
period of Russian history. By comparing and contrasting these reforms, I may be able to 
ascertain any similarities or differences. That is, whether Russia's reforms are consistently 
heading toward a liberal democracy and a market oriented economy or if the policies are 
reverting to a more authoritarian nature. The media's role in attempting to realise change in 
society through influencing public perception and opinion will be one ofthe points focused 
upon. 
The role of the head of state (General-Secretary of the Communist Party and the President) 
has played a critical role in Russia's transformation. The office of the President has a lot of 
power at its disposal, which can be wielded against a political foe. To an extent, the leader has 
been able to set the agenda initially, in the arena of societal reform. However, the political, 
economic and bureaucratic elite has been able to slow and on some occasions halt the 
intended transformations, had it been perceived to threaten their interests. At certain points in 
time, the entrenched interests have been able to topple a leader, who they felt threatened by, 
I Downing, J., Internationalising Media TheOlY: Transition, Power, Culture Reflections on Media in Russia, 
Poland and Hungmy 1980-1995, London, Sage, 1996, pp. 2 - 3. 
2 
such as the case with Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. 2 A similar coalition of the normally diverse 
and fragmented interest groups attempted to remove Gorbachev in August 1991. Bearing 
these cases in mind, a leader must be careful in the scope and the speed of their reforms, 
should they too be toppled from power. 
A striking feature of the post-communist era is the lack of distinction between the spheres of 
politics, business and the media. The business and political worlds are both unstable and 
prone to conflict. During the Yeltsin era (1991 - 1999) Prime Ministers and even entire 
governments were hired and fired on a regular basis. At times one person may hold a post in 
all three of these areas. To illustrate this point I will use the infamous oligarch, Boris 
Berezovsky as an example. After the presidential elections in 1996, Berezovsky was one of 
the leading big businessmen in Yeltsin's 'inner circle,' part of his business empire consisted 
of significant media holdings and Yeltsin appointed him as secretary of the Russian Security 
Council. On the surface, there would appear to be considerable potential for conflict of 
interest. Has Russian politics changed in the post-Yeltsin era? 
The primary focus of this thesis is centred on Vladimir Putin, his origins, rise to power and 
his apparent societal objectives. Russian voters elected their second President, since the fall of 
communism, in March 2000. Vladimir Putin's rise through the political ranks has been very 
swift, catching some political commentators by surprise. In a short time period Putin had risen 
from the Director of the FSB, to Prime Minister, to Acting President and was then elected 
President. 
A second aim of this work is to explore the use of PR and image making, currently occurring 
in the Russian Federation. At present there appears to be a lot of effort being invested in 
bringing about a change in attitude of citizens, domestic and foreign, toward Russia's status as 
a nation. Russia's image as a world power has taken a battering since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. Yeltsin weakened central authority for political expediency did not help 
Russia's image as a former world power. The world's TV networks broadcast a weak and frail 
Yeltsin, who often made a fool of himself (therefore Russia also) on the world stage. The 
smooth PR campaign, which Gorbachev had used to bring a change in the international 
community's toward Russia had been long forgotten. 
2 For a detailed analysis of Khrushchev's leadership style see Taubman, W., Khrushchev: The Man and his Era, 
New York, W. W. Norton & Co, 2003. 
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Putin's accession to the presidency has seen a change in the power relations between the 
centre and the regions, the business community and the Kremlin, the Russian government and 
the media. The above-mentioned changes would seem to be oriented towards a specific goal, 
the re-establishment of the central government's former power and prestige. To reinvigorate a 
state that had become lame and lethargic. 
This thesis aims to examine some of the mechanisms used by the Kremlin's administration, 
to 'forge' Putin as a viable successor to Boris Yeltsin. As Yeltsin's term in office neared its 
'inevitable' end, the governmental bureaucracy swung into action. The break in the Kremlin's 
power relationship policy was almost instantaneous, following Yeltsin' s resignation from the 
presidency on 31 December, 1999. 
The Russian media has and still is undergoing a dramatic series of transformations since 
1985. Prior to Gorbachev and his reforms, the media were a central and integral part of 
maintaining the socialist state. Media and State were in an interdependent relationship, the 
media needed the State for funding and support and the State needed the media to provide 
ideological support - to create a stable political environment in which communism could 
continue to survive. Above all, the media were subordinate to the will of the State under this 
particular regime. 
However, things began to change, slowly at first, during Gorbachev's glasnost and 
perestroika reforms. Although the role of the media was still to support the State in its 
political, social and economic objectives, it was to spearhead top down initiated change. The 
media was used to sway the Soviet public and push aside political opposition to the reforms. 
A concept was introduced into society by the political elite - positive criticism. This process 
involved members of the public making observations and comments through the media. 
Weaknesses were exposed, transgressions were highlighted in order to reinvigorate an ailing 
Soviet State. A greater level of freedom of speech was permitted in the printed media. 
New laws were passed by the Gorbachev administration, such as the 1990 media law. The 
concept of freedom of speech and press seemed to be taking hold in the Soviet Union. Up 
until approximately 1990, the Soviet media appeared to be a unified mass that disseminated 
propaganda from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Breaks began to become 
visible and were clearly exposed in the August 1991 coup. Media organisations divided 
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themselves between political patrons and politician factions. Some sided with the hard-line 
communists and other media sided with Gorbachev. 
The new found freedoms of the late Soviet period laid the foundations for a period of 
run-away tabloid journalism. With political control and censorship measures relaxed, 
journalistic style changed. Reckless, irresponsible and unfounded accusations were printed in 
the press during this period. The excesses of freedom of speech became apparent. The hopes 
of developing an attitude of positive criticism in the Soviet media disappeared. 
Centralised control evaporated entirely with the break-up of the Soviet Union. This allowed 
a continuation of editorial freedom, which was now tempered by market realities. In the early 
days of the post-Soviet state, a euphoria pervaded that have been dubbed as the Golden Years 
of the Russian media. Some media based themselves on foreign models - for example the 
newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta modelled itself on the British newspaper The Independent. 
By 1993, the issue of market realities began to impose a new direction upon the media. 
Media were no longer supported by the State and had to make their own way financially as the 
cash-strapped State was in no position to offer any help. This left the option of enlisting the 
help of financial donors from the Russian business community. A feeling existed amongst the 
media hierarchy, that although they were seeking financial partners, this would not affect a 
media organisation's editorial freedom. However, these businessmen otherwise known as 
oligarchs were not going to give something for nothing. 
The oligarchs wanted and needed a voice with which to sway political figures and events in 
their favour. Media assets came to form parts of large industrial/financial empires and were 
used by their financial masters as a mouthpiece to put across their message. As a rule, media 
were not financially viable enterprises in their own right. This situation brought about the 
blurred distinction, which marked the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, in the line between 
business and politics. 
As time progressed the new Russian State began to grow stronger and stronger and assumed 
a greater control over society. Media are considered an important aspect, as they are a means 
of producing cultural identity and are thought of as being important in swaying public 
opinion. Two important political events that involved media co-operation and goodwill during 
the Yeltsin era included the 1996 presidential elections and the First Chechen War (1994 -
5 
96). During the First Chechen War, the media initially sided with the Federal Government and 
ran with the official version of events. However, by mid - late war some privately owned 
media began to break ranles. By June 1996, the time of the presidential elections, the media 
appeared to be back on side with the Kremlin again. Media co-operated with Yeltsin, to secure 
their future (freedom of speech) and the property of the oligarchs from possible 
nationalisation had the Communist Party been successful in the elections. 
Yeltsin appeared to be a guarantor of the media's freedom of speech. Media co-operation 
with the State in the 1996 presidential elections was considered by some at the time, to be an 
expedient measure at the time and they could reassert themselves after the election was over. 
This co-operation seems to have initiated another phase in the development of Russian media. 
A growing subordination to the will of the State by not only state-owned by private media as 
well. During the later years of his presidency, Yeltsin initiated changes to media law and 
introduced new key government personnel in the media and information sector. These actions 
laid the foundations for a greater level of control over the dissemination of information by the 
authorities. 
Between the economic crisis of 1998 and the Duma elections of December 1999, Yeltsin had 
become convinced of impending personal disaster ifhe was unable to successfully choose an 
heir to the presidency. He needed someone who would be reliable, yet almost unlmown. Once 
again the media would be required, to try and sell Y eltsin' s candidate to the Russian people. 
Media chose their political patrons prior to the Duma elections of December 1999 and the 
March 2000 presidential elections. This decision is a critical one for media organisations, if 
they support the 'wrong' (losing) political figure, their business and activities can come under 
threat as well. 
In spite of manipulating the media and laying the foundations of a more restrictive legal 
framework during his term as President, Yeltsin came to be viewed by many as the champion 
and saviour of a free Russian press. He held an iron grip on the state controlled media, where 
he forced his will upon them in a somewhat ruthless manner. The regular sacking of state-TV 
managers bears testimony to this political interference. Putin's coming to power, through 
Yeltsin's patronage accelerated a trend that had become apparent by the late Yeltsin era. That 
of greater central government control over the flow of information into and out of Russia. 
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During the run up to the March 2000 presidential elections, Putin stood on a political 
platform that favoured strengthening the central state and on law and order. This combined 
with his background of service in the KGB and to a lesser extent, bureaucratic administration 
lent an indication to a possible direction change. Moves have been made to resurrect a 
stronger and greater Russia. To try and achieve these goals the centres of producing cultural 
identity have been rallied and their potential power to influence and affect change harnessed. 
As such, the media are a centre of cultural production and have been sUbjected to an 
intensified campaign by the authorities to restrict themselves to disseminating the 'official' 
viewpoint. This has applied equally to state and private media. 
Under the Yeltsin era, catch phrases and rhetoric focused on preventing a return of 
communism to Russia. This is what bound media and government, at times. The rhetoric has 
changed under Putin's administration. Initially, there was a focus on law and order and in 
distancing the oligarchs from the centre of power. Both Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
Gusinsky fell to this particular campaign. Simultaneously, tied to the issue ofre-establishing 
law and order was the Second Chechen War. Putin used this campaign to bring about a higher 
public profile for the elections. 
This war has evolved over time, influenced by events both domestic and international. After 
the events of September 11, 2001 and various acts of terror committed in Russian territory, the 
focus of the rhetoric has shifted more toward combating terrorism. An action that has been 
designed to bring the appearance of a convergence of Western and Russian interests. Such a 
convergence has helped to mute a lot of international criticism of Russian actions in 
Chechnya. 
In spite of a departure from the policy of regionalism, Putin has retained parts ofYeltsin's 
old bureaucratic apparatus. This includes some of the political entourage. Does this mean that 
in the midst of apparent change there is also a measure of continuity? 
Leading academics have argued that there is a measure of continuity in the manner in which 
the Russian politics and media operate. A leading academic in the field of Russian media and 
politics summed up this sentiment and noted that this is often overlooked. 
"(John) Downing [ ... J concludes that the continuity between the old and the 
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new system has been largely underestimated.,,3 
In the title of my thesis is the word ideology, it is a widely used and greatly contested 
political term. I will, at this early stage explain the context in which this term will be used in 
this work The principle significance of the term lies in it referring to a coherent (more or less) 
"set of ideas that provide the basis for some kind of organised political action."4 
Ideologies straddle the crossroads of theory and practice. Therefore some common 
characteristics can be found in ideologies. 
• Offer an account or critique of the existing order. This may be given in the form of a 
'world view.' 
.. Generates a model of a preferred future. The desired model may be given as a vision of a 
'good society.' 
41} Give an outline as to the possibility of political change and the best means to expedite the 
change.s 
Chapter One deals with the debate as to whether a cult of personality exists around the 
Russian President, Vladimir Putin. The chapter begins by defining the concept of cult of 
personality and then progresses to placing this theory in a practical setting. Origins ofthe 
concept are discussed and then the practice( s) of cult of personality in the Soviet Union are 
discussed. The two most prominent figures in the history of cult of personality are discussed, 
the Soviet leaders Joseph Stalin and Leonid Brezhnev. Other lesser figures, framed in these 
terms, have been deliberately excluded. This is intended to bring greater focus and clarity for 
the reader, to come to terms with these complex phenomena. 
After laying the chapter's theoretical and practical foundations it shifts the focus to Vladimir 
Putin. Beginning by examining how Putin was able to gain enough public profile for him to 
win the 2000 presidential elections. What was his method of communication? What kind of 
appeals did he use to try and win over the voting public? The period in which Putin had his 
3 Ekecrantz, J., "Introduction: Post-Conununism and Global Culture" in Ekecrantz, J. & Olofsson, K., Editors, 
Russian Reports: Studies in Post-Communist Transformation of Media and Journalism, Huddinge, Almqvist & 
Wiksell International, 2000, pp. 1 - 30, p. 26. 
4 Heywood, A., Key Concepts in Politics, New York, Palgrave, 2000, p. 22. 
S Ibid. 
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public profile launched was short, but intense. 
After his victory at the polls in March 2000, the focus of the Kremlin's PR concerning the 
personality of Put in changed. It entered a new and more mature phase, which built upon his 
initial public profile. Many different aspects in society have emerged, which on the surface 
would seem to suggest that a form of cult of personality exists. But, is this sufficient to say 
that a cult of personality exists due to several aspects of the theoretical concept have 
manifested in contemporary Russian society? 
The second chapter analyses key political actors and the issue of elections in the Russian 
Federation. Both Yeltsin and Putin have ideal public images, that is the image that they would 
like to convey to society of themselves. There are numerous reasons as to why these public 
identities are created, it seems that one of the main reasons for this to occur in the first 
instance is to enable a politician to fill a niche on the political scene. The type of political 
niche to be filled would depend upon the political mood of society. Yeltsin was able to gain 
his popularity through appealing to the masses. He liked to be associated with the masses, as 
their champion. 
As Y eltsin' s term as President continued, the public mood and sentiment changed. The era of 
Y eltsin' s presidency became known as bespredel, without limits. Yeltsin realised this change 
and that political change was to occur in some form, ifhe was to secure his legacy this change 
needed to be managed. His eventual chosen successor was Vladimir Putin, due to the Yeltsin 
legacy of political and economic chaos a new public image was needed. 
Initially a potential heir, the politically ambitious Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov has 
sought the Russian presidency for some time. His political office has enabled him to 
accumulate a measure of power and influence, which he has wielded to support his campaign 
for Russia's top political position. Among the assets that he has acquired to support his claim, 
have been significant holdings in the media industry. The media are owned by the Moscow 
City Council, but effectively controlled by Luzhkov himself. 
In addition to Yeltsin, Lyudmila Putina as the Presidential First Lady has her role 
scrutinised. Questions and issues dealing with topics such as the role played by the First Lady 
in Russia and whether this role has remained constant or has been evolving are tackled. This 
9 
particular facet of Russian politics is mostly overlooked in the field of academic analysis. 
There appears to be very little academic literature published. The lack of information raises a 
question, just how important is the First Lady in Russian political life? 
A third theme of the second chapter deals with the perceptible increase of the importance and 
predominance of the state's role in Russian society. This particular facet, that of the pre-
eminence of state interests are above all else, seems to have been resurrected during Putin's 
tenure in power. Certainly, the concept is not new in Russian or world politics. Just to what 
extent has this re-emergent theme come to dominate the post-Y eltsin political scene? 
One of Put in's election pledges was to distance all oligarchs equally from political power. 
Oligarchs were very influential during the Yeltsin era, especially after helping Yeltsin secure 
another term in office during the 1996 presidential elections. The oligarchs made a highly 
visible presence, mixing public life with private gain. Such an obvious conflict of interest, 
which they managed to accumulate massive wealth, made them an object of contempt in the 
eyes of the public who struggled to make an existence. High profile examples were made of 
the oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky. But, to what extent and with how 
much success has the war on the oligarchs been fought? 
Chapter Three - A Search for Identity and the Russian Orthodox Church, covers a wide 
range of issues linked to the Russian peoples' search for an identity that is both specific and 
special, which sets them apart from other peoples of the world. These topics and discussions 
are related to how Russia and Russians see themselves, as evident through media debates. Is 
Russia oriented to the East or more to the West? A difficult question to answer and one that 
has perplexed many for centuries. Some of the sections have been simplified for ensuring the 
complexities of some of these debates do not overcome the reader. For instance, in section 
3.1.1, I only refer to Westemisers and Slavophiles. Ideologies such as Eurasianism are left 
out, there is not enough room to take the many and varied ideologies into account in a manner 
that ensures justice is done to each. 
The issue of patriotism is inspected in Chapter 3.3. Patriotism can be used to bind a nation 
together in times of adversity and difficulty. Is patriotism being used again, in order to achieve 
the objectives of the political elite? Are the tactics the same as those used during the times of 
the Soviet Union, or have the strategies and manner in which state-sponsored is applied 
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evolved? 
In Chapter 3.4, the focus will be on the interaction between the State, the mass media and the 
Russian Orthodox Church. The work will begin by firstly briefly examining the ROC's brief 
revival as a result of the Second World War. In an effort to try and boost a sagging war effort, 
Stalin enlisted the help of the ROC. An informal agreement was struck between the parties. 
This agreement allowed for some leniency to be shown to the Church, but brought it under the 
complete control of the State. Why did the ROC agree to help, what was in effect their 
enemy? 
Close ties began to be forged between Church and State has continued, although on another 
footing since Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika during the later part of the 1980's. President 
Yeltsin did not alter the new Church-State union, after the Soviet Union dissolved. In return 
for political support, recognition and participation the Church offered the political leadership 
power through legitimisation. In other words, the Orthodox Church would attempt to transfer 
power and prestige to selected key political powers through officially sanctioning them. 
Political actors seem to have readily accepted this offer, with the thought that they will be 
given access to the Church's flock via the leadership of the ROC. 
Although the exact number of Orthodox believers is difficult to determine, the ROC's 
influence in secular matters has been steadily growing. This has continued into the 
administration of President Putin. A form of partnership between State and Church has 
become evident. Such a union has not only been taking place on a federal level, but also a 
regional and local level. Part of the ROC's success in the political arena can be attributed to 
their highly rigorous, but successful lobbying campaign. Church influence in the areas of 
education and the military most clearly demonstrate the level of interaction between the State 
and Church. 
One of the circumstances that seem to limit the ability of the ROC in spreading more rapidly 
among Russian society is the lack of ability to deal with the past. Several issues relating to the 
Soviet past have surfaced and caused significant image damage. Issues are slowly evolving 
into scandals by the ROC's inept handling of political communication in matters such as the 
alleged links between the Patriarch Alexis II and the KGB and the debate on restitution of 
Church land and property seized by the State during the Soviet era. 
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Chapter four deals with many different issues, which are and were at play from the late 
Soviet period into the contemporary period. The late Soviet period is included to provide a 
form of measure for the reader to gauge developments in the Russian media during the fluid 
developments of the mid-1980's until the present time. Foreign ownership and influence in 
the landscape of the Russian media is the first of the issues to be studied. Just how much 
foreign influence is present in the contemporary mass media of Russia? 
Next is the development and direction(s) of the Internet in the Russian Federation. Internet 
usage rates, political use of the net, attempts to control the flow of information that is 
transmitted electronically and commercialisation issues are looked at. The Internet had been 
neglected as a reliable means with which to transmit a message by the authorities for some 
time, but I intend to demonstrate that such assumptions are very misplaced in the 
contemporary environment. 
Chapter 4.3 - 4.5 explores the role and interaction between media and society. Important 
questions and concepts are examined, such as the level of trust of the media in modem 
Russian society, methods of manipulating the public and the availability of ordinary citizens 
to communicate with the political elite to name a few. 
The final parts of chapter four give the reader an understanding of the philosophy and 
practicalities of the Soviet media and the short period of intense change and transformation 
that it underwent. These parts lay an understanding of the purpose of the mass media in the 
Soviet Union and how this purpose, although in the bigger picture remained constant, did 
change a little. This change then permitted the tumultuous events of 1990-1991 to transpire, 
without the changes brought about by the Gorbachev administration the fall of the Soviet 
Union may have taken somewhat longer to occur. 
Chapter four concludes with sections on media in the present-day setting. Developments in 
the media are traced in areas such as state support of the mass media, censorship and other 
mechanisms that are used as a means of leverage on editorial content. What are the similarities 
and the differences in the way( s) in which the state and big business set out to influence what 
appears in the mass media? 
Relations between the media, government and the military during periods of armed conflict 
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are scrutinised in Chapter five. This chapter begins by looking at the First Chechen War 
(1994-96) and the consequences of this war on politics and the media. Did the federal 
government begin the war with a set plan for political communications and ifthere was a plan 
was it implemented correctly? The war had a negative impact upon freedom of speech and 
saw an increase in central government attempts to act as the gatekeeper. 
Inept handling of both the military action and political communications brought about a 
humiliating withdrawal from Chechnya by the federal government. There was to be some 
three years of a form of peace before the outbreak of the Second Chechen War in late 1999. 
During this interlude lessons from the First Chechen War were learnt and political 
communications of foreign countries to their public during times of war studied. Two 
conflicts (not directly involving Russia) that have seen the art of communicating something as 
unpleasant as war to the public in a very 'friendly' manner has been the 1991 Gulf War by UN 
forces and the 1999 Kosovo operation by NATO forces. These two conflicts have the 
dimension relating to political communication examined and this is then related back to the 
Russian experience. 
The Second Chechen War was prosecuted in a more concise and professional way. A lot of 
PR work went into effect before the open hostilities erupted. President Putin used the war as 
one of the platforms to gain pUblicity and popularity for the 2000 presidential election. The 
government has seemed to be in more control ofthe flow of information concerning events in 
this particular war. Alongside the use of coercive means and persuasive means has been the 
employment of a very specific language, which has the ability to create emotion and cloud the 
real issues at hand. 
Chapter six Framing the News, the final chapter looks at the use of topics and agenda setting 
in news programmes. There are many broadcasting media organisations operating in the 
Russian Federation. At the beginning of 2002, a total of 1457 TV stations and 1100 radio 
stations held valid broadcasting licences.6 A brief introduction gives an account of the use of 
agenda setting during the Soviet era and how it developed. Then the focus of the chapter is 
fixed on the modem setting, with regard to the news content of ORT (later TV]) and NTV for a 
given period. The first channel being a state channel and the second given channel a privately 
6 The Russian Broadcasting IndustlY, National Association ofTY and Radio Broadcasters of Russia, 
www.nat.ru/eng/rb/industry.php. 9 October, 2003. 
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owned one. What topics are raised, is there any readily identifiable bias? These are some of 
the questions and themes that shall be studied. 
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CHAPTER 0: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE THESIS. 
0.0 Chapter Objectives 
The principal aim of this introductory chapter is to give the reader an understanding of the 
underlying goals and objectives of the thesis, and the theoretical framework upon which the 
work is built. The main themes shall be presented to the reader, peripheral themes which help 
to generate a greater understanding (and their significance) will also be mentioned. 
I will begin by outlining what is to be discussed in the following chapters. An introduction to 
my theoretical approaches follows 1.2 Theories such as critical theory, media theory (based on 
McQuail's work and the Four Theories o/the Press), political communication and semiotics 
will be explained. The applications and possible shortcomings of these theories when applied 
to the media of the Russian Federation will also be outlined. 
This introductory chapter will include not only theory on how events are framed through the 
use of theory, but will go further. For events to occur in the first instance, a catalyst is needed 
to generate a sequence of incidents, which will culminate in an event. For the purposes of this 
work, the role of the media in trying to manage, manipulate or create an event will be 
analysed. 
0.1 Media Theory 
In this part I shall deal with the concepts of how the media operate, the significance of the 
media, social functions of the media, requirements for freedom of the press and lastly, some 
theories of the press will be outlined. Most of the material from this section has been drawn 
from Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (McQuail, 1994: 1 - 2). 
0.1.1 The significance ofthe mass media 
According to McQuail, there are five ways in which the mass media are able to manipulate 
or form public opinion: 
(1) Power Resource: it is a possible medium of determining control and innovation in society. 
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The mass media is the principle way in which information that is vital to the viability of most 
social institutions is disseminated and received. 
(2) Location (or Arena): this is where many aspects of public life, at a national and an 
intemationallevel are played out. 
(3) Media as a Source: the media provide a major source of definitions and images of social 
reality. As a source, this is the place where the construction of societies and groups culture 
and values occur. And where these concepts are stored and expressed. 
(4) Fame: the means of attaining publicity and effective performance in the public arena by, 
in this instance, politicians. 
(5) Normal: this is the measure by which society deems what is normal and that which is 
abnormal. It is a benchmark that the public uses to make judgements based on that society'S 
current value system ofnormality.7 
0.1.2 Social functions of the media 
Functionalist theory: social practices and institutions are explained in terms of individual and 
societal needs. When applied to the media these needs include such things as: order, 
integration, guidance, motivation, adoption, socialisation and continuity. Society is perceived 
as a working system oflinked subsystems, of which the media is one ofthe subsystems. The 
media is portrayed as self-directing and self-correcting.8 (McQuail, 1994: 77 - 78) 
According to Functionalist theory, the media specify certain social functions. In this role the 
media may reinforce existing values and beliefs or may act to change incumbent values and 
beliefs. There are five aspects of social function; information, correlation, continuity, 
entertainment and mobilisation. 
(1) Information: in the constantly changing world in which we live, the media are the 
7 McQuail, D.,Mass Communication Themy: An Introduction, London, Sage, 1994, p. 1. 
8 Some functionalist theorists include; M. Janowitz, H. Lasswell, H. Mendelsohn, K. R. Stamm and C. R. 
Wright. 
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providers of infonnation about what is happening at a local level and news concerning the 
larger international community. Through the infonnation provided by the media, indications 
regarding relations of power are put forward. 
(2) Correlation: this is where opinions are fonned. By commenting on events through 
explanation and interpretation the process of consensus building begins to take place. Through 
the way in which the news is presented orders of priority are set and the relative status of the 
news is given. 
(3) Continuity: through the nature of the events covered the media may either express itself in 
the dominant culture, thereby maintaining a commonality of values. Or recognise other 
subcultures and new cultural developments that will help create a new set of values. 
(4) Entertainment: the primary function of the entertainment aspect is to provide a source of 
amusement and relaxation, resulting in a reduction in the level of social tension. 
(5) Mobilisation: various societal objectives may be campaigned for, issues of politics, the 
economy, environmental concern and freedom ofspeech.9 
0.1.3 Requirements for the freedom of the press 
There are certain conditions and expectations to be met before the label of a 'free press' can 
be given. The expectations may differ slightly from culture to culture, there are however some 
common attributes associated with a truly free press. 
The issue of censorship is pivotal to the issue of press freedom. Governmental controls such 
as licensing and censorship restrict what can and will be said. A news organisation should be 
able to publish the news and opinions that it wishes to express, without fear of punishment or 
reprisal. In addition to the publishing of the news, access with regard to the collection, should 
also be equally unimpeded. 
Bound in the ideal of the right to communicate, the public should have free reception of and 
9 Me Quail, D., op. cit. (1994), p. 79. 
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access to all points of view and news. 
With the advent of vast commercial empires, in which media organisations have been 
swallowed up, comes the concern over the influence on the type and nature of the 
communication of information by the owners. Socialist theorist and American academic, J. 
Herbert Altschull stated in his second law of journalism that 'the contents of the media always 
reflect the interests of those who finance them.' 10 
Taking Altschull's thesis further, British academic William Bloom makes no distinction 
between state controlled and private media. "[ ... J because a free press, like a controlled press, 
needs to satisfy the demands of its patrons - whether these demands are political or for 
financial pro fit. ,,11 
The relevancy of these two reflections will become clear in the course ofthis work. Suffice 
to say at this stage that demands will be made upon media regardless ofthe nature of its 
ownership that is state or private. Media may be viewed as a prize, which when used 
effectively can manipulate events (to a certain extent) to one's advantage. I intend to 
demonstrate, in the Russian context that the media is manipulated by both commercial and 
governmental interest groups to bring about a particular situation. 
0.1.4 Political Communication 
Brian McNair, in his book An Introduction to Political Communication uses the definitions 
of Robert E. Denton and Gary C. Woodward (1990) extensively in describing political 
communication. 12 The issues surrounding what defines a political communication are complex 
and broad, as are the issues of politics in Russia. The press is often used by its owner to 
express their interests. Politics and business are closely tied, at times seemingly inseparable 
from each other. Media barons vie for positions of influence and favour by attacking each 
other and their political foes through the newspapers and television channels. 
10 (1) McQuail, D., op cit. (1994), p. 162 
(2) Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., Media/Society: Industries, Images and Audiences, 2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks, 
Pine Forge Press, 2000, p. 36. 
II Bloom, W., Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, p. 86. 
12 Definitions taken from Denton, R. E. & Woodward, G. C., Political Communication in America, New York, 
Praeger, 1990. 
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Denton and Woodward define political communication as the: 
public discussion about the allocation of public resources 
(revenues), official authority (who is given the power to make legal, 
legislative and executive decisions), and official sanctions (what the state 
rewards and punishes). [ ... J the crucial factor that makes a communication 
'political' is not the source of a message, but its intent and purpose. 13 
By this definition, political communication does not necessarily originate from the 
government or politicians. What makes a message 'political communication,' is that the 
message is designed to have an impact upon the political thought process. As such, a further 
definition needs to be made, to define groups that make purposeful communications about 
politics. 
According to McNair, there are three groups that constitute those that perform purposeful 
political communication. 
(A) Politicians and political actors: every type of communication by these groups that is 
done with the aim of realising a particular goal. 
(B) Non-politicians: communications that are directed at the first group by interest groups 
such as voters or newspaper columnists. 
(C) The media: media analysis of politics (and ofthe politicians, as defined in the first 
group) that takes the form of news reports and editorials. 14 
McNair explains three parts to political 'reality.' The reality is determined by who the 
observer is, of the three groups that have been defined above. 
(A) Objective political reality: this category is made up of political events as and when 
they occur. 
13 McNair, B., An Introduction to Political Communication, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 3 - 4. 
14 McNair, B., op. cit., p. 4 
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(B) Subjective political reality: how politicians and citizens interpret political events. 
(C) Constructed political reality: this is how political events are covered and reported by 
the media. 15 
Russian business interests lobby the politicians for both power and wealth. The most 
powerful lobby groups are made up by the Russian business elite, the so-called oligarchs. 
These oligarchs are a wide and varied group of business and political interests. Some will 
make use of the existing politicians to achieve their aims, others became the politicians 
making the decisions (such as Boris Berezovsky). Part of the financial interests held by the 
more powerful oligarchs (as outlined in the section relating to media ownership) is media 
groups, which are used to disseminate the owner's point of view to the public and to the 
politicians. Although, with time and deciphering a media outlet's messages, a hint of the 
owner may become apparent, the owner is not obligated by law to declare their ownership. 
Instead, a founder must be registered. Some of the duties that are undertaken by the founder 
include; "it is an entity that applies for the registration papers, signs contracts with the editor 
and can make a decision to cancel the publication.,,16 It should be noted that the owner and the 
founder are not necessarily the same person. 
By controlling the media, the oligarchs are to an extent able to influence the constructed 
reality. The control over constructed political reality in tum, has an influence on subjective 
political reality. This is because of the oligarchs through their media holdings, limit the 
content and focus of news. The public will form opinions on what they are able to view, read 
or listen to. Recent events (the Kremlin's crackdown on the media, starting openly in 
approximately May 2000) signal the government's realisation of the importance of controlling 
the flow of information (and consequently the interpretation of the information which is 
supplied). 
The view expressed by sociologist J. B. Thompson in 1988 appears to be very relevant to the 
thesis, he gave an interpretation of communications. He looks for the message, which is given 
inside the main message and the end goal ofthe communication. "When our concern is with 
the analysis of ideology, then the role of interpretation is to explicate the connection between 
15 McNair, B., op. cit., p. 12 
16 Richter, A., Moscow Media Law and Policy Institute, received bye-mail on 14 October, 2002. 
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the meaning of the symbolic constructions and the relations of domination which that 
meaning serves to sustain."17 
Thompson advises a study which comprises of three parts when analysing the social 
processes of mass communication. 
• Institutional arrangements for production. 
• The messages themselves. 
@ Reception and incorporation of messages by individuals and groups. 18 
These attempts to influence the government or the public are tied to the notions ofthe critical 
theorist Jurgen Habermas. Two ofHabermas's concepts hold particular relevance, firstly the 
concept of the 'public sphere.' A definition of public sphere involves the existence of "a 
socially organised rational-critical discourse targeted on influencing state power."19 
The second concept to be considered, revolves around what Habermas describes as the 
"colonisation of life-world of the public by both corporate and governmental forces, against 
which the public has come to react by organising various types of oppositional and social 
movements."20 A recent period in the expansion of media watchdog groups in the Russian 
Federation may be linked to the concept of public resistance to the governmental and 
corporate forces control of media assets. 
I will be assuming a totalist theory approach to the analysis of political communication. 
Totalist theory occurs where media communication is principally defined in relation to other 
power institutions, such as politics and economy.21 
0.2 Critical Theory 
The area of critical social theory has a specific focus on "issues of power and justice and the 
ways that the economy, matters of race, class, and gender, ideologies, discourses, education, 
17 Editor Elderidge, l, Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 44. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 25. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 182. 
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religion and other social institutions, and cultural dynamics interact to construct a social 
system." (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 281). 
Critical theory was developed in the 1930's by three German academics. Herbert Marcuse, 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (from the so-called 'Frankfurt School') moved to the 
United States after the Nazi accession to power in 1933. The theory of critical enlightenment 
derives from critical theory. 
Jurgen Habermas, an influential thinker of the Critical Theory school of thought, proposed 
three types of knowledge. The first type is empirical - analytical which is linked to the area of 
natural sciences. Another type which was proposed is historical - hermeneutic, which has to 
do with meaning and understanding. The final classification is critical sciences, with an 
emphasis on issues of emancipation. 22 
The Frankfurt School believe that modem media do not challenge the audience to be active 
and to think. Instead, it provides them with ready-made opinion and 'infotainment.' The 
purpose of the media is to reinforce the existing hegemonic structure.23 A possible conclusion 
that could be drawn from this notion is that the owners of the media and the incumbent 
political elite are one and the same. 
What is the reason in behind providing the public with ready-made opinion and 
'infotainment?' Critical theorists have an opinion to explain this phenomenon as well. 
"[ ... J members of the Frankfurt School were also convinced that the culture 
industry focussed on trivia rather than substance. Presenting trivia makes it 
possible to avoid issues that might lead to real debate and conflict.,,24 
Critical theory's role is to analyse the competing power interests between groups and 
individuals within a given society. A focus is made on identifying who gains and who loses in 
certain circumstances. An argument of Criticalists stipulates that privileged groups sometimes 
have an advantage in supporting the status quo, to protect their advantages. 
22 Kauppi, M. V. & Viotti, P. R., International Relations TheO/y: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond, 
3rd Edition, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 46. 
23 Louw, P. E., The Media and Cultural Production, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2001, pp. 96 - 97. 
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On the other hand the Birmingham School of thought offers an alternative explanation. They 
assume an active and not passive audience, which is a vulnerable object of 'education.' The 
Birmingham School re-empowers the audience by tying the use of the notion of alternative or 
oppositional decoding of media messages to them.25 
My argument is that the oligarchs (especially Vladimir Gusinsky and Berezovsky) are the 
result of the previous power regime, as represented by the former President Yeltsin. Putin' s 
election as President has brought about a partially new power regime, which has no place for 
some ofthe oligarchs. The incumbent power system (the oligarchs) are therefore fighting for 
their power and privilege, in some cases their very existence. They want to see the old power 
base maintained. 
0.3 Semiotics 
Dualist Theory (Self and Other): 
In the book The Semiotics of Russian Culture, Lotman and Uspenskii (1984) claim that the 
dual semiotic model of binary opposition was formed in eighteenth century Russia. Their 
argument centres on the premise that there were only two outcomes in Russian culture, right 
and wrong, good or bad. There is no room for neutrality or 'grey' areas, everything is black or 
white. 
Dualism was first applied to the reforms of Peter I, which created Russia as a partly 
Easternised and partly Westernised state. This was a departure from the past, when Russia was 
considered to be an Eastern nation. 
At anyone period of time, two sets of mutually opposed mechanisms within a given culture 
are said to operate at given time. One of these mechanisms has a tendency toward diversity 
and the "polyglotism" of culture. 26 
24 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 35. 
25 McQuail, D., McQuail's Mass Communication Theory, 4th Edition, London, Sage Publications, 2000, 
pp. 97 - 99. 
26 Uspenski, B. A, Ivanov, V. V., Lotman, 1. M., Toporov, V. N. & Pjatigorski, A. M., Theses on the Semiotic 
Study o/Cultures, Tartu, Tartu University Press, 1998, p. 27. 
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The other mechanism, which operates concurrently, has the inclination toward uniformity. 
An attempt will be made to organising a conformist culture. 27 
Lotman and Uspenskii claim that this tendency is uniquely Russian. The bipolar Russian 
values did not hold in the 'Catholic Christian West,' which had an allowance for a neutral 
state of being. 
According to Uspenskii, cultures may be "oriented toward writing (text) or toward oral 
speech, toward the word or toward the picture [ ... J." 28 Russia's rich literary past indicates that 
text is of significant value to the Russian culture. Text has a history of carrying more meaning 
and being more than just a form of entertainment. A dry narrative of events, such as in the 
Western style press, is instead made in the form of political or moral analysis. The meaning 
that is transmitted is more emotionally charged. 
Russian bipolarism did not end at the end with the death of Tsar Peter I. The Soviet regime 
exploited the concept throughout their tenure in power. The use of this strategy did not solely 
apply to labelling the foreigner as the enemy. Stalin used bipolarism to rid himself of any 
possible vestiges of opposition by tarnishing people as 'enemies of the people.' 
The popularity of exploiting bipolarism seemingly waned during the early Yeltsin years. 
From 1996 however, the political leadership has shown themselves to be willing and able to 
exploit this tool. Recently in the Second Chechen War, a concerted effort has been initiated by 
the Kremlin to vilify the Chechen people. It is my intention to apply the dualistic theory to the 
Chechen situation. Media coverage has portrayed a struggle of good (the Federal Russian 
forces) against evil (the Chechen leadership), an evil that according to the Kremlin will stop at 
nothing to destroy the Russian state and its people. 
0.4 Ideology 
A pivotal concept of this thesis is the term 'ideology.' To an extent, ideology has determined 
Russia's immediate past. The mass state-imposed ideology ofMarxism~Leninism dictated 
society's shape and function, what was important and what should be discarded. This all-
27 Ibid. 
28 Uspenski, B. A, Ivanov, V. V., Lotman, 1. M., Toporov, V. N. & Pjatigorski, A. M., op. cit., p. 28 
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pervading guiding principle was dominant for over seventy years in the Soviet Union. 
It seems as though the legacy of Marxism-Leninism sti111eaves an influence in contemporary 
Russia. But to what extent? This effect is difficult to measure and can be the source of an 
endless debate. 
But, first it is necessary to provide a definition of this controversial concept, for the purposes 
of this thesis. What is ideology? And what are its characteristics? 
The Media Reader gives, what I believe is a good definition of the term. Ideology "[ ... J those 
images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, 
interpret, understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence."29 
Ideology does not exist in a pure and insulated environment. The underlying philosophy of 
an ideology needs a medium, to be communicated to an audience. A means of achieving these 
ends can be found in language "[ ... J is by definition the principal medium in which we find 
different ideological discourses elaborated."30 Significance oflanguage, in terms of what is not 
said (may be implied, hidden meanings or a 'natural' conclusion) can be of equal and possibly 
be of greater significance as the exact text of what is said. 
Ideologies, by their very nature are a phenomenon of mass culture. A subconscious 
collective identity introduced to society, not necessarily introduced by violent means. An 
ideology appears to offer an individual a chance to 'belong,' a very strong motivation. In 
addition to the belonging aspect, ideology presents the believer with a system or guide on how 
to interpret and react to events, it is the creation of an idealised existence. 
Because of this idealised existence, some certain traits exist across the spectrum of 
ideologies; 
411 An articulation of different elements into a distinctive set or chain of meanings. 
411 In a liberal ideology 'freedom' is connected with individualism and the free market; in a 
socialist ideology, 'freedom' is a collective condition, dependent on, not counterposed to, 
'equality of condition,' as it is in liberal ideology. 
29 Editors Alvarado, M. & Thompson, J. 0., The Media Reader, London, BFI Publishing, 1990, p. 8. 
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• Ideological struggle can take place by articulating the elements differently, thereby 
producing a different meaning. The 'chain' is broken and a new articulation is established. 
• Ideological statements made by individuals, but ideologies are not the product of 
individual consciousness or intention. Ideologies are a collective process and practice. 
ED Ideologies tend to disappear and become a 'naturalised' state of common sense. 
• Ideologies work by 'making sense. '31 
During the transitional period, there appears to be a tension created between individualism 
and collectivisation. From a certain perspective, a form ofbinarism also exists here. British 
academic James Lull contends that "[ ... J ideology must be represented symbolically to be 
effective. "32 
Ideology is an essential element in the establishment of authority through the exercise of a 
form of power. "Ideological influence is crucial in the exercise ofpower.,,33 Therefore, for an 
ideology to be successful, it requires an effect means of communicating its message to an 
audience. What happens if the message does not get through to the target audience at all, or in 
the manner intended by the sender? 
"Fabricators of dominant ideologies become an 'information elite.' Their 
power, or dominance, stems directly from their ability to publicly articulate 
their preferred systems of ideas.,,34 
To illustrate the above point, we can refer to Mildco Kivikoski, a researcher in the 
Department of Political History at the University of Turku, Finland. Kivikoski's penetrating 
analysis ofVaclav Havel (Czechoslovakia) and Gyorgy Konrad (Hungary) is presented in his 
article. 35 These two dissident intellectuals theorised on how to break a hegemony as strong as 
the East-Central European states. They both concluded that it was not possible to bring about 
change from within the system, as demonstrated by the Soviet backlash in Hungary in 1956 
and the 1968 Prague Spring. 
30 Editors Alvarado, M. & Thompson, l 0., op. cit., p. 9. 
31 Editors Alvarado, M. & Thompson, J. 0., op. cit., pp. 9 - 10. 
32 Lull, l, Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach, Oxford, Polity Press, 1995, p. 166. 
33 Lull, J. (1995), op. cit., p. 32. 
34 Lull, l (1995), op. cit., p. 7. 
35 Kivikoski, M., "Anti-politics' and Civil Society: Forgotten Ideas in East Central Europe?" in Kangaspuro, M., 
Russia: More Different than Most, Helsinki, Kikimora, 1999, pp. 45 - 70. 
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The best means of bringing about change was thought to be by bringing about ideas of civil 
society and anti-politicisation of society. This could awaken society's consciousness. The 
creation of individualism in a totalitarian society would bring about a contradiction and 
conflict in society, as Eastern Europe during the post-war period was a mass society. 
This conflict, caused by two very different ideologies in the same political space would bring 
about the fall of one or the other. Resulting in a winner take all scenario. Awakening 
individualism in society would have the effect of putting expectations and demands upon the 
state, which could not be fulfilled. The result of this action would be a long-term project. The 
collapse of the Eastern Bloc took some ten years to eventuate, the rot started as far back as the 
early 1980's.36 
Described above, are the two sides of a coin. On the one hand, a competing ideology is able 
to get a message across to an audience effectively, thus initiating change. The flip side is the 
incumbent ideology that failed in its bid to remain as the hegemony. This was caused in part, 
by the ability to communicate effectively with their nation's citizenry. 
Mass-mediated ideologies are strengthened by collaboration on information between various 
agencies such as the government, schools, businesses, religious groups, the military and mass 
media. The result is a reinforcement process of the ideological influence. Society's most 
entrenched and powerful institutions rely on one another as they share an ideological 
foundation. 37 This means that mass media are part of the process of reinforcing an ideology, 
the are not the total sum of the process. 
British sociologist John B. Thompson took the notion that mass media help to serve the 
interests of the incumbent elite further in 1990. Embodied in the theory of media is at ion, he 
argues that; 
"[ ... J instead for a new understanding of how mass media extend the 
availability of symbolic forms in time and space in order to establish and 
sustain relations of domination."38 
36 Kangaspuro, M., Editor, Russia: More Different than Most, Helsinki, Kikimora, 1999, op. cit., pp. 45 - 76. 
37 Lull, J. ( 1995 ), op. cit., p. 33. 
38 Lull, J. ( 1995 ), op. cit., p. 27. 
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Since Putin's ascension to power, there has be less pluralism in the media and a much greater 
level of compliance to the official version. A signal was given to the media via the mention of 
creating a 'single information space.' The re-building of a strong centralised state has been 
matched by attempts to 'educate' the public in topics such as 'culture' and patriotism.' A 
media campaign has been launched in conjunction with initiatives from other sources of 
ideology, such as the Russian Orthodox Church and the schooling system. 
0.5 Jean Baudrillard's Theory of Simulation and Simulacra 
The two concepts, simulation and simulacra are somewhat controversial theories, but ones 
that warrant further scrutiny and investigation. I will begin this sub-chapter by providing a 
definition of these concepts. Then I will attempt to relate various concepts, throughout this 
work, to these concepts.39 
Simulation is the first concept, which I shall attempt to clarify; 
"[ ... ] simulation is the process whereby representations of things come to 
replace the things being represented. In other words, we think that the 
representations are more important than the 'real. "'40 
"[ ... ] a form of illusion, the replacement of the world by its image, so that 
we do not experience things originally but only as a copy of something 
else.,,41 
This means that an idealised image of reality, which mayor may not be a mirror of 'reality.' 
Baudrillard goes further, he states that society has lost touch with reality. Contending that 
society is infatuated with the simulation of reality, as represented by mediums such as TV and 
the Internet. The 'new reality' replaces the 'real reality,' society has come to feel comfortable 
in the artificial reality. An important point is that the new reality is not fake, just an imitation 
of something real. "It is another reality, that has a power and a meaning that is, if anything, 
39 For more on the subject see Baudrillard, J., Simulacra and Simulation, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, 1997, especially pages 79 - 87. 
40 http://carmen.artsci.washington.edu/panop/subject_S.htm, February 12, 2002. 
Also see, Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., Media / Society: Industries, Images and Audiences, Second Edition, 
Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge Press, 2000. 
41 Butler, R., Editor, Jean Baudrillard: The Defence of the Real, London, Sage Publications, 1999, p. 23. 
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greater than the 'real' real."42 
As a result of the above-mentioned reasoning, an important point emerges, concerning the 
very nature of simulation; 
"A model is 'built' by combining features or elements of reality, and an 
event, a structure or future situation is 'played out on' those elements, and 
tactical conclusions are drawn from this with which to operate on reality.,,43 
The above statement does not mean that reality is entirely removed from the process of 
simulation, but the process from which reality may be derived. 
"The aim of simulation is not to do away with reality, but on the contrary to 
realise it, make it real.,,44 
Now for the definition of the concept of simulacra. In this concept the process goes one step 
further than in simulation. 
"Simulacra are copies of things that no longer have an original. Ideas about 
simulacra are part of the post-modem notion of the worlds without origins 
and a world without depth, a world of surface. There is no underlying 
meaning, only an exploration of surfaces."45 
"[ ... J 'simulacra' are reproductions of objects or events [ ... ]."46 
In the circumstance of a harsh or unfamiliar present people may look back to their past with 
nostalgia. French intellectual Jean Baudrillard has argued that it is a fear ofthe future which 
causes an attempt to re-run history.47 A type of cultural re-cycling. 
42 http;/lcarmen.artsci.washington.edulpanop/subject_S.htm, Febmary 12, 2002. 
43 Baudrillard, J., The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures, London, Sage Publications, 1998, p. 126. 
44 Butler, R., Editor, Jean Baudrillard: The Defence of the Real, London, Sage Publications, 1999, p. 23. 
45 http;//carmen.artsci.washington.edu/panop/subject_S.htm, F ebmary 12, 2002. 
46 Kellner, D., Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1989, p. 78. 
47 Stevenson, N., The Transformation of the Media: Globalisatioll, Morality and Ethics, New York, Pearson 
Education Ltd., 1999, p. 121. 
For further reading on Baudrillard see pp. 121 - 122, 
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Baudrillard hypothesises that the constant bombardment of images, which society is 
subjected to, instruct people how to live their lives by the creation of the artificial world. 
Following on from this point, "culture and society become a flux of undifferentiated images 
and signs."48 But, how are these images and signs transmitted? Modem media have provided a 
rapid means of transmission, which Baudrillard has addressed. 
"The nse of broadcast media, especially television, is an important 
constituent of post modernity, for Baudrillard, along with the rapid 
dissemination of signs and simulacra in every realm of social and everyday 
life.,,49 
American academic Byron Hawk has likened Baudrillard's concepts to a concept of the 
German critical theorist Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse's notion of one-dimensionality where "the 
multi-perspectival negating potential of art becomes collapsed into one-dimensional thinking 
is promoted by dominant ideology."50 The simplifying potential of art may make an ideology 
more easily accepted by recipients of the message. Baudrillard drew attention to this facet 
also. 
"All dichotomies between appearance and reality, surface and depth, life and 
art, subject and object, collapse into a functionalised, integrated and self-
reproducing universe of 'simulacra' controlled by 'simulation' models and 
codes."sl 
An effective control over the delivery of the message can have a profound affect on the 
target audience, by blurring the distinction between fact and fiction. Without firm reference 
points, such as values and beliefs, an audience might be easier to manipulate. However, if the 
message suffers from poor and inconsistent delivery, the consequences for the sender of the 
message can be catastrophic. 
Russian media have moved on from the Gorbachev era practice of trying to encourage 
constructive criticism, which went wrong and may have been a significant factor in helping to 
48 www.uta.edu/englishlhawklsemioticslbaud.htm. February 12, 2002. 
49 Kellner, D., op. cit., p. 68. 
50 www.uta.edu/englishlhawklsemioticslbaud.htm. February 12, 2002. 
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collapse the Soviet Union. People lost faith in the system that had begun to criticise itself, a 
process that ultimately transfonned into a destructive process. 
In the contemporary situation, which still has some pluralistic aspects remaining, the media 
are trying to a new reality to life. Ideology and discourse seem to be aimed at rebuilding a 
strong Russian state that is built upon a strong patriotic feeling. The manner in which this 
effort is being directed utilises some old symbolism to convey a message to the public. 
Messages are condensed and simplified to facilitate public consumption. 
The content of the media (pro-Kremlin) has created a positive artificial world, which is what 
the public yearned for after the Yeltsin years of bespredel (order and stability). An example of 
this is the high profile stand taken against the oligarchs by Putin. He made a stand promising 
to distance the oligarchs from power, two high profile cases against Gusinsky and Berezovsky 
were then initiated. This gave the impression that something was being done. But, have any 
genuine major changes been brought about by this limited campaign? 
0.6 Image Theory 
A comprehensive plan of strategy and implementation is needed to cultivate and maintain a 
desired image. The process can be made more difficult if there is no control of media assets or 
the control is tenuous. A set plan of action needs to be adopted from the outset, each stage in 
the over-all plan contributes to the final outcome. 
At the beginning of the exercise of image making, thought needs to be focused on the 
transition from 'Current Image' to 'Target Image.' A question needs to be asked, how close is 
the current image from the target image?52 
A series of cumulative steps are then followed, which progressively serve to guide the 
manufacture of image. 
51 Kellner, D., op. cit., p. 77. 
52 Beach, Lee-Roy, Editor, Image TheOly: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations, Malwah, New Jersey, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998, p. 104. 
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Value Image -------- Trajectory Image -------- Strategic Image 
~ Value Image - decision maker's principles. These serve to guide a decision on plans or 
goals. 
~ Traj ectory Image - decision maker's goal agenda. Represent the hopes for the future and 
what will be achieved. 
~ Strategic Image - plans adopted for achieving the goals and plans adopted during the 
traj ectory phase. 53 
A desired image can be transmitted via the media into a target audience. TV is considered to 
be among the most effective medium available to bring about a change or reinforce an 
existing social convention. But there are limits to the effectiveness of the campaign, namely 
the nature of the audience. 
"Employing media imagery in the routine construction of interpersonal 
discourses of all kinds is a social common use of TV. [ ... ] Media consumers' 
own interests, exercised within the circumstances and venues of reception 
(the endless micro-social contexts), greatly influence how media imagery is 
interpreted and used toO.,,54 
French academic Gabriel Tarde expressed his thoughts on how the media derive their power 
of influence. He stated that "One pen suffices to set off one million tongues [ ... ]" and that 
mass media possess the ability to transport "[ ... ] thought across distance.,,55 
A society'S values can be determined by the experience, collectively and individually. 
Therefore, a society that has experienced hardship or deprivation at the hands of their political 
elite in the past may be more wary or suspicious of TV content, than a society that has not 
experienced such conditions. 
To get the desired image output, a set procedure needs to be adhered to by the message 
sender. In the case of the Russian media, the current dominant sender of messages is the 
53 Beach, Lee-Roy, op. cit., pp. 12 - 13. 
54 Lull,J., op. cit. (1995), p. 61. 
55 Ewen, S., PRJ A Social Hist07Y a/Spin, New York, Basic Books, 1996, p. 69. 
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government. The current administration would appear to want to re-establish a strong Russia. 
This needs to be brought about by well-planned and concise means to avoid 'noise' or 
confusion among the intended recipients of the message. The value image phase seems to be 
running, evidenced by the employment of themes such as patriotism and the pre-eminent role 
of the state. Just how far in achieving the set goals has the process gone now? 
0.7 TV and Power 
Rules form an important part of every society's ability to function. They can be formal or 
informal in nature. That is, rules which are prescribed in a country's regulations and statutes 
or rules, which form a part of social norms (it is understood, by members of a certain society, 
that tasks are performed in a certain way). 
Rules are "explicit codes and implicit understandings that constitute and 
regulate social behaviour. Rules assert what is normal, acceptable, or 
preferred and how social interaction is to be carried OUt.,,56 
From an early age, all members of society are initiated into the world of power play and 
rules. We are taught to respect and obey social institutions - 'the church,' 'the school,' 'the 
army' and 'the law. ,57 Rules can facilitate the smoother functioning of society in two ways; 
• "Rules promote explicit and implicit understandings that inspire patterns of social 
behaviour." In other words it helps in creating a form of identity through a measure of 
uniformity in society's functioning. 
ED "People frequently find rule structures comforting." Rules bring a degree of predictability 
in what is generally an unpredictable world. 58 
However, the use of rules can have a sinister twist as well. "Explicit and implicit rules help 
organise social behaviour by connecting ideology to authority.,,59 Taking the process further, 
"rules simultaneously manifest and reinforce authority.,,6o The authorities to their advantage 
56 Lull, l, Media, Communications, Culture: A Global Approach, Oxford, Polity Press, 1995, p. 191. 
57 Lull, l, op. cit. (1995), p. 57. 
58 Lull, J., op. cit. (1995), p. 54. 
59 Lull, l, op. cit. (1995), p. 61. 
60 Lull, l, op. cit. (1995), p. 54. 
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can use this situation. One ofthe areas in the media where this is occurs is in news production. 
"[ ... J a defining characteristic of news production, namely that news is the 
ultimate bureaucratised meaning-making - that news is simply the outcome 
of a highly routinised process of collecting and processing information, 
where the process is guided by formal rules.,,61 
If a ruling group has the ability and the will, they are able to use the concept of rules to push 
through and legitimise their actions. There are two possible methods of achieving these ends; 
• Rules "are often used to rationalise and invoke authority [ .. .]"62 This sentiment is 
enshrined in the phrase 'because it is the law.' The notion of law, in a western context 
evokes an image of impartiality and fairness. 
e "[ ... J rules are malleable. They can be manipulated to serve the purposes of the issuing 
authorities [ ... ]"63 Governments can make new laws to suit their agenda. If an old law is an 
obstacle, it may be possible to modify or remove the law. 
Taking into account what I have explained concerning law, there is a relationship between 
law and power. Those who own the law have the power to exercise control. Power can be 
observed in numerous forms; 
CD Economic Power - institutionalised in industry and commerce. 
• Political Power - institutionalised in the state apparatus. 
• Coercive Power - Institutionalised in military and paramilitary organisations. 
• Symbolic Power - "the capacity to use symbolic forms [ ... J to intervene in and influence 
the course of action or events.,,64 
A fast and effective medium is needed to transmit a message (ideology) to an audience for 
the realisation of power to occur. Electronic media are among the most efficient transmitters 
of information. The effectiveness stems from "[ ... J the ability of the electronic media to 
61 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 165. 
62 Lull, J., op. cit. (1995), p. 56. 
63 Lull, J., op. cit. (1995), p. 50. 
64 Lull, J., op. cit. ( 1995 ), p. 71. 
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effectively call attention to certain symbols, persons, and ideas.,,65 
One fonn of electronic media has been the focus and attention of those who have sought to 
accumulate political and economic power. TV has often been at the centre of political 
struggles. But, why has there been such an intense battle over the control of TV broadcasting? 
By being able to control TV's content it is possible to enact a measure of discursive 
management. This ties in with the notion that "the more legitimacy rulers have, the less 
coercion they need to employ.,,66 Those who are in power will have three discursive goals; 
e Produce discourses that advance and confinn their interests. 
@I Try to create as much discourse closure as possible by using the power they already 
possess to influence discourse making processes in the direction of closures favouring the 
'perspectives' and 'practices' that benefit themselves and their allies. 
CD Try to regulate discourse shifts so that discursive change favours the interests of the 
already dominant. 67 
The battle seems to have been triggered by some 'unique' attributes of TV, which other 
fonns of communication seem to lack. "TV has the unparalleled ability to expose, dramatise 
and popularise cultural bits and fragments ofinfonnation.,,68 This means that TV is able to 
highlight and promote certain bits ofinfonnation. 
The 'cultural bits and fragments' are not merely randomly selected, but the decision is made 
at a conscious level. "[ ... ] the selected infonnation often congeals to fonn ideological sets that 
over-represent the interests of the powerful and under-represent the interests ofthe others.,,69 
It is possible to deduce from the above-mentioned quote that, rather than challenge the 
incumbent elite, TV is more likely to be engaged in a role of supporting and reinforcing the 
existing ideology. American academics George Gerbner and Larry Ross reached this 
conclusion in 1976. They said with regard to TV, "[ ... ] its chief cultural function is to spread 
65 Lull, J., op. cit. ( 1995 ), p. 9. 
66 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 107. 
67 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 114. 
68 Lull, J.,op. cit. (1995), p. 9. 
69 (1) Ibid. 
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and stabilise social pattems.,,70 
Through the use of a combination of voice and image, TV is able to generate a perceived 
greater credibility than other mediums such as newspapers or radio. The use of a narrator 
while news footage is being shown simultaneously is an effective way of generating the 
senders desired meaning. 
"Accessed voices in TV news can be either empowered or disempowered by 
the connotations produced by the signs of the situation which are present in 
the shot.'m 
An example may be some news footage showing Russian troops performing a task. It is 
possible to derive an inference from this scene, which could project an image of orderly and 
purposeful meaning. 
TV is the interface between a society's public and private lives. It brings the outside world 
into a family's living room. Therefore, TV may become viewed as the medium that connects 
society's two spheres. "The TV medium has a mythic identity as a technology which bridges 
the gap between public and private.,,72 
The importance of TV as a source of information, when compared to other mediums is made 
apparent in surveys. 
"In 1999, the overall audience of the print media was equal to 80% of the 
whole population while the leading medium, TV, got the attention of 95% of 
all Russians, and radio of about 82%."73 
Since the break-up ofthe Soviet Union and the beginnings of private broadcasting, the 
number of TV stations in the Russian Federation has boomed. By 1999, there were 
approximately 800 TV stations in existence. This number can be divided further, into private 
(2) Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 9. 
70 Lull, J., op. cit. (1995), p. 11. 
71 Bignell, J., Media Semiotics: An Introduction, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997, p. 124. 
72 Bignell, J., op. cit., p. 125. 
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and state owned companies. 
® 500 privately owned TV stations. 
® 300 partly or completely state owned TV stations.74 
As this data demonstrates, the state (regional and federal) does not play an insignificant part 
in the TV broadcasting industry. 
0.8 Making the News 
News is an important source, from which society can derive their meaning of events in the 
wider community (regional, state or world community). A lot of the news content is distant 
from most individuals' personal experience. News making and production is a complex 
process, but which is managed in a very methodical manner. Certain routines and steps must 
be carried out in order to achieve the desired end result. 
A news story consists of four main parts; 
• Framing - establishing the topic. 
• Focussing - the event's significance is explained. 
• Realising - story confirmation and the process of authentication. 
• Closing - alternative views are discounted. This process occurs throughout the story.75 
One of the most important tools oflegitimisation in news is the use of photographs. By using 
a photo in a news story, a claim is made regarding the story. Photographs carry a "claim to 
denote reality.,,76 It may be possible to try and defend a story's authenticity by claiming, 'they 
have a photo, so it must be true.' The appearance of truth and reality reside with the concept 
of photographic ('irrefutable') 'evidence.' 
73 Vartanova, E., "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, Russian Media Challenge, Helsinki, Kikimora Publications, 2001, p. 25. 
74 Vartanova, E., "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 41. 
75 Bignell, l, op. cit., pp. 119 - 121. 
76 Bignell, l, op. cit., p. 103. 
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The interpretation of photographs is an important aspect to appreciating the power of the 
application and use of the photo in news items. A key to this power lies in the concept that 
images are influenced by a linguistic code. Pictures are an effective way of influencing and 
triggering memory due to the instantaneous nature of recalled memory. A picture evokes a 
linguistic association. The written word requires decoding by an educated reader. 77 
"[ ... J every photographic image depends on the system oflanguage despite 
the fact that they are made up of iconic and not linguistic signs.,,78 
News items, whether in newspapers, on TV or on the radio are given a ranking or order of 
importance. The news item is not randomly slotted in somewhere because 'it fits.' A 
conscious decision is made to rank news, this indicates to the audience the perceived value of 
a particular story. With regard to TV news; 
"In general, reports with high news value are those which appear near the 
beginning of the bulletin, just as the front pages of newspapers present 
stories with high perceived news value to readers.,,79 
As I stated in chapter 0.7 TV and Power, media tend to support rather than challenge the 
dominant ideology. The news aspect is a component of the wider media industry and can be 
viewed as working toward supporting the incumbent political elite. TV's perceived neutrality 
may make the task of transmitting ideology an easier task. 
"News discourse, even in the apparently 'balanced' and 'objective' context 
of TV news, will use the current dominant ideological myths about society 
as its 'neutral' way of perceiving news events. What is perceived to be 
factual and neutral is a mythic construction determined by the dominant 
ideology. ,,80 
The importance of news is not restricted to solely informing or manipulating the public about 
certain issues. News can be aimed at other target groups, sometimes to establish a type of 
77 Ewen, S., op. cit., p. 152. 
78 Bignell, l, op. cit., p. 102. 
79 Bignell, l, op. cit., p. 114. 
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infonnal dialogue between two or more parties. 
"[ ... J news enables policy makers to send messages to one another: to make 
their programmes known without discussing them directly. The news serves 
as a testing ground for the reactions of others in power.,,81 
Polls, although not always giving an absolutely accurate and full picture of complex 
processes occurring in society, do none the less provide an insight into an instance of time. 
Results that have been derived from Russian polls regarding attitudes toward the media and 
news can be quite confusing and may even appear to be contradictory, although one should 
consider the political orientation and allegiance of the polling agency concerned. The results 
of a May 2002 poll, which was published on www.monitoring.ru was publicised by the 
news agency Interfax. A nationwide poll of 1300 people was conducted. The subject 
concerned the notion of censorship; 57% ofthose polled considered it necessary to impose 
censorship on the Russian media, 35% disagreed and 8% were undecided.82 
Two polls were conducted in the first quarter of 2002 by two different polling agencies, 
which concerned the level of trust in TV news. The polls derived different results from their 
surveys. In February 2002 the polling agency Public Opinion Foundation made results of a 
poll available to the privately owned news agency Inter/ax. A sample of 1500 people from 
rural and urban areas were questioned on their opinions of TV news. The results derived 
showed that, of those polled; 43% believe that news they hear from TV is objective, 39% 
think that it is often biased, 32% consider TV news exhaustive and 56% regard it as 
insufficient. 83 
Then in April 2002 results from an opinion poll that was conducted by the polling agency 
ROMIR were released to the state-owned newsagency ITAR-TASS. There was a different 
orientation and result from this particular poll. The ROMIR poll showed that 63.3% of 
respondents trusted news programmes on the state-owned channels ORT and RTR. The news 
80 Bignell, J., op. cit., p. 128. 
8! Turpin, J., Reinventing the Soviet Self: Media and Social Change in the Former Soviet Union, Westport, 
Connecticut, Praeger, 1995, p. 8. 
82 Majority of Russians Favour Media Censorship - Poll, Interfax, 30 May, 2002. 
Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #6281,31 May, 2002. 
83 Pollsters Say 39% of Russians Think TV News is Often Biased, Interfax, 18 February, 2002. 
JRL #6085, 19 February, 2002. 
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item then went into a bit more detail as to which particular programmes were trusted; 46.8% 
thought that ORT news carried the greatest level of credability, 16.5% thought that RTR news 
was the most credable, NTVrated at 16.2%, Kultura and TV Tsentr rated at 0.5% of trust each. 
4.9% of respondents stated that they trusted no news programmes. 84 As seen from the above 
mentioned results, the outcome can be confusing and can be tied to what message the owner 
or controller of the polling agency and/or media outlet wants to convey to the public. 
0.9 Chapter Summary 
By their very nature, theories are a simplification of reality that is designed to help 
understand and in some cases predicts trends in society. Added to this is the fact that a lot of 
research has been conducted, but most of it has been carried out in the Western world - the 
United States and Western Europe especially. This has left a gap in an adequate theoretical 
understanding of the former Eastern Bloc. A problem further compounded by the complexities 
ofthe region. 
Even during the Soviet era, when the former Eastern Bloc's media systems were given by 
some (such as McQuail) as a uniform functioning theoretical body, certain nuances existed. 
Some countries exercised much more control over the mass media than others. After the 
collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the problem of constructing a useful theoretical tool for the 
region has intensified. Uneven economic and political development through the region during 
this transformatory phase has translated to uneven progression in the field of the mass media. 
Although this thesis relates to the Russian situation, some ofthese problems exist here too. 
The political situation has changed markedly, not only as a result of a change in presidential 
administrations (Yeltsin to Putin), but also within the time that Yeltsin was President. 
Regional differences also exist, some regional governors tend to rule in a very autocratic 
manner and others less so. 
This makes it very difficult to utilise a solitary theory, which will give an acceptable picture 
of the actual situation. The situation in Russia requires a combination of theoretical 
approaches because the Russian media is not entirely similar to the Western one, because of 
84 Majority of Russians Trust State TV News - Poll, ITAR-TASS, 20 April, 2002. 
JRL #6199,21 April, 2002. 
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its hybrid nature that includes the legacy of the Soviet past. Therefore, I have chosen to adopt 
different theories from a range of disciplines, such as political science, sociology and 
communications studies. These theories need to be moulded, so that they can be adapted to the 
Russian context. Additionally, my focus is on media based in the main cities, especially 
Moscow, for the reason of simplicity of empirical material. 
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CHAPTER I: VLADIMIR PUTIN AND THE DEBATE ON THE EMERGENCE OF 
CULT OF PERSONALITY. 
1.0 Chapter Objectives. 
A lot of debate exists as to whether a cult of personality surrounds the Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin. Many have argued that due to the nature of publicity used to portray his 
image that it is clear that a cult of personality does in fact exist. However, publicly at least, 
Putin has tried to distance himself from being seen to publicly endorse some aspects of an 
emerging industry that is built upon producing and selling Putin memorabilia. He has also not 
condemned such actions. 
In order to examine and discern if a cult of personality exists, first a definition and 
explanation of the term needs to be conducted. This will provide the article (and the reader) 
with a neatly defined boundary from which to work. A necessity when dealing with such a 
loaded, emotional and contentious issue and concept. The definition that I will provide will be 
the lynchpin and will act as the framework for the rest of the work. 
A cult of personality can be transformed into a form of ritual. If it becomes ritualised, then a 
measure of 'normality' is associated with the figure at the centre ofthe cult of personality. 
When 'normality' is attained, the system becomes routinised process that can (if successfully 
applied) act as a regulator of society through conscious and/or subconscious control of the 
citizenry. 
After having established a definition for the phenomenon of cult of personality, I shall 
examine its history in the Soviet Union. This is intended to act as a base for comparison 
further in the work. By establishing its nature, through providing practical examples from 
Soviet history I will be better able to judge if cult of personality has been revived in 
contemporary Russia. An emphasis will be placed on a study of Joseph Stalin, as a 
consequence of his importance to the study of cult of personality. 
British academic Christel Lane argued that it was necessary for the Soviet political elite to 
employ mechanisms, such as cult of personality, to 'smooth-over' and disguise the 
inconsistencies in the system. That, had cult of personality not been employed, the Soviet 
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system would be de-legitimised through a break in society's belief that the communist 
ideology worked. 
"[ ... J is continually forced to cover up this discrepancy between ideology 
and reality by structuring the citizens' perception of the later. ,,85 
As I have stated above, Putin has been careful to distance himself from an emerging industry 
that has based itself on selling products that are based upon his claimed personality, charisma 
and the importance of his position as the President of the Russian Federation. There would 
appear to be two distinct phases to Putin's PR campaign so far. The first phase being the 
establishment of a 'public Putin.' A public persona that can be recognised and liked by the 
people. This phase was used during the election campaign, to get Putin into office. 
The second phase of Putin' s PR campaign has already begun. It is aimed at not only 
reinforcing and consolidating his positive image, but to develop the image further. It is a 
continuous process that requires regular renewal, if it is to remain effective. During this phase, 
which is still current, some elements of the past have been revived. Some of these include the 
creation, distribution and sale of portraits of Put in, busts of Put in and pop songs about Putin, 
to name a few. 
Ultimately, this requires the asking of some important questions to clarify the situation, as to 
whether a cult of personality exists around Vladimir Putin or not. What is a concise definition 
of 'cult ofpersonality'? How did 'cult of personality' manifest itself in the Soviet Union? Do 
the present day conditions, under President Vladimir Putin, match the definition and the 
practice of 'cult ofpersonality'? 
1.1 Definition of Cult of Personality. 
'Cult of personality' is a very evocative and emotive term. This provides a necessity to give 
a clear and definitive understanding of this concept from the outset of this work. The absence 
of such could usher a certain confusion through the lack of clarity, which may become evident 
in writing on this contentious issue. 
85 Lane, c., The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case, London, Cambridge University 
Press, 1981, p. 28. 
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The term 'cult of personality' was first used in the USSR at a Communist Party conference in 
1956. It was initially used to "denote and explain away the style of government exercised by 
Stalin, but of wider application."86 
Author Frank Bealey agrees with the origins of the term as a "term used by Khrushchev to 
describe the exaggerated idolatry of Joseph Stalin during his time in power (1923 - 1953)."87 
But, how does the 'cult of personality' manifest itself? What are the 'symptoms' and 
signs displayed by this phenomenon? Many explanations have been offered and some 
common threads exist. 
At its most basic level, 'cult of personality' can be described as "the attribution of 
superhuman powers and wisdom to an individual."s8 Other definitions can be more detailed, 
but still contain the basic elements listed in this brief definition. 
A Dictionary of Political Thought's analysis of the cult of personality phenomenon offers a 
good definition. 
"It seems to refer to the concentration of political power and authority in a 
person, rather than in the office which he occupies, accompanied by an 
enforced adulation of that person on the part of ordinary citizens, and 
massive propaganda designed to display his superhuman virtues."s9 
Another view of how cult of personality manifests itself is described in a very vivid and 
emotional manner. 
"In posters, paintings literature and through the media the Soviet dictator 
received sickening praise. [ ... ] It was revived, though not to the same 
degree, under Brezhnev (1964 - 82)."90 
86 Scruton, R., A Dictionmy of Political Thought, 2nd Edition, London, MacMillan Press, 1996, p. 121. 
87 Bealey, F., The Blackwell Dictionmy of Political Science, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 93. 
88 Laird, B. A. & Laird, R. D., A Soviet Lexicon: Important Concepts, Terms and Phrases, Lexington, Lexington 
Books, 1988, p. 53. 
89 Scruton, R., op. cit., p. 121. 
90 Bealey, F., op. cit., 1999, p. 93. 
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Israeli academic (former Soviet academic) and author of Manipulation of a 
Language: Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms, Ilya Zemtsov gives a more 'colourful' 
interpretation of 'cult of personality,' in addition to the standard concept of building 
an image through the use of media (newspapers, film and literature). Although the 
following extract pertains to Stalin, Zemtsov does not restrict this definition solely to 
Stalin, but to the entire Soviet leadership up to the time of publication (1984). It is 
Zemtsov's contention that the Soviet regime requires 'cult of personality' as a means 
of gaining legitimacy for their rule. 91 
"The cult of Stalin's personality was regulated by a code of minutely 
defined rituals, and the authorities insisted on their observance. Public 
buildings, parks, highways and town squares were decorated with portraits 
of 'the father of the peoples.' Party conferences and plenums commenced 
and concluded with salutations to Stalin and pledges of love, loyalty, and 
respect for him.,,92 
By breaking down the basic and consistent elements of these definitions, it is possible to 
derive a single definition that incorporates the essence of what is explained above. Taking into 
account the prior mentioned conditions, my definition of 'cult of personality' from a sender's 
perspective is as follows; an enforced system that bestows extraordinary human powers, 
knowledge and intellect of a single leader that is supported (and disseminated) via a massive 
propaganda campaign, which is designed to convey and reinforce the given positive attributes 
of the individual. 
The term, as outlined earlier, was introduced by Khrushchev to describe Stalin's rule. It 
should be understood that this was a period of 'de-Stalinisation.' Therefore the term carries 
with it a negative connotation. Cult of personality, as a concept is meant to convey and 
express the excesses of Stalin's rule, explained as a deviant departure from 'true' socialism. 
So, cult of personality can be described, in terms of its existence as being 'abnormal' and 
deviant. 
91 Zemtsov, L, Manipulation of a Language: Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms, Fairfax, Hero Books, 1984, 
p.73. 
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1.2 Cult of Personality in the Soviet Union. 
The system of cult of personality is an important element in a method of control. It was one 
ofthe tools that were used to motivate and' guide' the masses. Christel Lane described the 
role of ritual in the Soviet Union, as compared with the West. 
"In Soviet society cultural management in general and ritual in particular are 
much more important as a means to maintain social control than they are in 
Western society."93 
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, after whom the term 'cult of personality' is named, managed to 
successfully convey an image, which was disseminated by using a mixture of techniques that 
included methods of free will and force. Different media techniques, during the pre-electronic 
media age were used to propagate the desired image. These techniques are described in the 
book Stalin and Stalinism. 
"The war raised Stalin's stature to new heights; afterwards he basked in the 
reflected glory of military success. The years which separate 1945 from his 
death on 5 March 1953 saw the cult of his personality reach astounding 
heights. He became the true charismatic leader. There was always an air of 
mystery about him. [ ... J Stalin was also sparing in his public appearances. 
In a pre-television era most citizens knew him only from newspaper 
photographs. The films in which he appeared presented him in heroic 
colours with no sign of the pockmarks on his face. Like many short 
men - he was only about 1.6 metres in height - he was acutely conscious of 
the fact, and portraits and films give the deliberate impression of a taller 
man.,,94 
Stalin was careful to cultivate an image that gave the impression of his being at one with the 
people. He ensured that positive attributes were cultivated to the full potential. Stalin, who 
described writers as the "engineer of the soul", displayed an acute awareness of the power of 
92 ZemtSQV, 1., op. cit., p. 72. 
93 Lane, c., op. cit., p. 28. 
94 McCauley, M., Stalin and Stalinism, 2nd edition, New York, Longman, 1996, p. 63. 
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pen.95 When opportunities were presented, the publicity was soon seized upon. An example of 
this was the Second World War, he played on the symbolism and imagery of a soldier after 
hostilities broke with Nazi Germany. Stalin was rarely seen out of uniform in the public. 
Images of War outlines how the process began, "he began to address the masses as their 
military rather than political leader. [ ... J Stalin, who had never fought a battle in his life, 
became synonymous with Soviet military might.,,96 Stalin's new image, as embodied in the 
idea of a soldier was transferred to him because of the public's association of the soldierly 
appearance. This was to have a flow-on effect, by bestowing other virtues on Stalin. 
"On 24 June, 1945 a victory parade was held in Red Square to celebrate the end of the 
'Great Patriotic War' in Europe. Stalin was acclaimed a 'Hero of the Soviet Union,' the man 
who alone won the war for Communism and the Soviet Union.,,97 Through the use ofa 
mixture of visual cues (army uniform), Stalin was able to manufacture an image of prowess 
and power. Attributes were attached to him, traits that he may not necessarily have possessed 
at all. The important point is that these attributes existed in the memory of the Soviet people. 
Nowhere is it the 'cult of personality' issue of the Stalin period more evident than in the 
writings of the period. The following extract is taken from Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography 
by G. F. Alexandrov. 
"Stalin is a brilliant leader and teacher of the Party, the great strategist ofthe 
Socialist Revolution, military commander, the guide of the Soviet State. An 
implacable attitude towards the enemies of Socialism, profound fidelity to 
principle, a combination of clear revolutionary perspective and clarity of 
purpose with extraordinary firmness and persistence in the pursuit of aims, 
wise and practical leadership, and intimate contact with the masses - such 
are the characteristic features of Stalin's style. After Lenin, no other leader 
in the world has been called upon to direct such vast masses of workers and 
peasants. He has a unique faculty for generalising the constructive 
revolutionary experience of the masses, for seizing upon and developing 
95 McCauley, M., op. cit., p. 63. 
96 Groman, J., Editor, Images of War, The Warlords: Profiles o/Power, London, Marshall Cavendish, 1989, 
p.40. 
97 Groman, J., op. cit., p. 41. 
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their initiative, for learning from the masses as well as teaching them, and 
for leading them forward to victory. [ ... J Stalin is the worthy continuer of 
the cause of Lenin, or, as it is said in the Party, Stalin is the Lenin of 
today."98 
Lane believes that the Soviet Union was 'susceptible' to the 'cult of personality' 
phenomenon, which stems from its history. Stalin had progressed to be the most advanced 
case of cult of personality in the Soviet Union and depending on the political orientation of 
the literature read, Lenin and Brezhnev (to a lesser extent) can be added to this list. But, Lane 
still maintains that there was ample potential for another cult of personality to rise. 
"Soviet political culture [ ... J is distinguished by an acceptance of a strong 
central power and the belief in its infallibility. Such a culture is, of course, 
fertile soil for the development of a renewed leader cult.,,99 
Leonid Ilych Brezhnev became the Soviet Union's general-secretary in 1966 and remained 
there until November 1982. During the Second World War he had served as a political 
commissar, rising to the rank of major genera1. During his tenure in office, Brezhnev 
attempted to cultivate an image of himself, which consisted of many different facets. He 
lauded himself as the great fighter for peace, a great theorist and Leninist and a hero of Soviet 
culture.100 The intended over-all picture was of a great, energetic and learned man. 
By May 1970, Brezhnev had managed to secure his position of power. This was reflected by 
images disseminated by the Soviet propaganda machine. His photo appeared in newspapers 
almost everyday, he was quoted in scientific and theoretical journals and his portraits were 
bigger than anyone else's.101 
The following are a selection of books, which Brezhnev has credited to his name; 
411 Following Lenin's Course 
411 Malaya Zemlya (part 1 of memoirs) 
98 McCauley, M., op. cit., pp. 115 - 116. Taken from Alexandrov, G.F., et aI., Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography, 
Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1947, pp. 198 - 201. 
99 Lane, C., op. cit., p. 220. 
100 http://homepage.tinet.ie/~manics/MSPedia!Brezhnev.htm, February 5, 2003. 
III Rebirth (part 2 of memoirs) 
III Virgin Lands (part 3 of memoirs) 
III Memories 
III Moldavian Spring 
III Space October 
III Word About Communists. 102 
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In May 1976 Brezhnev 'became a marshal of the Soviet Union. The highest Soviet military 
rank has been held by only Communist Party chairmen Brezhnev and Stalin. Further public 
accolades were heaped upon his burgeoning collection in 1979, when he received the Lenin 
prize for literature (which was later re-called).I03 These public prizes and offices were 
designed to demonstrate in a very public manner and to legitimise Brezhnev's rule, as the 
Soviet Union's leader. 
Brezhnev received a multitude of awards in his lifetime for many different tasks or 
accomplishments he performed or was credited with performing. To give an idea of some of 
these various recognitions, I have illustrated some of these below. 
III April 1961: made Hero of Socialist Labour for his contribution to development of 
rocketry and for guaranteeing the success of Gagarin's space flight. 
III May 1965: for his wartime service is awarded Hero of Soviet Union. 
lit December 1966: for 60th birthday is awarded Hero of Soviet Union medal. 
III 1968: for bravery in war is awarded Order of Lenin with Gold Star and the title Hero 
of the Soviet Union. 
III July 1973: granted Lenin Prize for 'The Promotion of Peace Among Nations.' 
III November 1975: F. Joliot-Curie Gold Medalfor Peace. 
• December 1981: B. Karmal of Afghanistan awards Brezhnev with Sun of Freedom 
medal. 
• December 1981: to mark his 75th birthday is given Order of Lenin and Gold Star -
Hero of the Soviet Union medal. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary and 
Romania also award medals to Brezhnev. 
101 www.anet.netl~upstali/brezhnev.html. February 5, 2003. 
102lbid. 
103 http://homepage.tinet.ie/~manics/MSPediaiBrezhnev.htm, February 5, 2003. 
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~ May 1982: receives medal In Memory of the 1500lh Anniversary of Kiev. 
• May 1982: Vietnam's Lee Zuan gives Brezlmev Order of Ho Chi Minh. 104 
To mark his 75 th birthday, Brezlmev celebrated the occasion with much pomp and ceremony. 
This included a film that showed presents and tributes flowing from all over the Soviet Union, 
to their leader. 105 Modesty or at least the appearance of it, did not seem to agree with 
Brezlmev. Stalin used to publicly not approve of the personality cult, which surrounded him. 
Possibly, this may have been an attempt to try and display the modesty trait, which seems to 
be valued by Russians. 
However, as with Stalin, upon his death the public image of Brezlmev was unravelled by his 
successors. During the annual party congress in mid-1988 Gorbachev criticised the cult of 
Brezlmev. After his posthumous fall from grace, Brezlmev's name was removed from a city at 
the request of its citizens, also from the names from streets, squares and public buildings.106 
These events display some similarity with the de-Stalinisation process that was initiated by 
Khrushchev after Stalin's death. 
1.3 Does a 'Cult of Putin' Really Exist? 
Professionals have carefully nurtured Vladimir Putin's public image in the PR business. 
There have been very few lapses, which contradict the carefully manufactured image. In 1996, 
prior to Putin's rapid rise to prominence, he was an unemployed city official from st. 
Petersburg. Through contacts he was able to initiate a series of events, which would lead him 
to several high-ranking government service jobs in the Kremlin's bureaucratic apparatus. His 
patron was the Kremlin's Director of the Office of the Administration, Pavel Borodin. 107 
Putin rose rapidly through the ran1es of the civil service, culminating in his appointment as 
the director of the FSB in 1998 (the FSB-Federal Security Service is the successor of the 
KGB). After Yeltsin had selected Putin to be his eventual successor, a flurry of activity was 
aimed at building a suitable image for the heir apparent. His earlier career in the KGB and low 
public profile gave the PR people a 'blank canvas' on which to create the desired image. In 
104 www.anet.netl-upstartlbrezhnev.html. February 5, 2003. 
105 Vasilyev, Y., "Putin is Interesting, Yeltsin is not", Moscow News, October 9,2002. 
JRL #6483, October 10, 2002. 
106 http://homepage.tinetie/-manicsIMSPediafBrezhnev.htm, February 5, 2003. 
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the following, I will discuss how this was realised. 
Work on Putin's identity has now entered a new and more mature phase. It is not so much 
about creating identity, but about reinforcing positive traits. New mechanisms and mediums 
are being employed in this process, including some means that were used during the Soviet 
period. Some of these mediums include the production of paraphernalia such as portraits of 
Putin, busts of Put in and pop songs about Putin to name a few. Putin however, has 
consistently played a public distance between condoning this emerging 'Putin culture 
industry,' he has also not condemned such activities. 
An important question to be considered in light of events that are transpiring is 'does a cult 
of Putin really exist or is what we are seeing merely an extension of the apparent Russian 
tradition of displaying adulation toward the nation's leader?' 
1.3.1 Creating Putin. 
Although Putin had been chosen by Yeltsin to succeed him, a distance between the two 
politicians needed to be established. Yeltsin had negative connotations associated with his 
public persona, which presented a problem. He needed to offer a candidate, which appeared to 
be the opposite of what he appeared to be, ifhe was to be successful in having his candidate 
accepted by the public on voting day. 
Putin set out to establish himself as a young, vital and energetic man of action by opening a 
campaign against the breakaway republic Chechnya. But this was only one ofthe personal 
traits, which were sought to be created. The following are some of the means used by Putin to 
establish his credentials in the eyes of the voting pUblic. 
iii Putin travelled widely around Russia-tried to distance himself from a Moscow centric 
approach. The all-inclusive approach brings the meaning that everyone matters, from the 
biggest city to the smallest village. 
iii He rode in Moscow's suburban trains and chatted with commuters-this act establishes 
the premise that Putin is able to relate to the 'ordinary' man in the street. 
iii He was the dinner guest of an ordinary Kazan family--once again demonstrating his close 
107 Putin, V., First Person, London, Hutchinson, 2000, p. 125. 
proximity to the problems of ordinary Russians that he is able to understand and 
empathise with the populace and is not above them. 
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III He met with women at a textile factory in Ivanovo-in this move Putin appears to 
demonstrate that he values the female constituency as well by attempting to court women 
voters (something which Yeltsin never did). 
III He spent a night on a nuclear submarine and flew in a military jet over Chechnya-these 
actions were to demonstrate Putin's ability to be an effective Commander-in-Chief, by 
virtue of the fact that he has spent time with 'his' men on 'dangerous' military duties. 108 
Putin's creation of self-image is fraught with possible dangers, but the power of his creation 
of selflies in what this self represents. "Selfhood [ ... J is a chronically unstable productivity 
brought situationally-not invariably-to some form of imaginary order, to some purpose, as 
realised in the course of culturally patterned interactions.,,109 That is to say, that Putin's 'new' 
image needs to be constantly reinforced and must evolve in a society if the message is to 
remain effective. An image cannot be created and then left to its own devices, because the 
message design will ultimately fail. In a time of great upheaval, during the last of Y eltsin' s 
period of bespredel, Putin came to be represented as stability, law and order. This is what the 
public appeared to demand. 
1.3.2 Creating an 'Acceptable' Public Personality. 
The PR strategy has been aimed at showing Putin as an honest and apolitical political figure. 
This strategy was stepped up during the election campaign. Putin's image 'minders' wanted to 
show that he was not an ordinary politician, but an honest person who cares deeply about 
Russia. During the presidential race, Putin never actually issued a programme. Instead he 
published an open letter to voters that outlined Russia's problems. The open letter offered no 
concrete solutions, only a promise to tackle the problems and to restore Russia's former 
greatness. 110 
News often showed favourable coverage of Put in, surrounded by supporters. A positive spin 
was also put on his refusal to participate in televised debates. Putin was promoted as Russia's 
108 Brown, A., Editor, Contempormy Russian Politics: A Reader, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, 
p.l72. 
109 Battaglia, B., Editor, Rhetorics of Self-Making, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1995, p. 2. 
110 Brown, A., op. cit., p. 172. 
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new face, while depicting his opponents as relics of the Yeltsin era. This was in spite ofthe 
fact that Putin was Yeltsin's handpicked successor. A majority of news coverage was devoted 
to following Putin. The positive spin could be maintained in site of the saturation coverage, 
because Putin only gave interviews to sympathetic reporters. III 
Putin faced relatively few risks of adverse pUblicity in his carefully managed PR campaign. 
He was never 'exposed' to 'hostile' reporters, never put in an unpredictable environment 
(such as a televised political debate) and generally was able to choose the time and place of 
his interviews. This situation was able to secure Putin with a guaranteed outcome, prior to any 
interview. Putin was able to maintain a moral ascendancy over the interviewer, which 
promoted the appearance of a strong leader. 
By refusing to be drawn into a conventional campaign Putin was possibly able to distance 
himself in the public psyche from the largely discredited politicians. Additionally, by stating 
the obvious with regard to Russia's problems, he displayed an empathy and greater 
understanding of the average public feeling by putting into words what few if any politicians 
would dare say. Ifhe had promised various measures and they failed, Putin would have been 
held to account personally, by the public. This way ensured that there was nothing of 
substance he could be held to account for, he merely mouthed public sentiment and 
aspirations. Putin won the March 2000 presidential elections in the first round. The next 
presidential elections are due sometime in 2004. 
1.3.3 Reinforcing the Image. 
During Putin's term in office so far, numerous opinion polls have been conducted 
concerning President and his leadership. A portion of these polls relates to Putin's popUlarity 
rating as Russia's leader. The majority of the polls give Putin high ratings, as much as 
between 70 - 80% approval ratings. A possible effect of these polls would be to reinforce an 
image in the public's mind that Putin is a very popular leader, without regard to how the polls 
deduced their statistics. The newspaper Novye Izvestia raised the above issues well on 
November 28,2001 in the article Putin 's Rating Needs Verification. 112 
III Brown, A., op. cit., p. 332. 
112 Nadzharkov, Alexander, Putin 's Rating Needs Verification, Novye Izvestia, November 28,2001. 
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On the whole Putin's public image has not faced a serious challenge to the created 
perception. The sole exception to this occurred when the Kursk incident was initially 
mishandled, when Putin did not immediately break from his holiday. The Presidential Press 
Service, who normally looks after the President's PR needs, was absent on this occasion. The 
Kursk sank on August 12,2000, this was in the middle of a series of political repositioning 
and consolidation as a result of a change in power (Putin succeeding Yeltsin). There was a lot 
of jostling occurring in political circles, ambitious politicians seeking the new President's 
favour and patronage and the opposition repositioning themselves. 
On August 8, 2000 a metro underpass at Pushkin Square was bombed. Putin was also in the 
midst of bringing 'rogue' oligarchs to heel, Vladimir Gusinsky of Media-Most and Boris 
Berezovsky of Logovaz. This was being done to ensure governmental control of television 
broadcasting (channels with nation wide coverage). These distractions permitted a brief 
breakdown in the otherwise a well-managed public image ofthe President. The break was 
brief and therefore no permanent damage to Putin's public image seems to have occurred at 
the time. 
A more broad-based effort is now underway to create and cultivate a desired image. Some 
measure of control has been secured over the mass media through a mixture of legislation and 
intimidation (such as the raids on Media-Most in May 2000). One of the means used to 
reinforce an idealised image of Put in is through a proliferation of biographies. Among the first 
of these was First Person, by Vladimir Putin. This book portrays a very 'correct' picture of an 
'ordinary man' who is devoted to his family and Russia. 1 13 
Former military journalist Oleg Blotsky (working in the propaganda section) has undertaken 
a trilogy with the blessing of Vladimir Putin (Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the presidential aide 
acted as the go-between). 114 Blotsky's volumes to date include, Vladimir Putin: A Life History 
(volume 1) and Vladimir Putin: A Rise to Power (volume 2). This series of biographies 
appears to be aimed at manufacturing a very serene, modest and sincere portrait of the Putins. 
JRL #5569, November 28, 2001. 
113 See Putin, V., First Person, London, Hutchinson, 2000. 
114 Book About Life of Putin to be Released Soon, Interfax, January 16, 2002. 
JRL #6027, January 17, 2002. 
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Vladimir Putin: A Life HistOlY goes as far back as the 18th century and up to the point where 
Putinjoined the KGB. The book is written as a collection of memories from Putin's friends 
and acquaintances, as well as extensive interviews with Putin himself. Putin's friends and 
acquaintances offer only the warmest descriptions and praise of the President. Only Putin 
retains his characteristic trait of humility, a key aspect to his public persona. I IS 
This first book of the trilogy portrays Putin as fearless, steel-willed, hospitable, altruistic, 
very resilient, warm and unpretentious. The book asserts that Putin has lost none ofthese 
traits upon assuming the Russian presidency. Vladimir Putin: A Life History is written in easy 
to understand Russian and has been compared to the anecdotal stories of the good deeds of 
Lenin. Blotsky has defended his book by stating "I do not think it is a eulogy. I simply 
conveyed what people (who met Putin) said.,,116 Descriptions of the books layout and style 
would seem to suggest that it is a product intended for a broad, potential mass audience. 
Oleg Blotsky's Vladimir Putin: A Rise to Power details Putin's life from 1975, when he 
joined the KGB, until his ascent to the presidency on December 31, 1999. He has hinted that 
the third book will not be ready until at least mid-2003. This volume is intended to cover 
Putin's accomplishments as the President ofthe Russian Federation.l17 
Vladimir Putin: A Rise to Power relies on the monologues of Lyudmila Putina and pictures 
the President as a hard-working, reliable man, but devoid of emotional warmth and feeling. 
However, Lyudmila Putina's tone is not one of complaining at her circumstance. It has been 
postulated that as a result of the excessive praise of the first volume, the second volume is 
intended to give the impression of adding some measure ofbalance.1l8 Certainly, if the public 
perceive the works to be too one-sided they may not pay much attention to the books. If 
however, the appearance of partiality is managed, then the literature may be considered as 
having more credence. 
Putin's PR image has managed to have an effect on at least the female section of society, 
Sergei Yastrzhembsky was President Yeltsin's Press Secretary and has managed to maintain his position of 
influence and power in the Putin administration. 
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where he has some kind of appeal them. Writer and commentator on women's issues, Maria 
Arbatova makes the assertion that; 
"Putin is widely popular among Russian women and is considered [to be] a 
typical European man.,,119 
Television talk-show moderator Yelena Khanga agrees and says that Blotsky's portrayal of 
Putin runs contrary to the popular public perception of his image. 
"A lot of women see him as the perfect man. He does not smoke. He does 
not drink. He is in good physical condition. [ ... ] Russian women love him 
because they want someone reliable and strong. We are sick and tired of 
guys who have to be taken care of as if they were another baby in the 
family.,,120 
From the statements of the two above-mentioned commentators, it would seem that the 
image-makers have succeeded in disseminating the message to at least some of the public. 
The strong image that has been offered to society would appear to be the 'correct' choice, as it 
has generated a positive impression of Put in in the minds of Russian women. This implies 
some measure of growing competence in the abilities of the state-run PR apparatus. 
An anti-thesis to the official oriented versions appeared in Moscow on December 25,2001. 
The book featuring the Putin family, Piquant Friendship was written by Irene Pietsch. She 
was an acquaintance of Lyudmila Putina, beginning when Vladimir Putin was stationed in 
Germany. Several Russian newspapers refused to publish any excerpts from the book. This is 
most likely due to some unflattering criticism levelled at the President. Most of the criticism 
seems to refer to chauvinistic and boorish behaviour displayed towards Lyudmila Putina. 121 
By October 2002, according to historian Roy Medvedev there were approximately nine 
books published in Russia about Putin. Books about Putin have also been published in a 
119 Williams, C. l, Book Details the Unenviable Life of Mrs. V. Putin, Los Angeles Times, September 16,2002. 
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foreign language abroad including; Two in Chinese, with as many in French and German. 122 
As Medvedev points out, Putin may seem to be more interesting than other Russian 
politicians. This may stem from his 'mysterious' and obscure background, such as his service 
in the KGB. The books on Putin may be filling the public's demand to know more about their 
President. 
Currently, literature about Putin would appear to be more aimed at perpetuating a myth 
through instilling a concept, image or belief in the public psyche. The St. Petersburg branch of 
Yedinstvo produced an 'ABC' book. This book tells first year school children about Vova 
Putin's youth. According to the article Putin Cult Touches New High, there are similarities 
between this book and the way that Soviet school children had the stories of the young Vova 
Ulyanov (Lenin) recounted to them. 123 
Putin, as a man of action and understanding for the people have been stressed in the Russian 
media. This was demonstrated by an opportunity, which presented itself to the Kremlin's PR 
machine in May 2001. The Siberian town of Lensk was under threat of flood due to ice that 
blocked the Lena river. The ice plug was bombed by three Sukhoi SU-24 fighter-bombers, 
apparently on Putin's orders. 124 Putin merely utilised an pUblicity opportunity that presented 
itself, as would most politicians in a similar circumstance. 
TV, which is considered to be the most effective medium in terms of the ability to influence 
an audience has been employed in the task of reinforcing Putin's image to the public. On June 
11,2001 the state-owned channel RTR ran a documentary on Putin, it showed him dwelling 
on state business and talked about his vision for Russia. The documentary coincided with the 
10th anniversary of the Russian declaration of sovereignty (from the Soviet Union). 125 This act 
could be construed as being highly symbolic, possibly to try and distance any associations or 
ties with the Soviet Union, thereby reinforcing the perception of a 'true' Russian patriot. 
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The programme was one hour long and offered a mostly positive perspective of the 
President. During the documentary Putin stated that he would only run for a second term of 
office ifhe had proved to the nation that he deserved it. A 'down-to-earth' portrayal of Put in 
was offered through a selection of documented scenarios. Some of these scenarios are listed 
below. 
@ Footage of Put in in March 2000, on the verge of winning the presidential race. 
@! Visiting a former schoolteacher at her apartment. They are shown chatting and 
laughing, he then hugs his former teacher and her husband before leaving. 
ID Putin shown in the back of his limousine returning from the Kremlin, regretting that he 
would like to stop for a beer but could not. Because it would cause crowds to gather 
and result in traffic chaos. 
@ Showed Putin weighing (75 kg) himself after taking a swim at a pool at his residence 
outside Moscow. 126 
These images are combined to build a positive profile of Vladimir Putin. Many 
characteristics can be derived from analysing the meaning of these scenes. The scenes were 
not randomly chosen, but were designed to create a character that the Russian public can learn 
to like. By showing Putin chatting with his former teacher, at her home, it is meant to convey 
that Putin does care about the ordinary person and is not 'afraid' to be seen with them. Taking 
this concept further, it means that Putin can relate to and empathise with the ordinary 'man on 
the street.' Many Russian politicians have the reputation as being out of touch with those who 
they are meant to represent. 
When Putin is shown lamenting his dilemma over his desire to stop for a beer and the social 
consequences of doing so, several traits can be deduced from this particular setting. By 
thinking about wanting a beer Putin is shown to be human, just like everyone else. People are 
better able to identify with someone who is able to think like them. His decision not to stop 
due to the possible traffic chaos conveys the image of social responsibility. The reason given 
for not stopping is meant to reflect Putin's 'selfless' (collective) desire not to inflict problems 
or inconvenience upon road users. 
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The last image that I would like to analyse is when he is weighed. During the period ofthe 
Soviet Union physical fitness was an important concept, so much so that it was a compulsory 
subject at university ( and still was when I attended Russian University of Friendship 
Peoples). Putin is shown to be exercising and to be in good physical condition. In this 
capacity, he is acting in the capacity of a good role model for society to imitate. This may well 
revolve around the concept of a strong body equals a strong mind. 
Of the two state owned, national channels (TV 1 and RTR) it is significant that RTR was 
chosen to air the documentary. RTR is the more trusted of the two channels and this has been 
reflected by past government actions and policy. For instance, in August 2000, RTR was the 
only state-run media organisation that was trusted enough to be allowed close to the events of 
the Kursk disaster. Additionally, the new structuring of state-owned media organisations and 
assets gives a disproportionate level of responsibility and power to RTR. 
Putin's 50th birthday provided an opportunity for a media display. Celebrations and tributes 
poured into the President from around the Russian Federation. Various items were covered by 
the media, which included cards being sent by school children to youth groups singing 
admiring hymns to Putin. Gifts were also included in the media coverage, a crystal crocodile 
from Moldova, a slow-growing Siberian pine tree from Tomsk and promises of a reproduction 
of the Tsarist crown from the Urals region.127 
Some interesting aspects are being displayed in the type of gifts and celebrations that marked 
Putin's 50th birthday. There is nothing new in respect to the cards and hymns, these would 
appear to be more 'traditional' means of the Russian public to demonstrate to their leader 
respect and aclmowledgement. However, some of the gifts, especially the promise of 
reproducing the Tsarist crown would appear to demonstrate an emerging Imperial discourse 
and notions that are connected to Russia's leader. 
A St. Petersburg based film director, Igor Shadkhan also 'celebrated' Putin's 50th birthday by 
completing a TV film about the President. The film is called Vladimir Putin: A Conversation 
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in the Evening, screened on RTR on October 6,2002 (Putin's birthday). 128 This news story 
was told inITAR-TASS, the state-owned news agency. The news item conveyed the 
impression that the President had not changed at all upon being elected Russia's leader. An 
implication that can be derived from this suggestion is that Putin is not a man who is 
corrupted by power. Therefore he is able to remain above the level, which many Russian 
politicians can sink to. 
1.3.4 Putin's Initial Public Profile: A Summary. 
Putin's initial lack of public profile may have been a contributing factor to Yeltsin 
nominating him as his successor. None of the negative connotations, which plagued many of 
the more experienced politicians, were associated with Putin. As an unknown factor the PR 
specialists were better able to create a political figure that would appeal to the public. 
The government had control of the media and therefore possessed the means to create and 
transmit their desired ideal image. Yeltsin ensured that the full resources of the government 
supported Putin. His impending retirement from political office would leave him in a 
vulnerable position if a 'non-friendly' politician would win the presidential election. 
In stark contrast to Y eltsin' s public image of ill health, lethargy, inaction and chaos, Putin 
was given the chance (with large-scale state media presence on hand) to be portrayed as 
energetic, youthful, brave and a dedicated family man. The numerous favourable qualities 
associated with Putin through his widely covered actions showed a man who was determined, 
patriotic and willing to restore Russia's and the Russians' place in the world. 
Through a mixture of legal manoeuvring and intimidation, high profile opposition media 
were pacified. This reduced the availability and access to alternative information (to the 
government's view) in Russian society. The use of opinion polls has supplemented the 
Kremlin's PR strategy by creating the appearance of topics of public debate and consensus 
reached on the issues discussed. 
Lastly, the illusions of the PR generated idealised public image of Put in are being reinforced 
128 Russian Film About Putin Completed in Time for Leader's 50,h Birthday, ITAR-TASS, October 1, 2002. 
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through the use ofliterature. Rapid successions of politically correct biographies on the Putin 
family have appeared. These books have been produced under strict supervision and offer a 
mostly positive and glowing view of Russia's First Family. The appearance of book literature 
may be an attempt to add greater credence to Putin's ascribed personal qualities by using a 
more respected and traditional means of conveying the message. 
1.3.5 Putin: The Passionate Lover of Literature. 
As Putin as consolidated his position as head of the Russian state, media have set out to 
strengthen an image of the President in society. The humanistic values that have been 
attributed to Putin include what appears to be some long-held tradition values, in addition to 
some of the more modem traits that were mentioned earlier in the work (during the 
presidential election campaign). Some of these traditional values have also been utilised by 
Soviet leaders, such as Stalin and Brezhnev. 
One of the important value that acts as a measure of cultural sophistication is the love and 
appreciation of literature, especially classical literature. In 2002 Putin signed a decree On 
Publishing a Great Russian Encyclopaedia. Yuri Osipov, President of the Russian Academy 
of Science and chair for the scientific and editorial council, which will be responsible for the 
publication confirmed this. He stated that the council had been "instructed systematically to 
inform Putin about the preparation of the encyclopaedia for publication. ,,129 
IfPutin's intentions are genuine, then this may be a move to increase the level of public 
lmowledge. More cynical views may include, that this will be an extension of the 'Patriotic 
Programme' and designed to offer an sanitised and official view. Another motive may be, by 
associating himself with the publication of a scientific work, such as an encyclopaedia, Putin 
may be trying to project a more educated aspect of himself to the Russian pUblic. 
An upbeat story appeared in the state-run news agency ITAR-TASS in January 2003, on the 
theme of what Russians like to give their leaders as New Year presents. The article began by 
quoting Soviet writer Maksim Gorky, "a book is the best present of all." ITAR-TASS then 
went into detail over the depth and breadth of literature that has been gifted to the President. 
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Nataliya Gavrilenko, a Deputy Chief of the Presidential Library Operations Department 
explained that 1500 books that were given and are kept in the Kremlin's library mainly cover 
history, law, economics and fiction. And that the themes of books ranged widely. 130 
On the surface, this article, from a Kremlin controlled media source, is attempting to paint a 
picture of a sophisticated President who likes literature. The emphasis of the story on the 
diversity of the literature is possibly an attempt to convey the idea that Putin is a complex man 
of wide and varied interests. The theme on the use of literature has the appearance of being 
used in a complementary fashion with Putin's physical attributes (decisive, man of action, 
etc.). This man be used as a balance, a decisive man of action could be construed as being 
impulsive and reckless. But, if it lmown that Putin reads (or is associated with reading) a wide 
variety of literature, then he could be considered to be learned. And learned people, 
theoretically, should not be prone to making incorrect and impUlsive decisions. 
The reading ofliterature, can add other attributes too. Certain types ofliterature can convey 
an image, such as mystique, sensitivity and intelligence. Even Olbik's thriller utilises the 
imagery offered by association with literature. In The President Putin is described as reading 
"Roman stoic poet Seneca" when he is "in between killing Chechens.,,131 An almost 
'romantic' notion indeed. 
1.3.6 Putin For Sale: The Industry Dealing in Putin Paraphernalia. 
A varied industry has become established, selling Putin souvenirs and paraphernalia. This 
industry, which may seem strange to many observers, established itself soon after Putin's 
election victory. First and foremost, this section is intended to bring to the reader's attention 
some of the different items that have been and will be produced. I will not be making any 
moral judgements myself, but will raise some of the arguments that have emerged during the 
public debate surrounding the issue of Put in and a cult of personality. 
Popular items of Put in memorabilia include photographs of the Russian President. Colour 
photos come in numerous sizes throughout the country. The social and political culture of the 
130 Putin Gets Books as New Year Presents Most Often, ITAR-TASS, January 2, 2003. JRL #7003, January 3, 
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state bureaucracy is such that it has once again become 'important' to have a portrait of the 
President on the wall and/or desk of government officials. 132 During the Soviet era, 
government officials did likewise with portraits of the Soviet leader. 
A project, whose fate I do not know, was to produce 25cm bronze sculptures with a likeness 
to Putin. By May 2001 a plaster model of the sculpture was completed and Yedinstvo (Unity 
party) officials from St. Petersburg were seeking a sponsor to fund this project. If they are 
successful, Putin will be the first Russian leader after Stalin to have his bust cast in bronze 
during his lifetime.133 Possibly connected with this story, news of a metals factory in the Urals 
that had begun producing Putin busts surfaced in the media in May 200 1.134 Putin's aides 
intervened on one occasion to stop the proposed bustS. 135 
The following are a summary of some of the other items of Put in memorabilia available for 
purchase in the Russian Federation. 
• A local handicrafts factory located at Chelyabinsk, Siberia produced a pocket watch 
with a portrait of Putin on its face. 
III Yedinstvo party officials from St. Petersburg developed a new game called President 
the Patriot, a president's joker helps the red patriots defeat the white enemies. 136 
411 Villages, where Putin has made pit-stops, offer guided tours around these sites.137 
III Calendars and Easter eggs with Putin portraits. 138 
III An enterprise in Tajikistan produces carpets with Putin's profile, in various sizes. 139 
• Nikolai Yegorov from Chelyabinsk wants to have his frost-resistant tomatoes patented 
under the name Vova Putin tomatoes, but officials hesitant. 
411 Putin lollipop and Putin ice-cream. 140 
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These products do not necessarily reflect government intention or policy to institute a cult of 
personality that is centred on Putin. Much ofthe activity seems to stem from the initiatives of 
business people of local officials. As the Deputy Head of the Russian Government Staffput it 
in an interview with RIA -Novosti, "[ ... ] industry produces anything for which there is a 
demand.,,141 
1.3.7 Cultural Putin: Art and Culture Dedicated to Putin. 
For the purposes of this work, my definition of art and culture and the inclusion of examples, 
will be somewhat broad. In addition to the more usually associated facets, such as music and 
theatre, other more unusual examples will be added. Some additional examples to be included 
will be religion, places and people. 
Some ofthe seemingly bizarre acts of adoration directed at the President or in Putin's name 
have included: 
III At a contest in St. Petersburg, a tattoo portrait of Put in won a special prize for 
patriotism. 
CD Siberian farmers have named a collective farm after Putin. 
III An orthodox priest from the Krasnodar region is building a 'Putin temple.' 142 
4& Ingushetia, a village named a street in Putin's honour in October 2002. The 
President ofIngushetia was the former head of the FSB in the republic and was 
supported by the Kremlin in 2002, during the elections there. 143 
III An opera composed by Vitaliy Okorokov in Saratov, titled Monica in the Kremlin. 
The opera, which is yet to be produced, will feature Putin's private life. 144 
III A plague was erected by a businessman, at the site to commemorate the occasion 
when Putin planted a maple tree some years previously. 
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Ell In the town of Mytishchi (near Moscow) a local newspaper published a poem called 
Beloved President, the poem promised that so long Putin was in office "worldwide 
glory awaits Russia. ,,145 
Ell Pop song Just Like Putin sung by all-girl band Singing Together. 146 
Ell In the Union o/Creativity art gallery in Moscow, an exhibition entitled Our Putin 
ran from January 29 - February 12,2001. 147 
The above-mentioned exhibition stirred some controversy during its brief period of display. 
A total of nine portraits of Put in were on display, showing him in various poses. 
411 Vladimir Putin shown standing beneath a Kremlin tower. The picture of Put in is 
described as "strangely majestic" and he is seen to be "surveying his empire." 
411 In another, Putin is shown staring into the choppy waters of the ocean. In this pose he 
is depicted as a defender of the motherland. He is wearing a submariner's hat and has a 
pair of binoculars in his hands. 148 
An artist at the exhibition, Fyodor Dubrovin rationalised the decision to open the 'Our Putin' 
exhibition. 
"In any society there should be a cult of positive personality [ ... ] Why not 
promote this image? People are trying to be like him. He is a role model.,,149 
Dubrokin's statement would seem to indicate that the exhibition was conceptualised on the 
basis of higher principles. His reference to a 'cult of positive personality' bears a remarkable 
similarity to the role of the Soviet media, whose role was to guide and motivate the populace 
by suggesting models for imitation and models for avoidance. However, journalist Peter 
Baker suggests that the motives for the exhibition were not set upon high political principles. 
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He suggests that it was a publicity gimmick, one that got the gallery on the front page of one 
of Moscow's largest newspapers and boosted attendance by as much as 20%.150 
The probable arrival of a new thriller novel, President written by Latvian author Aleksandr 
Olbik, for the Russian market hit the news headlines in July 2002. President is a story, which 
depicts Putin as a version of a 'James Bond' character, who is "personally hunting down and 
assassinating Chechen rebel leaders while doing his bit for world peace.,,151 
In describing his novel, Olbik draws upon much of what Putin's image-makers having being 
trying to convey to the Russian public. He also plays on the sense of community or belonging 
and the fear of enemies of Russia, which in the contemporary context means terrorists. 
"What I wrote is a literary version of events that could have occurred [ ... J 
The former Soviet Union has not had a political leader like Putin for a long 
time. Russia needs a strong leader because we have strong enemies.,,152 
The book offers various explanations and accounts of Put in's activities. For instance, his 
unpopular decision not to immediately leave his holiday retreat in Sochi and take control of 
the Kursk crisis in August 2000. Olbik's book suggests that Putin was challenged to a 
personal duel by Shamil (reference to Shamil Basayev the Chechen rebel leader who was 
reportedly killed by the FSB). As a result Putin travelled to Chechnya and because ofthis 
encounter between the two of them was wounded, therefore unable to console the families of 
the crew of the Kursk. 153 
Russian media have criticised Olbik for the glowing depiction of the thriller's hero. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow's biggest selling daily, is one of the media organisations 
that have criticised Olbik. In face of this criticism, Olbik has maintained that the thriller was 
not initiated on the request of the President. 154 Olbik later admitted to an underlying motive 
for the title and character of his book. "If! had named 'the hero' Petrov or Ivanov, nobody 
would read it." The book had to be published in Ukraine because of official objections in 
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Russia. J55 Ultimately, it would seem that the use of Put in's name, in this instance is a decision 
based on economics rather than politics and was based on the initiative ofthe author. 
The pop song Just Like Putin blanketed Russian airwaves for some time after the song was 
released by the all-girl band Singing Together. Below is a translation of the song by journalist 
Lenard Leeds. 
Just Like Putin 
"My boyfriend is such a jerk, Ijust can not stand him 
Some kind of drugs he always must be shooting 
He is history, I am surely going to dump him 
And then I will find a real man just like Putin 
CHORUS 
(Just Like Putin) ifhe is half that man 
(Just Like Putin) he will be sober and 
(Just Like Putin) he won't diss me or 
(Just Like Putin) ever run away no more 
I saw him on TV news, talking all alone 
He said the world's at risk, he is rootin' -tootin' 
He would be funny at a party, sweet at home 
And now I will find a real man just like Putin 
CHORUS 156 
Singing Together is also going to re-record the song in both English and Spanish according 
to the song's composer Kiril Kalashnikov. He has also hinted on tackling social issues in 
Russia, such as the high incidence of abortion. 157 Kalashnikov would appear to be using an 
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attention grabbing theme to launch Singing Together into the commercial world and he 
intends to keep in the news through broaching sensitive societal issues. 
1.3.8 Putin's Heritage. 
Blotsky's biography on Putin, Vladimir Putin: Life Story, is written in a manner that is not 
uncommon to tactics used by past leaders in Russia. It is a tactic about legitimisation of a 
leaders position through recounting their heritage. If the leader's bloodlines or associations 
can be traced back to someone of stature and significance, this is used to add of the perception 
of rightful succession. Vladimir Putin: Life Story comes with a complete genealogical tree, 
which is traced back to the beginning ofthe 18th century. This aspect has been deemed 
important enough for Blotsky to dedicate a chapter to Putin's ancestors.158 
In July 2002 Pravda published the first of its articles on the genelogy of the Putin family. 
The article stressed the closeness of Put in's ancestors to Russian royalty. "The President's 
ancestors belonged to the relatives of the first tsars - the Romanovs.,,159 Pravda's story then 
goes on to describe the hardship faced by Putin's ancestors, by events such as the Lithuanian 
invasion of the 17th century. 
Later in 2002, in November, Pravda wrote another story that raised the prospect of Put in 
having royal blood. Firstly, the physical similarity between Vladimir Putin and Prince Mikhail 
Tverskoy is discussed. This may be intended to plant the idea in the readers' head, that a 
blood tie may exist between Putin and royalty. A catchy agenda-setting opening to the article, 
which could subconsciously plant the notion. An examination of the name Putin then follows. 
According to the article the illegitimate offspring of noble families were often granted 
shortened names. In this particular example, a clan of Princes from the Tver region, whose 
name was Putyanin was used. Their claim to fame was then detailed. 
"This clan gave Russia many outstanding military leaders, as well as artists, 
politicians, and priests. This is one of the oldest clans in Russian history. If 
September 4, 2002. 
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President Putin is a descendant of the Putyanin clan, this means that 
Vladimir Putin is related to nearly all the royal families of Europe.,,160 
By all appearances, this article seems to be an attempt at legitimising Putin's position as 
Russia's ruler. It gives a notion of links with the Imperial past, thereby creating the image of a 
'natural' right of succession. Pravda is not the only media organisation to use a royal tie, in 
October 2002 the Moscow News published an article that compared Putin to Tsar Alexander 
III. The article concludes that Putin has many attributes ofthe Tsar, but is an improvement 
upon him. 161 The above mentioned article would appear to be trying to achieve the goals of 
Pravda, but attempting the result through a different method. 
1.4 'Moving Together' - The Rise of the So-Called Putin Jugend. 
From the outset of its conception, Idushchiye Vmeste (Moving Together) seems to have been 
created with the aim of re-establishing the phenomena of a mass organisation. The 
individuality of members appears to be stripped away and replaced by a collective culture, 
which is directed toward serving the State and its interests. As such, its function could be to 
serve as an organiser, motivator and guide of the masses (Russian youth in this particular 
case). The organisation's slogan is "to be the best.,,162 The Kremlin has denied the existence of 
any formal links between itself and Idushchiye Vmeste. 
Idushchiye Vmeste was created by Vasily Yakimenko in mid-2000. Yakimenko left his 
position as overseer of state-run charities in May 2000, for this purpose. 163 The youth 
organisation is openly pro-Kremlin, Yakimenko has stated that Idushchiye Vmeste wants "to 
create a new generation to help the President bring Russia out of crisis." Deputy head of the 
presidential administration, Vladislav Surkov, adds official weight and backing ofthis 'youth 
organisation' as its patron. 164 Idushchiye Vmeste's website claims that their membership 
stands at some 100,000 from Russia's entirety, of which some 80% are classed as students. 165 
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Idushchiye Vmeste claims to be pro-President and not pro-Putin. Yakimenko has stated that 
the organisation is run by young people, funded by company sponsorship and not controlled 
by the presidential administration. He said that they would continue to support Putin and the 
presidential administration "for as long as they want what we want for Russia."166 However, 
some public statements have cast some doubt over this claim. "A year ago today our 
organisation was started. The organisation was set up by Putin. Therefore, we call this day 
Day of Putin, in short." (Unidentified boyY67 
Yakimenko has made no secret of his attitude toward Putin. He has, as outlined previously, 
denied any intention of trying to create a personality cult or having 'blind' loyalty to Putin. A 
statement that he made to media in May 2001 does provide an indication of his closeness to 
the Russian President. "He is the only person who can consolidate society and drag Russia out 
ofthe moral swamp it is in right now.,,168 
Other junior members of Idushchiye Vmeste have made comments to this effect more 
recently. On November 7,2002 the organisation held an 'action' celebrating Moscow's 
liberation from the Polish invaders in 1612. Several thousand members were present, 
including Pavel Tarakanov, a Moscow student who openly announced his support for Putin. 
"This victory represents the Russian Federation's glorious fighting spirit. 
[ ... J We like Putin as a person. Nobody makes fun of him, like they did 
about every Russian leader since Stalin. Putin is not ajoke.,,169 
Tarakanov's words would appear to be underlining the processes of several new trends 
currently occurring in Russian society. The mention of the' glorious fighting spirit,' which is 
indicative of the increasing militarisation of society. Tied with this notion is the selective use 
of history to generate pride and patriotism. In hand with the historical theme is the process of 
psychological 'normalisation' of the Stalin era. Stalin who was previously denounced by most 
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Soviet leaders after his death in 1953, is to some extent being 'rehabilitated' as an example of 
a strong leader. Putin's strong attributes are emphasised in this brief quote, which may 
indicate that either the 'correct' answer is being given or that the significant amount of 
resources that have been invested in shaping Putin's image are beginning to bear fruit. 
The rewriting of Russian history is in line with some of Put in's statements on the 'patriotism 
programme,' which among other objectives sets out to 'right' the 'errors.' An action, which 
was called 'For the Last Time' was held on October 22,2002 near Lenin's Mausoleum to 
coincide with the 85th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's work Advicefrom a Stranger. 
The organisers of Idushchiye Vmeste were going to publish at least 100, 000 copies of a 
brochure that cited figures of victims of the 1918 - 22 Russian Civil War, the smuggling of 
gold from Russia and lists of writers, philosophers and scientists who had to leave Russia. 
Yakimenko said that "these real figures taken from historical literature will help young people 
realise Lenin's true role in this country's history.,,17o 
An odd mixture of old and new ideology are present, creating an organisation of a somewhat 
hybrid nature. Idushchiye Vmeste as previously mentioned, is pro-Putin, official government 
policy is alleged to be pro-Western in orientation. However, some xenophobic tendencies 
have been surfacing. Although, no overly negative statements concerning the organisations 
stance on Western Europe, the same can not be said for statements regarding the United 
States. Yakimenko was quoted as saying that American culture was "an absolute evil, devoid 
ofthe important components like spirituality and awareness of its own ethnic nature."17! 
A statement from Idushchiye Vmeste's leader on the May 8, 2001 rally gave an indication of 
the depth ofthe organisation's rejection of Western values, in favour of embracing Russian 
culture. He also stressed the important role that Russian history has and probably will 
continue to have on shaping 'desirable' values in society. 
"[ ... J Russia's youth had finally turned their face toward Russia, and you-
know-what toward the West. [ ... J all Western nonsense is being shoved 
aside and youth understand that what is most important today are not 
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Western values, but preserving the system of relations handed down to us by 
our own history.,,172 
Idushchiye Vmeste has also displayed a strong affinity with the Russian Orthodox Church. 
Yakimenko has issued strongly supportive public statements regarding the role of the Church 
in providing Russian people with a good moral basis. The Orthodox Church is a conservative 
organisation, which also displays a distinct suspicion and dislike for things foreign. 
"[ ... ] the last organisation sincerely and systematically concerned with 
issues of moral upbringing of young people. [ ... ] The Russian Orthodox 
Church is striving to restore and preserve morality and cultural values. We 
are co-operating with the Russian Orthodox Church.,,173 
November 2000 was the first public appearance (rallies and other activities are referred to by 
the organisation as 'actions') ofIdushchiye Vmeste, in which members celebrated Putin's 
presidency. During the rally, the crowd numbering in the thousands, gathered near the 
Kremlin, wearing t-shirts emblazoned with Putin's face and speaking of their love for the 
President. 174 This stance was in stark contrast to the apparently nonchalant beginnings of the 
organisation, which seemed to want at least the appearance of distance between Idushchiye 
Vmeste and President Putin. 
On May 8,2001 Idushchiye Vmeste rallied in Moscow to commemorate the first anniversary 
of Put in's swearing in ceremony. An estimated crowd of 10,000 youths from all over Russia 
participated. They were seen wearing t-shirts with Putin's head and chanted "Putin, Putin.,,175 
Membership of the organisation is 'sold' mainly to the 14 - 30 year old age group. 176 This 
may be partly due to the belief, by the political establishment, of the existence of a 'lost' 
generation of Russian youth. The director of the All-Russian Centrefor the Study of Public 
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Opinion, Yuri Levada emphasised the apolitical and 'corrupt' nature of contemporary Russian 
youth in an interview. He feels that youth lack any higher moral goals, commitments or ethics. 
"They have no concept about any long-lasting values in life. [ ... J We never 
had politicised youth. All our political upheavals of the past 10 - 15 years 
took place without the participation of young people. The active people 
were those aged 40 and above. Russia's youth are resolutely apolitical and 
appear content to support President Vladimir Putin.,,177 
Although Russian youth hold a generally positive image about Putin and 'support' him. This 
support is not manifested as anything tangible. Jeremy Bransten conducted interviews with 
several young Russians for the article Russia: Nation's Youth are Apolitical and Materialistic, 
which seem to back this contention. One interviewee, Veronika (aged 17) gave a response that 
was fairly typical of those who were interviewed. 
"I watch the (TV) news fairly often, I read the papers, but I don't have any 
special opinion about the President for the moment. Politics is not my 
hobby. For the moment, it doesn't interest me." 
"As a person he appeals to me, as a man he appeals to me. You know, he 
looks like a trustworthy person. He's always well groomed, he looks great. 
And as regards politics, I'm not interested in politics in general." Irina (24) 
on Putin. l78 
Idushchiye Vmeste would appear to be an attempt to mobilise, politicise and utilise Russia's 
youth in achieving politically motivated social objectives. Without a politically engaged youth 
now, Russia in 30 - 40 years in the future could well face a political crisis. Any gains toward 
a strong and centralised state in the immediate future could possibly be lost to political 
indifference, if the current trend is to continue. 
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The organisation's members are rewarded for their participation in 'actions.' Various 
incentives are offered to the participants, which hints at the problem faced by the organisers of 
Idushchiye Vmeste in generating self-initiated participation by youth. A news item on TV6, 
from Moscow gave viewers an indication of some of the benefits that were on offer. Other 
offers have also been documented by other media organisations. 
411 "For this action we were given free cinema tickets." (Unidentified boy) 
411 "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin finds sponsors, as it were, to organise, for instance, 
cruises for us, or holidays in the resorts. We were there a week ago, for instance. We 
go to swimming pools, we go to gyms, we enrich our inner lives, we go to concerts, all 
this is absolutely free." (Unidentified boyy79 
CD On May 8, 2001 Kommersant published an article, where a member of Idushchiye 
Vmeste claimed she was guaranteed ten hours of Internet access per month, two movie 
tickets per week, access to a swimming pool once a week, promises of free aerobics 
classes and foreign language instruction. 180 
A vigorous recruitment campaign has been initiated by Idushchiye Vmeste, which rewards 
existing members who are successful in bringing in new members. Idushchiye Vmeste is 
organised along military lines, members are divided into groups of five called Red stars, 
which are led by aforeman. Theforeman receives a free pager and £30 for their services. 
Each of the five soldiers receive £ 1 and free t-shirts. l8l Existing members are also enticed to 
encourage others to join through the use of granting of higher rank and other rewards. 
"Once you have a red star, try to persuade another fifty to join. Give them a 
party if they show interest in the group. You must be able to encourage and 
to punish, then you will become a commander of a division. If you persuade 
another thousand to put their fate in your hands, you will be a 
co-ordinator. ,,182 
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The organisation is very regimented and guided by an expansive set of rules and guidelines 
for the members. Some of the compulsory cultural commitments of members include such 
deeds as; 
~ Reading at least six Russian classics a year. 
1& Visiting the site of a battle, where the Russians were the victors. 183 
@ Listening to Classical Russian music. 
~ Involvement in charity work with veterans and orphans. 184 
49 No swearing, drugs or drunkenness. 
e Emphasis on patriotism and physical fitness. 
e Respect you elders.18s 
Idushchiye Vmeste has taken on the task of acting as literary and cultural censors in Russia, 
on their own accord. In this instance, I will use the case of attempting to influence the 
consumption of literature to illustrate my point. Yakimenko has already stated his intention to 
"purify Russian literature.,,186 The aims of the organisation in this respect seem to be two-feild. 
Firstly to discourage the production, distribution and consumption of modem 'liberal' books. 
A second aim is to encourage books that offer a more 'positive' view of Russian life and 
history. 
The second aim is tied to the first possible objective, to rid Russia of 'corrupting' modem 
'liberal' books. Idushchiye Vmeste has been printing thousands of copies of books of the Red 
Army's victories during the Second World War. These books were offered, free of charge, in 
exchange for the 'corrupting' literature. This enterprise is expensive, but appears to be 
secretly financed by two companies with close connections to the Kremlin and the Moscow 
City Counci1. 187 
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One of the targets of Idushchiye Vmeste is postmodernist writer Vladimir Sorokin. The 
group were able to influence prosecutors in filing charges against Sorokin on July 11,2002. 
Charges faced by the writer are based on allegations of disseminating pornography. Goluboye 
Salo (Blue Lard), a 1999 novel written by Sorokin is the source of the controversy. The 
masculine form of the Russian word for blue is also a slang term for homosexuals. Passages in 
the book, among other things, depict sexual acts between the clones of Stalin and 
Khrushchev. 188 This action has started a debate that has centred on allegations that there is a 
general tendency in culture to make it more controlled. 
In addition to targeting Sorokin, Ad Margin em the Russian publisher and anyone who sells 
the book is subject to investigation. If convicted, Sorokin could face up to two years in prison. 
Idushchiye Vmeste engaged in an 'action' against Sorokin in Moscow in June 2002. The 
group put on rubber gloves and destroyed copies of Sorokin's books, throwing them into a 
large mock toilet bowl. According to Aleksandr Ivanov, director of Ad Marginem the 
publicity and controversy caused by Idushchiye Vmeste's actions has quadrupled the sales of 
Sorokin's books. 189 Idushchiye Vmeste had also published excerpts from Goluboye Salo and 
other works of Sorokin, then set fire to them near the Bolshoi Theatre. 190 
In contrast to the quick actions of the police and prosecutors in initiating legal proceedings 
against Sorokin, a complaint made by Sorokin and his publishing house accusing Idushchiye 
Vmeste of infringing the copyright law. This complaint was dismissed by a Moscow District 
court. 191 
The 'front men' of the book exchange are usually smartly presented teenagers and young 
adults. Anthologies of Russian classics, called Russian Legacy, are exchanged for the works 
of modern writers, whom the group claims are trading in cynicism and despair. Mikhail 
Myasoyedov, a supervisor of the Idushchiye Vmeste group stationed at Pushkin Square 
justified the organisations actions. 
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"I think this lack of spirituality is the basis for all other problems around us. 
It causes the general degradation of culture and morals."l92 
Idushchiye Vmeste's founder, Yakimenko has also stated his favouring restrictions being 
placed on the sale of "dark and explicit fiction because it rots the psychological health of the 
people living in this country."193 Such emotive and idealistic rhetoric seems to be an integral 
part of the organisation's communication strategy with its members and the pUblic. Other 
'actions' have also been undertaken, which among other things have included; 
e Letter writing campaign again TV6's reality TV programme Behind the Glass, due to 
alleged explicit sexuality and the depiction of slack youth. 
e 'General Cleaning of Russia,' where members took up brooms and swept the streets of 
50 Russian cities. 194 
Schools have also been the target of the group's attention. They established, what have 
been described as 'military style check-points' and established 24-hour patrols. This was 
designed to enforce drug-free zones in schools. 195 The above-mentioned community service 
programme (such as the 'General Cleaning of Russia' action) has strong similarities with the 
Soviet era subbotnik phenomena. 
Idushchiye Vmeste have been vocal in various public debates, including a debate revolving 
around the issue of alternative military service. Their path has also been determined by the 
traditional values and concepts that are held. The group has publicly taken the stance that has 
been adopted by the government with its policy of patriotic education, coupled with a 
perceivably increased level of militarisation of society. They would appear to believe that 
serving in the armed forces will instil a set of good values and moral code. 
In an apparent reaction to the activities of Idushchiye Vmeste, a bomb was detonated in the 
Moscow Office of the organisation on September 11,2002. An explosive device equivalent to 
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350 - 400 grams of TNT was detonated at 01:00 hours.l96 The timing of the explosion seems 
to suggest that no casualties were intended by this act. 
Other youth organisations than Idushchiye Vmeste exist in the Russian Federation. Among 
these organisations are The Pioneers, an organisation that has been resurrected from the 
Soviet past. The Pioneers used to be a nation-wide organisation during the days of the Soviet 
Union, a society that included most of the nation's children aged from 10 - 14 years. 
However, this organisation almost totally collapsed along with the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Although several scout like groups became established, an exact organisation had not re-
emerged. 197 
However, The Pioneers was kept alive by a dedicated core of organisers. The Pioneers is still 
under the wing of the Communist Party, but a less politicised organisation. Some members of 
the Communist Party believe the organisation to be on the road to recovery. Communist Party 
leader, Gennady Zyuganov claims that there are approximately 60,000 pioneers in Russia. 
The Pioneers met in Red Square to mark the 80th birthday of the organisation, where potential 
members were inducted into the rights and ceremonies. This included visiting Lenin's 
Mausoleum and tying red neckerchiefs around their necks. 198 
In spite of some similarities with the Communist past, such as the rituals that were described 
above and the retention of their slogan "always ready," there are some breaks with the past. 
They no longer have the duty to build communism or fight for the cause of the working class. 
Their new societal duties include such tasks as standing up for the motherland, goodness and 
justice. 199 These new tasks have a remarkable similarity to the goals and aspirations of 
Idushchiye Vmeste. 
Sofia Ruzina (88) who was a delegate at the first Congress of Pioneers in 1929 and was 
present at the Red Square ceremony, stated her past and present philosophy. 
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"Pioneers organisation wi11live. Now everyone thinks only about where to 
get money. Meanwhile we were fighting for good causes. [ ... ] was taught to 
fight for peace, bread, the revival of industry and the liquidation of 
illiteracy. ,,200 
The seemingly contradictory task of trying to shape the future by looking at the past, through 
examining history is important. Idushchiye Vmeste also shares this concept and its important 
status. The Pioneers use tales from events such as the Second World War (The Great Patriotic 
War) to give their members a sense of both pride and belonging, to their motherland. 
As with Idushchiye Vmeste, the theme of defending the motherland against an enemy is an 
important ethos of the organisation. A pioneer from the Moscow Region, Misha Pavlov (11) 
stated that a young pioneer's main goal is to defend the motherland from the enemy. Nastya 
Donnik (11) and Biana Karasonova (12) agreed with this priority. They added that terrorists 
were the 'enemy' and they planned a look out. When they were asked what a terrorist looked 
like they answered; 
"Anyone strange or suspicious, or unknown could be a terrorist. [ ... ] dark 
haired people from the Caucasus, like Armenians [ ... ] terrorists are just bad 
people regardless of their nationality."20I 
This statement exemplifies some ofthe prejudices in Russian society, concerning the 'other.' 
People from the Caucasus have been the target of this prejudice and are often referred to in 
everyday street language as 'blacks.' The terrorist is emerging as the new 'enemy of the 
people' in the contemporary environment. Putin has used fear of the terrorist to gain political 
support, this has been helped by having readily identifiable terrorists from the Caucasus 
regIOn. 
Other youth organisations have also been further developed after Putin's election victory in 
March 2000. Soyuzmol held its fist congress concerning a union between other organisations 
and Walking Together on October 29,2001, the birthday of the Soviet youth organisation 
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Komsomol. As with Walking Together, Soyuzmol is concerned with building a bridge between 
the state and Russian youth. To illustrate this point I will quote one of their slogans. 
"Civic, patriotic and personal responsibility of each member to the union. 
Soyuzmol believes its aim is to consolidate young people and to conduct a 
dialogue with the state.,,202 
Soyuzmol has been influenced somewhat by its predecessor Komsomol, this has been 
reflected in rhetoric from the organisation. During the three-day congress, officials made a 
statement to the effect that the positive experience of Komsomol should be further developed. 
This statement received applause from the audience.203 
The subject of this October 2001 congress was the notion of a union, which would unite 
some 200 public organisations and would bring a membership of 500, 000 under one roof. 
Putin had already voiced his support for such a union.204 Such a move would streamline 
control over this vast and varied array of organisations, brining them under a form of 
centralised control would allow for better deployment and use of their activities. Additionally, 
those activities would also be a lot more easily screened. 
1.5 Chapter Summary. 
Two of the questions asked in the Introduction have now been answered in the course of this 
work. A working definition of cult of personality has been derived and the nature of cult of 
personality in a practical application was discussed, with reference to the Soviet period. 
However, the last question still remains. Do the present conditions, under Vladimir Putin, 
match the definition and the practice of cult of personality? 
Although certain aspects of cult of personality would seem to be manifesting themselves in 
Putin's Russia, this does not necessarily equate to the existence of a 'classic' case of this 
phenomena. In short, my answer has to be no. It is for the following reasons that I do not 
believe that a true cult of personality exists in contemporary Russia. 
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Putin has attempted to publicly distance himself from the appearance of trying to create or 
endorse the formation of a cult of personality around him. In 2002 he told journalists that 
limits should be placed on the growing trend of naming things after him.205 This may in part, 
possibly demonstrate that there is some reluctance on the part of Put in in allowing an 
unchecked growth of 'Putin-mania.' 
Other reasons are possibly behind and driving the expansion of the 'Putin culture' industry. 
Senior lecturer in contemporary Russian politics and society at the London School of Slavonic 
and East European Studies, Peter Duncan has suggested that the emerging trends may be 
interpreted as an emerge cult of personality, but warns about reading too much into it. 
"I agree that it looks like a classic personality cult of the sort that Stalin or 
the later [Leonid] Brezhnev had. But really, Russia has changed an awful lot 
since that time. And the state does not any longer have the capacity to 
organise that sort of personality cult, in the way that it could in the past. 
Russia is not a totalitarian society anymore. And the state, if anything, is 
weak.,,206 
Deputy editor of the Moscow newspaper Novye Izvestia, Otto Latsis has speculated that 
Putin is not 'controlling' the current 'Putin-mania,' external factors are at play. He proposes 
different people, from businessmen to local politicians wish to gain an advantage from Putin's 
popularity and are simply jumping on the bandwagon. 
"There is not a personality cult. [Putin] can be criticised. He does not react 
much to criticism, but we do have that option. The fact that there are some 
toadies who want to praise him - that is their initiative.,,207 
Historian Roy Medvedev also excludes the possibility of the existence of a personality cult 
and proposes that other factors are at play, creating the perception of the creation of a 
personality cult. 
205Bransten, J., Russia: From Pop Songs to Vegetables, Is a Putin Personality Cult Emerging?, RFE/RL, 
September 9, 2002. www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/09/09/, February 5,2003. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
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"A personality cult is a more complex notion, half-religious in nature. Its 
first symptom is when all criticism is being banned. We do not have it yet. 
There is gratitude to Putin, maybe even love for him among some social 
groups. There is also an element of grovelling in it. However, it would be 
wrong to speak of a personality cult. ,,208 
On occasion, Putin or those who represent him have intervened to stop excessive examples 
of 'Putin-mania.' He has stated his wish that "I would ask them neither to write books about 
nor cast busts of me." But added, that he is for the most part, powerless to stop much of this 
activity?09 The Russian constitution, provided that it is conducted within the given guidelines, 
allows for freedom of speech and expression. This may, to some extent bind Putin in a 
dilemma. He too, must act within the law and not be seen to be overly inhibiting the rights of 
citizens who wish to go about legal business or activity. 
Another possible reason for all ofthe fuss around Putin may be found in a lack of identity 
and public disillusion. At breakneck speed the Soviet Union disintegrated from a nation of 
superpower status, disintegrated into the current form of post-Soviet states, which are 
suffering unprecedented economic and social hardship (as far as its current citizens are 
concerned). This has resulted in a desire for law, order and strength. Andrei Ryabov, an 
analyst with the Carnegie Centre in Moscow describes this sentiment. 
"People are beginning to look not for the previous system of values but the 
symbols of the previous system because these symbols in their minds are 
associated with a good age [ ... ] They are very tired from 10 years of 
revolution. They are waiting for a new era of calm."210 
Political analyst Aleksandr Tsypko offers a similar view on the crisis of ideology and 
values, which is currently besetting Russia. 
208 Russian Analysts See no Personality Cult Trend in Street Being Named After Putil1, BBC Monitoring, Elcho 
Moskvi News Agency, October 9,2002. JRL #6486, October 11,2002. 
209 Baker, P., Putin 011 a Pedestal: 'A Cult of Positive Personality', Washington Post, February 12,2001. 
JRL #5088, February 12,2001. 
2\0 Ibid. 
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"This is no personality cult. This is a latent passion for extolment coming 
from the grassroots. This is a wish to associate all one's hopes for the future 
with one person. It indicates that after the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
modem Russia has found itself in a difficult situation from the moral and 
ideological points ofview.,,21l 
Putin has understood and appreciated this public desire. And as a perceptive politician has 
build an image that appeals to these ideals. His image-makers seem to have succeeded in 
transmitting the 'correct' picture to the Russian public. From this point of view, it could be 
argued that this displays good political intuition and practice rather than the specific goal of 
creating a cult of personality. To use the adage, no news is bad news and even bad news is 
goodnews. 
During his public appearances Putin has consistently denied creating a personality cult and 
has been seen to be a little awkward and modest about the attention. He has stressed that it is 
'work as usual' and that gifts that he has received as head of state will remain state property. 
This is in contrast to Yeltsin' s actions during his term in office.212 
The process of tributes and accolades devoted to the President seems to be driven or 
propelled as a bottom-up process rather than a process that has been initiated and guided as a 
top-down system. Many of the many, often bizarre forms of what could be construed as 
adulation are brought about on the initiative of businessmen or officials and have not been 
started on the orders or request of Put in. 
A culture of offering flattery to Russia's leaders has existed for a long time. This may be 
one of the aspects that is plaguing and binding Putin in the current situation. Putin sees that 
the excesses of flattery could be damaging, but is powerless to put a stop to it. Aleksandr 
Tsypko describes Putin's dilemma aptly. 
211 Russian Analysts See no Personality Cult Trend in Street Being Named After Putin, BBC Monitoring, Ekho 
Moskvi News Agency, October 9, 2002. JRL #6486, October 11, 2002. 
212 Jack, A., The Empire Strikes Back: Putin Cult Reaches New Levels, Financial Times, October 12,2002. 
JRL #6489, October 12, 2002. 
"Servility, flattery, eulogy are fundamental flaws in our political culture. 
The President can not but see that such flattery is detrimental to his 
image."z13 
83 
It should also be considered that the phenomenon of cult of personality was set in a 
one-party totalitarian state some fifty years ago. Putting aside allegations of unfair elections, 
through either intimidation or some form of manipulation, people can still choose another 
candidate (other than Putin) should they desire to do so. There may not be many viable 
alternatives to Putin, which is a debate in the media, but this does not reflect the inadequacies 
of political system, but rather those who represent the system (the politicians themselves). 
A second point to consider, on the theme ofthe origins of cult of personality, is the time 
period in which it was set. Media and communications technology was rather clumsy and easy 
to control by state authorities who worked in a totalitarian environment. It would be 
inconceivable for a Russian journalist to criticise Stalin for operating a cult of personality 
during his period of rule. In the contemporary setting this has occurred. Some minimum level 
of legal protection does exist, up to a certain point, although broken on occasion by the 
authorities when suppressing debate on some issues (such as Chechnya). As the Russian 
government seeks to normalise relations with the outside world through integration into the 
world community, expectations and obligations are placed upon it by the community in which 
Russia seeks to join. 
Since Putin's accession to power, a lot of debate has centred on conflict in the media and the 
issue of freedom of speech. Much as happened, with regard to the level of permissible 
freedom of speech and editorial independence, many of the changes are not favourable for 
freedom of speech in the media. Conflict continues between media and the State, although to a 
lesser extent than in the beginning of Putin' s coming to power. This suggests at least two 
processes at play. Firstly, that media independence has been to some extent subdued by 
government pressure. The second point, referring to the fact that some conflict between the 
two parties still exists is that some measure of pluralism still exists in the Russian media. If 
the government were outright victors in the 'information war' there would be no pluralism 
and consequently no need to use coercion to enforce compliance to the government's wishes. 
213 Russian Analysts See no Personality Cult Trend in Street Being Named After Putin, BBe Monitoring, Elmo 
Moskvi News Agency, October 9,2002. JRL #6486, October 11,2002. 
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The arrival of New Communications Technology (NCT) has also had an impact on the 
ability of any person or organisation wishes to initiate a cult of personality. NCTs are by 
nature, small, portable and able to access independent information. These aspects make NCTs 
very difficult to control through the traditional methods of censorship. A cult of personality 
environment requires a monolithic information structure. Total control of information is 
required; from image formation, to dissemination for the possibility of successfully planting 
the sender's message in the mind of the intended audience. Currently, it is possible for 
Russian citizens with access to technologies, such as computers with Internet access, to gain 
outside information, which may contradict the sender's message. Such contradictions would 
render the sender's message ineffective through cognitive dissonance. 
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CHAPTER II: PUTIN AND HIS INHERITANCE. 
2.0 Chapter Objectives 
The first parts of this chapter are intended to give the reader an appreciation of the image that 
has and is present, initiated by political figures to promote a person or a cause. Three key 
figures have been chosen - Boris Yeltsin, Lyudmila Putina and Yuri Luzhkov. Yeltsin as the 
past President is important in this study. He was the first post-Soviet leader of the Russian 
Federation. How did he come to be in this position, what public profile did he send to the 
Russian public to ehance his appeal? 
Lyudmila Putina plays an increasingly public role in political life. Is this a new trend or 
merely a continuation in the line of Presidential First Ladies in Russia? To answer this 
question, it is necessary to delve into the immediate past and look at the role played by Raisa 
Gorbacheva and Naina Yeltsina in society. Another important point for consideration is 
whether Putina's role has remained constant from March 2000 or if her role has changed with 
changes occuring in society. 
The final political actor to be considered of the above mentioned names is the Mayor of 
Moscow Yuri Luzhkov. He is an ambitious, charismatic and energetic political survivor. Over 
time he has managed to accumulate a sizeable media asset to wield at his will. Since Y eltsin' s 
time Luzhkov has held ambitions of being President of Russia and has actively tried to 
manipulate circumstances and events that would be conducive to bringing this about. 
In the period leading to the March 2000 election, one of Put in's popular platforms was the 
promise to distance all oligarchs from political power. Russian society witnessed the very 
public destruction of Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky's media empires shortly after 
Putin's successful attempt at the presidency. But, what else has happened since this time, have 
there been many or any significant changes in the relations between the central power and the 
oligarchs? 
Chapter 2.3 is intended to verse the reader with the manner in which elections are conducted 
in the Russian Federation. Issues such as the use of kompromat will be discussed. The 
elections of 1996 and 2000 will be the focus. In addition to the election strategies employed in 
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these presidential elections, I will also investigate events and occurances which seem to be 
having an influence on the upcoming 2004 presidential election. 
Lastly, chapter 2.4 explores the issues of totalitarian discourse and state interests in Russian 
society. Since Putin has come to power, the State has attempted to recreate a strong 
centralised control. Along with the desire to bring about a more vibrant and centrally 
controlled Russia has come the rhetoric through the mass media. How has the will to create a 
strong Russia been expressed in the media? 
2.1 Image Making 
According to the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci, the ruling elites use mass media to 
"perpetuate their power, wealth, and status by popularising their own philosophy, culture and 
morality. ,,214 
Certainly, Stalin was not the last Russian leader who attempted to create a public perception 
by associating wartime exploits with themselves. On July 29, 1987 in Literaturnaya Gazeta, 
historian Professor Iurii Poliakov accused Soviet leaders of creating personality cults and 
exaggerating their war records. The primary targets of his criticism were Konstantin 
Chemenko and Leonid Brezhnev.215 There would appear to be some form of benefit for the 
Soviet leadership to be associated with the war effort. Some of the beneficial attributes may 
include traits such as; courage, reliability, integrity and decisiveness. 
The main focus of this section will be on personal image and the image of Russia. A brief 
introduction will be given to the nature ofYeltsin's image making efforts as a background and 
comparison to the contemporary style utilised by Putin. 
Cultivation analysis may prove to be a useful tool of evaluation for the style of political 
advertising campaign used to appeal to the public sentiment. A definition for the term 
cultivation analysis is as follows; 
214 Lull, J., op. cit., p. 32. 
215 Editors Graffy, J. & Hosking, G. A., Culture and Media in the USSR Today, London, Macmillan Press, 1989, 
p.28. 
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"[ ... ] seeks to define long-term role of TV in contemporary society, 
proposing that heavy TV exposure blends attitudes in the direction of 
mainstream cultural values, and bends them in line with the somewhat 
conservative political agenda ofthe media owners and the power structure in 
general. "216 
2.1.1 Lyudmila Putina and the Use of the Presidential First Lady, As Portrayed in the 
Russian Media for Providing Model Behaviour. 
Throughout the Soviet era the press was the "collective organiser, agitator and propagandist 
of the Party.,,217 In order to meet this expectation the media's role in society was clearly 
defined by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, they were to be a motivator ofthe people's will and 
efforts in order to create a better socialist state. 
During the Soviet era, the media was designed to be an advocate that also instils certain traits 
into society. They were not designed to be transmitters of neutrally loaded information. This 
way of thinking and acting was part of the mass media's core identity for nearly % of a 
century. Consequently, this behaviour has been carried through into the post-Soviet period. 
Much has been written on the mostly male leadership of the Soviet Union and Russia over 
the years. A vast amount of material has covered many different aspects of their rule. 
However, one area that has been gaining increasing importance recently (gauged by the 
increasing coverage in the media) has been the role of the First Lady in politics and society. 
This area seems to have been mostly neglected, excepting some brief articles written in 
newspapers periodically. The subject is long overdue for some attention, to bring this 'hidden' 
topic into public discussion. 
Traditionally, in Soviet and Russian politics, the wife of the country's leader is faceless and 
barely even recognised. This changed when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the mid-
1980's, his wife Raisa enjoyed a high profile both domestically and internationally. Her image 
or public persona was created, as a highly educated, intelligent and modern woman with a 
mind of her own. Other traits which came to be attributed to her included virtues such as 
216 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 182. 
217 Elderidge, J., Editor, Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 55 
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working for the betterment of the state / people of the Soviet Union. The compassionate and 
caring facet added to Gorbachev's over-all strategy of giving socialism a 'human face.' 
As the Soviet Union crumbled and the Russian Federation came into existence, Boris Yeltsin 
assumed leadership of the newly formed state. The Russian President's wife appeared to 
assume a lower key and traditional role (according to Soviet politics). During her public 
appearances, Naina Yeltsina was publicly seen in the supporting role and tended to shy away 
from most political commentary. 
The change in the role of the First Lady may have been brought about for a variety of 
reasons. For instance, the Gorbachevs seem to have received a lot of blame for the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the contemporary society people do not remember the 
shortages of the late Soviet period, but the cradle to grave welfare system (even if this system 
was not functioning perfectly). 
Another reason for Raisa Gorbacheva's unpopularity was that she appeared to be different 
from 'everyone' else. Her style of dress and manner was more Western than Russian. Due to 
this ill feeling toward the Gorbachev's it was necessary for Boris Yeltsin to assume a more 
traditional and less controversial identity. This would have the effect of distancing Yeltsin 
from any association with Gorbachev's regime (possibly viewed as being somewhat decadent 
and out of touch with the average citizen). 
Yeltsin came up through the ranks of the Soviet regime. He held high ranking numerous 
posts in the system. Although Boris Yeltsin liked to consider, or at least been seen as a rebel, 
he was part of the old guard. As such, he was the Patriarch of his family. Ifhe could not be 
seen to be in control of his own family, how could he ever control Russia? This may have 
been one of Mikhail Gorbachev's downfalls. He was seen as being led or controlled by Raisa 
Gorbacheva, this may have been taken as a sign of weakness. 
President Yeltsin resigned from office on December 31, 1999. He promptly promoted his 
chosen successor, Vladimir Putin to the Russian public. The little known Putin was elected 
President in March 2000, in the background was the equally mysterious First Lady Lyudmila 
Putina. As time has progressed, she has assumed a greater role in public life. Although she is 
not as assertive as Raisa Gorbacheva, the role played is still greater than N aina Y eltsina' s 
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public role. 
President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed Raisa Maksimovna's unique 
situation in his memoirs. "Our society did not have a tradition of according the First Lady a 
special status [ ... ]'''218 Gorbachev was also resolute on Raisa's independence; "[ ... J she was 
neither an extra nor simply the President's shadow."219 
Raisa Maksimovna was entangled in the political intrigues of the infamous 'Kremlin Wives' 
through her husband's rise in the political ranks. A specific 'pecking order' existed in this 
group, which was rigidly enforced.220 She did not like or enjoy this vicious environment and 
described it in the following manner "[ ... J the atmosphere, full of arrogance, suspicion, 
sycophancy, and tactlessness.,,221 
The first presidential lady in Russian (the Soviet Union) history was Raisa Maksimovna 
Gorbacheva. She was a highly educated, professional woman (lectured in sociology at 
university level), who dressed in a 'Western' style. Raisa Maksimovna gave the perception 
that she was very much her own person. Her character and style was a cause for admiration 
overseas, but engendered much hate and loathing in the Soviet Union.222 In an article in 1999, 
Raisa Gorbacheva was described as being "feted in the West as a symbol of change in the 
Soviet Union as she brought First Lady-style glamour to the Kremlin.,,223 
The evident style and glamour of Raisa Gorbacheva, which was possibly enhanced and 
exaggerated in the Soviet public's mind became a source of contention. Raisa Gorbacheva 
was different, this seemed to create ill feeling amongst sections of Soviet society who were in 
the grip of food and commodity shortages. 
"Raisa Gorbacheva's elegant wardrobe was seen as a symbol of the 
privileges enjoyed by senior party members and their families. Her 
appearance conjured up images of special shops with luxury food items, the 
218 Gorbachev, M., Memoirs, New York, Doubleday, 1996, p. 447. 
219 Gorbachev, M., op. cit., p. 275. 
220 Gorbachev, M., op. cit., p. 122. 
221 Ibid. 
222 For further information read Passage: Raisa Gorbachev, 67, September 20, 1999. 
www.wired.com/news/topstories/0.1287.21841.00.html accessed April 29, 2002. 
223 World: Europe Raisa Gorbachev dies, September 20, 1999. 
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polyclinics which gave party members better health servICes than those 
available to the general public, the special shops with Western clothes.,,224 
In Memoirs, Gorbachev's autobiography, he tries to instil an image in the reader's mind that 
separates the possibility ofRaisa Maksimovna influencing Kremlin policy. "Of course I did 
not give lectures in philosophy for Raisa Maksimovna, just as she did not do my work.,022S 
However, an apparent contradiction appears later on in the book. Under Soviet law, spouses 
of the leader Soviet Union were not permitted to be employed in high government positions. 
Gorbachev did admit to acting on Raisa Maksimovna's advice. 
"[ ... J often resulted in my giving assignments to various agencies to work on 
specific problems. Her professional training and practical experience 
allowed her to give me more than just a list of facts and impressions; she 
could share her thoughts and sometimes suggest specific policies.,,226 
Raisa Maksimovna's real or perceived interference in official politics and her departure from 
the 'traditional' role of a leader's spouse drew criticism and even anger from some of the 
public. Her presence on high profile occasions, such as overseas trips attracted hostility. 
Gorbachev indicated that one critic even wrote to him with the terse message, "who does she 
think she is, a member of the Politburo?,,227 
Possibly as a counter to the increasing criticism, to satisfy a personal wish or to try and 
enhance the policy of 'socialism with a human face,' Raisa Maksimovna engaged in 
numerous humanitarian causes. For example, her voluntary work for the Soviet Cultural 
Foundation.228 
Naina Yeltsina played a very different role in Russian politics. In Boris Yeltsin's Midnight 
www.wired.com/news/topstories/0.1287.21841.00.html accessed April 30, 2002. 
224 Martin, Seamus, Gorbachev - Hero or Holy Fool?, The Irish Times, January 12,2002. 
www.ireland.comJ200210112/310748760WKI2GORBY1.html accessed April 30, 2002. 
225 Gorbachev, M., op. cit., p. 274. 
226 Gorbachev, M., op. cit., p. 275. 
For further details on Raisa Gorbacheva's alleged influence see; 
www.wired.com/news/topstories/0.1287.21841.00.html. 
227 Gorbachev, M., op. cit., p. 274. 
228 Gorbachev, M., op. cit., pp. 275 - 276. 
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Diaries, she was portrayed as a very family oriented person. Numerous accounts throughout 
Yeltsin's autobiography try to reinforce this concept of traditional role-play.229 
Boris Yeltsin highlighted some of Naina' s qualities in his autobiography. Examples of 
supportive role-play included: 
.. Accompanying Boris Yeltsin to the ballot box in the 1996 presidential elections, at a 
crucial point, when Y eltsin' s career was far from secure. 
.. Naina accompanied Yeltsin on his overseas tours. 
Some of the supportive roles, which were enacted 'behind the scenes' and not readily seen 
by the public eye, were; 
.. Caring for Yeltsin during his bouts of illness. 
CII Trying to reason and talk sense into Yeltsin when his judgement appeared to be blurred by 
emotion. 
However, Naina Yeltsina did not stay out of the headlines altogether. On March 1,1997 an 
article by Reuter titled Yeltsin 's Wife Says She is Nostalgic for Soviet Times was published. 
Naina Yeltsina was quoted from an interview she had with the Moscow radio station Ekho 
Moskvy. 
"I do not rail against the past. Like everybody I feel nostalgia for the Soviet 
Union as for a large family when we were all together. [ ... J Now I find that 
my friends live abroad - in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ulaaine, and this of course 
is sad. [ ... J But I look forward with optimism. With time our economic space 
will be one and we will be together all the same.'>230 
Reuter tried to put a 'spin' on her interview, which was not intended by Naina Yeltsina. On 
the surface it seems to be an attempt to create the idea of a resurgence ofthe Soviet Union. 
What the interview probably conveyed to the Moscow public was the traditional importance 
229 Yeltsin, B., Midnight Diaries, New York, Public Affairs, 2000, pp. 320 - 322. 
230 Reuter, Yeltsin's Wife Says She is Nostalgic/or Soviet Times, March I, 1997. 
Magic News Archives, March 1997, 
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of close family and friends. No political statement concerning the revival of the Soviet Union 
seems to have been made rather a loss of kinship. 
Another article written by a Western agency seems to be less alarmist and more realistic 
concerning Naina Yeltsina's public style. 
"Russian First Lady Naina Yeltsin, a far cry from the glamorous Raisa 
Gorbachev, is likely to stay firmly in the background when her husband and 
U.S. President Bill Clinton meet this week. 
Naina -- a wallflower with a steady, motherly image - turns the clock back 
to the Soviet era when Kremlin wives were rarely seen or heard and she 
turns her back on pUblicity. 
"I am only the President's wife. I shudder when people call me the First 
Lady," she has been quoted as saying. 
Her image is a stark contrast to the attractive and well-dressed Gorbachev, 
who impressed in the West but attracted criticism at home for being 
outspoken. 
[ ... J Popular at home for her down-to-earth image, well-wishers sent Naina 
over a million roses for her 65 th birthday last week, according to !tar-Tass, 
which appeared to be enjoying a little poetic licence. 
[ ... J Naina has said that her main duty is to be a good wife, mother and 
grandmother and that she has no desire to enter politics. 
Shortly before her husband's re-election last year, Naina unveiled her 
secret recipe for a chocolate cake in a Russian television interview designed 
at boosting YeItsin's image as a family man.,,231 
http://idc.cis.lead.org/idclbmnl97-03-02.html accessed May 1, 2002. 
231 Yeltsin's Wife Set to Fade into Summit Background, May 1, 2002, 
www.europeaninternet.comlrussia/special/summit/summitl.php3 accessed May 1, 2002. 
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This article places great emphasis on Naina Yeltsina's attempt to adhere to the traditional 
role of the leader's wife. Certain traits are repeated throughout the article. The most common 
attributes placed on Naina Yeltsina are: 
• Keeps low public profile. 
• Her appearance and standard of dress is kept at a modest point. 
• A lot of importance placed on the traditional roles of being a good wife, mother and home 
maker. 
• Is of a modest nature and humble. 
• ITAR-Tass's comment that she was popular with the Russian public because of her low 
key approach. 
Working on the assumption that the media convey a message for a specific purpose, other 
than a merely serving an informative function, ITAR-Tass 's message would appear to be an 
attempt at constructing an identity for the female segment of the Russian media market. This 
last point could be construed as a model for others to emulate, because Naina Yeltsina's 
approach has earned her popularity unlike the 'Un-Russian' manner ofRaisa Gorbacheva. 
Taking this line of argument further it is possible to reach the conclusion that, if women copy 
Naina Yeltsina's public persona they will be popular too. 
Lyudmila Putina has been somewhat of an enigma, a shy person who had managed to keep a 
remarkably low public profile for some time. Some public exposure came with the publication 
of First Person.232 It seemed as though she wished to remain out of the public spotlight and 
that Lyudmila Putina would adhere to the traditional role of the First Lady. 
Possibly as a result of the increasingly assertive and public roles of the first ladies from other 
leading world states, this seclusion may be coming to an end. This would imply that if Russia 
copies the traits of leading world states, she might come to be accepted as a leading world 
state too. Another possible explanation is that Vladimir Putin wants to be seen in the Russian 
public as a family man, for this image to succeed he needs to have his family in a higher 
public profile. A matter of politicking and perhaps, leading to greater appeal to the female 
constituency. 
232 For more information concerning Lyudmila Putina, please see Putin, V., First Person, London, Hutchinson, 
2000. Especially pages 149 - 161. 
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A series of biographies have been, or are about to be published on the presidential family. 
First Person was one of the earlier biographies, but other publications have been produced, 
producing a glossy and palatable account of the Putin family. Fonner military journalist Oleg 
Blotsky has undertaken a trilogy with the blessing of Vladimir Putin (Sergei Yastrzhembsky, 
the presidential aide acted as the go-between).233 
Blotsky's volumes to date include, Vladimir Putin: A Life History (volume 1) and Vladimir 
Putin: A Rise to Power (volume 2). This series of biographies appears to be aimed at 
manufacturing a very serene, modest and sincere portrait of the Putins. During the course of 
producing the second volume, Blotsky has worked with Lyudmila Putina. The account in the 
Inter/ax article of this relationship gives an impression of the possible content of these works. 
"Now the journalist is working on the second half of his book and keeps in 
touch with the President's wife, Lyudmila Putina. The journalist 
characterised Lyudmila Putina as 'a very modest, decent and simple 
woman.' The journalist said the Putins are a really happy family. The only 
topic they would not discuss was their daughters. 'We want them (the 
children) to have a nonnal life,' Lyudmila Putina said. [ ... J 'I am a father 
myself, so I respect and understand the decision of the presidential family,' 
the journalist said.,,234 
Certain traits and characteristics are emphasised in the above-mentioned article. Some of the 
'desired' themes that emerge from the text are, the Putins are a 'perfect' nuclear family with 
strong family values and commitments. Lyudmila Putina is painted as a protective mother, but 
is a nonnal person just like 'everyone else.' The themes of modesty, decency and simplicity 
seem to be important characteristics for Lyudmila Putina's image-makers, as they frequently 
emerge in pro-Kremlin literature. 
An article by RIA Novosti on January 6,2002 has attempted to further create and reinforce 
the public persona for the First Lady. The full text of this article is reproduced below. 
"The Russian President's wife Lyudmila Putin (nee Shlaebneva) was born 
233 Book About Life of Putin to be Released Soon, Interfax, January 16,2002. JRL #6027, January 17,2002. 
234 Ibid. 
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in Kaliningrad on January 6, 1957, finished a secondary school in 1975 to 
undergo a course at a technical college, and graduated from the Leningrad 
State University in 1986 where she majored as a philology student of 
Spanish and French. Later, when her husband stayed in Germany on a 
business assignment, she joined him and learnt German on her own. Once 
getting a scho01leaving certificate, she practised temporarily such jobs as a 
post woman, then a turner apprentice at the Kaliningrad Torgmashworks 
with becoming a skilled turner in a short while, a nurse at the city hospital, 
the chief of an amateur drama studio for teenagers, an accompanist, a 
stewardess on internal routes in the Kaliningrad air company. Shortly after 
meeting her future husband Vladimir Putin in Leningrad, at the age of 22, 
moved to the city to enter a preparatory department of Leningrad State 
University and live at a student dormitory. She was a third year student 
when she married Vladimir Putin, an intelligence officer then. Lyudmila 
moved with her husband and daughter Masha to Dresden at the end of the 
'80's where their second daughter Katya was born. As the President's wife, 
Lyudmila Putin is engaged in cultural and welfare affairs, including active 
her work at the Centre for Support, Development and Dissemination of the 
Russian language in Russia and the former Soviet republics and other 
European countries. Friends and acquaintances describe Lyudmila Putin as a 
very modest, amiable woman alien to make-up and devoted to her 
household, a person of integrity. According to Lyudmila, the role of the 
First Lady meeting all the expectations is very difficult for her. "It is very 
hard to remain oneself in such circumstances and what can be more 
important?" she wonders. In her foreign trips, she is attracted by discovering 
a lot for herself and spreading lmowledge about modem Russia. "When 
heads of state meet, they can see through each other better and learn more 
about their countries," said Lyudmila Putin."235 
RIA Novosti, a government owned and operated news agency, certainly attempts to associate 
certain traits and characteristics with Lyudmila Putina. President Vladimir Putin has a highly 
mediated public image, one generated as much by media and PR specialists as through fact. In 
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Russia's new age of 'American-style' mediated presidential elections, the candidates family 
become part of the 'package' to be sold to the public. This differs greatly from the Soviet 
period when a leader's family was rarely seen or heard. Such a profound change in the 
conduct of the elections has necessitated breaking the seclusion of the First Family. 
A series of traits and attributes are bestowed upon Lyudmila Putina in the above article, 
which both support and contradict the 'traditional' role of the First Lady. One of the points 
that' Toward Lyudmila Putin 's Birthday' tries to emphasise is her intelligence and academic 
aptitude. Numerous accounts are rendered to the reader, referring to her school and tertiary 
accomplishments. The reason for highlighting such accomplishments is not entirely clear, but 
it may relate to her 'suitability' for her new public role as the First Lady. By 'suitability,' I 
refer to the possible association of intelligence and aptitude with a tertiary education. This 
trait is more reformist than traditional, but necessarily so in the current climate of highly 
televised politics and image-making. 
Lyudmila Putina's family achievements are noted too. Her devotion to husband and children 
are part of the picture of a happy 'traditiona1' family. This was one of Vladimir Putin's 
political personas. The importance ofthis persona may be heightened during Russia's current 
period of rapid popUlation decrease, which has made the topic an important political issue in 
the Russian Federation. Strong family values are a traditional personality trait. The 
predecessors of Lyudmila Putina, Raisa Gorbacheva and Naina Yeltsina had diametrically 
opposed family value images held by the public, as has been outlined earlier in this work. 
The previous work experience of Lyudmila Putina, which is highlighted in the article goes 
some way toward reinforcing her personality image, as a caring and nurturing figure. Working 
as a flight stewardess and a nurse in a city hospital for instance. By mentioning that she was a 
turner at the Kaliningrad Torgmashworks, the story gives the impression that Lyudmila Putina 
can also relate to the 'average' person from the street and she can empathise with them. In this 
instance, Lyudmila Putina's image is an odd mixture of old and new ideals. Certain kinds or 
types of work tend to carry a stereotype, such as nurses or airhostesses may be seen as caring 
and nurturing. This point when taken to an extreme, the work could be regarded as 'motherly' 
type of occupation. Then, the reference to the factory work could be viewed as an opposite to 
235Toward Lyudmila Putin's birthday, RIA Novosti, January 6,2002. JRL# 6008, January 7,2002. 
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this notion. Under the artistic form of Socialist Realism, 'ideal' female role models were 
created. These women were held to be the equal of men, able to handle the rigours of a 
labouring profession without tiring or complaint. 
An admission by an American First Lady, to working in a factory would be unlikely because 
of possible negative consequences that could follow. They may be seen as 'common' or lower 
class. No such connotations appear to exist during the Soviet times in Russia, due to the 
above-mentioned role of Socialist Realism. Another kind of effect may occur, such as being 
able to identify and 'bond' with the masses through a shared experience. 
Lyudmila Putina is portrayed as being a modest person, a far cry from the perceived excesses 
of Raisa Gorbacheva. Mention is made of Lyudmila Putina being "[ ... J very modest [ ... J alien 
to make-up [ ... ]." This is an important way in demonstrating the traditional qualities of 
someone who is firmly 'planted' in reality and is capable of handling most situations, because 
they do not let power 'corrupt' them and begin to act or behave as if they were superior to the 
rest of society. 
The final trait that I shall mention relates to the public role of Lyudmila Putina. Her public 
projects, which often carry a high media profile. In this respect, there are some similarities 
between Raisa Gorbacheva and Lyudmila Putina. Raisa Gorbacheva's projects often involved 
working in areas of humanitarianism and culture. Lyudmila Putina's work seems to be 
connected to some of the broader state goals, such as reviving pride in Russia and things that 
are Russian, resurrecting a form of patriotism. 
An image is conveyed to the reader that Lyudmila Putina is actively engaged in not only 
protecting, but also in spreading Russian culture and heritage. "As the President's wife, 
Lyudmila Putin is engaged in cultural and welfare affairs, her active work at the Centre for 
Support, Development and Dissemination of the Russian Language in Russia and the former 
Soviet republics and other European countries. [ ... J In her foreign trips, she is attracted by 
discovering a lot for herself and spreading knowledge about modem Russia.,,236 
236 Toward Lyudmila Putin's birthday, RIA Novosti, January 6, 2002. JRL# 6008, January 7, 2002. 
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Could this section of the article be aimed at restoring some measure 'Russianess' in the 
nation's identity? Certainly, Russia is at a crossroads in the search for identity. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union also brought about a crisis in identity. Russia lost her place in the world, the 
republics declared independence and the Eastern Bloc nations kept Russia at a political 
distance. In addition to the loss of the inner and outer layers of the Soviet Empire, Russia also 
lost her status as one of the world's superpower states. It is a lot for a society to absorb in such 
a short span oftime. 
One of the recent high media profile cases undertaken by Lyudmila Putina is the debate over 
Russian language. Two camps of thought exist in this debate; those who want to modernise 
the Russian language, through such acts as the inclusion of foreign words into mainstream 
Russian language. The other side calls for a purification of Russian language, by excluding 
such things as foreign words from the Russian vocabulary. 
Andrei Ryabov, an analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Centre referred to the language debate 
as part of a strategy from President Vladimir Putin to strengthen the state and restore national 
pride.237 Lyudmila Putina entered into the language debate in mid-2001, when she attended the 
opening of an international Russian language contest (in which participants from 41 countries 
entered).238 She also opened a roundtable on 'Language Policy in Modem Russia' on April 16, 
2002 at St. Petersburg State University.239 
Izvestia, a newspaper owned by oligarch Vladimir Potanin, who still retains close links to the 
Kremlin gave a glowing account of Lyudmila Putina's participation. 
"The roundtable on Tuesday was a model affair in the literal sense of the 
word, with participants seeking to demonstrate the exemplary command of 
the great and mighty Russian speech. Some even succeeded. 
Lyudmila Putina opened the meeting of philologists, politicians and 
teachers. The First Lady skilfully used the rhetoric stratagem of 
237 Yablokova, Oks ana, Government Moves to PurifY Russian, Moscow Times, June 27, 2001. 
JRL #5325,27 June, 2001. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Kantor, Julia, In the Beginning There Will be the Word: The Russian Language will Become the Basis for the 
National Idea, Izvestia, 17 April, 2002. JRL #6193,18 April, 2002. 
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unexpectedness. To start with, she made an elegiac confession to the effect 
that it was 'an honour to be seated next to Lyudmila Verbitskaya (rector of 
St. Petersburg University), within the walls of one's alma mater. She noted 
'it is a pleasure to see the state give so much attention to language policy.' 
And then abruptly: 'The reform of the Russian language conducted by the 
Academy of Sciences seems times erving to me.' She suggested that the 
roundtable participants give thought how to preserve and advance the 
Russian language in the modem world. ,,240 
This article by a Kremlin 'friendly' media outlet only served to intensify the debate. One 
week later, this time in Moscow Lyudmila Putina appeared to actively and publicly intervenes 
in the debate through public statements that were made. 
In an article titled 'Putin's Wife Puts Spokes in the Wheels of Language Row,' she is quoted 
as saying "it is too early to launch language reform. ,,241 The article went on to describe the 
response of her interference by a newspaper. 
"But the media has openly gloated over the intervention of the powerful 
President's wife. 
'Putin has de facto annulled the reform,' the Vremya MN daily boasted.,,242 
The above comments seem to hint that Lyudmila Putina has a powerful and influential 
position. In this instance the implied model of behaviour here would appear similar to that 
associated with Raisa Gorbacheva. Therefore this implied behaviour would not seem to agree 
with the overall image that is desired by image-makers in the Putin camp. A part of the 
argument of Lyudmila Putina that is congruent with Kremlin policy is the defence of 'purity' 
in the Russian language. 
240 Kantor, Julia, In the Beginning There Will be the Word: The Russian Language will Become the Basisfor the 
National Idea, Izvestia, 17 April, 2002. JRL #6193,18 April, 2002. 
241 Nedbayeva, Olga, Putin 's Wife Puts Spokes in the Wheels of Language Row, Moscow, AFP, April 23, 2002. 
The last time language reform was carried out in Russia (Soviet Union) was in 1956. 
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The Academy of Science commission, which has been tasked with investigating the prospect 
oflanguage reform has countered Lyudmila Putina's criticism. Their main point of contention 
is the lack of academic or professional qualifications held by Lyudmila Putina to enter such a 
debate, with 'uninformed opinion.' 
"It's good that the state should be interested in language, but Lyudmila 
Putina was last studying philology 30 years ago, and she studied Spanish -
that is not enough to evaluate the work of experts, said Maria Korolyova, 
who explains language rules daily in Moscow Echo radio's broadcasts. ,,243 
Taking into consideration the mixed signals, which this article gives the reader, may hint at a 
wider problem. On January 13,2001 Putin was quoted as saying, "any talk about unity of the 
Russian State apparently starts with the formulation of its tasks and goals. A single 
information space is a priority task. It would be worth noting that the word came first." 244 
Vladimir Putin's words seem to imply a lack of tolerance towards pluralism in the press. A 
'single information space' would appear to hint at the beginnings of a single truth, instituted 
from the nation's highest political office. The lack of conformity in this article may imply that 
the government is not yet fully in control of all Russian media and the' single information 
space' has not been realised yet. 
On March 6,2001 President Putin answered questions live on the internet for one hour. 
During this time, a St. Petersburg internet user put him on the defensive. The user described 
the absence of Lyudmila Putina from many public trips and appearances as 'patriarchal' and 
unlike the role of her predecessors Raisa Gorbacheva and Naina Yeltsina. 
In reply to this accusation Putin said "this is just the way we operate, 
whether you like it or not. The people elected me, not my wife, [ ... J I can not 
issue instructions. Our relationship is such that if I started to do that the 
result would be quite the opposite. She carries herself in the way she feels 
necessary. ,,245 
243 Nedbayeva, Olga, Putin 's Wife Puts Spokes in the Wheels of Language Row, Moscow, AFP, April 23, 2002. 
The last time language reform was carried out in Russia (Soviet Union) was in 1956. 
244 Putin Says Single Information Space Essentialfor Integrity of State, ITAR-TASS, 13 January, 2001. 
JRL #5026, 15 January, 2001 
245 Popeski, Ron, Putin Goes Online, Defends Record, Reuters, 6 March, 2001. JRL #5135, 7 March, 2001. 
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The question and reply give an indication of the sensitive nature of what is trying to be 
achieved through the use of image manipulation. On the one hand the President does not want 
to appear as being condescending to women. Such an image may cost him their support at the 
ballot box. But, this needs to be tempered with not being seen as too weak and liberal by 
conservative elements of the voting public. 
On this occasion the criticism aimed at Putin seems to have been acted upon. A new 
presidential website has been opened on June 20, 2002, which has been given the address 
www.president.kremlin.ru.z46 An attempt appears to have been initiated to combat Lyudmila 
Putina's perceived low level public profile during presidential business. This information has 
the appearance of being aimed at and offered to a domestic audience. In the photo album 
section, especially where the photos have been taken on overseas trips, Lyudmila Putina is 
featured often and beside her husband. If the action was taken deliberately, to counter the 
criticism, the result has the hallmarks of a compromise. A compromise between the desired 
image of Put in being a strong leader and Lyudmila Putina in a visible but supportive role. 
The main focus of this work is looking at how the media have created the public persona of 
Lyudmila Putina, and suggesting a possible reason for the creation of this stereotype or model. 
Russian media still have some legacies of the Soviet era remaining in their style and manner. 
This is not surprising considering Russian journalists had been trained in a specific and 
regimented doctrine for some 75 years. Traditionally, the role of the media was not to solely 
inform society but to educate and motivate them toward a specific goal or purpose. 
In order to get a better appreciation of Lyudmila Putina's role in the process of conveying an 
image for imitation it was necessary to briefly examine her predecessors to form a context. 
Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva and Naina Iosifovna Yeltsina were opposite ends ofthe scale 
personality wise and the role they played in society. 
Raisa Gorbacheva was an educated, glamorous and assertive woman. She dared to step out 
of the shadow of her husband, Mikhail Gorbachev and consequently reaped the wrath of 
society. Some ofRaisa Gorbacheva's 'mistakes' included her Western dress standard, 
frequently appearing in public (in the Russian media) and being labelled as interfering in 
246 Naumenlm, Larisa, Putin Gets a Website with Bells and Whistles, Moscow Times 21 June, 2002. 
JRL #6319,21 June, 2002. 
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politics through influencing national policy. The model that was presented by Raisa 
Gorbacheva was very radical at the time, breaking many of the longstanding protocols and 
traditions of the era. Whether a case of 'tall poppy syndrome' or resentment concerning the 
decay of the Soviet Union's power, prestige and society's standard of living or maybe some 
other reason, Raisa Gorbacheva was not popular at all in the Soviet Union. 
The next First Lady was Naina Iosifovna Yeltsina, who proved to take an opposite approach 
to that of Raisa Gorbacheva. She kept a usually low public profile, apart from being seen in 
the supportive role of Boris Yeltsin. Naina Iosifovna's clothes were kept to a neat but drab 
standard and if she gave an opinion it did not contradict the President's. Over the years that 
Boris Yeltsin was President (1991 - 1999) she cultivated a very motherly, modest, low key 
and traditional persona. If Itar-Tass's assertions are correct, this approach seems to have 
worked as she seemed popular with the Russian public. 
Lyudmila Putina seems to have taken a persona that is a hybrid of the two previous 
approaches taken by Raisa Gorbacheva and Naina Yeltsina. This hybrid may be a reflection of 
the complexities of politics. Russia wants to be admitted to the world community via 
membership of various international organisations, such as G7, World Trade Organisation, 
Council of Europe, United Nations etc. For this goal to be successfully fulfilled and Russia 
could once more playa leading role in world affairs, a desirable image needs to be conveyed 
to the world community. President Putin has stated that this 'desired' image will be based on 
Russia's 'Europeaness.' 
"Russia is a diverse country, but we are part of Western European culture. 
No matter where our people live in the Far East or in the South, we are 
Europeans. ,,247 
Since the 1996 presidential elections, politics in the Russian Federation has become 
increasingly mediated and Americanised. As with presidential politics in the United States, 
the presidential candidate is not a stand-alone entity. The candidate's entire family can be 
submitted to public scrutiny through the media. 
247 Putin, V., op. cit., p. 169. 
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Some of Lyudmila Putina' s profiles are somewhat Western in nature, such as her charity and 
cultural work. This particular example is not necessarily based on a European example, but 
would have a closer association with one of the roles of an American First Lady. 
A counter-force of the Western brand of image is the domestic population. 'Too much' 
Western image may tum Russian voters from supporting President Putin in the next elections, 
as may have been the case with the Gorbachevs. Therefore a balance needs to be struck during 
the course of identity construction. To allay public concerns or fears of too much foreign 
influence in their leadership some distinctly 'Russian' traits or characteristics needed to be 
included in Lyudmila Putin's profile. 
Her Russian profiles have included modesty, motherly nature, does not wear 
make-up, absence from official tours and duties and the association with Russian 
'institutions,' such as language and the Russian Orthodox Church. These profiles are designed 
to exclude any possible association with the perceived excesses ofthe first First Lady. The 
Kremlin's PR managers have brought desirable and traditional qualities of the First Lady 
together in one person. 
The use of imaging appears to be in support of the Kremlin's domestic objectives. One of the 
main goals seems to be the resurrection of a strong and centralised state. But, in order to 
achieve this goal more readily the public may require motivating to join the state in attaining 
these ends. A method to bring about public consensus is by using the media to motivate and 
bring about 'desired' modes of behaviour. 
Creating personal profiles for First Ladies is by no means a strictly Russian phenomenon. 
The profiles that are offered to the public can be regarded as an indication of where on the 
political spectrum the presidential candidate is located. For instance, U. S. President George 
W. Bush has a traditional image. Laura Bush, the First Lady keeps a usually low profile with 
the main thrust of her public profile being geared at producing a homely and motherly image. 
On the other hand, Cherie Blair, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's spouse is a lawyer by 
trade and maintains her own life. The British Labour Party, in this case have manufactured 
either by design or default a liberal image of an independent working woman. 
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One of the conditions, which must occur in order to facilitate the successful transmission of 
the sender's desired image to the public is consistency of image. This is more likely to occur 
when complete consensus is reached in media outlets. If alternative or competing messages 
are disseminated through media channels, this will affect how the receiver interprets the 
message. A government friendly message may lose some credibility or be treated with 
suspicion if contradictory information is readily available. Indications seem to be that the 
Kremlin does not exercise complete control over all Russian media outlets. This is evident in 
some mild measure of pluralism that still exists in story and news content in the Russian 
media. 
Another problem faced by the Kremlin is the existence of pluralism in society. The break-up 
of the Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Marxist-Leninist hegemony has allowed some 
measure of political pluralism to begin to develop. Ultimately, this means that the voting 
public cannot be treated as an entirely homogenous group. Therefore any message intended to 
appeal to the public must be delivered in a manner that caters to a heterogeneous group. A 
message of this nature is more difficult to create and maintain due to lack of uniformity, 
bringing with it numerous pitfalls for the sender in achieving their desired end goal. 
The above mentioned problem became evident during President Putin's internet question 
answering session. He had his image built on a patriarchal model, which was assumed to be 
catering to the nation's desire to relive the past. The question from St. Petersburg proves that 
not everyone approves of a 'strong man' image that has been portrayed. 
Lastly, a possible obstacle to effective reception of the message, as per the sender's goals is 
the history of the Russian media in the role of public agitator and motivator. It would be naive 
to think that the entire public would be completely unaware of media manipulation, given that 
the Soviet people were subjected to propaganda for some 75 years. Public wariness of media 
manipulation, from at least some sections of society may prevent the' correct' interpretation 
of the message. This would have the effect of creating an alternative or counter-intended 
message. 
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2.1.2 Oligarchy and Putin 
Russia's economic elite seemed to have materialised from nowhere and have at times, 
blatantly exercised considerable influence on politics. The economic elite, so-called oligarchs, 
epitomise the merging of business and political power. Their strength and influence became a 
source of contention for not only the public, but also the political elite. So much so, that the 
topic of distancing the oligarchs from political power became an issue in the 2000 presidential 
elections. Yet, a little over one decade ago, officially there was no such group existing in 
society. From where do the oligarchs originate? 
Russian sociologist and writer, Yuri Burtin was less than flattering of the nature of 
contemporary politics. He has described the new Russian political elite as 'nomenklatura 
democracy,' where "democracy exists only for the members of the nomenklatura." Burtin 
added, that Russia's new economic system is 'nomenklatura capitalism.'248 
The oligarchs were able to gain power because of access to economic resources, which 
generated wealth and economic power. They are drawn from the old Soviet economic 
nomenklatura. This placed them in an ideal position in the old hierarchy. In addition to this, 
the oligarchs had the ability and intention to utilise this power for further personal gain. 
On July 8, 2000 Putin addressed both houses of parliament in his first state of the nation 
address. A portion of his speech contained his ideas on the defense ofthe state, and the 
building of a strong central state. In his address, Putin said "the only real choice for Russia is 
to be a strong country, strong and sure ofitself.,,249 
One of the methods that Putin intends to use to achieve a strong central state, is the rule of 
law, the so-called 'dictatorship oflaw.' President Putin believes that a strong set oflaws will 
clarify what is expected of the country's citizens, to bring order to a chaotic Russia. "We 
need to get all the authorities, all citizens to be aware of their responsibilities before the 
country.,,250 A message that echoed the famous inauguration speech of President Kennedy, 
"ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." 
248 Ra 'anan, U. & Martin, K., op. cit., p. 9. 
249Reuters, Highlights of Putin 's State of the Nation Address, 8 July, 2000. JRL # number 4391, July 9,2000. 
250Reuters, Highlights of Putin 's State of the Nation Address, 8 July, 2000. JRL # number 4391, July 9,2000. 
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In Russia's chaotic present, a proposed cure, that of patriotism was hinted by Putin. There is 
some concern that what makes Russia unique and different is being lost. If these lost Russian 
traditions and culture are revived, a renaissance of the Russian state will soon follow. "The 
unity of Russia is strengthened by the patriotic nature of our people, by our cultural traditions, 
memories [ ... J ."251 An emphasis was placed on patriotism and unity during the speech, on the 
premise that a strong central state can only exist if people feel strongly for their motherland 
and if the people are unified in their purpose. 
One of Put in's concerns is the nature of the relationship between Moscow and the regions. 
The governors of the provinces have been given a free reign since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Governors of the eastern spans of Russia, and the more remote areas, rule these 
regions as their own (independent of Moscow's authority). Events such as the scramble to 
grab Russia's wealth in the privatisation auctions, a rising rate of crime and a harsh life for the 
ordinary citizen have created a desire for the re-emergence of a strong central state. In the 
electioneering prior to the March presidential elections, Putin offered an appeal by promising 
a dictatorship of law. Implying that this would bring stability back into peoples lives. For this 
to work, the power of the regional governors needs to be broken. 
Power is to an extent diffused, some ofthe Kremlin's wishes are not carried out, especially 
ifthey do not further the local governor's ambitions. Some of the regions are ruled by the 
governors as states within a state. "The regions should not compete for power [ ... J, We have 
created little islands of power, but there are no bridges to connect them.,,252 
The recent attacks by the government on Media-Most have another possible meaning, other 
than the suppression of a free press. As outlined earlier the media was largely controlled by 
the oligarchs. Putin made the pledge to end the oligarchs grip on Russian politics. In order to 
send a message to the oligarchs, he needed to make an example of a media group. 
Media-Most has the reputation for being one of the most independent and outspoken media 
organisations in Russia (when they refused to follow the Kremlin's wishes on what is 
allowed to be shown in the coverage of the Chechen war). If the government had succeeded 
in bringing Media-Most to its knees, then other media groups, which were less independently 
251Reuters, Highlights of Putin 's State of the Nation Address, 8 July, 2000. JRL # number 4391, July 9, 2000. 
252Ibid. 
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minded would soon bow to their pressure and the oligarchs would lose their voice. This test 
case could become a blueprint for tackling the other media organisations under the control of 
other oligarchs. 
The detention of Vladimir Gusinsky, Media-Mast's head, and the attacks on Media-Most did 
not have the desired effect. Instead of crushing resistance to the Kremlin will, the actions of 
the Kremlin united the previously divided and feuding oligarch community. In an 
unprecedented move the oligarchs displayed open solidarity and supported Gusinsky. On 14 
June, 2000, seventeen of Russia's most prominent business leaders published an open letter 
to the prosecutor general, Vladimir Ustinov. In the letter, the oligarchs labeled Gusinsky's 
arrest as a political vendetta and a threat to democracy in Russia. 253 
Media-Most and the government have been involved in a constantly changing relationship. 
At present relations between them are strained. The involvement of Media-Most in exposing 
'truths' in Chechnya, corruption in government circles and supporting candidates other than 
Putin in the presidential elections has had the two sides feuding. A series of misfortunes have 
been plaguing Gusinky's organisation recently. 
The media group have had state owned banks calling in their loans. Another incident was a 
raid on the offices of Media-Most in Moscow. And on a more personal note, an official from 
the Kremlin publicly referred to Gusinsky as "a type ofbacteria.,,254 
Prior to the Kremlin's open display of hostility toward Media-Most a meeting took place 
preceding the upcoming elections of December 1999 and March 2000 between Vladimir 
Gusinsky and the Kremlin's Chief of Staff, Alexander V 0 loshin. Gusinsky claimed that 
Voloshin tried to persuade him to co-operate with the Kremlin during the presidential 
elections. According to Gusinsky the following conversation took place, "Voloshin said, as 
if he were joking, let's pay you US$l 00 million so that you wont be in our way while the 
election is on. You could go on a vacation.,,255 When Gusinsky refused Voloshin's offer, he 
was told that it meant war between the Kremlin and Media-Most. 
253Russia's 'Oligarchs' Rally Behind Fallen Comrade, EJC News Media Digest,15 June, 2000. 
www.ft.comlft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Articles&cid=FT35TBB5H9C&live=true&, 16 June, 2000. 
254Editorial, Moscow Times, Raid Part of a Disturbing New Pattern, May 17,2000. 
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On the morning of Thursday May 12, 2000, offices of the Media-Most group around 
Moscow were simultaneously raided by the FSB, tax police and the general prosecutor. The 
original purpose of the raid was given as a tax raid, this was later changed. The FSB gave the 
explanation, that they were looking for eavesdropping devices.256 
Mikhail Berger, Segodnya 's chief editor proposed two possible explanations for the raid. 
Firstly, as a direct response to the recent reports on corruption in Russia's power structures. 
The second reason given, is that this raid is merely the start of a broader clampdown on the 
freedom of the press.257 
During the Presidential campaign, Media-Most gave their support to Grigory Yavlinsky. 
Thus giving Yavlinsky a platform to deliver verbal attacks on Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir 
Putin.258 Due to the nature of the allocation of airtime on state controlled media at the time 
(March 1999), these attacks would have been very difficult to attempt without this help. 
The government and the various agencies involved in the operation have offered their 
explanations following the consequences of the raid. 
Vladimir Putin offered a defence through the PPS on May 12, he reiterated his commitment 
to freedom of speech and went on "this attitude does not depend on the position taken by this 
or that pUblication or channel, nor to what degree that position agrees with that ofthe 
authorities [ ... J all are equal before the law, no matter what business they are in." The 
statement argued that media companies cannot try to gain immunity from criminal 
investigations. "No attempt at blackmail in relation to law enforcement is permissible, just as 
limits on freedoms of speech and of the mass media are not permissible.,,259 
While Putin tried to distance himself from acting in a heavy-handed manner against a free 
press, the Press Minister Mikhail Lesin gave a different explanation. Lesin tried to pin the 
blame of the raid on the media. His statement revealed a certain zeal, with regard to the idea 
255Dixon, R., Pushing the Boundaries of a Free Press, Los Angeles Times, June 1,2000. 
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that the state must be protected at all costs against those who want to destroy it. "The defense 
of the state from the free mass media is a pressing problem at present.,,260 
In the post-raid analysis, several theories have been offered to explain why the Media-Most 
offices were targeted by the government. This incident has attracted the attention of human 
rights advocate groups, such as The Gorbachev Foundation, Institute of Humane 
Communication, Russian Union of Journalists and the Glasnost Defence Foundation. Each 
offering an interpretation of events. These groups believe that the raid was a carefully 
orchestrated attempt by the government to curtail the freedom of the press. 
An article in the Christian Science Monitor by Fred Weir, puts the notion forward that this 
raid is merely the latest event in the sometimes very public feuds among the oligarchs. A 
struggle between the oligarchs on the 'inner circle' of the government 
(such as Boris Berezovsky) and those that are vying for influence.261 
Many, mostly unsupported accusations are aired publicly. The feud between the two media 
magnates, Berezovsky and Gusinsky is particularly vicious. Gusinsky has been the target of 
anti-Semitic coverage on ORT, a television channel controlled by Berezovsky ( both 
Berezovsky and Gusinsky are Jewish ).262 An editorial in the Moscow Times (May 17, 2000) 
was more specific on one ofthese allegations of ORT against NTVand Gusinsky, ORThad 
apparently insinuated that NTV was a base for Israeli spies.263 
Alexei Simonov, chairman of the Glasnost Defence Foundation (GDF), did not view the raid 
as a random act. "This assault did not come out of thin air, it is part of a deliberate pattern of 
actions. There have been many warnings that the new President intends to force the press to 
follow his line, and use all means to punish those who refuse.,,264 
The Russian Union of Journalists (RUJ) was equally scathing of the raid, viewing it as an 
attack on the freedom of the press and as an anti-constitutional act. In a statement released by 
RUJ several issues were raised, "the armed raid was an anti-constitutional, arbitrary act of 
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government conducted with the goal of intimidating the independent mass media. This is a 
real attempt to introduce censorship by (men in) ski masks.,,265 
IosifDzyaloshinsky's view, who is the President of the Independent Institute of 
Communicativists, is that "whatever Putin's programs for the economy and politics, we are 
absolutely sure he does not intend to tolerate dissent in society."266 
Some analysts feel that there has been a shift in power, and as a result ofthis shift, it has 
enabled an attack on the freedom ofthe press. The Gorbachev Foundation's conclusion, is 
that "the security forces have become much more influential in Russia under Putin, and they 
are behind these new pressures on the press. The free press stands in their way, and Most is 
the premier symbol of independent media in Russia."267 
In view of the above statement, it does not come as a surprise, that approximately one week 
before the raid on the Most offices, the Moscow newspaper Kommersant, published what was 
reputed to be a Kremlin 'working paper.' This paper called for an expansion of the security 
forces duties, to include such roles as intervening against opposition media and political 
groups. According to what was published in Kommersant, the document proposed that "the 
President needs a structure in his administration that cannot only forecast the political 
situation but also clearly control the political and social processes in Russia."268 
With the raid following this document's publication, there was some skepticism about the 
government's true intentions. And the reasons offered by the government were treated with 
little serious regard. The response of the press community in Moscow was to organise an 
Obshchaya Gazeta (Joint Newspaper). This paper is only produced when the press community 
feels that there is a threat to the freedom of the press. Some 62 newspapers and media 
organisations helped to produce the issue on May 17,2000 (only 30 sponsors helped with the 
edition which protested against Andrei Babitsky's treatment by the government ).269 The 
media organisations owned by Boris Berezovsky were noted for their lack of support in the 
joint edition.270 Which highlights the highly political nature of the newspaper business and the 
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oligarchs. 
An uneasy truce between the government and NTV was reached on the 28th of May. Kukly 
("Puppets"), a political satire show using puppets, was dropped by NTV.271 The show was a 
source of irritation for Putin, who did not like the way he was portrayed on the program. 
Yevgeny Kiselyov of NTV said that 
"NTV and Media-Most executives received conditions, the respect of which 
would mean the authorities would leave us in peace. Foremost, that Putin 
should no longer be the hero of the Kukly program. In order not to fan the 
flames, if someone high up is so worried about a rubber puppet of the 
President, before it was Yeltsin and now Putin, we have decided to try an 
experiment. We will try one program without the Putin puppet.,,272 
Kukly has had a long and troubled history with attempted political interference. The program 
has been a source of discontent for the Russian elite due to their irreverent portrayal. In 1995 
the prosecutor general pursued a criminal investigation against Kukly for "insulting" President 
Yeltsin. On this occasion political support favoured the program, resulting in the prosecutor's 
dismissal. 273 
A renewed effort was waged against Kukly by supporters of Put in. They claimed that the 
President Putin had been "insulted" and called for the filing of criminal charges. Senior 
police officials added a warning to NTV, that if Kukly did not tone down the content NTV 
could face "unpleasantness.,,274 
Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Centre summed up why he 
thought the government behaved in this way toward Kukly: 
27lIn the early 1990's Russian TV used the British media as a model, and this satirical programme became a 
hallmark of the Russian media policy in the 1990' s, reflecting the Yeltsin government's commitment to 
pluralisation of opinion and freedom of speech. Kukly is an imitation of the British satirical show "Splitting 
Image." 
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"The Kremlin does not want to destroy NTV, it only wants to make it submit 
to the Kremlin's official line. They were very dissatisfied with Kukly's 
interpretation of Putin's political activities. This show is more damaging to 
Putin's reputation than any criticism from the communists or other politicians. 
[ ... ] ( the Press Ministry) is trying to restrict and correct the media. It is a real 
threat to the free press in Russia.'>27S 
The Kremlin's actions in trying to force NTV to submit to their will seems to be heavy 
handed and unnecessary. Kukly was a very popular program, the popularity arising from an 
irreverent treatment of Russia's leading political and business figures. This popularity has 
come into conflict with the government's intention to control the flow of information. Should 
they succeed in their efforts against Kukly, the Kremlin will have brought to heal a long-lived 
source of irritation. In addition, their success will also display the power at the government's 
disposal by subduing a high profile, private independent media organisation. This would have 
the effect of 'frightening' other would-be independent media groups into complying with 
future government demands. The recent series of 'attacks' on NTV are part of a bigger picture 
of subduing the remnants of a free Russian press. 
In an interview at Radio Mayak, one week from the election, Putin said that the oligarchs 
influence was largely due to their "merging of power with capital." Putin went on to issue the 
threat that "such a class will cease to exist. [ ... ] Unless we ensure equal conditions for all, we 
won't be able to pull the country out of its current state.',276 Putin's comment has brought him 
into conflict with the oligarchs. One of the more outspoken oligarchs is Boris Berezovsky. 
In May 2000 Berezovsky was openly boasting about his prowess as the power broker of 
Russian politics. He talked of his role in being able to persuade President Yeltsin to resign, 
and in promoting the next President to office, Vladimir Putin. By late July 2000, however 
with the political fortunes seemingly turning against him, Berezovsky has been taking a 
different approach. He has begun to distance himself from the government and into the 
position of opposition. When Berezovsky was in the process of resigning from parliament he 
parted with a message, "I do not want to take part in the destruction of Russia and the 
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creation of an authoritarian regime. There is a deliberate campaign being unleashed, aimed at 
destroying big business in Russia. All power is being concentrated in the President's 
hands. ,,277 
But what are Boris Berezovsky's exact motives for this sudden change in political 
affiliation? Are there are any alterior motives? A possible reason for Berezovsky's actions are 
related to recent events of the political past. 
Boris Berezovsky has tried to exert his influence on the newly elected President Putin very 
quickly. It was a blatant attempt by a political actor to influence his audience (President 
Vladimir Putin) with subjective political reality. In late March 2000, a paper owned by 
Berezovsky printed an article which reminded Putin of who was responsible for getting him 
into the presidential office, and the possible consequences ifhe forgot. 
Putin's planned reforms have the potential to seriously disrupt the way that Berezovsky will 
be able conduct his business deals in the future. The plans to strengthen the central 
government at the expense of the regional governors means that separate business deals with 
the regions may not be allowed. And it is in the regions where the vast wealth of natural 
resources are located, at present in the control of the governors. 
Recently, Putin has also pledged to crackdown on the oligarchs, to distance them all from 
power. Berezovky's proximity to power has placed him as a target of this crackdown. 
Another of Put in's election promises was to tackle the problem of corruption. When the 
government was headed by Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, a charge of embezzlement and 
money-laundering was laid against Berezovsky in 1999. When Yeltsin removed Primakov as 
Prime Minister, Berezovsky's arrest warrant was lifted.278 Kaspe was quoted as saying 
"Berezovsky clearly understands that his number is coming up. That is why he has been 
moving for the past month into opposition to Putin. When the police come for him, he wants 
to be able to say it is about political repression, not a criminal investigation.,,279 
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During April and May 2000, Berezovsky's business 'transactions' were sUbjected to intense 
scrutiny by the Prosecutor General's Office. One of the investigators assigned to the Aeroflot 
case, Nikolai Volkov was prepared by early April 2000 to officially lay charges against the 
oligarch. Berezovsky was accused of fraud and money-laundering, an estimated US$400 
million made by Aeroflot was transferred to two of his financial companies (Andawa and 
Forus) in Switzerland. An additional charge of creating a criminal association is under 
consideration.280 
Berezovsky does not intend to be passive in his resistance to the likely scenario of his 
business being curtailed. He has made two announcements, firstly that he is stepping down as 
a deputy in the State Duma (supposedly as a mark of protest because Putin's style of 
leadership). The second announcement was that he is consolidating his media assets into a 
single company, to protect his political interests.281 Through the newspaper Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, Berezovsky made it quite clear that he intended to use his media empire as a political 
weapon, that would enable it to serve as an "important political lever" in challenging 
President Putin.282 
Initiating an information war with Putin's admipistration, Berezovsky continues to try and 
influence public opinion and the government through his media assets. In May 2000, 
Berezovsky had published an open letter which criticised Putin's plans to limit regional 
power. Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Centre, said that "the 
letter is a pretext to form a new opposition of regional leaders and 0Iigarchs.,,283 
Yevgenia Albats, an independent journalist based in Moscow, went on to describe an article 
published in another paper owned by an oligarch that she refers to as BAB (Boris 
Abramovich Berezovsky). The article alleged, in a half-hearted manner that election fraud 
had taken place. This article refuted previous election claims; 
"According to information from unofficial sources, acting President Vladimir 
Putin won around 42% of the vote on March 26, not the 44.8% the 
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Communists say that he got, and certainly not the 52.5%, as the Central 
Election Commission has stated. Putin received 10.5% of his votes as the 
result of outright election fraud.,,284 
Berezovsky claimed that he was worried about Russia's future, he did not want to see the 
end of democracy. Izvestia took a more cynical approach as to possible motives for writing 
this letter. The newspaper claims Berezovsky views himself as a kind of father figure to Putin 
(because of his help at the elections), the letter was a public attempt to control Putin, who was 
making decisions which were independent of 'The Family. ,285 
The letter contained eight suggestions, which Berezovsky wanted put to a public 
referendum. These suggestions would ultimately enhance the regions independence. 
Berezovsky's proposals would also give him more opportunity to interfere with regional 
politics. The sixth suggestion would benefit Berezovsky, because Prosecutor General Ustinov 
is an associate ofBerezovsky's. 
• Ask President Putin to cancel the decree which establishes the seven federal 
districts. 
• Use direct popular elections to create the Federation Council. 
• To pass legislation that the dismissal of elected regional and local leaders will only be 
carried out by the will of voters. 
Ell Delineate and unify respective rights and obligations ofthe federal centre and the regIOns 
in a single, standardised federative agreement. 
Ell Retain present system of creating organs of local government, while strengthening 
legislation which gives their independence from regional leaders and accountability to 
voters. 
• Establish local prosecutor's offices, which are directly accountable to the Prosecutor 
General's Office, for overseeing compliance to the constitution. 
411 To introduce a common legislation which would establish the criminal liability of 
regional executive officials for specific violations ofthe federal law. 
II» To have the law dismissing or appointing the regional heads of regional offices of federal 
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agencies canceled. This should be agreed to by the regiona11eaders?86 
Putin's intended reforms have been labeled as a mistake and 'Soviet.' Berezovsky told 
Reuters on June 2,2000, "what Putin is suggesting is destroying the principle of the vertical 
division of power. It is the centralisation of vertical power [ ... J in other words, the Soviet 
system of government. [ ... J but this is a mistake.,,287 
The destruction ofthe vertical division of power which Berezovsky refers to is the power 
relationship between the regions and Moscow. Putin has announced that he wants to reform 
the provinces, and part of this reform entails amalgamating Russia's 89 provinces into seven 
administrative regions. The proposed reforms would also give Putin the power to sack the 
governors and place administrators of his choice in place of the governors. 
Putin's threatened 'dictatorship oflaw' has the potential to ruin Berezovsky. Promises of 
keeping the oligarchs from power and to investigate alleged acts of corruption have proved 
popular with the Russian public. In a Reuters conducted poll, Putin received a 73 % rate of 
approval for his conduct in July 2000.288 Berezovsky relies on his contacts within the inner 
circle of power in order to conduct his business. If the Kremlin is successful in its pursuit of 
the oligarchs, with Berezovsky shutout of the inner circle and his past business deals are used 
against him, then he will be finished. So far, Berezovsky's reaction to the pressure exerted on 
him and the other oligarchs, seems to be out of the desire for the self-preservation of his 
business interests and himself. In the nine years since the fall of communism, during the rule 
of President Yeltsin, Berezovsky has amassed a fortune and he has a lot to lose ifPutin is 
successful. 
2.2 Access and Method of Communication: Yeltsin and Luzhkov. 
Both Boris Yeltsin and Yuri Luzhkov are high-profile political actors in the Russian 
Federation. Yeltsin held power from 1991 unti11999, during which time he appeared 
regularly on the mass media mediums. He initially began his public image as a vibrant man of 
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the people, who was capable of both empathy with and compassion for 'his' people. He held 
the advantage of political incumbency and therefore access to all of the state owned media. 
But ultimately his positive PR image attempts foundered and in the end failed. Why did this 
occur? 
Yuri Luzhkov, the current Mayor of Moscow has long held the ambition of being elected to 
the Russian presidency. Consequently he retained close links with Yeltsin to increase the 
chances of being named as Yeltsin's successor. At the same time he built up a media base via 
the Moscow City Council, which acquired media assets that have been effectively controlled 
by Luzhkov. After Yeltsin nominated Putin as his successor, Luzhkov aligned himself with 
Primakov. The results proved to be potentially dangerous for Moscow's Mayor. What image 
does Luzhkov portray to the Russian public and was his message effective? 
2.2.1 President Boris Yeltsin - Russia's Past President. 
Boris Yeltsin was the first Russian president of the First Russian Republic. Although he was 
the country's first democratically elected leader, his roots began in the Communist Party 
hierarchy. He had his own distinct style of governance, gaining initial popularity by his 
association as one of the people. The popular appeal to the masses was an initial success, 
however as Russia lurched through a series of recessions and economic difficulty he needed to 
devise an alternative motive to regain public appeal. 
The roots of the contemporary Russian Presidency lies in Gorbachev's creation of the Soviet 
Presidency in 1990.289 To launch his political career, Yeltsin needed to destroy another's, that 
of Mikhail Gorbachev. To bring this plan to eventual fruition he established the news agency 
RIA-Novosti to wage an information war. 290 Other Soviet relics that were inherited by the First 
Russian Republic (1991 - 1993) included the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's 
Deputies. It was intended that the two forces (the president and the executive) would balance 
each other and operate as a dyarchy (dvovlastie).291 Checks and balances in this system 
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seemed to ensure that no one institution gained too much power and influence. 
During the euphoria of this period, Yeltsin had a distinct advantage over his political 
opponents. Yeltsin was the dominant figure in Russian politics of the immediate post-
communist period due to public perception, which strongly identified him as being symbolic 
ofthe victory over communism in August 1991. This meant that there was no viable political 
alternative to Y eltsin. 292 
Yeltsin is a shrewd politician and a survivor, he knew how to tum this circumstance to his 
advantage. His tendencies oscillated between democratic and autocratic throughout the eight 
years that he was president. After outmanoeuvring his political opponents, Yeltsin was able to 
concentrate a great deal of power in the hands of the president. The Prime Minister has little 
real power. This enabled Yeltsin to make the Prime Minister the scapegoat during periods of 
political unpopularity.293 The alarming rate at which Prime Ministers were hired and fired 
during Yeltsin' s tenure is testimony to this notion. During a period of less than two years 
Yeltsin dismissed no less than four Prime Ministers. 294 
The media's honeymoon with the new Yeltsin government was brief. As the crises in society 
began to emerge, the media found that these made for sensational reporting. Yeltsin, who had 
been held up by the media as a champion of democracy now began to receive bad pUblicity. 
A discernible break in Y eltsin' s style ofleadership occurred before and after the 1993 coup 
attempt. The groups who he patronised also changed as the requirements of his administration 
changed. One outstanding feature that continued through the Yeltsin years (1991 - 1999) was 
the sense of chaos and lack oflaw. 
Political scientist, Thomas Remmington, describes Y eltsin' s Russia as a 'soft state;' 
"Yeltsin's Russia today displays all the pathologies of a soft state: 
government can not ensure that policy is carried out, or even guarantee the 
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timely payment of wages to employees, announcements about new state 
agencies and progress are made and soon forgotten, and a crisis of law 
enforcement is manifested by the enormous rise of organised crime, deep 
government corruption, and lax fiscal control."295 
The above description ofYeltsin's Russia paints a bleak picture. Russian commentators, 
when referring to the period ofYeltsin's term in office, use the term bespredel (without 
limits).296 To infer that the entirety of the country operated without limits is an over-
exaggeration. Yeltsin was a 'hands-on' ruler, who liked to be at the 'coal face' of politics. 
Although Yeltsin made his initial profile as that of a democrat, his words and actions told 
another story. Yeltsin made compromises as a strategy for his personal survival, on the one 
hand (such as the fostered regionalism - to 'buy' to regional governors support in the 
Federation Council). But, he also liked to be in charge of matters and once stated that "I act 
the way I consider necessary.,,297 As such, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior 
associate Lilia Shevtsova, considers Yeltsin to be a reactive and impulsive po1itician.298 
Y eltsin' s perception of democracy and the form it should take, appears to be tainted by a 
mixture of past experience and his personality type. His intentions and aspirations are plain, 
using his own words. 
"Everything should be subordinate to a single, sharply defined principle, 
law, establishment. Roughly speaking, someone in the country should be 
chief. That is all there is to it. ,,299 
As the head of the executive branch of government, Yeltsin was able to wei1d a lot of 
influence over the state controlled media assets. As will be explained in the censorship 
sections, he could hire and fire the heads of state TV at will. In addition to this, the 
government appoints the chairman and the deputies of RlA-Novosti. Since 1993 (unti12000) 
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there have been five chairpeople.30o The lack of job security by state media workers creates an 
environment of fear. Therefore incumbency endows the political actor with much power and 
influence to dictate the course of state media actions and coverage. The state media workers 
are oblidged to carry out the wishes of their political master, for if they do not they will be 
without work. 
Russia was operated as a myriad of interest groups vying for influence and power. Yeltsin 
was able to play these groups against one another to maintain his position of power. Certainly, 
Yeltsin considered himself to be the Patriarch of his entourage / family. As the Patriarch, he 
demanded nothing less than total loyalty and obedience from the 'Family' (the inner circle of 
friends and associates was known as the Family).301 
His patriarchal tendencies did not stop at relations with members of the Family, but also 
member states of the CIS. Yeltsin considered these countries to be his children. As the 
'children's' father, he was very protective of Russian interests in the CIS. A continuance of 
tone, as if the Soviet Union still existed.302 
A difference existed between the early and later years ofYeltsin's presidency. The watershed 
of change occurred in 1993, during the coup attempt. During the early stages of his rule, 
Yeltsin was a populist who was able to mobilise the masses against his political opposition.303 
He carried an air of charismatic authority about him, such as his speech on top of the tank 
outside the Whitehouse during the 1991. 
The later presidency saw a shift toward patriarchalism, he wanted to be firmly in charge of 
affairs. His personality became more inaccessible and withdrawn.304 But what was the reason 
for this change in attitude? 
The catalyst of the change appears to be the events surrounding the 1993 coup. During the 
unrest, the secret police and the armed forces failed to publicly voice their support for Yeltsin. 
He had considered this group to be among his trusted allies. Consequently he became a more 
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bitter, untrusting and brutal ruler.305 
A change was witnessed in the groups, which Yeltsin favoured. Certain types of entourage 
were more dominant than others, at certain stages. Early in his presidency, before he became 
disillusioned, Yeltsin chose young and reform minded democrats (such as Chubais and 
Nemtsov). But, as time progressed, a stronger tendency toward favouring the so-called siloviki 
(the 'power ministries' such as police, FSB and armed forces) became apparent. When 
choosing his government, ex-siloviki filled the top posts, men such as Primakov, Stepashin 
and Putin.306 
Yeltsin was the president of the Russian Federation for some eight years. He inherited his 
position from the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. As time progressed, Y eltsin' s health 
and popUlarity both declined. It has been suggested that Yeltsin wished to be president until 
the year 2000, when he was expected to step aside. On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin suddenly 
resigned his position. But this move helped to ensure that his legacy remained secure. This 
gave Putin, his chosen successor, the advantage of incumbency (as the acting president) and 
brought the presidential elections forward three months. The constitution requires an election 
to be held with in ninety days of the president's resignation. 307 
During Y eltsin' s tenure in office, conflict between the legislative and executive branches of 
government began at an early stage. Throughout this conflict, Yeltsin used the media as a tool 
to discredit his political opposition. The main gist of his argument revolved around the 
premise that the parliament was the chief obstacle to reform. 
Yeltsin's main political rival in 1992 was Ruslan Khasbulatov, but he was not able to match 
the President's popular public profile. This was for a number of reasons as characterised in the 
following description. 
Ruslan Khasbulatov had a "gloomy character and acerbic manner inspired a 
strong dislike for him in many people. [ ... J His team of unappealing 
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appartatchiki generally compared unfavourably with the dynamic, polished, 
and articulate people around Y eltsin. ,,308 
During Y eltsin' s tenure as President of the Russian Federation (1991 - 1999), he held the 
advantage of incumbency. This meant that he was able to harness the power of the state media 
to his benefit. Relations between the media and Yeltsin began well. During the initial period 
of privatisation, Yeltsin gave the media complete independence from their Soviet minders. In 
return, the media assumed that their independence would continue so long as Yeltsin's 
presidency continued. Therefore the media were closely aligned to Yeltsin.309 
Relations with the private media were however, not so clearly defined. By 1995 the media 
began to tum away from Yeltsin. The First Chechen War was offered as a possible reason, as 
Yeltsin seemed powerless to stop the war. 310 However, the 1996 presidential elections saw a 
convergence of interests between the government and the owners of the private media, due to 
the Communist Party 'threat.' After the successful conclusion to the elections (for Yeltsin), a 
series of economic crises and bouts of illness saw the gradual errosion of Yeltsin' s public 
credability. No longer was he perceived as being an energetic man of the people, but perhaps 
as a sick and corrupt politician with only self-interest at heart. 
In a final act, to try and protect The Family and himself, Yeltsin executed a very well timed 
and choreographed exit from office on 31 December, 1999. The scene and setting were well 
staged and had several important aspects to it. 
• Done on New Years Eve - people were celebrating and were distracted. 
ED Yeltsin wiped a tear from his eye on the televised broadcast. 
• Asked for the peoples' forgiveness as "many of our dreams have not been realised.,,3ll 
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2.2.2 Yuri Luzhkov - Mayor of Moscow 
Moscow's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov has proved to be a very ambitious and driven political 
figure. He has been the Mayor of Moscow since 1992.3\2 For some time he considered himself 
to be Yeltsin's heir to the Russian presidency. He strove to achieve popularity by undertaking 
high profile publics acts and embarking upon a massive upgrade programme of Moscow's 
public infrastructure. Luzhkov also has close ties to the Russian Orthodox Church.3J3 
Testimony to his influence and power in Moscow is a nickname that he has earned - the Tsar 
of Moscow. Luzhkov supported Yeltsin at critical points, such as the August 1991 coup and 
the 1993 crisis between Parliament and the Yeltsin. As a sign of gratitude of this 'loyalty' 
Yeltsin rewarded him by granting broad powers outside of federal control, which exempted 
Moscow city from Russia's privatisation programme.314 
As a shrewd and astute politician, Luzhkov is aware of the need for political connections, 
good media coverage and publicity. He set about achieving this goal by granting media outlets 
that were based in Moscow privileges. Some of these concessions included lower taxes, rents 
and utility charges. In return he had secured neutral or favourable media coverage.315 
Luzhkov gradually brought a merging of media, financial and political capital to help him 
with favourable publicity in the media, which could in the end be used to start a PR campaign 
for entry into national politics. The weekly pUblication Obshchaya Gazeta is financed by 
Luzhkov. Mosbiznesbank funds the publication of the newspaper Rossiya.316 
In addition to influencing media outlets, Moscow City controls numerous media outlets 
directly. As the Mayor of Moscow Luzhkov has been able to exert his influence over these 
media. Some of the media enterprises that are controlled by Moscow City include; 
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(II TV Tsentr 
III Literaturnaya Gazeta 
III Rossiya 
III Vechernaya Moskva 
ell Metro 
(II Moskovskaya Pravda (printing plant)31? 
(II TeleExpo 
(II Metropolis (publishing house) 
!III Tsentr Plus 
III Kultura 
!III Vecherny Klub 
• Tverskaya 13318 
The 1996 Moscow Mayoral elections saw Luzhkov take 96% of the vote.319 In the 1997 
elections to the Moscow City Duma, those aligned to Luzhkov did very well. In the aftennath 
of the successful elections, his supporters took steps to create a pro-Luzhkov party, which 
could launch his presidential aspirations into a more practical application. The party 
Otechestvo was founded. 320 He began to distance himself from the Kremlin in the late-Yeltsin 
era. In one instance, the airforce declined pennission for Luzhkov to travel by helicopter into 
Tver, on the grounds that Yeltsin was to fly to Gennany for a G-8 meeting the next day. 
Luzhkov's inspection of the fanns proceeded, but by car and with the declaration that the 
Kremlin had made him "enemy No. 1."321 
Several issues and areas have been targeted by the Mayor and his advisors, to give him a 
social-democratic political platfonn from which to initiate his national political aspirations. 
Sometimes these issues may be 'ordinary' and on other occasions could be considered to be 
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controversial, they are all designed to bring Luzhkov pUblicity. A partial list of issues or 
causes that have been raised or championed by Luzhkov is given below. 
• Visited Crimea and proclaimed that Sevastopol should be Russian and not Ukrainian. 
41& Made favourable remarks regarding the Belarussian President Alexandr Lukashenka 
and the Russian-Belarusian Union. 
• April 1998 called for economic sanctions against Latvia due to alleged civil rights 
violations against the Russian-speaking minority in the country. Took part in a street 
protest outside the Latvian embassy in Moscow.322 
• Vowed to resurrect Russian industry his way. Two ailing auto-makers were 
re-nationalised in the process (ZiL and AZLK). 
41& Likes to be seen, in well publicised media events, manning wrecking cranes, 
destroying the Khrushchev-era appartment blocks and building new ones in their 
place.323 
Specific, colourful and patriotic symbols are employed by Luzhkov to facilitate the 
manufacturing ofa favourable public sentiment toward him. At the Mayor's request, central 
Moscow buildings had large banners displaying Soviet military medals draped over them. An 
imperial eera symbol that seems to be often employed by Luzhkov is his doning of armour, as 
the 11th Century figure credited with founding Moscow - Yuri Dolgoruky. He wears a leather 
cap at most dedication ceremonies and public events, this is his trademark that is used to 
differentiate him from other political figures. 324 
Between the August 1998 economic crisis and the 1999/2000 electoral cycle, Luzhkov saw 
his political ambitions umavel. He embarked on a deliberate campaign to distance himself 
from the Kremlin to capture the anti-Kremlin vote, but ended up in a protracted legal (see 
chapter 4.8.4) and kompromat (see chapter 2.3.2) campaign with the government. This fight 
proved to be very costly, as both Luzhkov and Primakov were targeted in a very nasty and 
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slanderous black PR action. The 2000 mayoral elections reflected this, as Luzhkov received 
70% of the vote in these elections.325 
Perhaps sensing impending financial and political strife, Luzhkov changed allegiance again 
and cast his public support for Putin. This seemed to bring a halt to government actions 
against Luzhkov and his interests. From June 2000, his political prospects appeared more 
rosy. He accompanied Putin on a visit to Italy, where a possible pact or an understanding may 
have been forged during a three hour closed session meeting between the two. The 
Berezovsky controlled newspaper Kommersant announced that Luzhkov had been 
"rehabilitated. ,,326 
2.3 Presidential Elections 
The importance of friendly media coverage to politicians has been realised for some time. 
Politicians have used various means to gain this coverage, often by less than scrupulous 
means. I will start by outlining the main political parties in contemporary Russian politics and 
their role in the political process. 
Elections in the Russian Federation, both presidential and gubemational, are contested 
bitterly by political rivals. Dirty tricks and compromising material (kompromat) are widely 
used to gain an advantage over the opposition. The public has become wary and cynical 
toward Russian politics and politicians. In a poll conducted in 1999; only 3% of respondents 
thought that the 'worthiest individuals' won elections. However, 83% of respondents thought 
that the 'most cunning' won the elections.327 
During times of unpopularity Yeltsin's convenient scapegoat was usually, immediately 
preceding an election the director of state TV. The first years of the post-Soviet transition 
witnessed a rapid succession of directors. Yegor Yakovlev was dismissed from the 
directorship of state TV in November 1992, Yeltsin accused him of allowing negative 
coverage of Russian troops in North Ossetia. Yakovlev's successor, Vyacheslav Bragin did 
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not fear much better and was dismissed in December 1993. His crime was permitting a 
documentary about Zhirinovsky to be aired the night before the national elections. The next 
appointment to state TV's directorship was Aleksandr Yakovlev.328 
The 1995 and 1996 elections were a watershed in electoral conduct. Collusion between the 
oligarchs and Yeltsin, to maintain the status quo saw the decline of pluralism in the media. 
Something from which the media has not recovered. 329 The presidential campaign was a 
bruising, gruelling and merciless slog for the candidates. A deliberate strategy was employed 
to bring about a more easily manageable campaign by dividing it into a two-way contest. 330 
In the 1995 elections National TV and radio was legally required to provide one hour free 
airtime to political party advertising. This advertising allocation had to be shared among 43 
parties. However, parties could choose to purchase additional airtime, which cost between 
US$10, 000 - 30, 000 per minute. Consequently, small parties were not in a financial position 
to compete for airtime with the larger more established political parties.331 
The content of media coverage gave the voter little in the way of information on party image 
and ideology.332 Instead, the focus ofthe election was based on anti-Communist rhetoric and a 
war of personalities. This superficial method of waging an election campaign gave the voter 
very little idea of what social, political and economic policy they may expect after a 
government has been sworn in. 
As the Kremlin controlled the country's main national TV stations, they were in a position to 
exact some measure of control over the share of airtime that political parties received. The 
pro-government Our Home is Russia party gained a 25% share of the free airtime in 1995.333 
This share ofthe free airtime is very disproportionate when the number of political parties 
involved in the electoral process is taken into account. 
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The Central Electoral Commission, a supposedly neutral body designed to oversee and 
ensure a free and fairly contested electoral process had an influence in the final outcome. They 
consistently supported the government's case when the other political parties lodged 
complaints.334 
Yeltsin fought the 1996 presidential campaign on a strongly anti -Communist platform.335 As 
may be expected, the state owned media were openly biased toward the Yeltsin campaign. If 
resistance was sensed or undesirable results achieved, a more 'reliable' person usually 
replaced the head of state media.336 During the course of the presidential election campaign 
Yeltsin received 53 % of the transmission time allocated to the presidential candidates.337 
Co-operation was also secured from the private media. One of the reasons for their 
assistance was a fear that a return to communism would see the end of media freedom in the 
Russian Federation.338 In his autobiography, Yeltsin summed up the resource and financial 
help that he received from the oligarchs. "During the elections financial capital turned into 
political capital. ,,339 
The ¥...PRF presidential campaign failed to take advantage of the first round lead. They did 
not take Yeltsin to task on issues such as Chechnya (lst War), conscription or economic 
decline. Their campaign was poorly co-ordinated and at times sent contradictory messages to 
the public through the mixing of Leninist and Russian Orthodox symbolism.340 
KPRF's approach to the election campaign differed greatly from Yeltsin's, which was 
conducted on a more professional level. His campaign message was consistent and had a well 
planned strategy. In addition to using the fear of a resurgent Communist Party and all of the 
chaos that it would bring, Y eltsin' s personal traits were touched upon. Yeltsin proj ected 
himself as the 'glue' that held Russia together, a message that became more intense as the 
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campaign progressed.341 
Open hostility between the executive and legislative branches of government was briefly 
abandoned in late 1997. Yeltsin was able to secure a truce with parliament by increasing 
parliamentary access to the media. This was achieved via the following measures; 
• Two hours of airtime each week on state radio dedicated to parliamentary activities. 
• Two hours of airtime each week on RTR dedicated to parliamentary activities. 
• Funding was provided for a new parliamentary newspaper.342 
Yeltsin found compromise necessary during periods of low popularity. At this stage low 
popularity coincided with a large Communist Party representation in parliament. 
A perceivable break in campaign rhetoric between the Yeltsin era presidential elections and 
Putin's style is evident. A new set of issues and styles has taken a dominant role in the 
presidential election campaign. 
"It is characteristic that during the last Duma and presidential election 
campaigns, the rhetoric has changed strikingly in comparison with earlier 
campaigns. Neither democracy nor freedom of the press, issues that carried 
the day during the early 1990's, were present among the slogans of either 
candidate or their programmes. Much more fashionable have become cliches 
such as 'law and order,' and 'state' and 'national interests.' Patriotic appeals 
rather than universal human values or human rights now dominate electoral 
campaigns most of all at the expense of public interest.,,343 
Putin was able to disseminate his desired image in the period prior to the presidential 
elections via state owned and other government 'friendly' media outlets. In the period from 
January to March 2000, Komsomolskaya Pravda informed its audience about Putin's 
biography. The affect of this publicity was to make Putin appear more understandable and 
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human to the readers. 344 
State controlled media carefully covered all of Put in's visits and cultivated the image of an 
apolitical politician. Putin had as much coverage on Russian TV as Zyganov, Yavlinsky and 
Zhirinovsky combined (Putin's three main contenders). During the period leading up to the 
election of March 26, 2000, Putin received nine hours of coverage between March 3 - March 
21 on the state channel ORT.345 
As the 2000-election campaign progressed and Putin seemed increasingly likely to win the 
contest, some media switched their allegiance. NTVand TV Tsentr became more pro-Putin in 
their coverage from February 2000. By this time it had become clear that the networks would 
have no other presidential candidates to support.346 
A political scientist at Oxford University, Professor Archie Brown, summed up a major 
difference between Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin. Both Yeltsin and Putin 
have their roots in the Soviet administration, but "Vladimir Putin, who unlike Boris Yeltsin, 
displays some real nostalgia for the Soviet Union, clearly wishes to restore Russia as a great 
power - though not necessarily as a 'superpower. "'347 
2.3.1 New Rules of the Game 
President Putin facing little in the way of serious political challenge to his rule or the reforms 
which he has been pushing through parliament. His opposition is broken into factions, which 
also fight each other. 
In the years after Russia adopted a democratic model of government, there has been an 
increasing number of minor political parties that have been formed. In the 1995 Duma 
elections, 43 political parties were on the ballot. But, by the 1999 Duma elections the trend 
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had been reversed with only 26 parties on the ballot papers.348 What had caused this new trend, 
and why? 
New rules had been instituted which made the survival of minor parties very difficult. The 
all-powerful Central Electoral Commission (CEC) was in charge of administering the 
electoral laws. They have the ultimate power that has the potential to bring about a party's 
demise, if the CEC had such an intent. 
The structure of the electoral system has forced some political adaptation and compromise. 
Russia's ballot consists of two distinct parts, a proportional representational part and a first 
past the post system. A 5% threshold applies to the proportional representative portion of the 
system, this in effect deters small parties from contesting the elections. Of the 43 parties 
which contested the 1995 Duma elections, only four passed the 5% threshold.349 
First past the post applies to the single member district part of the ballot. Constraints 
imposed by this system force parties of similar ideologies to run mutually agreed upon 
candidates.35o This political collusion, required for the survival of parties may have the effect 
of limiting or stunting the full potential of political pluralism. An alternative view may state 
that it is best to rid the system of weak and ineffectual parties. A kind of 'political 
Darwinism,' survival of the fittest parties only. 
As previously established, the CEC is a powerful organisation with a series of wide-ranging 
powers at its disposal. Listed below is an outline of some of the main means at its disposal, 
which can allow the CEC to exclude some political parties from the political process: 
• a requirement to verify 20% of the 200, 000 signatures needed for inclusion in the ballot. 
@! parties with 15% or more, invalid signatures are disqualified. 
@! candidates who do not submit an accurate financial statement, disclose a criminal record 
or foreign citizenship are disqualified. 
• disqualification of any top three candidates or 25% of candidates on entire list, 
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automatically excludes the party from the list. 
• 1999 electoral law stipulates a US$77, 000 deposit to be paid to get a party on the ballot, 
as an alternative to the 200, 000 signatures. Ifparty gains less than 3% of vote the deposit 
will be forfeited. Additionally, if the party gains less than 2%, they will be required to 
reimburse the CEC for allocated TV and radio time. 351 
These measures would appear to be aimed at limiting the proliferation of small political 
parties. The impact on a smaller party could be devastating, if one or more of these laws were 
found to be broken. But what have been the practical implications on Russian politics, apart 
from the stifling of small party creation? 
2.3.2 Use of Kompromat in Elections 
Through their ability to apply some control over the media, hence the makers of meaning, 
the government can derive benefits from a secondary power. A definition of the term 
secondary power is "the power that derives from the capacity to make or break political 
leaders, and either circulate or suppress information and ideas.,,352 Using the Russian example, 
the circulation or suppression of information and ideas are embodied in the use and 
application ofkompromat and 'freezing out' political opponents. 
The elections of 1999 and 2000 will be the focus of this section. I will be referring to the 
1995 and 1996 elections as a background and to compare these elections, to evaluate any 
possible differences or similarities in the way the campaigns unfolded. Needless to say, 
Russia's leading politicians waged both election campaigns in a ruthless manner. 
With the methods ofthe 1996 presidential campaign still fresh on the minds of the KPRF, 
they kept a relatively low profile. They did not want to 'rock the boat' from 1996 - 1999, 
because of the fear of another political crackdown if they did. The ideology and rhetoric of the 
party was strongly anti-systemic, but their actions were neutral. This was not ensure that a 
systemic crisis was not precipitated by their actions. 353 
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Gennady Zyganov, leader of the KPRF, attended a lot more interview programmes than in 
1996. This time, the Communist Party and Zyganov were not demonised, but their activities 
received very little media attention. All TV channels, including NTV gave considerable time 
and attention to Zyganov's rival, Arnan Tuleev (Kemerovo oblast governor). In 1996 Tuleev 
had supported Zyganov, but in the 2000 campaign he repeatedly criticised the leadership of 
the Communist Party.354 By not launching an all-out smear campaign against the Communist 
Party, it seems as though the government campaign strategists had discounted the KPRF as 
the Kremlin's main rival in the elections. So, ifthe Communist Party was not the main rival 
who was considered to be the main rival? 
The smear campaign waged by the government seemed to have two primary targets. One of 
these targets was Yabloko and its leader, Gregory Yavlinsky. A vicious smear campaign was 
unleashed in the final week ofthe race. It was feared that Yavlinsky, who appeared to be 
benefiting from high profile exposure, may have prevented Putin from winning an outright 
win in the first round of the elections.355 This could have occurred by splitting the vote, 
thereby taking votes from the other candidates, Putin required 50% or more ofthe vote to win 
in the first round. 
ORT and RTR refused to air two interview programmes featuring Yavlinsky, during the final 
week before the elections and launched a series of scathing attacks. Reports were shown, 
accusing Yavlinsky of breaking campaign spending rules, taking money from foreign sources, 
seeking to undermine Russian stability and having plastic surgery. Three days before the 
election ORT and RTR aired a phoney press conference, in which flamboyant homosexuals 
gave their support to Yavlinsky.356 
In addition to be attacked by the government, Yabloko was also embroiled in a bitter 
information war with SPS and OVR. This ensured that Yavlinsky and Yabloko remained 
mostly on the defensive. Yavlinsky had begun the campaign by trying to highlight his 
legislative achievements in the Duma and Stepashin's work during his tenure as Prime 
Minister. To counter the smear campaign he tried to tarnish SPS. This was attempted by 
reminding the public of SPS' s involvement in the unpopular 1992 'shock therapy' reforms 
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and by pointing out that the August 1998 crisis hit when Kirienko was Prime Minister.357 
The target ofYabloko's smear campaign, SPS, recognised the popularity of the Chechen 
War. As a consequence, they gave their full support for the war. SPS and its leader Kirienko, 
criticised Yabloko for being a 'do nothing party' and for taking a neutral stance on Chechnya. 
SPS's strategy attempted to cash-in on Putin's popularity. In a strange twist, Kirienko was 
shown meeting Putin in one of SPS' s campaign adds. At a later stage, Kirienko officially 
endorsed Putin's presidential candidacy.358 The strategy applied by SPS does not appear to be 
aimed at Kirienko winning the presidential election, but to eliminate any chance of an 
effective challenge to Putin by other parties (especially Yabloko). Additionally, Kirienko' s 
actions tend to indicate some reliance on riding the wave of Put in's popularity. 
Another leading contender for the presidential elections was the Fatherland All-Russia Party 
(OVR), headed by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgenni 
Primakov. They had positioned themselves as a centrist party, which opposed Y eltsin' s 
policies. OVR pledged greater state support for agriculture and industry, vowing to fight 
corruption in the highest echelons of government (i.e. 'The Family').359 
Luzhkov, a one-time supporter ofYeltsin and a possible heir of his legacy, became a critic in 
1998. During his criticism ofYeltsin, Luzhkov stated that Yeltsin was no longer fit to serve. 
Throughout 1999, attacks against Yeltsin and 'The Family' intensified. Oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky, an archenemy of Luzhkov, was targeted. Procurator-general Skuratov had opened 
a criminal investigation against Berezovsky with Primakov's blessing. By May 1999 
Primakov was Russia's most popular politician.360 
IfPrimakov or Luzhkov were elected president, Yeltsin and 'The Family' (including their 
property) would not be secure. This prompted the government to launch a series of scathing 
attacks against OVR and personal attacks against its leadership, TV hosts such as Dorenko 
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earned their reputation as 'information killers. '361 Lesin even entered the fray, when he 
criticised OVR during an appearance on RTR two weeks prior to the election.362 
Luzhkov was accused of graft, nepotism, corruption and conspiracy to commit murder. 
Primakov was also subjected to a smear campaign founded on unsubstantiated rumour and 
hearsay. Some of the accusations levelled against Primakov included be blamed for failing to 
halt NATO's bombing campaign of Yugoslavia, ordering the assassination of the Georgian 
president (Eduard Shevardnadze), destroying the Russian defence industry and being too old 
to lead Russia. 363 
OVR's regional allies were not immune from these scathing personal attacks either. ORT 
accused the presidents of the Ingushetian and Kabardino-Balkarian republics of sheltering 
Chechen terrorists. Both of these presidents had given their support to OVR. 364 The Kremlin 
waged an insidious information war against their opponents, the scale and level of work 
committed against anyone single political rival may be an indicator to the perceived level of 
threat which that particular rival poses. 
OVR was able to offer some limited resistance and counters to the government onslaught, 
through media assets controlled by Luzhkov. But OVR's media assets were inferior to those, 
which were pitted against them. TV Tsentr is a small Moscow based TV station, where as the 
government controlled the national TV stations ORT and RTR.365 Consequently, OVR was 
only able to reach a limited and localised audience, the government's media assets could 
target Russia's entire population. In a war of attrition such as this, those who possess superior 
means of information dissemination will eventually win the contest. 
During the 1995 and 1996 electoral campaigns, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR) and its leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, were leading contenders in the elections. LDPR 
was largely excluded from national TV coverage, which bears testimony to the government 
assessing them to be a threat to their re-election bid. 
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During the inter-election period (1996 - 1998), LDPR built up a solid reputation as being 
pro-Kremlin. This was achieved through their voting record in the Duma. In recognition of 
this support, the government gave LDPR almost unrestricted access to the pro-government TV 
channels during their election bid.366 
Zhirinovsky gave seven interviews to ORT and RTR, a further six interviews were given to 
TV 6. ORT gave 15%, RTR 10% and NTV 11 % of the campaign coverage time to LDPR's 
election bid.367 This was a remarkable tum of events considering LDPR was technically an 
opposition party and the government had the means to ensure that the party could be 
margina1ised in terms of the amount of coverage it received from the nations national TV 
channels. 
The political party that is associated with the government, Unity, was a target of the smear 
campaign also. NTV (which was owned by Gusinsky and was subject to a lot of pressure from 
the government) supported OVR, the nature of their allegations consisted of exposing graft, 
corruption and the dictatorial ruling style of the regional governors who supported Unity. The 
regions in question were Primorye, Ka1iningrad oblast and Kalmykia.368 
Numerous factors culminated, which ensured that the kompromat levelled at Unity was 
essentially ineffective in achieving any lasting or significant damage to the party. The pro-
presidential media promoted Unity heavily. 28% of ORTs election coverage and 15% of 
RTR's, was devoted to Unity. The party gained greater popularity after Putin endorsed Unity 
on state TV on November 24, 1999.369 Putin's actions brought about an event which ensured 
that Unity's popUlarity was tied to Putin's. IfPutin's ratings remained high, so did Unity's. As 
I explained earlier, OVR had fewer media resources at their disposal and were not able to 
match the level of coverage attained by government sponsored parties and politicians. 
Unity's campaign was waged on the promotion of personalities and not policies. A strong 
emphasis was put on differentiating Unity's leadership from the 'other' political parties. They 
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were promoted as being unlike regular politicians, such as OVR's career politicians. Drawing 
on their distinctiveness, voters were told that they could trust in Unity's honesty and integrity, 
based on the fact that they were not regular politicians.37o 
Lesin, the minister of press and information, also interfered at several critical junctures in the 
electoral process. He personally asked TV Tsentr to cancel a weekly TV programme featuring 
journalist Alexander Khinshtein. Some time earlier, Khinshtein had run foul with the 
authorities when he published an article accusing the government of corruption. Initially, the 
authorities tried to have him admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Vladimir. Khinshtein was 
able to avoid detention. He was now running for a seat in the Duma. No such objections were 
shown by Lesin toward Alexander Nevzorov, a journalist from ORTwho was also running for 
a seat in the Duma.371 Once again, the government attempted to attain the situation of 
sidelining 'undesirable' political aspirants by denying them any pUblicity. 
On the whole, it seems that the use of kompromat is relatively ineffective way of achieving 
an end result. The audience does not focus on the veracity of the story in question, instead 
they focus on the dynamics that initiated the production of the story. "Questions about who 
wrote what about whom and on whose orders often seem to get greater attention in the media 
discussion than whether the report was actually true.,,372 
2.4 Totalitarian Discourse And State Interests 
The aim of this section is to assess totalitarianism, as pure political concept. I will firstly give 
a description of the nature and trends of the totalitarian phenomenon. After I have given the 
reader a basic understanding of the meaning and the functioning of a totalitarian regime, I 
shall attempt to apply the concept to the contemporary Russian situation and make a 
determination as to whether the concept is applicable or not. 
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2.4.1 Definitions and Characteristics 
I will begin this section by giving a brief and narrow definition of totalitarian. For the 
purposes ofthis thesis I have kept the definition this way, due to the wide ranging discourse 
available on the nature and definition ofthis word. After the definition, I will attempt to 
explain some ofthe peculiarities of the totalitarian phenomenon, giving some examples. 
By definition, totalitarian states are the strictest regimes. The Soviet Union and other 
communist countries of the Eastern Bloc are considered to be examples of totalitarianism. In 
descending order, the next most invasive class of regime is authoritarianism. Regimes that fall 
into this category are dictatorships, such as Spain under Franco's rule. 
Totalitarianism - a philosophy which "seeks to be comprehensive and / or has a systematic 
impact upon societal organisation." 373 
"[ ... J is an all-encompassing system of political rule that is typically 
established by pervasive ideological manipulation and open terror and 
brutality. [ ... J seeks 'total power' through the politicisation of every aspect 
of social and personal existence. [ ... J implies the outright abolition of civil 
society: the abolition of 'the private. "'374 
Downing (author of Internationaiising Media Theory) claims that "totalitarian rule begins 
with totalitarian movements." 375 The underlying premise of this assumption is that the 
totalitarian regime is aided to power by support from below. Unlike a coup d' etat, where the 
elite use force to impose their will on the masses. An example of this is the August 1991 coup. 
During the bid for total power, totalitarian ideologies seek to create a motivating force, to 
mobilise their followers in a common goal. "Totalitarian ideology [ ... J identifies as a key 
component of their rise is not simply a regime-sponsored public relations fog, but a vital 
mobilising force in the transition from movement to regime and for the inner core of the 
373 Downing, J., op. cit., 1996, p. 2. 
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regime." 376 
A mobilising message used by the Nazis rise to power was the resurrection of a strong 
Germany, after the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles. The use of the image of the 
restoration of national pride exerts a powerful pull on a population that has endured a long 
period of hardship and degradation. In their study of the nazification of pre-war Germany, 
Adorno and Horkheimer theorised that two pre-conditions must be present for a totalitarian 
power to exist. 
• Hardship - such as economic or loss of a country's prestige on the world stage. 
• Loss of individual consciousness - A mass society is easier to manipulate.377 
An ideology of popular appeal (to the masses or a target group) must be disseminated by 
some form of media, for a movement or regime to gain or hold the audience's attention. 
Presently, on the totalitarian movement level, Russian right-wing organisations are looking to 
new methods at spreading their message. The traditional forms, such as newspapers (Pamyat -
meaning Memory) are being complemented by more modem means of dissemination. 
A new tool of their information war arsenal is the internet. Information is spread rapidly, 
cheaply and to a large potential audience. The increasing globalisation of right-wing 
organisations becomes apparent by the fact that some of these groups publish their 
information in English, as well as Russian. Two examples are: 
• National Patriotic Front "Pamyat" - www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Loge/84611 
and 
411 Russian National Socialist Party - www.nationalism.org 
The existence of an English translation of these movements ideological literature would 
seem to indicate the possibility that the material is not solely intended for domestic 
consumption. 
Downing states that the "[ ... J emphasis on the paramount role of ideology implicitly 
376 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 3 
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underlines the significance of media communication in diffusing and developing such 
ideologies at every phase in the coming to ascendancy of such regimes." 378 
During the process of political communication, the totalitarian movement or regime will 
seek the establishment of several 'favourable' conditions for their continued expansion or 
maintenance of power. A primary objective of the communication process is to enter private 
as well as public spheres of communication. As Hannah Arendt, a political scientist expresses 
this phenomenon "total domination succeeds to the extent that it succeeds in interrupting all 
channels of communication, those from person to person inside the four walls of privacy no 
less than the public ones." 379 
One of totalitarianism's goals is to aggregate a society's consciousness. That is to create a 
mass consciousness. "Totalitarianism seeks to stamp out individual consciousness and replace 
it with a mass consciousness. By creating an 'us' as opposed to a you or I, the product is a 
'People as One. '" 380 
An important aspect of totalitarian language is the aspect of creating binary opposition. By 
using the emotional rhetoric of nationalism and / or patriotism, the audience is urged to 'do 
their duty.' In some cases a highly persuasive argument. Stalin used the message 'defend your 
motherland' as a far more symbolic and potent rallying point for the Soviet population during 
the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 45). Had a call to defend socialism been used, the result of the 
call to arms and the populace's resolve may not have been so effective. 381 
During a regime's ascendancy to power, a surreal world is created to make and perpetuate a 
myth. To use Le Fort's (a political scientist) terminology, it is the creation of a totalitarian 
fantasy, "[ ... ] to efface social division, to absorb all processes of socialisation into the process 
of state control, to push the symbolic into real." 382 The ultimate embodiment of this ideal is 
the construction of Socialist Realism, which pervaded all aspects of life in the Soviet Bloc for 
nearly fifty years. 
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Le Fort has formulated a system of five basic assumptions, which define the ideology of a 
totalitarian regime. 
e Image as the 'Power-as-One' is ultimately expressed as faith invited in a single supreme 
leader. 
G Enemies and parasites constantly threaten the proj ect and must be searched out and 
destroyed. 
G Society can recreate itself totally according to an already understood definition of where it 
will end at the close of the process. 
e 'Totallmowledge of the detail of social reality' is available to the power structure. 
e The project addresses "the most secret, the most spontaneous, the most ungraspable 
element of social life [ ... J customs [ ... J tastes and [ ... J ideas." 383 
Editors of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1966) C. J. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski 
devised a six point 'syndrome of inter-related traits and characteristics': 
• existence of an 'official' ideology. 
G a one-party state, usually led by an all-powerfllileader. 
• a system of terroristic policing. 
411 a monopoly on the means of mass communication. 
411 a monopoly on the means of armed conflict. 
• state control of all aspects of economic life.384 
As pointed out above, in the case of a totalitarian state, the state shall seek to ensure 
complete control over means of cultural production. The media is one of the means of 
producing culture. 
"In extreme cases (totalitarianism), state-owned media agencies, broadcast 
media and film studios act as propaganda arms of the state, promoting a 
narrow set of government sanctioned images and messages. Audiences in 
such nations must become adept at 'reading between the lines' in decoding 
382 Downer, J., op. cit., p. 7. 
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such propaganda efforts. ,,385 
As stated earlier, a totalitarian regime seeks and demands total control over all areas of 
public and private life. To help enforce this control, specific security agencies are required. 
The use of such control mechanisms has been acknowledged by Putin, "they (the secret 
agencies) were a manifestation of a totalitarian state."386 Arendt viewed this stance as a 
potential weakness in the totalitarian system. She wrote, that the regimes reliance on the 
"demand of unlimited power leaves them vulnerable in the long term. [ ... J the most likely 
outcome of the Soviet system is a sudden and dramatic collapse of the whole regime [rather J 
than a gradual normalisation." 387 
Le Fort takes Arendt's notion further, and in more detail as to the nature of a regime's 
demise; 
"The power which disseminates itself runs the risk of reappearing as the 
organ of oppression towering over the whole society and becoming the 
common target of all contestation. The party, which penetrates every milieu 
and exercises control over all activities, runs the risk of being seen 
everywhere as a parasite. The distance between those above and those 
below, and more generally, inequality, runs the risk of being exposed. 
Finally, the all-pervading ideology runs the risk of provoking a generalised 
refusal to believe a radical mode of disaffection which relegates it to the 
status of a pure political lie; the power of discourse collapses, leaving the 
image of the oppressive power without a protective screen." 388 
History of the Eastern Bloc collapse (1989 - 1991) seems to have added some weight to the 
contentions of Arendt and Le Fort. A powerful mixture of falling living standards combined 
with the ability for anyone to disseminate news or information which was detrimental to the 
continued survival of the incumbent regime, ended communism's stranglehold in Eastern 
Europe. The finishing blow was the removing the fear of strict punishment, such as the death 
penalty, which prompted the population to openly challenge the authorities. 
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2.4.2 Applicability of Totalitarian Theory to the Russian Federation. 
The short answer, as to whether the tenn totalitarian can be applied to the Russian 
Federation, is no. Certainly, some totalitarian elements exist within the Russian State, but the 
overall situation falls short of totalitarianism. In the autobiography First Person Putin stated 
that "Russia needs a strong state. I am not calling for totalitarianism."389 Taking Putin's 
statement at face value, it would seem as though there is a desire to resurrect a strong centrally 
governed state, but not a return to a strict, totalitarian state. 
Contemporary politics in the Russian federation is a curious hybrid of the old communist 
period and the new democratic system. Russian historian Dmitri Funnan links the two periods 
vividly. 
"Today's elite is the old elite wearing new costumes. [ ... J But in the fonner 
USSR they feel like they are at home. Here they put on their field dress. 
Here they display their old instincts - chauvinistic, class, and so on.,,390 
This odd Russian hybrid of old and new methods and values displays a democratic 
framework laid over a system that is inherently authoritarian. "Post-Soviet Russia has an 
authoritarian political system with fonnal democratic institution, very strong presidential 
leadership, a fragmented party system and a weak ideological framework.,,391 
In the contemporary post-Yeltsin political world of the Russian Federation, in the period of 
the central state's reconstruction, the tenn guided democracy best describes what is happening 
to the political framework. Guided democracy is a quasi-democracy. Elements of both 
authoritarianism and democracy co-exist in the same political space. The main component of 
this system is the regional authorities control of political processes. This is often achieved by 
the authorities direct intervention in the process of party fonnation. There are no unifonn 
means of directing the political situation, this varies according to the regions' models of 
power.392 
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Totalitarianism can be used to describe a regime or a movement. In the example of the 
regime, as represented by the Russian government, some tendencies exist which fall short of 
what is expected of a Western democracy. The free use of presidential decrees to override 
parliament's will and Yeltsin's well exercised right to hire and fire ministers (and to dissolve 
parliament when differences were irreconcilable) are but two examples. 
Russia politically, seems to fall some where between a dictatorship and a democracy. 
Elements of both ofthese systems exist. Political Scientist O'Donnell offers a possible 
classification for Russia's political system. He has proposed the term 'delegative democracy,' 
which is a "[ ... J potentially enduring regime type, with its own particUlar features mid-way 
between dictatorial rule and representative democracy."393 
A delegative democracy has some features, which differentiate it from other forms of 
political systems. These features include "the endowment of the presidency with more and 
more formal powers in order to be able to address ever worsening economic crisis but leading 
in practice to a curious mixture of presidential omnipotence and impotence."394 The August 
1998 crisis seems to support this theory. Y eltsin had wide ranging powers at his disposal, 
supposedly to facilitate the quicker functioning of the political process to meet challenges 
faced by Russia. When the time came, an strange lethargy seemed to grip Russia's politicians, 
locking them in to a pattern of no action. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
Image-making is a key aspect to modem political life around the world and Russia is no 
exception to this rule. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and with it an end to a 
one-party State it has become necessary for political actors to 'sell' themselves to the voting 
pUblic. Consequently, a political figure's image and public traits are created around some 
popular or appealing notion. Aspects of appeal and popularity however, are not constant over 
time nor space. Ultimately this means that a politicain's public persona needs to be updated 
and changed, to reflect the public mood and sentiment. 
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Boris Yeltsin, the first post-Soviet Russian President, built up his image in the late Soviet 
period. The public mood during that time was for more freedoms and ultimately democracy. 
Conditions in the late Soviet period, such as the increasing lawlessness and shortages of even 
basic items in shops, meant that a change from the perceived faceless, cumbersome and 
inefficient Soviet system was desired. To cater for this public demand, Yeltsin marketed 
himself as an energetic and dynamic reformer and democrat. He also tried to form a 'bond' 
with the average person, as opposed to the impersonal Soviet system. 
Initially Yeltsin succeeded in selling this concept of himself to the Russian public. He 
reinforced his image by mixing with the people in well-publicised events. Political events 
brought about a change in his character, namely the 1993 conflict. As a result, Yeltsin became 
more withdrawn. His image ultimately failed because there were simply too many 
contradictions available to the public, through such sources as the mass media, which 
contradicted the image offered by Yeltsin and his advisors. Periods of ill-health and scandals 
involving corruption ate away his public support. 
Moscow's current Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov has national political ambitions that he has been 
working toward for some time. He has used his position as Mayor to accumulate a lot of 
financial, political and media capital with which to try and launch his bid for the presidency. 
Luzhkov stood on a social-democratic political platform. Some of his public persona traits are 
similar to Yeltsin's - being with the people, energetic and motivated. 
It seemed as though Luzhkov was going to be named as Yeltsin' s successor, after Yeltsin 
retired. However, when this did not materialise and relations between the two soured, 
Luzhkov chose to align himself (and his party) with former Prime Minister Yegeny Primakov. 
The challenge to the incumbent political structure, real or perceived, resulted in the state 
owned media being unleashed in a vicious smear campaign against both Primakov and 
Luzhkov. Luzhkov's media assets, although providing some measure of returning the fight 
were in the end insufficient. This was due to the fact that his media assets are mainly Moscow 
based, as opposed to the nationwide capability of the state. 
The Oligarchs received a lot of attention around the time of the 1999/2000 electoral cycle. 
Putin used them as a means of gaining a popular platform. Excesses of the Yeltsin era saw the 
oligarchs attain massive wealth very quickly. This drew emnity from the Russian public, 
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approximately 2/3 of whom live below the poverty line. Their influence on politics was also 
very evident, so much so that at times the distinction between business and politics was very 
blurred and indistinct. 
In a promised war to distance the oligarchs from the seat of political power, Putin was able 
to strike a chord with the public's sentiment. A very publicly fought financial and information 
war between the government and Gusinsky and Berezovsky seemed to demonstrate the 
willingness to bring the oligarchs to task. However, a closer examination of the conflict soon 
reveals other factors at play. Both Gusinsky and Berezovsky were loud, pushy and had the 
means, via their media assets to make a public spectacle. As such, they represented an early 
threat to the Putin administration that needed to be neutralised and at the same time would 
send a message to others who may challenge them as well as satisfying public sentiment. 
While the above mentioned conflict between the government and some of the oligarchs was 
in progress, the Putin administration needed to cement its credability. The changes that have 
been occuring in the manner in which Russian politics is prosecuted has meant that the first 
family and not just the President is in the media spotlight. PR for the Putins has been carefully 
managed and cultivated. Although the children have largely escaped the public's gaze, 
Lyudmila Putina is in the middle of it. 
Lyudmila Putina has been given a lot of managed publicity to show her as a traditional, 
caring and Russian woman. To give her some standing in society, some issues have been 
created to display her patriotic and humanitarian aspects, such as the debate surrounding the 
reform of the Russian language. The causes for which she fights seem to be closely related to 
the politca1 agenda of building a strong and patriotic state. Lyudmi1a Putina's public portrayal 
lies somewhere between that of Raisa Gorbacheva and Naina Yeltsina. 
Electoral cycles are a period of elevated political and social tension. There is much at stake 
for both the incumbent and challenging political forces and those who support them. As a 
result, there is often an accompanying rise in the level of conflict between politicians and the 
media. According to the written rules, the playing field should be even for the political 
players, but in practice this does not appear to happen. Bureaucratic structures such as the 
Central Electoral Commission tend to side with the governnment. 
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In addition to the advantage of having either neutral or friendly bureaucratic structures, the 
government also enjoys the benefits of incumbency due to access to the state owned media 
assets. This gives a definite advantage over political rivals who have to either buy time, align 
themselves with businessmen who possess media or own media assets themselves. The rules 
of the political game are set by the incumbent political power, others have to adopt these rules 
or exit the political arena. 
The above will enable political actors to compete more effectively in the conflict 
surrounding the lead up to the elections. Not only do political actors engage in party political 
advertising, cover events ofleading party figures, they also actively participate in the use of 
kompromat. In its application and use kompromat is negative and slanderous. Many 
allegations that are made are unsubstantiated or false. The role of the black PR is solely to 
destroy the personal reputation of leading opposition political figures. According to the rules 
set by the CEC and Media Ministry, media who carry kompromat are liable to face legal 
action. Opposition media have been subjected to legal action, however there would appear to 
be little to fear for state owned media who appear to avoid any negative consequences of their 
actions. 
In the course of establishing a strong and centralised State, allegations have been levelled 
that there has been a return of totalitariansim to Russia. Alleged events as loss of personal 
liberty and an attack on independent media have been used to justify thhis claim. Upon 
defining the concept of totalitarianism and some practical applications, there are some 
elements of totalitarian theory present, but not to warrant labelling Russia as a totalitarian 
State. 
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CHAPTER III: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY AND THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX 
CHURCH. 
3.0 Chapter Objectives 
The main obj ective of this chapter is to create an understanding of some possible underlying 
reasons for the changes, which are currently transpiring in the Russian Federation. After some 
years of declining prestige, a yearning for the symbolism of the former Soviet Union (power 
and prestige) is in the process of being established. A pattern has begun to emerge, ofthe use 
ofthe methods employed during the Soviet times, such as the emergence of a strong central 
state based on Moscow. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union was both rapid and traumatic for Russian citizens. By 
appearance, in 1990 the Soviet Union was a superpower, equal in all respects to the United 
States. However, by the end of 1991 the illusion was shattered. Many of the former Soviet 
republics wanted their independence and broke from their union with Russia. Post-Soviet 
Russia has slowly slipped into an abyss marked by rampant crime, degradation of social 
services, erosion of state power (nationally and internationally) and a drop in living standards 
for many ordinary Russian citizens. 
The harsh realities of the new Russia have caused some to look back on the years of the 
USSR with a sense of nostalgia. A nostalgia for what the Soviet Union represented, the power 
and might of the state (for which one could be proud) and a guaranteed existence for the 
average citizen (even if it meant shortages and cues for some items). 
Changes in the public's attitude are needed before the resurrection of a strong Russian state 
can be enacted. The shock of a 'loss of empire' has been profound. Part of Put in's appeal is 
his image as a man of decisive action, and who wants to restore some of Russia's pride. 
Since Putin's election to the presidency, an incremental series changes has taken place in 
Russian politics and society. One of these changes has been the increased control exercised by 
the government over the media. The media has begun to carry a new ideology, of the state's 
interests above everything else. 
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There has been a return to what may be construed as Neo-Soviet methods, in the Kremlin's 
relations with the media. Russian media are in the process of being restricted (editorially) by 
what is becoming an increasingly regulated environment. The government seems to consider 
control over the media as being essential in order for them to achieve their objectives. 
American academic Ellen Mickiewicz illustrates a possible reason for this concisely. 
"Control over the media [ ... J is seen as control over the shaping of 
fundamental Russian values and identity in the post-Soviet period, when the 
very definition of the country is at issue.,,395 
During the last three to four years the use of the highly emotive 'banners' of patriotism and 
nationalism have been used by the state to justify or explain their actions. This has been used 
in an attempt to bypass associated issues of their actions and to unite the populace behind 
them. 
I shall look at the rise of patriotism and its use in contemporary Russian society. There has 
been relatively little written about the greater importance being assumed by the concept of 
patriotism. Patriotism, as a tool with which to mould society is in the process of being 
reintroduced into society, after its absence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
In dealing with a concept, such as patriotism, it is necessary to first deal with the definition 
of the concept. This forms a basis for the argument of this work. Is patriotism being 
introduced into Russian schools? And if so, why? Without lmowing the nature of what 
patriotism is, it would be very difficult to adequately answer questions such as these. 
Issues of identity, patriotism and the mixing of state and religious matters shall be 
considered. The Russian Orthodox Church played a central role in the political life of Imperial 
Russia. At times the boundaries between Church and state became blurred, such as the role of 
the infamous Siberian monle Gregory Rasputin. Church activities were curtailed and 
eventually all but closed down by the outbreak of the Second World War (1941). However, 
the link between being Russian and being Orthodox had a strong association. "To be Russian, 
395 Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., Editors, Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Study, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p. 86. 
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Dostoyevsky said, is to be Orthodox.,,396 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a slow but steady reconciliation between the Church 
and state has occurred. By late 1997 some 8000 Orthodox communities served more than 
27,000 towns and villages throughout the Russian Federation's entirety.397 
The loss of Marxism-Leninism in 1991 signalled a crisis of social values. Since 1917 state 
ideology had defined Russia's place in the world, and the place of her citizens within society. 
So, the loss of the hegemonic ideology was accompanied by a loss of identity. Does the 
Russian Orthodox Church offer a viable alternative to Marxism-Leninism? 
3.1 Neo-Soviet Ideology and the Fluctuations of Identity 
As one of the most prominent US political scientists, Michael Urban clearly stated his 
position, with regard to the importance of identity in post-communist politics. "Politics in 
post-communist societies is in large measure a politics of identity. Central to it [ ... J national 
communities recreate themselves."398 
For over seventy years, various forms of communism have shaped Russia's consciousness. 
By 'various forms of communism,' I refer to the 'ritual' of reversing or altering the policies of 
the previous Soviet leader. Rites of passage which included denouncing their predecessor and 
removing and alienating his followers from power. Nikita Krushchev denounced Iosif Stalin, 
and in tum was denounced by his successor. 
Culturally, communism was 'sold' to the populace via the all-pervading Socialist Realism. 
All competing ideologies and identities were either purged or incorporated into the Soviet 
structure. 
Competing political ideologies were outlawed. But, the resurrection of the Russian Orthodox 
396 Laqueur, W., Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia, New York, Harper Collins, 
1997, p. 66. 
397 White, S., Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Post-Communist Society, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p. 204. 
398 Urban, M., The Politics of Identity in Russia's Post-communist Transition: The Nation Against Itself, Slavic 
Review: American Quatierly of Russian, Eurasian and East European Studies, Volume 53, Number 3: 733 -
765, Fall 1994, p 733. 
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faith by Stalin during the darkest year of 1941 (as a rallying point for the people) was 
achieved under strict state supervision. The Great Patriotic War was fought as a struggle for 
the very survival of the 'Motherland' against an aggressive foreign enemy. 
On the Soviet side, the war was not fought on the premise of the very survival of 
communism being at stake. Perhaps this is a realisation by the authorities that the excesses of 
the Stalinist purges were fresh in the minds of the Russian people and a call to arms under the 
banner of communism was likely to fail. The Germans, on the other hand, portrayed the 
conflict along ideological grounds. The war was to result in the crushing, not only of the hated 
and feared Bolshevism, but the subjugation of an 'inferior people.' 
The defeat of Nazi Germany saw the beginning ofthe Soviet Union's re-entry onto the 
world's international stage, as an equal partner. An embodiment of this ideal was the Soviet 
Union's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation is the Soviet 
Union's recognised successor state, by virtue of inheriting the seat on the United Nations 
Security Council. In the immediate post-communist euphoria the former Eastern Bloc wished 
to distance themselves as far as possible from any associations of their communist past, 
embracing the concept of a market economy. This embracing of the new brought about a crisis 
in identity, "[ ... J Russian national identity was closely intertwined with patriotic feelings for 
the now deceased Soviet State."399 
In attempting to redefine an identity a dual system of acquiring and rejecting symbology has 
occurred. On the one hand, a recovery of identity markers (that is symbols, rituals, anthems, 
history, literature and so on) from the period which preceded the Bolsheviks rise to power. 
Some of the pre-Soviet symbols and institutions that have been recovered in Russia include; 
the double headed eagle, the imperial flag, Orthodox Church and the reburial of the last 
imperial family.40o 
These re-invoked images are very important to the concept of national identity. Their power 
lies in a latent symbolism, which awakens a sense of identity. Images that embody the idea of 
399 Heo, U. & Horowitz, S., op. cit., p. 246. 
400 Suny, R. G., "Russia's Identity Crisis" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., pp. 363 - 368, pp. 363 - 364. 
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a nation are more important as emblems of the national idea than as pictorial things. 401 
The second part of this system refers to the attempt to purge identity markers associated with 
the communist past. Such acts as the toppling of statues dedicated to various 'heroes' ofthe 
communist era and the renaming of towns and streets, eliminating these connections.402 
Symbology, when offered to the public, is best done so within a polysemy and polysemic 
framework. This is because "[ ... J nothing is interpreted neutrally, and meaning can not be 
imposed."403 The open ended symbology used, draws upon or appeals to existing perceptions 
which are already circulating in the public. Politicians or those who seek to benefit from 
introducing a new ideology or system are then able to apply the media to achieve these ends. 
Lull gives an account, which would seem to substantiate my analysis on the use of 
symbology. "When the media and popular culture contribute to social change, this occurs 
because represented ideas appeal to predisposition and intentions people already hold."404 
Therefore, it is a matter of being able to 'harness' existing public perceptions and prejudices. 
Rhetoric of the early post-communist debate has revolved around the issues of stigmatising 
and purging the Soviet past. This was seen no more so than in the struggle between President 
Yeltsin and the Parliament. On 12 March, 1993 Ruslan Khasbulatov (at this stage Chairman 
of the Supreme Soviet) stated that the entire executive branch was "genetically linked with 
Bolshevism." Yeltsin's reply hinted that Khasbulatov and his followers were anti-
constitutional. 405 
Attempts by politicians trying to score 'political points' by referring to their opposition as 
Soviet are somewhat unusual. A large proportion of the Russian political establishment and 
bureaucracy has a Soviet era heritage. On a deeper level of analysis of the situation, a pattern 
has emerged, through the use of a mixture of cultural symbology and language. A "store of 
cultural 'materials' inherited from the past that are available to contemporary political actors 
401 Battaglia, B., Rhetorics of Self-Making, Los Angeles, University of Cali fomi a Press, 1995, p. 10. 
402 Urban, M., op. cit., p 733 
403 Lull, J., op. cit. (1995), p. 143. 
404 Lull, J., op. cit. (1995), p. 143. 
405 Urban, M., op. cit., p. 736. 
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endeavouring to (re)construct a national identity."406 
Political actors try to capitalise on the situation, through a 'logical' sequence of phases by 
creating binary opposition. The process begins with "[ ... J actors [ ... J they appropriate language 
and symbols of the past in order to deploy them against their opponents."407 This situation is 
not unique to Russia, although it may be considered to be utilised more aggressively in the 
former Eastern Bloc nations. 
An attempt is made to bestow upon the actor good virtues and negative connotations on their 
opponent. This is achieved by trying to exploit the existing preconceptions of the public. 
Political actors, "[ ... J by unmasking others as 'communists,' they present themselves as 
defenders of the nation, as bearers of the national interest."40B A creation of the theme of good 
versus bad. 
Another equally important point emerges from the process of stigmatising political 
opponents. It is inferred that "[ ... J by demonising others onto who is projected culpability for 
the discredited past."409 In other words, by association failures that occurred in the Soviet 
system are linked with those who are labelled a communist. It may be drawn, by inference 
that the' communist' is therefore a failure. 
The political rhetoric which is used in political communication, the messages have been 
encoded against 'the other,' (in this context to be defined as alien, evil, treasonous [ ... J etc.) 
although these messages are sometimes redirected back to their (Collective) sender. This ideal 
is embodied in Iurii Lotman's theory of hyper-semiosis. 
Hyper-semiosis occurs when "a communicative orientation aiming to realise itself in one 
'great word,' that functions in political struggle as the annihilation of the other through the 
incantation of certain words possessing magical properties - "the Russian Idea" and its 
synedoches on the one side of the spectrum, "reform," "democracy" and like terms on the 
other."4IO 
406 Urban, M., op. cit., p. 737. 
407 Urban, M., op. cit., pp. 737 - 38. 
40B Urban, M., op. cit., pp. 738 - 39. 
409 Urban, M., op. cit., p. 739. 
410 Urban, M., op. cit., pp. 744 - 45 
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Lotman's hyper-semiosis manifests itself in the context of the construction of self as a 
political subject. The use of 'great' and 'magical' words can be a potent symbol for the user, 
but with one important proviso. Imagery created by highly charged words and the 
manipulation of the desired response can be directed by the user so long as connotations 
associated with its meaning remain constant. 
Relying on the premise that perceptions and definitions remaining constant would be a 
hazardous course of action. Culture and society are in a state of constant flux, in terms of 
social definitions, as a result of individual and collective experience. Nor are definitions and 
perceptions within a given society uniform or constant. 
To illustrate my point, I refer to the general Russian public's perception and meaning (and 
associations) ofthe concept of democracy. On the eve of the Soviet Union's demise, 
democracy in the mind of the public seemed to be linked to such ideas as material and 
monetary wealth, as well as the more usual connections of political and individual freedom. 
This perception may have been moulded by the domestic media's portrayal of the Western life 
and culture. 
Images of prosperous Western countries, cities and people began to be shown on TV sets as 
the walls of state censorship were being eroded. This image of Western wealth was (and still 
is) further reinforced by a high rate of consumption of foreign soap-operas. As a rule, soap-
operas concentrate on the themes of power and success, as money can be used to acquire these 
concepts, wealth is central to the story. 
For the 'average' Russian, political freedom and a market economy have not brought about 
the expected personal wealth. An argument for democracy, as represented by the freedom of 
speech and political affiliation could be countered by the sentiment that, 'it is all very well 
having political freedom, but without the ability to feed your family adequately it is rather 
meaningless. '411 Poverty, corruption and the vast wealth accumulated by the oligarchs have 
left a sizeable portion of Russian society feeling disaffected and disenfranchised from the new 
system. Democracy has become associated with these negative factors present in the Russian 
411 While studying in Moscow in 1998 - 1999, I was informed about the average salary in Post-Soviet Russia 
some salary figures of close friends and university staff. A Music teacher (school) earns $US25 per month, a 
teacher at university earns 800 roubles per month, security guards at Russian University of Friendship Peoples 
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political model. 
State statistics have painted a bleak picture for the 'average' Russian. In 1997 the National 
Living Standards Centre identified 79 million people living below the poverty line (more than 
50 % of the popu1ation).412 Poverty had become more exaggerated since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The rich had become richer and the poor had become poorer. A comparison 
between share ofthe nation's wealth, in 1991 and 1997 reveals the trend. 
(II 1991 -least well paid 20% of population earned 12% of all money incomes. Best paid 
20% earned 31 % of all money incomes. 
(II 1997 - Least well paid 20% earned 6% of all money incomes. Best paid 20% earned 60% 
of all money incomes.413 
By 19971.5% of the Russian population had acquired control over 65% of the nation's 
wealth.414 A large and visible imbalance between rich and poor. These figures give the reader a 
possible reason for the general public's frustration and helplessness over the direction taken 
by the Russian economy and the absence of any tangible results from years of economic 
'shock therapy.' 
To an extent, no viable 'home grown' cultural alternative had been developed to replace the 
identity void left by the collapse of the discredited Marxist-Leninist doctrine. But, why had no 
alternative evolved during the seventy years of communist rule? 
A possible explanation for the absence of an alternative identity is provided by Claude Levi-
Strauss's theory of 'Indifferent variety.' A critical assumption of this theory states that 
"repression of communication by the party-state prevents individual and collective identities 
from circulating in society."415 The Soviet Union demanded a mass collective identity, 
imposed by the party-state upon the people. This mass collective identity shaped and 
reinforced by use of the media and arts, personified by Socialist Realist culture. 
receives 400 roubles a month. 
412 White, S., op. cit., p. 158. 
413 White, S., op. cit., p. 145. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Urban, M., op. cit., p. 746. 
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Socialist Realism was designed to shape the 'perfect' Soviet citizen and to mobilise the 
populace to achieve various state goals. The process of creating an identity continues and has 
resulted in a dilemma. In the search for a model of identity, some have retraced Russian 
history (prior to the Bolshevik take-over) in search of a uniquely Russian brand of identity. 
Another group of thought has looked to the West for an identity. 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn contemplated the dilemma of the Soviet Union's boundaries and 
identity in 1990. The Soviet Union was facing a crisis, civil wars were breaking out (or had 
broken out) in some of the republics and the Baltic states were demanding independence, 
while the communist leadership of the Eastern Bloc were being toppled. 
"The word 'Russia' has become soiled and tattered through careless use; it 
is invoked freely in all sorts of inappropriate contexts. Thus when the 
monster-like USSR was lunging for chunks of Asia and Africa, the reaction 
the world over was: "Russia, the Russians" [ ... J What exactly is Russia? 
Today, Now? Who today considers himself part of the future Russia? And 
where do Russians themselves see the boundaries of their land?"416 
3.1.1 East or West? 
There appear to be two main alternatives in Russia's search for identity. The competing 
identities a 'Western' or an 'Eastern' type, this process is still in a state of flux and no one 
identity dominates entirely. 
Russian academic Georgy Shakhnazarov summed up Russia's dilemma of identity and some 
possible choices in a concise manner. 
"Russia is entering the 21 st century in the throes of a severe economic, 
social and political crisis. Its troubles are made even more difficult by the 
turmoil in people's minds. As the Soviet Union broke up the society lost its 
goals and values that guided it for seventy years and the resulting vacuum 
has yet to be filled. The nation that has more than 1000 years of history 
416 Suryadinata, L., Nationalism and Globalisation: East and West, Singapore, Institute of South East Asian 
Studies, 2000, p. 325. 
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behind it is now once agam m search of identity, trying to answer the 
questions important for itself and for the world: 'Who are we, and what do 
we want?' Primary among these questions will be the issue whether Russia 
belongs to Europe or to Asia or perhaps constitutes a unique society which 
is to serve as a bridge between the two continents, a country with a unifying 
mission that expresses the Eurasian spirit.,,417 
A 'Western' concept centres on several prominent ideals associated with the term. The 
concepts revolve around the ideas that a country becomes 'normal' and 'civilised' ifit 
embraces Westernism. 'Normal' and 'civilised' are both subjective and vague ideals, the 
meanings are multiple. The pivotal aim of those who seek to impose Western identity appears 
to be Russia's (re)entry the elite club of the world's international forum, within close 
proximity to first world nations (particularly Western Europe). Russia's gradual shift in closer 
relations with the West had another effect. A unifying influence of a common enemy, i.e. the 
West, no longer existed. This may have been a contributing factor to the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. 418 
Putin has stressed on numerous occasions that he is in support of a more Western orientation 
for Russia. When it was popular and usual to hang firstly, portraits of Lenin or Kirov during 
the communist era and portraits ofYeltsin post-1991, Putin chose another figure. He hung the 
portrait of the Western thinking Tsar, Peter the Great in his office, when working for the St. 
Petersburg City authorities (during the administration ofthe city's mayor Anatoli Sobchak).419 
But Putin was not the first person or organisation to try and cash-in on the public's 
perception of Peter the Great. Yegor Gaidar's party, Russia's Democratic Choice held 
conventions under huge portraits of the Tsar. 420 Boris Yeltsin also tried to form an association 
with the Westernising Tsar, claiming that Peter the Great was his favourite historical hero. 
Yeltsin tried to have his political and economic reform programme compared to Peter the 
417 Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 339. 
418 Berglund, S., Aarebrot, F. H., Vogt, H. & Karasimeonov, G., op. cit., p. 60. 
419 Putin, V., op. cit., p. 90. 
For a detailed account of Peter the Great, refer to Hughes, L., Russia in the Age of Peter the Great, London, Yale 
University Press, 1998. 
420Ra 'anan, U. & Martin, K, Editors, Russia: A Return to Imperialism?, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995, 
p.4. 
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Great's efforts at reform and modernisation.421 
These moves by Russian politicians at linking their image to that of Peter the Great was done 
during a period of pro-West em sentiment in Russian society. On the surface, it would appear 
to be a somewhat cynical attempt to cash in on the public mood, through the use of a 'home-
grown' hero, which would appeal to Russians patriotic sentiment. 
An Eastern focus is centred on finding and adopting the 'Russian idea.' By taking this path, 
supporters of this method claim that Russia will remain a unique nation with a unique destiny. 
The assimilation of Western ideals would "corrode the very core of Russian national 
identity."422 One of the revived concepts from this 'Russian idea' is sobornost, a collective 
body with a common religious / spiritual effort. 
Russia's process of globalisation began in the later stages of perestroika. The end of the state 
monopoly on media and publishing saw a massive influx of Western culture. Integration into 
the world economy was fostered by Russia's need for loans to finance the reform programme. 
International institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
provided Russia with a sizeable proportion of the necessary finance, demanding in return, that 
certain political and economic conditions were met if their support was to continue.423 
The Singaporean Institute of South East Asian Studies has identified three possible 
consequences of globalisation upon national identity. The cost of these consequences is as 
follows: 
411 Erosion of national identities as a result of cultural homogenisation. 
@II Strengthening of national or local identities as a reaction or resistance. 
@II Decline of national identities accompanied by the creation of new identities ofhybridity.424 
The benefits of globalisation in the Russian Federation have been far from evenly and 
equally throughout the population. Inequalities and disparities in wealth have become more 
marked. This contention is confirmed by the Tenth Annual United Nations Development 
421 Ra 'anan, U. & Martin, K., op. cit., p. 14. 
422 Urban, M., op. cit., p. 741. 
423 Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 336. 
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Programme report, which indicated that globalisation only benefits the top 20% of the world's 
population.425 
There appear to be two primary sources of Russian national identity. These sources are the 
Slavic racial identity and the Russian Orthodox faith. Both of these identities have been in 
existence for a considerable period oftime, they constitute a more Eastern facing identity, 
where a unique destiny supposedly awaits Russia. 
Pan-Slavism is an emotionally charged and popular cause, especially for the far right. The 
theoretical framework of the Pan-Slavic centres on the ideal of creating a great Slavic state, 
where the Slavic people of the world are united. This notion is certainly not new, problems of 
agreeing on the exact nature and boundaries of this 'superstate' have plagued discussions, as 
problems of definition hampered the creation of a stable German state until the conclusion of 
the Second World War ( Kleindeutschland or Grossdeutschland - Small Germany or Big 
Germany). 
As with the German example, the issue of fellow peoples living abroad has proved to be a 
contentious issue in some political circles. After the Soviet Union's disintegration in 1991, 
some 25 million live in the 'Near Abroad.' These people had never formally emigrated from 
their native land, but have none the less been left stranded. In some of the ex-Republics they 
are unwelcome and discriminated against in such areas as citizenship and employment. The 
dilemma being that returning to Russia is difficult due to the lack of housing and employment 
to support them.426 Paradoxically, Russia is facing a population crisis, the death rate currently 
far exceeds the birth rate. 
Pan-Slavism is also present on the regional political agenda. The brotherhood ties with the 
Serbian people, fellow Slavs, provides an example. NATO's campaign against the former 
Yugoslavia in 1999 stirred sentiment in Russia. History has seen the Russian state prepared to 
424 Suryadinata, 1., op. cit., pp. 337 - 38. 
425 Suryadinata, 1., op. cit., pp. 339 - 40. 
For public reaction in fmUler Eastern Bloc see also Downing, J., op. cit., p. 47. 
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Hurst & Co., 1996, p. 17. 
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resort to waging war to protect their Serbian 'brothers,' the First World War bears testimony 
to that. During the NATO campaign, the Liberal Democratic Party opened recruitment offices 
in Russia, for those wanting to fight alongside the Serbs in April 1999.427 A possible cause for 
the Kremlin's indignation over the Kosovo crisis was NATO's lack of consultation or 
appreciation of Moscow's point of view. Which would have never occurred during the Cold 
War years, perhaps an indication of Russia's declining prestige on the international stage as 
'has been' superpower. 
Mainstream politics has dabbled in the idea of (re)creating a greater Slavic state. For a 
number of years, negotiations have been conducted among some of the CIS states for a more 
integrated political structure. This is most noticeable between Russia and Belarus. However, 
Belarus appears to be the more enthusiastic partner. During mid-April - July 1999, 
negotiations were conducted to discuss forming a loose union between Belarus, Russia and 
Yugoslavia. To date, nothing substantial has been implemented or agreed upon.428 
Within the diverse and fragmented Russian far right, there exist some common themes and 
aspirations. At the heart of some of these assumptions, held by the far right, it would appear as 
though a belief exists in Russia's unique destiny. But this destiny has been spoiled, or at least 
delayed by hostile foreign intervention, such as communism and the Western inspired 
transition to a market economy. 
• Russian ancient history is a blueprint to national rebirth, prior to foreign inspired reforms. 
III National identity will only be retained if the Russian Orthodox Church regains its 
powerful central position within spiritual life. 
III Russia was the prime victim of the Soviet Union. 
III Russia must cease the subsidising patronage relationship with the minority cultures in 
Central Asia.429 
Vera Tolz, a prominent British academic, has identified three incompatible variants of a 
legitimate Russian state. The concepts are based on the beliefs of political theories and 
aspirations held by various factions; 
427 Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 33l. 
428 Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 33l. 
429 Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 329. 
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«I Conservative nationalists, ultra-militant communists and Eurasianists believe that the 
Russian Federation should restore the Union, which should be joined by as many of the 
former Soviet republics as possible. 
• The re-establishment of an imperial Russian territory, resulting in a nation based on Slavic 
unity. Regions with large Russian minorities resident would be included, such as Northern 
Kazakhstan. 
@ A republic consisting of Russian speakers. The Russian speaking diaspora would be 
integrated into the Russian Federation. Some non-Russian autonomies would be permitted 
to separate.430 
3.2 An Empire Lost 
The Soviet Union, was arguably at its pinnacle of power (after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 
May 1945) by occupying Eastern Europe, this resulted in the division of Europe into 'spheres 
of influence.' Russia quickly established political control over their occupied zone. For some 
forty-five years, the Soviet Union's Eastern Bloc remained in existence, the power and 
prestige associated with Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe became a part of the Russian 
identity. 
This resulted in Winston Churchill's speech which contemplated the significance of what 
was occurring in Eastern Europe in what was to become a symbol of an emerging reality. On 
March 5, 1946, at Fulton Missouri, Churchill announced the "fall of an Iron Curtain" across 
Europe. 431 
Apart from several 'uprisings' (East Germany, Czechoslovakia 1968, Hungary 
1956), Russian authority was supreme until 1989 - 1990. By this time a change in political 
attitude (as embodied in Glasnost and Perestroika) and a will by the various nationalities for 
self-determination saw a rapid break-up of this once vast empire. 
The Soviet Empire had been composed of four layers. By late 1991 three of these layers had 
vanished. 
430 Suny, R. G., "Russia's Identity Crisis" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 364. 
III Six East - Central European states. 
III 14 Soviet Republics. 
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III Outer layer of diplomatic ties and alliances - India, Cuba, Angola, Egypt and Libya to 
name a few. 
III Deep inner layer of Russia. Ethnic zones such as Chechnya, Tartarstan, Sakha and 
Dagestan.432 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union was rapid. All of the republics chose to break away 
from Russia. There are still remnants of this process occurring today, for instance in 
Chechnya. Polish born, British analyst Bogdan Szajkowski identified 274 trouble spots, 
disputes and ethno-territorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 
1993.433 But, why did this process occur in the first place? 
On the surface the Soviet Union appeared to be a strong state. A state, which controlled the 
country's political means, economic, means and means of culture production. So, it seems 
strange that the state ideology failed when it had these advantages at its disposal. But, the 
hegemony was being weakened slowly over a prolonged period. Other ideologies had slipped 
into the Soviet Union, assisted by the rapid advances in communications technology. 
This trickle of information via the various forms of samizdat, slowly but surely undermined 
the CPSU as the gatekeeper and eroded the dominant ideology. "The impact of subtle, 
subversive symbolism can be far greater than often repeated representations of the dominant 
ideology."434 
Lull offers his interpretation of why the Soviet Union failed to remain as a single political 
entity after the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. "Social uprisings [ ... ], the states of 
the former Soviet Empire [ ... ] took place because conditions encouraged production of 
subversive ideology and the construction of resistant interpretations and actions by 
audiences. "435 
The explanation by Lull appears to allude to the breakdown of the Marxist-Leninist 
431 Editor, Thomas, V., The War Years: 1946 the Verdict ojHistOlY, London, Marshall Cavendish, 1991, p. 226. 
432 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 47. 
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hegemony caused a vacuum of ideology. Immediately following the breakdown, other actors 
sought to take advantage of the situation during this period and manipulate an agenda of 
national independence in the wake of independence from communism. 
In the wake of the political vacuum, with no viable heirs apparent, the situation in Russia has 
become volatile. Political instability coupled with a succession of economic crises has created 
fertile grounds for the rise of political extremism. Shenfield has drawn a comparison between 
Weimar Germany and contemporary Russia, with regard to the potential dangers of emergent 
fascism. 436 
At this stage the comparison is somewhat overly pessimistic. Crippling inflation and a total 
collapse of the German economy in the wake of a world war, followed quickly by a civil war 
(as well as the breakdown of the central authority of the weak government) proved to be more 
severe than what Russia is currently facing. 
Several leading Russian politicians have made public announcements on what they saw as 
necessary to restore the Russian State to what it 'should be.' The remedies offered are 
expansionist in nature, they may appeal to any sentiment in the public which may be nostalgic 
toward the concept of empire. 
4& Vladimir Zhirinovsky - has argued for the recreation of the 19th Century Russian Empire. 
4& Gennady Zyganov - advocates the "voluntary recreation of a unified union state." 
4& Boris Yeltsin - stated that Russia had a special sphere on influence of security matters in 
the former Soviet Union.437 
All ofthese ideas have the foundation that Russia has a special place in the world. The 
notions bound in these expressions advocate the loss of sovereignty of neighbouring states. 
This may be in the form of the complete absorption of the territory into the Russian 
Federation or the loss of some of a state's functions (such as conducting their own foreign 
relations ). 
436 Shenfield, S., op. cit., p. 49. 
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3.3 Use of Patriotism in Russian Society 
There has been an absence of State taught patriotism since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
occurred. For this reason, it becomes necessary to examine the role that was played by 
patriotism during the Soviet Union's existence. To look for any grounds for similarities and 
differences, which exist between these two eras, this will form the basis of a discussion later 
on in the work. 
The political elite can use both patriotism and nationalism as a symbol, to rally a country's 
citizens toward a social or political goal. However, to try and define identity and communality 
through ethnicity could prove to be very unpredictable. Russia's various ethnic groups, some 
of which seek a measure of dependence from Moscow, could feel alienated in a 
nationalistically based setting. The Soviet Union based national sentiment on patriotism. Both 
ofthese concepts offer a potentially powerful pull on a populace that is in despair after over a 
decade of hardship. Which of the two options would provide the political elite with the best 
means of achieving their goals? 
Since President Putin's election victory in March 2000, there has been an attempt to resurrect 
a strong and great Russia again. Changes have been brought about in politics and society to 
help in the creation of this 'new' Russia. Mechanisms such as the creation of the seven 'super 
districts,' exercising greater control over the content of the mass media and a myriad of new 
laws are all designed with the intention of once again making the Kremlin the centre of power 
in the Russian Federation. 
As a centralised state, the Kremlin may be able to better control the direction and 
development of society. However, they need a committed and motivated population to help 
them realise their goals. The current generation of Russia's workforce and society aged in 
their 20's to 30's should be the group that helps to realise societal objectives. But, this age 
group grew up in the era of perestroika and bespredel. An era of firstly great potential and 
hope, then followed by an equal measure of disappointment and frustration for many. In 
effect, they are a 'lost' generation. 
437 McFaul, M., op. cit., p. 256. 
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Putin has made comments regarding the importance and the role that patriotism will play in 
Russian society. As a consequence of the above-mentioned 'lost' generation, the political elite 
has been forced into concentrating their efforts in guiding the consciousness of the next 
generation. The plan seems to be long term and will run a course a lot longer than Putin's 
presidency. One of the best places to initiate training and instilling values and ideology are in 
the centres of cultural production. 
Centres of cultural production include such institutions of society as; the army, the church 
and schools. These institutions help to mould an individual's identity and their place in 
society. They also possess qualities of political power, therefore can command a measure of 
respect and acquiescence by members of the public. 
By making a concerted effort on influencing the next generation of Russians through the 
reintroduction oflessons in patriotism, the government's actions possibly indicate intentions 
of having large-scale societal objectives. Rather than trying to re-educate society into attaining 
the 'correct' values, another method could be to ask a question. What has made Russian 
society become so cynical and distant from the State? 
3.3.1 Definition of Patriotism 
It is necessary to begin this article with some key definitions that will help to facilitate the 
understanding of some arguments, which will be used. Patriotism is a key aspect in this 
article, but different aspects surrounding the concept need to be explained. Then, facets such 
as the motivating factors of patriotism will become more clearly understood and appreciated. 
Patriot - "A person who loves his country, and zealously defends its interests.,,438 
Patriotic - "Actuated or inspired by the love of one's country, directed to the public 
welfare. ,,439 
Patriotism - "The qualities of a patriot, love of ones country." 440 
438 Patterson, R. F., Editor, The Regent English Dictionmy, London, No.1 Publishing Co Ltd., p.296. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Patterson, R. F., Editor, The Cambridge English Dictionary, London, Tophi Books, 1990, p. 296 
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"[ ... ] is a sentiment, a psychological attachment to one's nation, literally a love for one's 
country.,,441 
The concept of patriotism is relatively straightforward. Patriotism is derived from the Latin 
word patria, which means fatherland. 442 Although, as earlier stated, the concepts of patriotism 
and nationalism are different, patriotism provides nationalist sentiment with a conduit for its 
objectives by forming an attachment to one's state. The significant traits, which may occur, 
are the generation of national unity and solidarity and by instilling a sense of rootedness and 
belonging in individuals.443 
3.3.2 Patriotism in the Soviet Union 
Patriotism in the Soviet Union, underwent a transformation from the later years of Joseph 
Stalin's rule (1950-53), into a more Russian form ofpatriotism.444 Focus was shifted from an 
international basis to Russian oriented view. Elements of Russian history were used 
selectively to glorify Russian accomplishments and used to give or legitimate Soviet rule. 
As Soviet patriotism evolved, it led to a restoration of Russian traditions and values.445 The 
process was selective in identifying heroes and villains of Russian history, to provide models 
of behaviour for Soviet citizens to either emulate or avoid. The resurrection of symbols and 
people seems to have been conducted on a need basis. That is, when a situation was dire 
enough or the political leadership wanted to attain a given goal, symbols were brought to life 
and given a meaning and context. 
A clear example in providing evidence ofthis phenomenon occurred in the Second World 
War, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The political elite's 
appeal to the Soviet people was a call to defend Russia and not socialism. Once again, the 
concept of Rodina (Motherland) was used as a rallying symbol for Soviet citizens to resist the 
German threat.446 The Russian name for the Second World War also suggests that a cause 
441 Heywood, A., op. cit., p. 256. 
442 Ibid. 
443 Heywood, A., op. cit., p. 257. 
444 Laqueur, W., Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia, New York, Harper Collins, 1997, 
pp. 63 - 64. 
445 Laqueur, W., op. cit., p. 62. 
446 Laqueur, L., op. cit., p.63. 
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other than the defence of socialism I communism was used, which is known as The Great 
Patriotic War. 
Another, seemingly incompatible symbol of the past, which was erected by the Soviet 
regime during the first desperate months of the Great Patriotic War was allowing the Russian 
Orthodox Church to operate again. Although the Church was tightly restricted and controlled 
in its functions, this was a significant event. However, the lillie between being Russian and 
being Orthodox had a strong association. 
Upon the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ethos of Soviet patriotism was 
abandoned. Boris Kagarlitsky, a Moscow based sociologist offered a possible explanation for 
the neglect of a State offered course in patriotism. 
"In the early 1990' s, the reformers/Westernisers viewed themselves as 
opponents of tradition and the enemies of patriotism. They sought to break 
with the past and completely rebuild all social structures. Inevitably, the 
rhetoric of patriotism passed into the arsenal of the communists."447 
During Boris Yeltsin's rise to power and eventual winning of the presidency of the Russian 
Federation, he used an anti-Communist platform to bolster his support among the people. The 
argument was simple - communism was negative and democracy was positive. Patriotism's 
close association with the Soviet Union meant that it was classed as being a negative aspect 
and therefore made redundant in the new 'democratic' Russian society. 
Yeltsin possibly chose this strategy, as conflict emerged between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. The use of this simplistic manipulation was designed to 
be highly emotive and easy for the Russian public to 'understand' and digest. Opponents and 
obstacles to Yeltsin's will could then be labelled as being Soviet, with the resulting loss of 
credibility that came with this branding. 
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3.3.3 Patriotism or Nationalism? 
The diverse ethnicity of the Soviet Union's population made exploiting ethnic divisions a 
potentially very volatile situation. Various brands of state' sponsored' nationalism and 
patriotism tends to be broad based and inclusive. The Russian Federation has continued this 
practice, as a rule. Nationalism tends to be based on ethnicity rather than citizenship. 
The disintegration process of the Soviet Union was rapid. All of the republics chose to break 
away from Russia. There are still remnants of this process occurring today, for instance in 
Chechnya. 
The diverse ethnicity of the Soviet Union's population made exploiting ethnic divisions a 
potentially very volatile situation. Various brands of state' sponsored' nationalism and 
patriotism tends to be broad based and inclusive. The Russian Federation has continued this 
practice, as a rule. Nationalism tends to be based on ethnicity rather than citizenship. 
Russian nationalism has focused on Rossiiskii Narod (Russian citizens) The ethnically pure 
component Russkii (ethnic Russian) has been largely ignored.448 This has continued after the 
demise of the Soviet Union, after which, the ethnic mix of the Russian State has been more 
homogenous. A 1996 census revealed that ethnic Russians made up 81.5% of the Russian 
Federation's population.449 
Enclaves of other ethnicities are present in the predominantly Russian Russia. Some of these 
peoples have been content to be ruled from Moscow, but others have sought a limited 
autonomy within the Russian State. These autonomous republics, or 'Republics' as they are 
referred to, are ethnically nations within a nation. A Russian term for this situation is 
Matrioshka Nationalism. 450 
Sources of ethnic mobilisation seem to originate not from Russian government sources, but 
from anti-state forces in Russia. For instance, the separatist Chechen forces. The Singaporean 
447 Kagarlitsky, B., Patriotism for New Russians, Moscow Times, 1 June, 2001. JRL #5278, 1 June, 2001. 
448 (1) Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 324. 
(2) Shenfield, S., op. cit., p. 49. 
449 Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 323. 
450 Ibid. The term refers to the traditional Russian dolls. Sometimes, as many as 30 smaller dolls can be 
contained within the biggest doll. A series of different sized figures each hidden in the next bigger sized doll. 
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Institute of South East Asian Studies identified two main factors, which bind the Chechens 
together in their bid for separation from the Russian Federation. These points are ethnicity and 
religion (Islam).451 
Advances in modem mass media communications have made the opportunity for public 
manipulation a much easier task. The communication process has become much more 
centralised, which ensures fewer communication nodes to monitor. TV's introduction has 
provided the chance to communicate directly and instantaneously into many houses at once. 
"Images concerning symbols of national identity can be communicated to the whole nation at 
the same time. ,,452 
Changes in the nature of media ownership can also assist the government in its information 
dissemination goals. Media ownership is in the process of being concentrated in fewer and 
fewer hands. This presents an opportunity for a virtual monopoly on political communication. 
The close proximity of big business to the government, who controls a large portion of the 
private media, merely reinforces the notion of a monopolistic communication process. 
"Contemporary mass media, however, provide the opportunity for virtually 
instantaneous mass communication and also for a monopoly of that 
communication. [ ... ] possibility exists [ ... ] a modem government to sustain a 
continuous manipulation of the national identity dynamic for political 
purposes. ,,453 
During the era of the Soviet Union, the political elite ruled over a very ethnically diverse 
country. The country's leaders realised the potential volatility of attempting to exploit 
nationalistic sentiments with such a diverse popUlation. The authorities used a more inclusive 
policy, based on citizenship, as opposed to nationality. 
Although the Kremlin has chosen to follow the less volatile route of patriotic political 
discourse, some elements in the right wing parties have stirred up nationalist sentiment based 
on race. The government, has on occasion selectively used a nationalistically oriented 
451 Suryadinata, L., op. cit., p. 340. 
452 Bloom, W., Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, p. 85. 
453 Bloom, W., op. cit., p. 86. 
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discourse in order to achieve State objectives. This seems to have been conducted on a small-
scale and selective basis. In 1997, a Russian academic, Valery Tishkov noted a change in the 
direction of academic and political discourse; 
"With the emergence of ethnic politics in the former Soviet Union, 
ethnographic primordialism ceased to be merely a marginal and empirical 
approach and suddenly revealed its potential for being enthusiastically 
applied in the quest for new identities, as well as nationalist political 
discourse. ,,454 
The most obvious recent manifestation of this change was witnessed after the outbreak of the 
Second Chechen War. A hysteria was created during the course of the infamous apartment 
bombings, which occurred late in 1999. This in tum generated ill feeling toward the 'Other.' 
Many Chechens and 'Blacks' from the Caucasus region were expelled from MoSCOW.455 
3.3.4 Reintroduction of Patriotism into Contemporary Russian Society 
In one sense President Vladimir Putin has a connection to a form of continuity with the 
Soviet past. He has stated that, "I was a pure and utterly successful product of Soviet patriotic 
education.,,456 
Putin has linked patriotism to a strong Russian state, going as far as to imply that without 
patriotism Russia would sink into an abyss. 
"Patriotism is a feeling of pride in one's country, its history and 
accomplishments. [ ... J Patriotism is the source of our people's courage, 
staunchness and strength. If we lose patriotism and the national pride and 
dignity that are connected with it, we will no longer be a nation capable of 
great achievements.,,457 
454 Duffield, M., Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London, 
Zed Books, 2001, p. 110. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Putin, V., First Person, London, Hutchinson, 2000, p. 42. 
457 Putin, V., op. cit., p. 214. 
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In an interview on the loyal state TV channel RTR in October 2002, Putin confinned his 
stated belief in the link between patriotism and a strong nation. "I believe that patriotism and 
love of one's homeland are the basic values for any nation or country.,,458 
Promoting the notion of 'patriotic education' was in existence before Vladimir Putin's rapid 
rise through the political ranles. As early as 1998, the head of Rosvoentsentr (Russian Military 
Historical-Cultural Centre) Vice-admiral Yuri Kvyatkovsky, proposed a similar programme as 
the current one under the title 'Russian Patriot. ,459 
The nature of the programme that was proposed by Kvyatkovsky had a clear set of goals, 
including the nature of the values that the education was intended instil in Russia's youth. 
"[ ... J resurrecting military-sporting games and similar activities. This will 
put the 'Zamitsa' (a pioneer tradition consisting of military related sporting 
events) back in schools. From there, the high-impact part of the programme 
is to consist of observing Defenders of the Fatherland day and month. In the 
conception of the authors' at Rosvoentsentr, all of this will cause youth to 
accept the right values, reject the wrong, and enter the draft age with a 
feeling of profound pleasure in heading off to active military service.,,46o 
The goals and objectives of the above-proposed programme would appear to be aiming to 
reintroduce the 'tried and true' methods of Soviet patriotic education for the purposes of 
achieving the desires of the contemporary political elite. But, why would the new 
'democratic' elite want to use Soviet methods to achieve their ends? 
A sizeable portion of the 'new democratic' elite are made up from the Soviet elite, the so-
called nomenklatura. 75% of President Boris Yeltsin's Presidential Administration was drawn 
from the communist nomenklatura. This proportion was matched in the Russian 
government. 461 
458 Putin Wants Powerful Russia its Citizens to be Proud oj, RTR, 7 October, 2002, BBC Monitoring. 
JRL #6483, 10 October, 2002. 
459 Makarin, A., Hello, Zarnitsa! The Government has Approved a Programme for the Patriotic Education of 
Citizens, www.segodnya.ru. 22 February, 2001. JRL #5112,23 February, 2001. 
460 Ibid. 
461 White, S., Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Post-Communist SOciety, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p. 267. 
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The Russian government identified a problem that 'plagued' Russian society as 
"indifference, egoism, individualism, cynicism, unmotivated aggression and a lack of respect 
for the State and social institutions.,,462 As a result of these listed problems the government 
sought a solution that would; "improve national morale, but will also aid the preservation of 
social stability, help the resurrection ofthe nation's economy and strengthen the country's 
defensive capacity.,,463 
In order to try and resolve the mentioned problems, the government announced on March 12, 
2001 their intention to introduce a five-year programme of 'patriotic education.' This was 
enshrined in the government's 'Decree on the State Programme Patriotic Education of the 
Citizens of the Russian Federation for 2001 - 2005. ,464 The text of the document lamented 
that the "gradual loss of traditional Russian patriotism has become more and more 
noticeable. ,,465 
News ofthe decree was published in the parliament's newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta, in a 
full-page article format, which has similarities with the Soviet past.466 When new laws were 
enacted in the Soviet Union, they were often announced by publishing the entirety of the 
legislation in newspapers. Some US$6.4 million was allocated to the funding of "patriotic 
museum exhibitions, academic research, sporting events, contests and conferences.,,467 
To win over the youth of Russia, a number of initiatives have been proposed, using a 
mixture of modern and traditional lures. Some of the ideas that have been proposed have 
included methods such as; 
EI Video games based on famous points in Russian history. 
EI Soviet tradition of naming schools after contemporary and historical national heroes to be 
restored. 
462 Russia Unveils 5-yr Plan for "Patriotic Education, "Reuters, 12 March, 2001. JRL #5146, 12 March, 2001. 
463 Gentleman, A., Reinventing Russia Following Recent Knocks to the Nation's Pride, A Programme of 
'Patriotic Education' has Been Launched by the Government, The Guardian, 21 March, 2001. 
JRL #5162, 21 March, 2001. 
464 Russia Unveils 5-yr Plan for "Patriotic Education," Reuters, 12 March, 2001. JRL #5146,12 March, 2001. 
465 Gentleman, A., Reinventing Russia Following Recent Knocks to the Nation's Pride, A Programme of 
'Patriotic Education' has Been Launched by the Government, The Guardian, 21 March, 2001. 
JRL #5162, 21 March, 2001. 
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• Patriotic web sites to be established by the government. 
• The media will be actively involved in promoting certain values. 468 
A measure of continuity would appear to exist between the current Putin administration and 
the Gorbachev administration. The pro-Kremlin website, www.strana.ru published an upbeat 
appraisal of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to a Moscow school, to deliver a lesson in patriotism. 
"The former President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, participated in the 
Day of Knowledge activities at school 237 in Moscow on September 1. He 
greeted the schoolchildren on the festive occasion and then gave a lesson in 
patriotism to senior graders. He urged the pupils not to be shy of being a 
patriot. By abusing patriotism, people lose their bearings, he declared. 
Under the guise of struggling for freedom and democracy, we must not 
trample on our past.,,469 
Publicity and lures are not solely targeting Russian youth. The wider public has been 
exposed to a publicity campaign aimed at promoting the new patriotic programme. Posters 
that portray the Russian medieval hero Yury Dolgoruky on horseback have greeted Moscow's 
pedestrians. Dolgoruky, dressed in armour is seen calling and urging citizens to help Russia 
overcome her present difficulties. 470 
The nature ofthe funding allocation was very specific in some categories. Specific categories 
included study devoted to; 
"State activities for the propaganda of patriotism in the mass media, 
including prizes for patriotic journalists and funds for the active opposition 
to distortion and falsification of the history of the Fatherland. ,,471 
468 Gentleman, A, Reinventing Russia Following Recent Knocks to the Nation's Pride, A Programme of 
'Patriotic Education' has Been Launched by the Government, The Guardian, 21 March, 2001. 
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470 Russia's Schoolfor Patriots, AFP, 15 March, 2001. JRL #5154,15 March, 2001. 
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What does the government expect to achieve from providing 'patriotic education,' in terms 
of output? During interviews with journalists and in press conferences, it has become clear 
that the government has some set expectations as to the benefits of 'patriotic education. ' 
Wording of the decree states that a main aim ofthe legislation is to; 
"[ ... J create in citizens a high patriotic consciousness, a sense of loyalty to 
the Fatherland, and a readiness to perform civil duties and constitutional 
obligations in order to defend the interests of the homeland."472 
An anonymous official from the Ministry of Education also outlined the importance and 
relevance of patriotic education in contemporary Russian society. The official was also careful 
to stress that it was patriotism and not nationalism that was the subject. 
"Sociological research has shown that since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, when a great many shocking facts were published about the USSR's 
history, there has been a wholesale rejection of the country's past by its 
population - including those aspects of it in which one could take pride. [ ... J 
Our programme is not aimed at imposing some kind of new ideology on the 
population; we are highlighting the importance of education in love and 
respect for one's country.,,473 
Former President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev has lent his support to the notion of 
'correcting' the textbooks. Whilst giving a lesson a patriotism lesson, he stated that "[ ... J in 
particular, to provide schools with a good material basis, to overcome the chaos found in 
textbooks [ ... ].,,474 An indication or clue of the likely nature and orientation of the new 
textbooks can be found in the government's announcement of its intention to reintroduce 
'patriotic education' in March 2001. 
A Moscow based political analyst, Andrei Piontkovsky, commented on a likely outcome of 
the financial incentives. "It means that a great many people are going to receive a lot of 
472 Gentleman, A., Reinventing Russia Following Recent Knocks to the Nation's Pride, A Programme of 
'Patriotic Education' has Been Launched by the Government, The Guardian, 21 March, 2001. 
JRL #5162, 21 March, 2001. 
473 Ibid. 
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money, and make patriotism their profession. ,,475 However, even if some people are going to 
make patriotism a profession, this does not necessarily involve a personal commitment to the 
State philosophy. Therefore, the problem still remains, only a surface facade of patriotism 
may be created. 
If the results of a November 2001 poll are anything to go by, Piontkovsky's scepticism may 
be well placed. The poll asked respondents to rank, in order of importance twenty-five words 
that expressed human values. Concepts and notions such as 'security,' 'peace' and 'family' 
ranked highest at over 30%. However, 'patriotism' was only ranked as being of high 
importance by 3 % of respondents. Additionally, 29% of respondents considered that 
"patriotism does not mean attitude but means a heroic deed. ,,476 
A poll result such as the one above, if it gives a true indication of public sentiment, is bad 
news for the government and its intentions. Not only does society display apathy toward the 
concept of patriotism, but the public's and the government's definition of the concept would 
also appear to be different. For the government to be successful in their 'patriotic education' 
programme, they need to change the prevailing attitude, values and definitions of 
contemporary Russian society. 
On the positive side for the government, a recent poll conducted by www.monitoring.ru 
sociologists gives the Kremlin some hope of achieving their ends. The November 2002 poll of 
1500 respondents showed that 77% of respondents considered themselves to be patriots, only 
20% considered themselves to be unpatriotic and a further 3% were undecided. The group 
who considered themselves to be patriotic was broken down further; 
~ Entrepreneurs - 79% 
~ Servicemen -76% 
Ell Pensioners - 82% 
• Citizens with a higher education - 84% 
474 Gorbachev Gives a Lesson in Patriotism in Moscow School, Former President Sees Vladimir Putin 's Efforts 
in Reforming Education as Positive, www.strana.ru. 1 September, 2001. JRL #5422,3 September, 2001. 
475 Russia Unveils 5-yr Plan for "Patriotic Education, "Reuters, 12 March, 2001. JRL #5146, 12 March, 2001. 
476 Ilyuchev, G., Lovefor the Motherland is Something Intimate, Izvestiya, 4 December, 2001. JRL #5580, 
4 December, 2001. 
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@ Unemployed - 69% 477 
These results would appear to indicate that the idea of patriotism appeals to a broad spectrum 
of Russian society. An interesting indication of the results is that society's elite (those with an 
education and in business) and pensioners associate themselves more closely as being a 
patriot. Although society does not appear to judge patriotism as being important, an 
overwhelming majority of the respondents do identify themselves as patriots. 
However, everyone has, not wholeheartedly welcomed the new programme that is in the 
process of being implemented. The daily newspaper Izvestiya, raised the question "How do 
you go about making a patriot?" Izvestiya also recalled the results of 'patriotic education' in 
the Soviet Union.478 
"Once they went out into the real world, either they cracked, realising that 
all they had learned was inapplicable, and became cynics, or they became 
fanatics for their ideas. ,,479 
Greater government interest in the content of school textbooks has already been publicised 
on occasion. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov appeared on ORT on the 30th of August, 2001, 
he took one textbook to task on a question that it posed. The textbook asked the question 
"why Russians had consistently failed to establish a safe and prosperous society?" He added 
that "it is not very clear what kind of people these textbooks are supposed to prepare." 
Kasyanov hinted that questions could leave students with an "inferiority complex.,,48o 
At the opening of a cabinet meeting on 31 August, 2001 Kasyanov exclaimed that he "found 
so much astonishing" material in school books on contemporary Russian history.481 Possibly 
as an attempt to rectify this perceived problem, the government announced a contest for the 
477 Overwhelming Majority of Russian Citizens Consider Themselves Patriotic, Interfax, 17 November, 2002. 
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creation of new textbooks on national history. The government's aim was to have the 
textbooks ready for school use by September 2002.482 
Patriotism, if applied in an effective manner, can prove to be an excellent means of 
motivating society. As was seen in the definition of the concept, the interests of the State 
come before everything else. Individuality is sacrificed for a collective mentality that works 
toward the 'betterment' of the country. Emotion rather than reason guide the actions of the 
collective. For these reasons, patriotism can be organised as a motivating force that directs 
society toward an objective or goal. But who decides what is best for society and directs 
society's goals and objectives? 
3.4 The Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church as Reflected Through the Media 
It is not my intention to make a detailed account of the political relations and events that 
have taken place between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the State. The aim of this 
work is to try and bring to light the ROC's influence in contemporary Russian society, 
through statements made through the media and via statements made by members of the 
political elite. For this reason, due to constraints on time and space, I will be concentrating on 
the content of 'main-stream' media organisations. 
In studying the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, via their media communications, 
I shall be taking the work from viewing the ROC as a collective body, rather than as 
individuals. For instance, statements from the Patriarch will be assumed to be the voice of the 
ROC, as the Patriarch is the embodiment of the Church's chief representative. I do realise that 
there are factions, conflicts and voices of dissent within the rallies ofthe ROC that are heard 
periodically, but given the physical constraints of this work there is not enough latitude to 
give full consideration to this pluralism of debate and thought. 
3.4.1 Russian Orthodox Church During The Soviet Era 
After the Soviet victory in the Russian Civil War and the foreign interventions (1917-22), 
the authorities viewed the ROC as a pillar of the old Tsarist regime and therefore a potential 
482 The Government Tries to Gain Control Over Histo/y Schoolbooks, Izvestiya, 31 August, 2001. 
JRL #5419,31 August, 2001. 
178 
danger to the fledgling communist state. Then from 1929 the Soviet regime tried to eliminate 
organised religion from society as quickly as possible.483 Institutions that are responsible for 
helping to form cultural identity include, the education system, the army and the church. As 
such, the ROC was potentially a competing source of cultural identity to a regime that was not 
established in society and could therefore be construed as a threat. 
During the opening phases of the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - May 1945), enormous 
setbacks were inflicted upon the Red Army and the low morale ofthe Russian people caused 
Stalin to reverse his earlier decision on closing the Church completely. By 1943 limited 
religious observance under strict state supervision was permitted, for the purpose of 
attempting to lift the public's morale, by offering them hope through belief. A kind of 
symbiotic relationship developed between the Church and the State, in return for their co-
operation the ROC would be allowed to exist in the Soviet Union. 
This relationship between the ROC and the Soviet State was formalised on September 4, 
1943. A meeting between Stalin and high-ranking Church officials took place and the 
agreement was reached in this unprecedented occasion.484 During this period the lin1e between 
traditional Russian patriotism and the ROC, played a significant role in rallying the masses to 
resistance against the German led invasion of the Soviet Union.485 ROC priests were 
instructed to instil 'Soviet Patriotism' by preaching and by example into their congregation.486 
With respect to the patriotic aspect, the ROC has a strong Caesaro-Papist heritage that 
results in "many bishops firmly believe that it is their patriotic Christian duty to side with the 
State. This is especially true when their state is criticised by foreigners.,,487 This statement 
may seem strange to the reader, in light of the fact that the Soviet State had tried to destroy the 
Church prior to the war and only let the ROC exist because they were considered to be of 
some use to the State. However, the pull of an outside threat to a nation can have the effect of 
uniting what would otherwise be splintered political interest groups. 
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English born writer, Irena Maryniak, claimed that the State used religion as a motivating 
tool. Although this work did not strictly relate to the period ofthe Great Patriotic War, it gives 
a clear indication of religion being used as a motivating and collectivising means by the State. 
"[ ... J presentations of religious faith, or indeed faith of any kind, as an 
effective tap for the energies of the socialist collective. These may also carry 
a suggestion that it might be useful to create a deity (even though none 
exists) in order to encourage people to behave in a more decent, patriotic 
way and to make them work harder. ,,488 
A revival of the ROC's physical condition also took place. The number of active churches 
rose significantly during the course of the war. At the beginning of the war in 1941 there were 
approximately 4000 churches in existence. By the conclusion of the war in 1945 there were 
approximately 16, 000 operational churches.489 Although the Church gave up its freedom and 
independence from an atheist state, by doing so they averted what seemed to be certain 
destruction at the hands of the state. They were serving a new master now. 
As a result of the 1943 understanding between the State and the Church, the ROC found 
itself cast in a role. That role was to support Soviet policy both on a domestic and an 
international basis. And, for doing a 'good' performance they were rewarded by the State.490 
However, during the war, not all clergy were supportive of the Soviet regime. In the 
occupied territories of the Soviet Union, many new churches were opened. These churches 
then served as a focal point for rallying support for the German forces, resistance against 
Soviet activities or serving the interests of nationalistic independence movements. 491 
Various religious repressions, aimed at limiting or destroying the influence of the ROC were 
in part successful. During the Soviet period 25, 000 of the 45, 000 churches based upon the 
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territory ofthe Russian Federation have been pennanently 10st.492 This loss in the number of 
churches lost bears testimony to the scale of the anti-religious campaign by the authorities, 
prior to their concept of a role for the ROC in the Soviet State. 
3.4.2 Effects Of Perestroika And Glasnost Upon The Church 
Initially, religion was a low-priority on Gorbachev's political agenda and was not considered 
to be very important. However, this changed as "religion became important as ideology was 
usurped by politics.,,493 Two important circumstances combined to make the issue of religion 
more central to the political struggles that were taking place behind the scenes during glasnost 
and perestroika. 
From 1987 the ROC had tried to apply pressure on the Soviet government through the use of 
open letters.494 It is uncertain whether this method bore any success. One of the events, which 
pushed the issue of religion into the political mainstream, however, was the Millennium 
celebration that was held in 1988. This was a celebration of the Slavic States adoption of 
Christianity in 988.495 The Millennium celebrations provided the occasion to highlight the 
activities ofthe ROC. 
Two media organisations that helped to campaign for the Church on matters such as the 
restoration of Church property were Izvestiya and Ogonek.496 However, from the late 1980's 
the ROC also began to build their own media apparatus. A monthly journal of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, Moskovsky Tserkovny Vestnik was the first ofthe new pUblications and first 
appeared in 1989.497 This course of action could have ultimately meant that the church 
authorities did not need to rely on the goodwill of the Soviet media to continue receiving 
favourable coverage. 
During the progression of Gorbachev's refonns, he found an ever increasing level of 
resistance to his goals and refonns. At times, the Gorbachev camp, media and ROC acted in 
unison. During the period of glasnost and the uncovering of past 'mistakes' the press 
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highlighted state abuses against religion. Therefore any officials seen to be acting against 
religion could be portrayed as an obstacle for the reforms.498 
The ROC was viewed as being of potential value for providing supporters for the reforms. In 
1988 the estimated number of believers in Soviet society was put at 25% of the population, 
which equated to approximately 70 million people.499 Gorbachev definitely needed this 
support, he also assumed that the Church could provide this support for his administration by 
influencing the Church's congregation. 
State-Church relations began to thaw as early as 1988. Gorbachev and the Patriarch uttered 
assurances and pleasantries to each other during the beginning of the reconciliation. The 
process began with Gorbachev urging believers and atheists to unite in the "common great 
cause of the restructuring and renewal of socialism." In response, the Patriarch called the 
Party programme "highly humane" and "close to the Christian ideal."soo From this point, the 
political influence of the Church has slowly increased its influence in the political sphere. 
The importance ofthe ROC to the Gorbachev administration's policy reform programme was 
clearly demonstrated by events surrounding the 1988 Church Millennium celebrations. The 
activities ofthe Millennium celebrations were very well publicised by the Soviet media. 501 
Had the Church considered to be a threat or a neutral stance was taken, it is unlikely that these 
celebrations would have received much attention in the Soviet media, if any attention was 
going to be paid in the first place. 
In addition to a great deal of Soviet media coverage of the Millennium events, a great deal of 
political participation in the festivities also took place. The celebrations occurred on State and 
Church property. All of these aspects combined to raise the public profile of the ROC. s02 The 
softening in State attitudes toward the ROC was reflected in political statements. 
A meeting between Gorbachev and the clergy took place on April 29, 1988 and was covered 
in the newspaper Izvestiya. During the course of this meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev was 
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reported as describing the Millennium as "a significant milestone in history, culture and 
development of Russia." He then went on to describe Believers as "Soviet people, working 
people, patriots." A need to revise religious legislation was also mooted at this meeting.s03 
These statements appeared to indicate a reversal of the Soviet government's attitude toward 
the ROC and its members. 
The Apri11988 meeting between Gorbachev, Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy 
Synod in the Kremlin had been the first occasion since Stalin's meeting with the clergy in 
September 1943. In addition to the above mentioned statements, Gorbachev reaffirmed a 
common past, present and future between State and ROC when he said, "we have a common 
history, a common Motherland and a common future. "S04 
As a result of the rhetoric of the meeting, a series of verbal exchanges between the Kremlin 
and the ROC eventuated. The limits to religious legislation were given. It was decided, by the 
Soviet government, that the legislation was to be; 
iii Revised "on the basis of Leninist principles." 
«I And that the State attitude to the ROC and Believers "should be defined in the 
interests of strengthening the unity of all working people and of the whole nation."sos 
Patriarch Pimen responded to the signals, which were sent by the Kremlin. His words gave 
the impression of support for Gorbachev's administration and the Soviet Union's reform 
programme. He stated that; 
iii Believers were "fervently praying for the success" of the reforms and "the new 
political thinking." 
• Pimen stated that the ROC was concerned with morality and in promoting "universal 
human norms" and that the ROC had always been devoted to "the moral education of 
the faithful, the assertion of the dignity of the human personality, the strengthening of 
the sanctity of the family home and a conscious attitude towards labour."s06 
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Property and land that was seized by the communist authorities began to be returned during 
1988 - 1989. From this point, the Kremlin granted several key concessions to the Church. In 
1989 the first religious leaders were elected to the Soviet parliament. 1990 saw the first 
religious services for some seventy years in the Kremlin's cathedrals and religious 
broadcasting was aired on state TV. Official recognition of religious observance came in 1991 
when the Orthodox Christmas became a public holiday.s07 
The elections to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 proved to be very 
successful in cementing the ROC's continued role in Soviet politics. During these elections 
three ROC hierarchs were appointed. s08 This action brought about close political ties between 
some members of the political elite and the church elite. 
In addition to the concessions offered by the Soviet State to the Church, legal provisions 
were instituted as a measure to protect the newly won freedoms. Three key pieces of 
legislation guaranteed a freedom of choice and prevented the state from legally repossessing 
what it given. 
• 1990 Law on Property - gave the Church full ownership rights to its property. 
• 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience - gave believers the right to propagate their faith and 
for parents to offer their children a religious upbringing. 
• 1991 Declaration of the Rights and Freedoms of the Individual- guarantee of freedom to 
practice and believe religion. s09 
These laws not only signalled a change of state attitude toward religion, but also were the 
beginning of a departure from a 'mass' oriented society, to one that was more individualistic. 
Gorbachev's law reform of religion made it possible to openly espouse an alternative ideology 
(to Marxism-Leninism). The way was made clear for the Church to pursue the fulfilment of 
society's spiritual and ideological needs. These events laid the path for a greater role for the 
ROC in the spiritual affairs of the Soviet Union, so what did the Church hierarchy do with this 
opportunity? 
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Soviet press began to cover the activities of religious organisations more favourably in the 
late Soviet period. This was especially so with the activities of charity work by religious 
groups, such as the Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Muslims and the ROC.510 This publicity 
provided religious groups with the opportunity to further strengthen their public profile, 
influence and activities. 
The ROC's increasing political influence began to be felt in the Soviet political circles. 
Aleksandr Degarev, the First Deputy Director of the Ideological Department of the CPSU 
Central Committee made comments regarding the dismissal of Konstantin Kharchev, the 
Director for the Council for Religious Affairs (the government agency tasked with 
'administering' the religious portfolio during the Soviet era). Degarev admitted that the ROC 
leadership played an instrumental role in Kharchev's dismissal from his position. This 
political struggle involved two other government departments, that had tried to have Kharchev 
removed, but was unsuccessfu1.511 
On May 3, 1990 Patriarch Pimen died and was replaced on June 7, 1990 when Patriarch 
Alexis II was elected Patriarch.512 During glasnost the excesses of communist rule were 
presented to society. The ROC, in acting with the Gorbachev administration played an active 
role in exorcising the demons of the past. Alexis II talked of the need for the Church's 
repentance because of their silence during this period.513 This comment seems to have come 
back to haunt the Patriarch though. 
To the outside world at least, it seemed as though problems pertaining to religious freedoms 
had been resolved. However, some debate and problems remained. By approximately 
1989-1990, some public debate began to emerge about the Church's past. During Gorbachev's 
reforms the ROC had been called upon to participate more fully in societal matters. But, there 
had been no internal restructuring of the ROC. This had resulted in some conflict and public 
debate as to whether the ROC was equipped to meet these new challenges. These fears were 
expressed by some members of the clergy and also appeared in the Soviet press.514 
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An example of one of the debates within the Church, concerning not facing up to its past was 
concerning the Council of Religious Affair's (CRA) classification systems for priests. The 
CRA divided priests into three categories, numbered one to three, category one being the most 
loyal to the Soviet State. Alexis II was classified as a category one priest under this system. 
The following is a description of the work and deeds of a category one priest. 
"[ ... ] both in words and deeds affirm not only loyalty but also patriotism 
towards the socialist society, strictly observe the laws on cults and educate 
the parish clergy and believers in the same spirit, realistically understand 
that our state is not interested in proclaiming the role of religion and the 
church in society and, realising this, do not display any partiCUlar activeness 
in extending the influence of Orthodoxy among the population.,,515 
Such an assessment is, on the surface at least, a resounding blow for the personal integrity of 
someone in Alexis II's position if it is true. Even if the statement is not true the dilemma 
caused by an apparent conflict of interests could easily force most to step down from office. 
However, Alexis II has continued to hold his appointment through much political turmoil. 
This action has not been the final damaging political revelation or action for Alexis II. In 
December 1990 Alexis II signed a letter, in which 53 prominent political, academic and 
literary personalities had put their names. The letter called for the declaration of a state of 
emergency and the imposition of direct presidential rule. Alexis II seemed to side with the 
conservative forces. His action was unpopular and resulted in a rushed press statement by 
ROC authorities who alleged that he was ill and did not know what he was doing. 516 Alexis II 
andlor his backers would seem to be reasonably politically aware, this action may have been 
sparked by a perception and an anticipation of future political events. If the conservative 
faction had ousted Gorbachev from power, then the ROC may have benefited from the actions 
of Alexis II. 
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3.4.3 The Russian Orthodox Church In The Russian Federation 
According to a 1999 poll conducted by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public 
Opinion (VTsIOM), the Church's status is high. Russia's two most respected organisations 
were the Orthodox Church rating a 65% approval and the armed forces (53% approval).Sl7 
Such a result is heartening for the Church's potential in Russian society. But, what does the 
Church offer the people, and is this high approval rating translating into a greater influence on 
society? 
On paper, the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys a strong following from the Russian public. 
Between 50 - 75% of Russians identify themselves as Russian Orthodox believers.518 Whether 
this figure represents the true number of active participants in the Church's, or is a reflection 
of cultural identity, is uncertain. 
In the immediate era of post-communism, Yeltsin continued and arguably accelerated 
religious freedom. Taking care to cultivate a warm relationship with the Orthodox Church. 
Part ofthe 1993 Constitution specifically guarantees religious freedom, this article cannot be 
amended by parliamentary vote. Its wording is specific, granting the "right to profess 
individually or jointly with others any religion or to profess none, to freely choose, hold, and 
propagate religious or other beliefs, and act in accordance with them."sI9 Close ties between 
Yeltsin and Alexis II may have helped in the State wanting to be seen in aiding in the ROC's 
physical restoration.s20 Although, the question remains as to whether this relationship is either 
merely politically convenient or a genuine relationship. 
Symbolic of the Yeltsin administrations close relationship with the Church was the costly 
rebuilding of the Church of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. This church was destroyed on 
Stalin's orders in 1931.521 This act, by the state, in the reconstruction of the spiritual home of 
Russian Orthodoxy demonstrated the growing influence of the Church in political life. In 
November 1993 Yeltsin also ordered rebuilt the Kazan Cathedral in Red Square, which had 
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been destroyed in 1936 as a 'cult building.,522 
Yeltsin also employed the centuries old tradition of the Russian Head of State consulting a 
leading Church figure prior to an event of national significance. Events such as the signing of 
the nuclear arms reduction treaty with the United States or the April 1993 referendum on early 
parliamentary and presidential elections.523 
Patriarch of the ROC, Alexis II played an active political part in the September / October 
1993 dispute between the Russian executive and legislative branches of government. He 
offered to mediate between the opposing sides, which they both agreed to. Although the 
negotiation process ultimately failed, the Church received a lot of media publicity for their 
mediation role. 524 
From 1993, when the ROC began to feel the effects of competition from other faiths, they 
sought to remedy the situation. This was attempted via actively trying to bring about 
amendments in religious legislation (in the ROC's favour).525 
During his term as President, Yeltsin came to be seen at many religious ceremonies. Debate 
exists as to whether this is a genuine show of faith on Yeltsin' s part or merely a vote-catching 
exercise. 526 Yeltsin did make promises to the ROC while in office. Some of these promises 
included; 
It Eventual restoration of all Church property and buildings. 
• State funds to restore and rebuild religious buildings. 
• To discuss the question of offering tax relief on Church income.527 
The ROC has continued to build upon its media asset base. In 1994 a new pUblication, 
Khronika that is devoted to theology and history appeared.528 
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What could be construed as a possible clampdown on non-Orthodox religions occurred in 
1997. After the Duma passed the bill by a large majority in September 1997, Yeltsin was 
forced in to signing the bill in to law. The new law excluded 'non-traditional' churches from 
educational activities, publishing literature, or visiting hospitals and prisons unless they could 
prove that they have been operating in Russia legally during the preceding 15 years.S29 
The effect of the law was to drive some religious groups underground to avoid police 
harassment. For instance, Jehovah's Witnesses were defined as a "destructive religious 
organisation of West em orientation" and were charged with "spreading religious hatred."s30 
This law was passed in spite of the fact that it contravened the 1993 Constitution and the Law 
on freedom of conscience. 
American academic Stephen Shenfield has made a somewhat disconcerting observation in 
Church-State relations. "The process of interpenetration of church and state has already gone 
so far that as Russia enters the 21st Century can no longer be considered a secular state."S31 
A possible explanation for the state's apparent fervour in resurrecting the power of the 
Russian Orthodox Church lies with the church's cultural production aspects. The church has a 
history of being a powerful ally of the Russian State in the past. It may be the intention of the 
contemporary political elite to resurrect this relationship. 
"In the liturgy of the Russian Orthodox Church, [ ... ] the inculcation of 
obedience and indeed devotion to the Tsar was the central message, 
incessantly broadcast to the faithful."s32 
3.4.4 State-Church Relations Under The Putin Administration 
Church and State have been moving together in a mutually beneficial alliance. Professor of 
Comparative Religion at Moscow State University, Alexander Kolunov outlined what he saw 
as the current relationship between State and the ROC. 
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"Since Russian civil society is so weak, the Orthodox Church looks to the 
State to provide material support and funding. [ ... ] In return, the Church 
provides ideological legitimacy for the State and helps to bring up youth in 
the spirit of patriotism. ,,533 
The ROC's role in State matters has continued since Putin's accession to power. This may be 
in part to the intensified search for a 'Russian' identity and a desire to strengthen the Russian 
State that has taken place. However, other factors may also be at play, which are leading to a 
greater participation of the Church in the affairs of State. 
"Apart from the army, the Russian Orthodox Church is probably the only 
social institution in Russia no politician can afford to offend [ ... ] Russia's 
present leader's are desperate to receive some of the authority the Church 
bestows.,,534 
Although politicians may believe that by courting the ROC leadership, which will lead to 
them gaining 'control' over the entire congregation, a problem in this calculation exists. The 
ROC leadership does not enjoy the full trust of all of its members.535 Reasons for this lack of 
trustwill be discussed in Coming to Terms With its 'Dark' Past. 
The size of the ROC has grown significantly and the organisation is a very sizeable body. On 
25 March, 2003 Alexis II released the Church's statistics via the State-owned news agency 
RIA Navastei. These figures were given at the diocesan assembly of Moscow's clergy in 
Moscow. The figures are as follow; 
«I 16, 195 registered parishes of the ROC on Russian territory. 
• 17,480 priests and deacons serving these parishes. 
• ROC has 131 dioceses. 
" 155 bishops serving. 
" 614 active cloisters - 295 monasteries and 319 nunneries. 
" 198 quiet cloisters - 160 monastery inns and 38 sketes. 
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G 560 Orthodox churches and chapels and 959 clergymen serving in Moscow. 
G 8 cloisters in Moscow - 4 monasteries and 4 nunneries. 536 
Putin has been seen as being close to the ROC from early on in his term as President. For 
instance his 'pilgrimage' to ROC monasteries in the White Sea area. These monasteries were 
devastated during the Soviet era, both Putin and the Church have expressed their desire to see 
these monasteries rebuilt. 537 
Of the 560 Orthodox churches located in Moscow, this group can be broken down further. 
Not all ofthese churches are active currently. Of the 560 churches: 
ED 30 have not yet resumed services 
G 34 still house secular organisations 
G 52 are still under construction.538 
The ROC has increasingly been using media to deliver political statements, matters more 
pertaining to State than to religion. At times, these statements have been on controversial 
societal topics or debates. On the 5th of January, 2002 Metropolitan Kiril was interviewed by 
Radio Mayak in Moscow. During the course of the interview, the presenter asked Kiril about 
Kaliningrad. 
Presenter - "What do you think the Church can do in this direction and put an end to all these 
political gambling regarding Kaliningrad region?" 
Metropolitan Kiril- "My answer will be quite harsh. As long as the Orthodox 
Church is out there in the Kaliningrad region, the region will always belong to 
Russia. ,,539 
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This comment made by Kiril gives a glimpse at the perceived inter-dependent relationship of 
the State and ROC by high-ranking members ofthe ROC clergy. However, clergy have not 
been the only ones to stress a close relationship between Church and State. Inter/ax reported a 
speech made by Putin in Solovki on August 20, 2001. Referring to the role of religion in 
society, Putin said: 
"[ ... J must be made the backbone of Russia's domestic and foreign policies. 
[ ... J God has saved all nations, Metropolitan Illarion once said. If so, all 
nations are equal in the eyes of God. [ ... J This simple truth has been the 
nucleus of the Russian State system, making it possible to build a strong 
multi-ethnic State, [ ... J Our spiritual teachers not only glorified the Russian 
people - without any exclusiveness or chauvinism. They have been teaching 
us throughout the centuries to respect other peoples. It would not hurt to 
think of this today. [ ... J contrary to the teaching about the God-chosen 
nature of individual peoples that asserted itself in medieval Western Europe, 
the Russian Orthodox culture has been laying the main emphasis on the 
equality of all peoples, which is a matter of principle for Russia. Since time 
immemorial, our country has been called 'Holy Russia' and these words 
have carried a great spiritual meaning, as they emphasized the special role of 
Russia voluntarily, as the keeper of Christianity. Without Christianity 
Russia would have hardly become an accomplished State. It is therefore 
extremely important, useful and timely to get back to this source [ ... ]. ,,540 
During this trip, Putin and the Patriarch travelled together, to the Solovki Archipelago, which 
was the site of persecution of members of the monastery by Stalin's security services. The 
land confiscated during Stalin's era was returned prior to the activities and the ceremony 
being conducted there during Putin's and the Patriarch's visit. 54l Putin's actions and comments 
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display a closeness not only between himself and the ROC, but also strong religious 
convictions. 
A controversial issue that has the habit of appearing and disappearing from the public forum 
is the topic of the Soviet State's confiscation of Church land and property and possible 
restitution by the contemporary Russian government. Some land and property has been 
returned, but the State still holds onto other former Church assets. A form of compromise has 
been reached in regard to this situation. 
From the mid-1990's the ROC was given some commercial concessions by the government. 
It is allowed to import between US$75 - 100 million worth of cigarettes. The ROC also 
acquired an 40% interest in the oil-export firm MES, which gave them an annual income of 
approximately US$2 billion. However, the cigarette concession was cancelled in 1996 and 
MESwent out of business around 1998.542 
As a consequence of these 'failures,' the Church has sought funds from other sources. Now, 
the ROC survives partly on a commercial bottled water enterprise and donations from the 
energy giants Gazprom and Lukoil.543 
An article written in the newspaper Vremya MNby Sergei Markedonov tells of the rise of the 
ROC's power and their ability to make news and political agendas - such as the issue ofland 
reform and meetings between President Putin and Alexis II. He also issued a warning with 
regard to attempting to impose an Orthodox ideology upon society by the Church and political 
elite.544 
When addressing the World Tartar Congress in Kazan on 30 August, 2002 Putin made a very 
strong speech regarding the role of State in religious affairs. He made it very clear that no 
political interference of religious activity should be tolerated and that religion was to become 
the bearer of 'human values'. 
542 LaFraniere, S., Russia's Well-Connected Patriarch, Washington Post, 23 May, 2002. JRL #6264, 23 May, 
2002. 
543 Ibid. 
544 Markedonov, S., The Time People: Plus the Conversion o/the Entire CountlY to the Russian Orthodox Faith, 
Vremya MN, 31 July, 2002. JRL #6388,6 August, 2002. 
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"We must not tell religious figures what to do, who to choose and how to 
form associations. We must create favourable conditions for their activities 
and do our best to prevent the building of barriers between them and citizens 
[ ... ] I've become increasingly convinced that now that we have no work 
collectives or party organisations, such as those of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, or educators oat places of work, nothing but religion can 
make human values known to people. ,,545 
From Putin's remarks, it seems as though the ROC is destined to become the new bearer of 
national identity. However, problems exist, ifthis is in fact the intended goal. Many surveys 
have been conducted in the Russian Federation, with respect to religious belief and practice. 
And a common thread of these surveys are a majority of the Russian population identify 
themselves as Orthodox, but their religious observance is somewhat lax. A survey conducted 
by the All-Russia Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), which was published in 
Izvestiya on 25 August, 2002 displayed some interesting results. 
@I 58% of respondents identified themselves as Orthodox believers 
@I 5% as Muslims 
fII 2% belonging to non-Orthodox Christian religions 
@I 3 1 % as atheists 
@I 60% ofthose identified as believing in God had not read any biblical text 
@I 42% of those claiming to be Orthodox had never been in an Orthodox church 
fII 31% of those claiming to be Orthodox had been "not more than once a year.,,546 
A poll conducted by Romir Research Centre of 2000 adults in November 2002 produced a 
results with both differences as well as similarities. 
@I 60% of Russians believe in God 
@I 21% believe in a Supreme Force, Spirit or Reason 
@I 16% do not 
545 Russian President Rejects State Intelierence in Religious Matters, Interfax, 30 August, 2002. 
JRL #6414,30 August, 2002. 
546 Two-Thirds of Russians Profess Faith in God, RFEIRL (Un)Civil Societies, Vol. 3, No. 36, 
4 September, 2002. JRL #6421,5 September, 2002. 
@ Orthodox Christianity practiced by 69% of respondents 
@ Islam 2.5% 
@ Buddhism 0.4% 
@ Other types of Christianity 3% 
@ Other religions 1 % 
@ Atheists 22%.547 
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However, once more, a gap emerged between profession and active practice of a faith. 
@ 46% of respondents did not have time to pray. 
@ 14% pray daily. 
• 10% pray once a week. 
• 9% once a month. 
@I 7% pray twice a year. 
ell 10% pray less frequently. 548 
Another survey conducted by the Public Opinion Fund on 19 April, 2003 of 1500 
respondents displayed more changes or differences from previous polls. The same poll was 
first conducted on 9 August, 1997. 
CD 69% of respondents professed a religion. 
@! 59% of this figure identified themselves as Orthodox. 
CI 8% as Muslim. 
@I 30% as Atheists. 
• In 1997 - 62% professed a religion. 
4& In 1997 - 38% declared themselves to be Atheist. 549 
These diverse results derived from the various polls differ from figures given by Church 
officials in media communiques. Metropolitan Kiril gave the figure of Russians who say that 
they are Orthodox Christians in a press statement as being 80%. He also added that the figure 
547 Some 60% of Russians Believe in God - Poll, Interfax, 29 November, 2002. JRL #6579, 29 November, 2002. 
548 Ibid. 
549 69% of Russians Say They Profess a Religion, Rosbalt, 28 April, 2003. JRL #7157,28 April, 2003. 
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of 80% did not relate to those who are active members of the ROC. 550 The many and varied, 
what are essentially guesses, underlie the difficulty in accurately ascertaining the exact 
number of Orthodox Christians in the Russian Federation. 
The Patriarch used the last Orthodox Christmas message to deliver a political statement on 
the hopes of the ROC filling the role of chief ideological provider in Russia. He linked State, 
social and religious issues together. Alexis II lamented the youth who: 
"[ ... J get caught in the nets of various alien teachings, and are corrupted 
spiritually and physically [ ... J The Church is making every effort to help 
people find their spiritual core [oo.J (everyone) to do his/her work in the 
place where the Lord has put them with faith, hope, and love as though 
working for the Lord himself, without expecting any reward or human fame. 
By doing so, each of us will serve our earthly homeland well [ ... J. 
When Russia heard constant prayer and tended to the erecting of God's 
churches, it prospered and expanded. But as soon as the light of Christ and 
the powerful love of the Christian faith began to dim among the people, our 
country lost its power and strength, and fell under the yoke of theomachists, 
who sought to tum it into a spiritual desert.,,551 
In his speech, Alexis II has tried to create a link between the notion of equating a 'healthy' 
flourishing of Orthodox culture with a sound nation. He has also used very purposeful rhetoric 
in trying to motivate the populace into working for the State without expectation of any form 
of recognition or reward. Because, by helping the State, the believers are engaging in God's 
work. The Patriarch is attempting to appeal to the section ofthe population that want to see a 
strong Russia again, he is suggesting the way to achieve this is by being an active member of 
the Church and the greater Russian community. 
Putin also spoke of religious matters in January 2003, from a more personal point of view. 
The story of how the Putin family came to seek God through the Orthodox Church was told 
during an interview to an American TV host, Larry King. Two incidents were told. Firstly of a 
550 About 80% Russians Say They are Orthodox Christians, Rosbalt, 25 January, 2003. JRL #7034,26 January, 
2003. 
55! Patriarch Alexis Extends Greetings to Russians on Orthodox Christmas, Interfax, 6 January, 2003. 
JRL #7006,6 January, 2003. 
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wooden cross given to Putin by his mother. This cross had been allegedly found in the ashes 
of the Putin house unscathed by the fire. Another story was that of his wife, Lyudmila Putina 
who had survived a serious car crash in Kaliningrad. In the aftermath of the accident, in her 
despair Lyudmila Putina found religion.552 
More controversy followed throughout late January and February 2003, with the spectre of a 
political-religious partnership becoming more open and apparent. The occasion was the debate 
surrounding a new bill, which had been put before the Duma. Some Duma lobbyists had 
proposed that in exchange for official recognition and funding, clergy should take over some 
ofthe State's social functions. By late January 2003 the ROC, Islamic and Buddhist faiths 
were named as those religious organisations with which the State could organise a social 
contract. Judaism was possibly going to be added to this list.553 
Following in tandem with this proposed bill was the governmental taskforce, which was 
designated the role of defining the parameters of proposed legislation aimed at extinguishing 
'religious extremism.' A draft report by the group proposed "technical intelligence measures" 
against suspects and a six year prison term for those found guilty. One of the given 
characteristics of 'religious extremism' was given as the "propaganda of the superiority of one 
religion over another.,,554 
Putin has publicly professed his support of Alexis II through the words of his speeches. On 
27 April, 2003 Putin congratulated Russian Christians on the Holy Resurrection of Christ, in a 
story carried by RIA Novostei. He ended the speech with a tribute to the Patriarch. 
"I would like to note your considerable contribution to the rebirth of the life 
of the Russian Orthodox Church and the development of state and religious 
relations. Today, with your active participation, the Church and the State 
continue to co-operate actively in the sphere of culture and education, 
Enlightenment and charity. Your high authority as a religious figure and 
552 Putin 's Road to Church, www.pravda.IU. 15 January, 2003. JRL #7020, 16 January, 2003. 
553 Vinogradov, M., Access to the Flock, Izvestiya, 24 January, 2003. JRL #7032,24 January, 2003. 
554 Uzzell, J., Eroding Religious Freedom, The Moscow Times, 24 January, 2003. JRL #7032,24 January, 2003. 
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your rich pastor's experience contribute to the settlement of many social and 
moral problems of society, the preservation of peace and accord.,,555 
Putin's comments heap praise on the Patriarch and attribute a lot of positive characteristics to 
him. The speech also reveals the growing ROC-State partnership and the increasing influence 
in the Church in what could be considered to be secular matters. 
The ROC has been vocal on important domestic and foreign issues. Chechnya has been one 
such issue, raised by the Church. Alexis II made a strong statement opposing the criminal 
element of Chechen society on 11 March, 1999. This was some 4 - 5 months before open 
anned conflict broke out between separatist Chechen forces and the Federal Russian forces. 556 
A strongly anti-Globalist stance has been taken by the ROC. This is reflected in the ROC's 
own written communications. In August 2000 the Church adopted a document titled 
Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, which stated their 
position concisely. 
"Spiritual and cultural expanSIOn fraught with total unification (of 
humanity) should be opposed by the joint efforts of Church, State, Civil 
Society, and international organisations with a view to promoting a truly 
equitable and mutually enriching exchange of infonnation and cultural 
values, combined with the efforts to protect the identity of nations and other 
human communities. [ ... J While always open to co-operation with people of 
non-religious convictions, the Church seeks to assert Christian values in the 
process of decision-making on the most important public issues at both the 
national and international level. It strives for the recognition of the 
legitimacy of the religious world view as a basis of social action (including 
by the State) and as a vital factor influencing the development of 
international law and the work of international organisations."557 
555 Vladimir Prttin Congradulates Orthodox Christians and all Christians of Russian With Christ's Holy 
Resurrection, RIA Novostei, 27 April, 2003. JRL #7156,27 April, 2003. 
556 Alexis II, Statement on the Situation in Chechnya, 11 March, 1999. 
www.russian-othodox-church.org.ru/ne903111.htm. 5 March, 2003. 
557 Verkhovsky, A., September 11 and the Orthodox Anti-Globalism of the Moscow Patriarchate, Panorama, 
11 December, 200l. JRL #5592, 11 December, 200l. 
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The document on Foundations of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church has 
left the way clear, in the rames of the Church, to have a say on what could be considered to be 
matters of State. Its wording gives justification for influencing not only Russian domestic 
policy, but also foreign affairs too. 
Perhaps the fruit of the above philosophy, the ROC opened a diplomatic representation to the 
European international organisations in Brussels, with an opening reception on 5 February, 
2003. A significant number of dignitaries were invited to the event. The permanent 
Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Communities, Vasily Likhachev 
delivered an opening address that was full of praise for the ROC. 
"The representation has begun its work only recently, but has already 
managed to establish good relations of partnership with the Mission of the 
Russian Federation to the European Union and the Embassy of the Russian 
Federation to the Kingdom of Belgium. These relations correspond to the 
spirit of partnership and co-operation existing today in relations between the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian State which respects all the 
traditional religions in today's society.,,558 
The Church's diplomatic representative in Brussels, Bishop Hilarion ofPodolsk, outlined the 
reasons for the ROC's decision to open the office. 
"In recent years the Russian Orthodox Church has manifested a growing 
interest in European problems. There are several reasons for it. First, after 
the collapse of the Iron Curtain, new opportunities have opened up for 
dialogue between the European Union and the countries which used to 
comprise the so-called 'Eastern Bloc'. Secondly, the considerable growth in 
the number of communities of the Russian Church in the European Union 
countries in recent years has made more tangible the presence of our Church 
in the religious, cultural and public life of Europe. Thirdly, the planned entry 
of traditionally Orthodox states and Baltic countries, in which there are 
some 300 parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate, offers additional 
558 Reception to Mark the Beginning o/the Mission of the Representative of the Russian Orthodox Church at the 
European International Institutions, www.russian-Olihodox-church.org.rulne302104.htm. 1 March, 2003. 
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opportunities for co-operation between our Church and European political 
structures. ,,559 
Bishop Hilarion's comments highlight to ROC's desire to become a much more active 
political actor. An active political actor not solely in domestic matters in the territory of 
Russia, but of the wider international community. His examples demonstrate the Church's 
willingness to delve into sensitive international issues, such as the status of the Baltic States. 
In keeping with an increased presence on international matters, the 2003 Iraqi War drew 
verbal responses from the Patriarch. The denunciations of the military action were carried 
most noticeably in Russian news agencies. RIA Novostei carried a brief item in which Alexis 
II described himself as being upset over the "hegemony of one power" in the current 
international community. And denounced any American military action as being more likely 
to harm the civilian population as the military, drawing a parallel with what happened in the 
1999 Yugoslavian operations.56o 
Inter/ax carried the Patriarch's statement of condemnation of military action against Iraq. In 
his statement, he singled out the United States for blame and urged Iraq's neighbours to offer 
refuge to civilians fleeing the fighting. Part of the communique went as follows: 
"The Russian Orthodox Church calls upon the governments of the anti-Iraqi 
coalition to stop the bloodshed. Do your best to prevent the spread of 
military operations. Resume negotiations for peace. Spare thousands of 
innocent lives.,,561 
The ROC's success in managing to disseminate political communications to the Russian 
public and the wider international community can be in part explained by their access to 
media. As has been shown in this paper, the close relations between State and Church have 
meant that the ROC has access to the network of state-owned media, which is a considerable 
559 Reception to Mark the Beginning of the Mission of the Representative of the Russian Orthodox Church at the 
European International Institutions, www.russian-Olihodox-church.org.ru/ne302104.htm. 1 March, 2003. 
560 Lipich, 0., Head of Russian Orthodox Church is Upset Over "Hegemony of One Power" in World 
Community, RIA Novostei, 7 March, 2003. JRL #7096, 10 March, 2003. 
561 Alexis II Denounces Beginning of War in Iraq, Interfax, 20 March, 2003. JRL #7111,20 March, 2003. 
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asset. In addition to this aspect, the ROC also has media assets of its own. This enables the 
Church to have even greater editorial control in some situations. 
The ROC announced plans in February 2002 to bring journalists working for their 
pUblications under a form of centralised control. A spokesman for Media Union (headed by 
Aleksandr Lyubimov), the pro-Kremlin journalists' association Aleksandr Shepkov explained 
about plans for a club of Russian Orthodox journalists. This was intended to 'promote unity' 
among reporters writing about the ROC. Head of the Moscow Patriarchate's Publishing 
Department, Sergei Chapnin stated that this step would be used to create a unified mass media 
holding ofthe ROC. The ROC owns and controls some 600 publications.562 
It would appear that the state authorities and the Church authorities are acting together in 
establishing a union ofOrthodoxjournalists/writers. Their stated aim is to create unity among 
those media personnel working in the area of the ROC. However, another effect would be to 
have and exercise greater editorial control. This is achieved by centralising the organisational 
structure and by the possibility of excluding those whose work is not considered to be 
ideologically compatible with those who head or control the union. Exclusion from the union 
could make continued work in the area very difficult. 
A strong Internet presence is also maintained by the ROC. The Rambler Internet portal 
conducts annual polls in 57 different categories - state, public, cultural, scientific, educational 
and other categories. For the second year in a row, Metropolitan Kiril has been named as 
'Man ofthe Year' in the religion category.563 Kiril's success in this poll would suggest that the 
ROC maintains a high level of public awareness of its activities and key personnel, in this 
particular instance, within the Internet community. 
In addition to the main Orthodox website located at www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru. 
the Church has initiated other sites. One such site is associated with the ROC's representation 
in Brussels, www.orthodoxeurope.org. The site is available in both the English and French 
languages. A wide variety of material exists on the site, which includes the free electronic 
562 Russian Orthodox Church's Club of Journalists, European Journalism Centre Media News Digest, 
15 February, 2002. 
563 The Internet Community Once Again Calls Metropolitan Kiril "Man of the Year", 
www.russian-Olihodox-church.org.rulne301282.htm. 1 March, 2003. 
201 
bulletin Eurapaica (with some 3000 subscribers worldwide).564 The ROC's increasing 
presence on the web displays an awareness of the value of the Internet as an effective means 
(both in tenns of time, resources and expense) to disseminate a unifonn message 
instantaneously to a large audience. Additionally, it demonstrates the Church's willingness 
and desire to reach a wider audience than solely a domestic audience based upon citizens in 
the region of the Fonner Soviet Union. 
In addition to access to state media assets, such as news agencies, radio and TV, for instance 
Metropolitan Kiri1 has a time slot on TV] (previously ORT) called Word a/the Pastar. 565 
They are in the process of building a fonnidab1e communications empire, access to other 
media is also possible. This is achieved via oligarchs who are aligned with the Kremlin, such 
as the media assets of Vladimir Potanin. An occasion that demonstrated this point clearly was 
the celebration surrounding the 85th anniversary of the newspaper Izvestiya. 
During a long interview with the Patriarch, which included the exchanging of pleasantries 
and the discussion of many political and social topics including the freedom of speech, the 
Catholic-Orthodox problem, death penalty and the anned forces, the meeting ended on a 
positive tone. Alexis II made numerous references to his 10ng-tenn association with Izvestiya, 
being a reader of the paper for some 40 years.566 Through his actions, Alexis II implied an 
endorsement by the ROC for the newspaper. It was a mutual exchange, the paper gave the 
ROC a means to voice its opinion publicly and the ROC reciprocated by giving its 'seal of 
approva1.' 
3.4.5 The Role Of Religion In Education And The Armed Forces 
Currently there are 37 Orthodox churches recorded as being situated on the grounds of 
military garrisons.567 Ties between the Church and the military have been stressed as being 
important by high-ranking members of the silaviki (power ministries, such as police, anny, 
564 (1) The Website of the Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the European Instiutions is now 
Operational, www.mssian-orthodox-church.org.m/ne301154.htm. 1 March, 2003. 
(2) www.orthodoxeurope.org, 1 March, 2003. 
565 The Internet Community Once Again Calls Metropolitan Kiril "Man of the Year", 
www.mssian-orthodox-church.org.m/ne301282.htm. 1 March, 2003. 
566 Konovalov, V. & Serdyukov, M., Lofty and Earthly, Izvestiya, 26 Febmary, 2002. JRL #6105,28 Febmary, 
2002. 
567 30% Of Russia's Servicemen are Believers - Defence MinistlY, Interfax, 1 April, 2003. JRL #7127, 2 April, 
2003. 
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FSB ... etc.). In 2001 the Director of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev stressed the value and need 
for such interaction "from the viewpoint of national unification. ,,568 
On July 8, 1993 the Defence Minister Pavel Grachev met with Metropolitan Kiril to discuss 
what were described as; 
"[ ... J co-ordination and relationships between the Church and the armed 
forces, especially in the field of moral formation of servicemen and 
educational work in the army.,,569 
The Ministry of Defence released statistics on the number of believers in the 
Russian armed forces to Interfax on April l, 2003. 
"The number of believers among Russian servicemen amounts to 27%. The 
figure for believers among contract servicemen is higher (up to 30%)."570 
Figures were also given in terms of categories of different believers by percentage. 
The breakdown of faiths went as follow: 
• Orthodox Christians - 74% 
ED Moslems - 9% 
• Buddhists - 3% 
• Other confessions - 2% 
CD Undecided - 12%.571 
However, the source from the Ministry of Defence who presented the figures also 
stated that most believers comprehended religion only superficially. The source also 
added that religious values particularly among the Christian faith, as a rule include 
elements from other religions and superstitions.572 
568 Bulgakov, V., Analytical Forecastfor Social Tensions in 2002, Vremya MN, No. 35, 2002. 
JRL #6133, 14 March, 2002. 
569 Ellis, l,op. cit. (1996), p. 147. 
570 30% Of Russia's Servicemen are Believers - Defence MinistlY, Interfax, 1 April, 2003. JRL #7127, 2 April, 
2003. 
571 Ibid. 
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"Nearly half of the servicemen regarding themselves as Orthodox Christians 
have outward notions of the basic symbols of faith. Among the servicemen 
identifying themselves with Moslems, Buddhists, and followers of non-
traditional movements and cults, the share that know the fundamentals of 
their teaching is relatively higher - over 80%. [ ... J among commissioned 
officers, the number fluctuating between faith and atheism has increased. ,,573 
A ceremony on 28 August, 2002 witnessed further revival of a military-religious tradition 
and co-operation. In a morale boosting exercise for the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet, an icon 
and the remains of Admiral Fyodor Ushakov were presented in a ceremony that included 
ROC priests and the presence of President Putin. Ushakov was made famous for his exploits 
in the 1788-91 Russo-Turkish war and fighting against Napoleonic forces based in Italy.574 
Ushakov was made a saint by the ROC in 2001. In an elaborate ceremony, a gold and silver 
box containing the remains of the Admiral and with an icon fixed to the lid was presented at 
the Headquarters of the Pacific Fleet by priests dressed in ceremonial attire. 575 This public 
ceremony seems to underline a closeness that is developing between the ROC, the President 
and the military. 
During the period from the late 19th Century to the early 20th Century over 40,000 religious 
parish schools existed, giving elementary religious education to the masses.576 The power and 
influence of this 'formidable' educational institution was broken in 1918. In January 1918 a 
Soviet government decree on the Separation of Church from State and School from Church 
was enacted.577 
572 30% Of Russia's Servicemen are Believers - Defence MinistlY, Interfax, 1 April, 2003. JRL #7127,2 April, 
2003. 
573 Ibid. 
574 Heintz, J., Putin Presides at Jcon Ceremony, AP, 28 August, 2002. JRL #6410, 28 August, 2002. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Pushkarev, S., Rusak, V. & Yakunin, G., Christianity and Government in Russia and the Soviet Union: 
Reflections on the Millennium, Boulder (Colorado), Westview Press, 1989, p. 42. 
577 Geraci, R. P. & Khodarkovsky, M., Editors, Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in 
Tsarist Russia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 223. 
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The ROC was to lose this opportunity for almost 80 years. The right to religious education of 
one's own choice was restored during 1990. On October 25, 1990 the Russian Law on 
Freedom of Religion was adopted. 578 
On the Orthodox Christmas Eve (January 6) Alexis II delivered his message to the people, 
whether out of genuine concern as an indicator of a future plan, he outlined some of society's 
major problems and the source of these problems. 
"We are still experiencing many difficulties and problems - poverty, social 
vulnerability, the threat of terrorism and crime, the propaganda of 
immorality, the epidemic of alcoholism and drug addiction, and other 
appalling vices. [ ... ] As the root of all of these evils is the injury of the 
human soul, it is impossible to change society for the better without faith, 
hope and love. [ ... ] In our turbulent world, people are again fighting against 
each other, and thousands of civilians in different countries have fallen 
victim to the evil will. God has also sent many trials to Russia, which was 
befallen by floods, storms and droughts last year. [ ... ] But even in the worst 
of circumstances Christians must never forget their saviours words, 'don't 
be afraid and keep believing,' addressed to each ofus.,,579 
Alexis II clearly identifies the crux of modern Russian society'S problems being linked to 
moral decline and decay. He also states that should the 'injured' human soul be repaired, then 
the Russian State will also rejuvenate and grow stronger. This statement may have been a 
prelude to the notification of an intention to reintroduce an Orthodox culture education 
programme into the Russian schooling system. 
In September 2001, Alexis II celebrated his 40th year of service in the ROC. He used this 
opportunity, when interviewed for the programme Details (on the State channel RTR) to 
propose the need for the Church's involvement in education. 
578 Ellis, J.,op. cit. (1996), pp. 162-63. 
579 Russian Patriarch Asks Russians to Pray for the Whole of Mankind, Interfax, 6 JanualY, 2001. 
JRL #6007,6 January, 2001. 
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"We understand that after 70 years of an atheistic education, the issue 
should not be posed today of introducing religious education in to school or 
high school education. But we are proposing that the history of Orthodox 
culture should be introduced as a subject, because our culture is based on 
Christian principles, on Orthodox traditions, and every cultured person 
should know about the principles of his or her Orthodox culture."580 
The issue was developed further in a December 2001 article in Argumenty I Pakty. In this 
instance the State and the Church acted in unison. A claim made by supporters of the new 
education programme was that young people had lost some traditional values and that the 
ROC had the 'answers' to restore those lost values. Deputy Education Minister Yury 
Kovrizhkin gave the figure that % of all believers in Russia are Orthodox Christians. And that 
60% of Russians were convinced that religion was necessary in preserving national 
self-awareness.581 
Kovrizhkin then outlined reasons for the necessity of Orthodox culture lessons to Russian 
youth. 
lit Youth constitute 25% of Russia's popUlation. 
~ 17% of youth believe in some form of 'higher power' and not in God. 
lit 16% of young people are superstitious. 
lit 17% believe in UFOS.582 
Based on these figures, Kovrizhkin concluded that this makes Russia's young people 
potential victims of totalitarian sects and religious extremism, which meant that 'saving' them 
from this was a priority. To do this he summed up what would be needed in order to be 
successful in this goal. 
"[ ... ] close co-operation between the Church and the State on the issues of 
education, the environment and human rights.,,583 
580 Russian Patriarch Urges Introduction o/Orthodox Culture Subject in Schools, BBC Monitoring (ofRTR), 
3 September, 2001. JRL #5424,4 September, 2001. 
581 Church and State, Argumenty I Fakty (WPS Monitoring Agency), 5 December, 2001. JRL #5590, 10 
December, 2001. 
582 Ibid. 
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The framework and infrastructure needed to support the stated cultural objectives were also 
detailed by Kovrizhkin. 
"[ ... ] openmg Orthodox day-care centres, kindergartens, schools, 
gymnasiums (high schools), Christian-patriotic and Christian-sports clubs 
under the patronage oflocal authorities.,,584 
Putin appeared to show his support for the idea of Orthodox culture lessons in schools in a 
comment he made on a visit in Kazan on 30 August, 2002. He made a comment that 
suggested that only religion has the ability to make human values known to people. His 
comment stirred some critical comments from members of the political factions Union of 
Right Forces and Yabloko, who expressed the opinion that some separation needs to exist in 
society between the functions of the State and the functions of the Church.585 
In spite of political pressure against the introduction of Orthodox culture lessons, the 
Minister of Education Vladimir Filippov released a 30-page description ofthe proposed 
course in mid-November 2002. He said that it was only submitted for consideration.586 The 
report was a recommended syllabus for the Orthodox culture class (which was already at this 
stage taught in some schools) and was sent to all schools by the Education Ministry.587 
However, this appears to be the case of a high-ranking political figure, using his position of 
power to announce that the government will permit such lessons to commence. 
The closeness of Church and State is evidenced by one of the authors of the 30-page report. 
Hierodeacon Kiprian Yashchenko is the Dean of the Pedagogical Department at St. Tikhon 
Orthodox Theological Institute, commented on his (and by extension the ROC's) involvement 
in the report, "Yes, we are separate from the State, but we can co-operate, can't we?,,588 
583 Church and State, Argumenty I Fakty (WPS Monitoring Agency), 5 December, 2001. 
JRL #5590, 10 December, 2001. 
584 Church and State, Argumenty I Fakty (WPS Monitoring Agency), 5 December, 2001. 
JRL #5590, 10 December, 2001. 
585 Russian MPs Critical of Putin 's Remarks on Religion, Ekho Moskvy News Agency (BBC Monitoring), 
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A vast catalogue of themes were listed in the report, which included subjects such as: 
Ell Biblical subjects 
Ell Orthodox tradition 
Ell Asceticism 
Ell Liturgy 
Ell Literature and art.589 
By the end of their Orthodox culture classes, students are expected to be able to write a paper 
on one ofthe 64 subjects given. Some of the listed subjects are; 'Faith and Science,' 'Moscow 
as a Third Rome' and the 'Orthodox Understanding of Freedom. ,590 The lesson plan was given 
a trail in the town ofNoginsk, approximately 50 kilometres southeast of Moscow. 
Noginsk's Orthodox culture lessons were formulated by co-operation between local officials 
and local priests. Teachers of the subject are put through on-going training, which includes 
lectures by theologians and priests, informal gatherings and pilgrimages. Archpriest Mikhail 
Yalov, the programme's architect in the Noginsk district deflected criticism of the mixing of 
Church and State. 
"In the church school, we teach children to pray. [ ... J In the public school, 
we explain to children how Orthodox Christians do it. A person can be 
religious or non-religious, but he should not be ignorant.,,591 
Critics of the notion of Orthodox culture lessons in the schooling system have cited several 
areas of possible concern. Points against the scheme that have been raised so far have included 
the constitutional separation of Church and State, because it may result in inter-ethnic and 
inter-confessional conflict. Another point has been the view that religion is archaic and has no 
real place in a modem society.592 Yalov's quote reveals a very thin line between direct 
religious tuition and instructing how religion is conducted in a correct manner. 
589 Zolotov, A., Schools to Teach Orthodox Culture, The Moscow Times, 18 November, 2002. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/stOlies/2002/11 118/00 l.html, 18 November, 2002. 
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The entire Ministry of Education repOli can be found via the link www.ed.gov.rulsch-edu/prkultllet.html. 
591 Zolotov, A., Noginsk's Orthodox Culture Experiment, The Moscow Times, 28 February, 2003. 
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592 Zolotov, A., Noginsk's Orthodox Culture Experiment, The Moscow Times, 28 February, 2003. 
208 
There would appear to be some merit in the opponents' case. In June 2002 The Movement for 
Human Rights asked prosecutors to open a case against Education Ministry endorsement of a 
certain textbook in the Orthodox culture programme. The prosecutors refused twice, to bring 
about charges of inciting ethnic strife against the editor and publisher of Fundamentals of 
Orthodox Culture. Then on 24 March, 2003 the Meschansky District Court upheld the 
decision of the Moscow prosecutors.593 Two examples of textbook interpretations were 
outlined. Some of the book's claims included: 
" Jews forced Pontius Pilate to crucify Jesus as "they thought only about power over 
other peoples and earthly wealth." 
" Non-Orthodox "guest" religions were accused of "not always behaving nobly in the 
traditionally Orthodox State.,,594 
The abovementioned examples could form the basis for misgivings regarding the 
introduction of Orthodox culture lessons into the schooling system. What has happened with 
regard to the issues surrounding a particular textbook, implies that abuses may and can creep 
into the structure. Has this been borne out in other examples, where an established system of 
Orthodox orientated education has been functioning? 
Over the last decade, Archpriest Alexei Vasilenko the Russian Orthodox community 
St. Alexy Hermitage at Novoalexeyevlca in the Yaroslavl region. Some 100 children receive 
an education from here, in a wide range of subjects. One ofthe pupils, 12 year old Alexei 
Klyuchevsky named his favourite subjects as military training, math, Russian and Latin 
during an interview.595 
Educational standards of the school seem to be successful and high. A strict discipline is 
maintained among the boys. Those who break the school's norms are punished by scolding, 
penance or expUlsion. Vasilenko explained the origins of the school's cadet corps. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/2003/02/28/002-print.html. 28 February, 2003. 
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"Unfortunately, we can not spank the children. [ ... J Sometimes I wish we could.,,596 
Mikhail Lyukshin the Commander of the school's Cadet Corps went on: 
"They were hard to deal with, rebellious boys, and now, dressed in 
uniforms, they have changed - they know they have to obey orders [ ... J 
That is Father Alexei's principle - not to give them a single minute of free 
time, because that is when the desire to do wrong emerges.,,597 
The attitudes expressed above, demonstrate a very strict and regimented approach to 
academic life in the school, along an Orthodox philosophy. It would appear to be bearing 
some measure of success. But, what is also revealed is an element of militarism into the 
school, along the lines of the reintroduced patriotism education programme in the State 
schools.598 Could this be an indication of State-Church collusion or a convergence of 
State-Church interests? 
According to the statistics released by the Patriarch, Alexis II in March 2003, the ROC 
possesses a powerful educational arm. Such a varied educational offering, which caters for 
every stage of education, could be used as a means of shaping the future youth of the nation. 
The ROC has declared that it has; 
Ell 43 theological schools. 
Ell 32 seminaries. 
• 6 preparatory pastor courses. 
III 4 theological academies. 
Ell 2 Orthodox universities. 
411 2 diocesan theological schools for women. 
III 1 divine institute. 
411 A number of preceptor and icon-paining schools. 
Ell 135 parish Sunday schools in MoSCOW.599 
596 Zolotov, A., Easter at a 'MonastelY for Laymen', Moscow Times, 25 April, 2003. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/storiesI2003/04125/003-print.html. 25 April, 2003. 
597 Ibid. 
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Papers, No. 75, Uppsala: Department of East European Studies, 2002, 16pp. 
599 Lipich, 0., Russian Orthodox Church has Over 16, 000 Parishes in Russia, RIA Novostei, March 25, 2003. 
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• 6000 theological students.6oo 
3.4.5 Coming To Terms With Its 'Dark' Past 
According to some, the ROC is still refusing to come to terms with unsavoury revelations 
and secrets from the Soviet era. Orthodox layman and sociologist Sergei Filatov has stated 
that the Church still has to come to terms with its past, such as collaboration with the KGB, 
financial impropriety and dubious morals. He maintains no real changes to the Church 
structure have been made in spite of surfacing information. 
"For any other social institution, as recent years have shown, such 
revelations would have meant at the minimum a total shake-up of the 
leadership [ ... ]."601 
Filatov offers some possible reasons for the ROC being unable to successfully fill the 
ideological vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. He suggests that in spite of very 
favourable political conditions, some of the reasons are linked to the nature of the Church. 
"Given the general hopes for the saving role of the Church, the Russian 
Orthodox Church had a very favourable conditions for heading the country's 
religious revival. But its internal moral and organisational state in practice 
excluded it from such a mission [ ... ]. In conditions of the growing pressure 
from below in favour of democratisation, the leadership of the Russian 
Orthodox Church has in general regularly responded to this threat by 
strengthening its authoritarianism in governing the Church.,,602 
In 1992, the ROC established a special commission to investigate its ties with the KGB. 
However, no reports appear to be published to date. 603 Alexis II is also the focus of 
controversy, concerning the collaboration role he may have played during the Soviet era. The 
JRL #7116, March 26,2003. 
600 About the Russian Orthodox Church, www.orthodoxeurope.org/bginfo/church en.php, 8 April, 2003. 
601 Ellis, l,op. cit. (1996), p. 149. 
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603 LaFraniere, S., Russia's Well-Connected Patriarch, Washington Post, 23 May, 2002. JRL #6264,23 May, 
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controversy, which surrounds him, only seems to snowball and the situation is not helped by 
the Church's stance on the matter. 
Some research points to a possibility that Alexis II was recruited by the KGB in his native 
Estonia in 1958 and served as an agent for some 30 years. KGB documents from Tallinn that 
had been obtained tell of an agent only known as 'Drozdov' being rewarded by being made 
Bishop there. Alexis II was made Bishop in 1961.604 
Alexis II has hinted at some measure of collaboration in the past. In a 1991 newspaper 
interview he broached the subject. Announcing that he was: "[ ... J sometimes forced to give 
way" (to Soviet authorities) and that he apologised for "such concessions, the failure to speak 
out, the forced passivity and expressions ofloyalty of the Church leadership.,,605 
More recent Church communications on the matter, have been less apologetic in nature. A 
spokesman for the ROC Father Vsevolod Chaplin said in March 2002: 
"Nobody has ever seen a single real document that would confirm the 
Patriarch used his contacts with Soviet authorities to make harm to the 
Church or to any people in the Church. ,,606 
Such a bland and meaningless statement is unlikely to reassure anyone who has doubts in 
this matter. The statement does not deny that Alexis II was associated with the KGB. Which 
raises the question, just how involved was he? Chaplin's words would seem to raise more 
questions, rather than be any effective form of' damage control.' 
In addition to the problems associated with the proximity of members of the clergy and their 
proximity to the power structures of the Soviet State, also arise questions from 'injustices' 
perpetrated by the State upon the ROC. And continuing from this line, the issue of the 
contemporary State redressing these past wrongs. One of the more controversial topics is the 
debate surrounding State confiscation of Church property and land. 
604 LaFraniere, S., Russia's Well-Connected Patriarch, Washington Post, 23 May, 2002. JRL #6264,23 May, 
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605 Ibid. 
606 Ibid. 
212 
Household Manager for the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Sergius of Solnechnogorsk 
made a statement through RIA Novostei on 31 July, 2002 in order to try and neutralise press 
criticism concerning the issue of restoration of Church land and property. He verbally 
reprimanded the Russian media and tried to 'correct' some of their assertions. 
"It is clear that return of all property, including land, is impossible, [ ... J 
(media) produce a negative impression [ ... J At the present stage, we are 
simply on the sidelines and the way the press presents the matter is simply 
inexpert. ,,607 
The Patriarch also made a statement through Interfax on the matter a short time later, at 
Tamboy on 8 August, 2002. This followed a meeting with the Federation Council, where he 
discussed the problem of the return of Church-owned lands. 
"I think that there were certain grounds for this issue to emerge [ ... J 
Unfortunately, they (the Federation Council) have taken the wrong approach 
to the issue and told the press about three million hectares (the Church 
owned before the October 1917 Revolution). In the meantime, there is no 
possibility to return these lands today, since cities, plants and other 
buildings were built on them. ,,608 
Alexis II stressed in his talk, that the only lands that needed to be returned to the ROC were 
the lands being used by Orthodox churches and monasteries. 609 A definite line of argument, to 
try and counter the PR damage caused by press claims of large-scale land and property claims 
by the ROC is being formed. This action demonstrates that the Church is aware of the 
possible political damage that may be caused if Russian society believes that the ROC will 
endeavour to make large claims. The actions of the Federation Council concerning their 
communication of Church intentions in the land issue also display either a lack of political 
communication sense on their part or that the ROC is not on friendly terms with all political 
institutions (or elements within institutions) in the Russian Federation. 
607 Russian Orthodox Church Does Not Claim Return of Revolution-Snatched Property, RIA Novostei, 
31 July, 2002. JRL #6380, 1 August, 2002. 
608 Russian Church does not Demand that all Lands it Owned Before Revolution be Returned - Patriarch, 
Interfax, 8 August, 2002. JRL #6392, 8 August, 2002. 
609 Ibid. 
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The Russian media had taken a stand in the issue of restitution of Church property and lands. 
ROC communications have been careful, so as not to inflame a potentially volatile situation, 
by making a demand for an unconditional return of all Church land and property confiscated 
during the Soviet era. This tactic does not seemed to have been completely successful though, 
judging by the comments made by Alexis II on RTR, who chastised the media for their 
reporting on this issue. 
"You see this issue is being resolved in a routine manner and the mass 
media have somewhat exaggerated the fact that I posed the issue of all the 
lands belonging to the Church being returned. We did not put the issue like 
that and will not put it like that. Today the monasteries cannot use those 
lands that once belonged to them. But today the monasteries are receiving 
land that they can cultivate to feed themselves and the pilgrims. I think that 
there is no need to raise the issue of restitution, because it evokes many 
other problems, and we are not posing the issue of having the property, 
which belonged to the Church returned. Wherever possible the Church 
should have returned to it the infrastructure that it needs for the normal 
activity of the parishes and plots of land that it can cultivate. And this is 
being done in a routine manner.,,610 
Restitution of lands has the potential to spiral out of control. Although Orthodox 
communications on this issue have been cautious and have attempted to distance the Church 
by use of denial, this falls short of what is required. The issue remains alive as a public debate, 
so long as it does the reputation of the Church is at stake. Private property as a concept is 
relatively underdeveloped in Russia still, which can hold back economic development. Added 
to this, the real or perceived possibility of having 'your' land taken off you as the result of a 
land claim made by the Church adds to the volatility. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the Soviet identity was also broken. This seems to 
have left some people without of sense of belonging or identity of any specific cultural 
610 Russian Patriarch Urges Introduction o/Orthodox Culture Subject in Schools, BBC Monitoring (of RTR) , 
3 September, 2001. JRL #5424,4 September, 2001. 
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marker. The political elite realise this problem and have been trying to create identity to 
encourage and motivate the populace to endeavour great achievements and to bind the 
fragmented society through recreating a collective society. The problem thus far, seems to be 
that of which identity to adopt. 
The desire to recreate a strong Russia again needs direction and motivation to succeed. 
Debate has raged in society as to take an Eastern identity, Western identity and other 
identities. Since Putin has taken office, there has been a definite shift in the direction of 
adopting a Western stance and identity, through proclaimations as his we (Russians) all are all 
Europeans. The search for identity has become apparent in the discourse of the Russian media. 
Media organisations have aligned themselves editorially to the beliefs that are expressed by 
their political patrons. These patrons understand the potential value of mass media, in terms of 
the influencing potential on the public, in disseminating their political agenda. 
The Soviet Union developed the concept of patriotism for political purposes. In this 
particular instance, patriotism was used as a motivating and unifying factor. Society was 
motivated into achieving the ruling Communist Party's plans and desires for the development 
of the State. But, this was conducted in a manner that was inclusive of all peoples, as many 
people and one nation. 
Because of the Soviet Union's and the Russian Federation's diverse ethnic mix, it would be 
dangerous to use a nationalistically oriented discourse to motivate society. This may end in 
antagonism between various ethnic groups. Such antagonism would serve to undermine the 
ability ofthe State to realise its objectives. Possibly for this reason, the political elite in 
contemporary Russia has chosen a patriotically based discourse over a nationalistically based 
one. Some elements of nationalism have been applied by the State, but seem to be an 
exception to the more common use of patriotism. The nationalistic elements appear to be 
catering for specific localised cases, such as Chechnya. 
Attempts to reintroduce patriotism began before Putin came to power. These attempts 
however, amounted to nothing. Patriotism had made its State-sponsored re-entry into Russian 
society in 2001. This move seems to be in keeping with Putin's apparent attempt to resurrect a 
strong, centralised state based on Moscow. Putin has stated that he is a product of the Soviet 
past. His heritage has many similarities with a line of Soviet leaders, both Yuri Andropov and 
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Mikhail Gorbachev began by rising through the ranles of the KGB, then they entered national 
politics. 
The Putin administration has identified one of Russian society's major problems as being 
unmotivated (to serve the interests of the State). The political elite has thought of a generation 
of Russians, which grew up from glasnost into the Yeltsin years, known as bespredel, as a 
'lost' generation. Therefore, a government initiative launched in 2001, aimed at once again 
motivating Russian citizens was tailored for the next generation. 
Putin's administration is flexible and adaptable, they have come to realise that the goals and 
aspirations of society (Russia's citizenry) and the government (the political elite) have 
become divergent. In order for the State to be able to motivate and organise society into 
achieving the political elite's goals, a hybrid of old and new means have been applied. This 
move is designed to bring about convergence of values and ideology between the State and 
society. 
The government seems to have 'borrowed' the Soviet era concept of patriotism, but has in 
some instances, 'packaged' it to appeal to contemporary Russian youth. Some 'traditional' 
aspects of Soviet patriotic education have been retained, such as the military related sporting 
games. But, new aspects have been added, which reflects a certain appreciation by the 
government that an appeal needs to be close to the values of the targeted section of society for 
the programme to be effective. 
If the programme is launched with an appeal that is too far removed from the values of those 
who the government intend to influence, the attempt may fail as the values are too different 
and can be rejected. The programme of 'patriotic education' appears to have the aim of 
gradually shifting the values of Russia's youth over time and not to attempt a sudden and 
massive shift in values. 
Moves by the government to re-establish 'patriotic education' as a taught subject should not 
be viewed in isolation to other changes that are occurring in Russian society. This move 
should be seen as being part of a larger change in contemporary society, which is being 
initiated by the political elite. Distancing the oligarchs, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
Gusinsky, from political power; creation of a 'single information space' in the Russian media; 
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re-organisation of the regional administration; new laws and regulations; patriotic education 
as a subject, are all seemingly aimed at the recreation of a strong, centralised state that is 
based in Moscow. 
For Russia to regain her 'greatness' of the past, which is seemingly what the political elite 
wants, a 'guided' and motivated population is needed for creating the conditions that are 
necessary for establishing such. The conditions that are needed, do not at this stage exist, 
which could be why many of the above-mentioned changes have been initiated, 'patriotic 
education being but one of those changes. 
The rise in importance and status of the ROC and its involvement in secular affairs would 
appear to be tied to the issue of identity. This has been demonstrated in a very clear and 
precise manner, when a report accompanied a Parliamentary Assembly resolution. The report 
described the relationship between the State and the ROC in the following way; 
"The Russian Orthodox Church appears to equate Russia with Orthodoxy, 
and Orthodoxy with Russia.,,611 
In a long-term study, funded by the Finish Academy of Sciences (the project running from 
1991-1999 is called Religion and Values After the Fall of Communism) the number of 
Russians identifying themselves as Orthodox has increased. 
• 1991- 27% 
(I 1999 - 82%612 
At the same time this rapid growth took place, the proportion that stated that they believe in 
God grew more modestly. 
• 1991- 34% 
• 1999 - 61 %613 
611 Pleven, L., Orthodox, Catholic Tensions Church Mirrors Rift in Russia, Newsday, 9 June, 2002. 
JRL #6298, 9 June, 2002. 
612 Furman, D. & Kaariainen, K., A Religious Revival Without Believers?, Old Churches, New Believers: 
Religion in the Mass Consciousness of Post-Soviet Russia, Moscow and St. Petersburg, Letni Sad, 2000. 
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The results of the research project and the report that accompanied the Parliamentary 
Assembly resolution perhaps indicate that religion is not necessarily strictly serve as solely a 
spiritual experience. This evidence seems to point to the role of religion as a cultural identity 
marker. It defines and distinguishes Russia and Russians from the rest ofthe world, gives a 
feeling or impression of being special and/or unique. 
A place of prominence was held by the ROC in Russian society during the Imperial period. 
After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the subsequent suppression of all religious activity 
in the Soviet Union, up till mid-1941, their status was almost destroyed. At his point, when 
the Axis armies thrust deep into Soviet territory, the Soviet State needed a rallying point for 
the people to give them hope and determination. This was not to be found in the Soviet State, 
especially after the excesses of the Stalinist purges. 
The ROC was enlisted into the service of the Soviet State, a seemingly inconceivable union. 
But, the offer could not be refused from the ROC's point of view. In return for offering the 
State ideological support in rallying the masses to resist the German led invasion, the Church 
was to be allowed to exist. In light of the devastation that had been brought upon the Church, 
there was no realistic alternative, if the Church was to survive in some form in the territory of 
the Soviet Union. Recognition offered to the ROC by Stalin in September 1943 ensured that 
the Church would survive for the time being. Both the Church and the State needed each other 
at this particular point in time. 
With the exception ofNikita Khrushchev's campaign against the Church, a relatively stable 
period in State-Church relations followed. A change in relations came about once more during 
the glasnost and perestroika reform period. Once more the State, Mikhail Gorbachev to be 
more exact, needed the help of the Church in the role oflegitimiser of the Gorbachev 
administration and as motivator of the people. On this occasion, the State allied itself with the 
Church offering it privileges in return for its public support of the reform programme and the 
public denunciation of political figures opposed to it. 
The rules ofthis union were different to those of the union that the Church entered into with 
Stalin. Prior to this union, religious affairs were considered to be marginal. Gorbachev's need 
613 Furman, D. & Kaariainen, K., A Religious Revival Without Believers?, Old Churches, New Believers: 
Religion in the Mass Consciousness of Post-Soviet Russia, Moscow and st. Petersburg, Letni Sad, 2000. 
JRL #5425, 4 September, 2001. 
218 
for numbers to support him brought about a higher status of the Church in society. Some of 
the privileges offered to the ROC included access to state owned media and greater media 
coverage of ROC events. This period allowed the ROC to not only consolidate its position in 
Russian society, but to extend its influence into the political real. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, political actors continued to court the ROC 
leadership, possibly in the belief that this would allow them to gain access to the Orthodox 
flock. By this stage, the ROC had raised its status considerably and had become a formidable 
political actor in its own right. Leading Russian politicians, such as Boris Yeltsin maintained 
a high public profile during occasions of religious significance. Both state owned media and 
media aligned with the government covered these events in a positive tone. 
The ROC was able to gain good PR from the 1993 coup. During this event they were cast in 
the role as negotiator between the warring factions - the executive and legislative branches of 
government. Although their actions ultimately failed, the Church received a significant 
amount of media coverage. Maybe as a reward for their 'loyalty,' Yeltsin made a point of 
consulting the ROC on matters of both national and international significance. 
Putin came to the Russian presidency in 2000, relations between his administration and the 
ROC have been most cordial. He has consistently supported the Church in matters, such as the 
Catholic-Orthodox conflict, where it has been made clear through the media (both domestic 
and international) that the ROC has the final say on issues as a possible visit by the Pope to 
Russia. Putin has also made it clear that he and his family are active Orthodox believers and 
are not just pretending to be believers to gain support from the Orthodox constituency. 
State owned media, such as the news agencies ITAR-Tass and RIA Novostei seem to bear the 
main stories concerning the ROC. Ifthe government and the Church were not on good terms, 
the ROC could be simply shut out ofthe state media. Stories given by state media 
organisations, such as the mentioned news agencies are positive in their spin. Sensitive issues, 
such as the involvement of the ROC in the military and education have been handled in a 
mostly positive fashion. This is a significant move, to tie media, education, the military and 
religion together as they are all institutions from where cultural identity is derived. The values 
of the next generation will be shaped by these societal institutions, which are increasingly pro-
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Kremlin in nature. This is in keeping with the desire by the political elite to recreate a 
powerful, centralised state. 
Although it can be dangerous for media to criticise the ROC or provide information that is 
contrary to the Church's belief due to the considerable political clout. It does on occasion 
transpire that some media will disseminate some information that the ROC does not agree 
with or like. This is seen in some issues that the Church wants to see disappear, such as the 
Patriarch'.s alleged links with the KGB and the issue of restitution of property and land seized 
by the Soviet State. It is something that the ROC has to deal with, possibly in a more assertive 
manner before more significant PR damage is done. These issues seem to have tainted the 
ROC already, which seems to be having an effect on the level of citizen participation in the 
Church's activities and life. 
The ROC does have a significant holding of its own media assets. There are some 600 
publications owned by the Church, as well as a presence on the Internet and other forms of 
communication. In recent years their media structure has been undergoing a revamp. This may 
be due in part to the desire to be able to exercise a more effective and greater level of editorial 
control over their media assets. The Russian government restructured the state owned assets 
recently, which seems to have paid dividends with respect to this presupposed aim 
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CHAPTER IV: MAIN TRENDS IN THE MEDIA. 
4.0 Chapter Objectives 
A quote from the 1990 Freedom Forum report on East Central Europe initiates an apt setting 
for one of the main questions / issues to be tackled by this particular part of the work. 
"Raw political power [ ... ] will be the decisive factor in determining how 
much freedom the media have.,,614 
Some aspects that will be investigated initially include, how foreign interests and influences 
have affected the Russian media, the role of the press in society and the development ofthe 
Internet in the Russian Federation. These aspects have all contributed in some way in bringing 
about the current characteristics and tendencies in the contemporary media. I will bring to 
light some of the less obvious as well as obvious results of political-media-societal 
interaction. 
This chapter will focus on a series of aspects in the Russian media. The period covered is 
broad, stretching from the Gorbachev era to the present. By returning to the Gorbachev era it 
is possible to gain some appreciation of some aspects of the contemporary media's 
peCUliarities and identity. A break in the media's 'normal' methods of operating in the Soviet 
system can be found in the mid-1980's, which then had a flow-on effect that generated 
consequences in Russian society from an ideological and an idealistic point of view. 
Some aspects and methods used to control and manipulate the media during the Soviet era 
have continued into the present day. Leading academics, such as Ellen Mickiewicz, have 
noted a remarkable level of continuity between the Soviet era mass media and the 
contemporary mass media. This can be clearly seen in areas where the struggle for control of 
the medium is most intense, TV is considered to be the most influential media source and 
therefore prone to a greater level of conflict than other mediums. 
The chapter also gives accounts of how the media are used to manipulate the public and the 
614 Milton, A. K., The Rational Politician: Exploiting the Media in New Democracies, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000, 
p.l. 
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public response to this attempt at manipulation. Certain virtues or powers of persuasion are 
associated with an effective application of media strategy. I will try to determine some 
themes, such as agenda setting in the media and just how effective or otherwise, these 
measures have been. The public's response to the media's reliability in providing accurate 
information, by assessing the public reaction to investigative journalism will be covered. 
In the later part of chapter four, I will look at the Soviet media, their role in the Soviet Union 
and what characteristics of this epoch remain today. Mechanisms of controlling the media 
shall be examined, as shall be demonstrated, the controls do not need to be graphic and violent 
to be effective. The media industry is in a vulnerable position due to its financial state, it is not 
uncommon for media outlets to continually operate at a financial loss. Therefore, 
governmental 'assistance' in the form of funding help can be tempting. Often, the funding 
comes with strings attached. 
The fourth chapter then deals with the issues surrounding censorship. Soviet era measures 
will be described, along with some of the outcomes. This will form a bench mark from which 
to draw a comparison with contemporary measures. I intend to show that censorship measures 
are not used solely by the government, but is also frequently used by the business sector. 
Regulation and law making of the media industry 
4.1 Issues of Foreign Ownership and Influence in the Media 
The renowned academic, Karol Jakubowicz, proposed a three-stage continuum in 1995. This 
continuum forecast a 'natural evolution' of media in the former Eastern Bloc nations. 
• (1) Media demonopolisation and decentralisation, and internationalisation of 
TV content. 
III (2) New media legislation, signs of journalistic professionalisation in new private media. 
It (3) Consolidation of media legislation, professionalisation and democratisation, 
beginnings of media concentration and influence of foreign media capita1.6!5 
From an early stage, media law inhibited the level of allowable foreign influence in the 
615 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 170. 
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Russian media. The law prevents foreign citizens, but not foreign companies, from owning 
(founding) mass media. This is embodied in the Statute on Mass Media, which replaced the 
1990 Media Law in early 1992.616 This may account for Terhi Rantanen's observation on 
foreign investment in the Russian media. 
"Russia is one of the few countries in Eastern Europe where foreign 
investment has not played a key role in the growth ofmedia."617 
Foreign intervention or influence, via using mass media does not necessarily entail being 
physically present in the country concerned. This dilemma or problem was encountered in the 
Soviet Union. By 1990 an estimated 60 million Russians could receive foreign radio 
broadcasts.618 This situation ensured that the Soviet government was not able to maintain its 
position as the country's gatekeeper, which would affect the effective transmission of 
ideology by virtue of the public's access to alternative information. 
Periodically, a xenophobic predictions are made concerning foreign ownership of the 
Russian media. At times, prominent persons make these sometimes unfounded statements. 
Whether these statements demonstrate genuine concern or are made to generate publicity (or 
an agenda) it is not entirely certain. 
In February 1994, Mikhail Poltoranin the State Duma committee chairman on information 
policy and communications publicly cast his sentiments on the influence of foreign content in 
the Russian media. His comments concerned the negative impact of low-grade foreign films 
on Russian morality and the "destruction of the common information space" in Russia.619 
These negative attributes seemed to be aimed at creating excuses for introducing some 
measures to influence programming, in the name of the public good. 
Renown exiled Russian academic, Alexander Solzhenitsyn once accused Radio Liberty of 
becoming a mouthpiece of the United States and of promoting Siberian separatism.620 
Certainly, Radio Liberty was sponsored by the United States and this would have some 
616 Rantanen, T., op. cit., p. 28. 
617 Rantanen, T., op. cit., p. 29. 
618 Vartanova, E., "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 53. 
619 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 132. 
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bearing on setting editorial content and hence the agendas. As for the promotion of Siberian 
separatism, the notion is somewhat fuzzy concept, which is difficult to prove or disprove. 
How would a foreign radio station influence a large heterogeneous region by engendering 
notions of separatism in its population? 
Although the authorities seem to be foreign influence in the Russian media as generally 
being negative, a notable exception to this 'rule' has occurred in the most unlikely of places. 
In the turbulent period of the immediate disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian 
broadcasting sought guiding principals. The ideals were thought to be found in the structure of 
Britain's BBC. A Director of TV at Ostankino, Oleg Slabynko explained; 
"[ ... J the role of Ostankino as a unifying broadcaster is very important. [ ... J 
Ostankino may be the station which can keep all these different peoples 
together, and to help resolve ethnic problems. In this respect the BEC is our 
model- as a unifying broadcaster, a corporation, and a regulator.,,621 
As a rule, the penetration of foreign ownership in the sphere of mass communications in the 
Russian Federation is minimal. There are however, some notable exceptions do exist. 
Mixtures of joint venture or wholly foreign owned media outlets have emerged in the post-
Soviet period. 
Foreign investment in the Russian media industry seems to have been attracted to some 
aspects or types of the industry more than others. For instance, there has been very active and 
competitive foreign investment in PR, advertising, film and video distribution and news 
agencies (such as Reuters).622 
The entry of Western news agencies into the Russian market has had a series of profound 
influences upon this sector of the media market. There has been an influence upon the news 
style used by Russian actors in the Russian news agency market. The Russian audience 
became familiar with the new news fonnat, which has forced the domestic news agencies to 
620 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 132. 
621 McNair, B., "Connnentary" ill Media Culture and Society, Volume 18, Number 3, Sage, July 1996, 
pp. 489 - 500, p. 492. 
622 Zassoursky, Y. N., "Media and the Public Interest: Balancillg Between State, Busilless and the Public Sphere" 
in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y. N., op cit., p. 170. 
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adapt a little in order to remain competitive.623 
In May 1995 Reuters announced plans to set up a network in Russia and the CIS. Agence 
France Presse soon followed Reuters's plans. 624 These international media news groups did 
not seem to want to take-over existing domestic media structures. The intention seemed to be 
to establish a new network. Reuters 1995 move in establishing a Russian language economic 
news service had another effect on the Russian market. It has stifled attempts by Russian news 
agencies from entering this market segment. 625 
Another highly emotional communication appeared, this time in an article in Obshchaya 
Gazeta (25 - 31 May, 1995). This article claimed that "Reuters already owned half of Russia's 
information space" and that "Russians would become slaves of Reuters and foreign 
information empires. ,,626 
One of the most prominent foreign investments in Russian media is from the Independent 
Media Group. The group was founded in 1992 and is the largest publisher of consumer 
magazines in Russia. 627 This group owns a string of media outlets, which include: 
III The Moscow Times 
III Playboy 
III Cosmopolitan 
fII Good Housekeeping 
III> Harper's Bazaar.628 
Independent Media reshuffled its media portfolio in late 2001. In September 2001 they 
announced that they were going to stop publishing Playboy by the end of 2001, which had 
been published since 1995 and launch a Russian edition of the men's magazine FHM 
623 Rantanen, T., op. cit., pp. 78 - 79. 
624 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 132. 
625 Rantanen, T., op. cit., p. 79. 
626 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 133. 
627 VNU to Sell Russia Holdings, www.europemedia.netishownews.asp?ArticleID=15199. 6 March, 2003. 
EJC Media News Digest, 6 March, 2003. 
628 (1) Zassoursky, Y. N., "Media and the Public Interest: Balancing Between State, Business and the Public 
Sphere" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y. N., op. cit., p. 170. 
(2) Rantanen, T., op. cit., p. 29. 
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instead.629 
In a move designed to shed itself of all consumer information activities, International Media 
Group (the parent company of Independent Media) announced the sale of its 35% stake in 
Independent Media. The shares were to be sold to existing stakeholders. The new owner to 
emerge from this deal was Prof Media, which is part ofthe Interros Group.630 This new stake 
has significantly boosted the amount of media assets under the control of Interros, which is 
controlled by the oligarch Vladimir Potanin. He remains as one of the few large scale private 
owners of media and remains close to the Kremlin. 
Another foreign media group, Burda Publishing House, possesses a series of magazine style 
publications under its control: 
Ii Cool 
49 Cool Girl 
49 Lisa 
49 Avtomir.631 
Other foreign interests exist elsewhere in the media industry. To name a few of the more 
prominent investments, these include: 
• A Greek publisher had bought a 51 % stake in Pravda. 
• Partial French ownership of the radio stations Nostalgie and Europe Plus. 
It Partial American ownership of Radio Maximum.632 
Joint venture enterprises in the Russian media industry have also existed. One of the joint 
venture programmes involved Britain's Financial Times and the American Wall Street 
629 Independent Media Launches FHM, Closes Playboy, issue 40, Media Digest, 12 September, 2001. 
630 (1) VNU to Sell Russia Holdings, www.europemedia.netishownews.asp?AliicleID=15199. 6 March, 2003. 
EJC Media News Digest, 6 March, 2003. 
(2) Editorial, Oligarchs Just Come and Go, The Moscow Times, 4 March, 2003. 
www. themoscowtil11es.col11/stories/2003/03/04/005-print.html, 4 March, 2003. 
631 Zassoursky, Y. N., "Media and the Public Interest: Balancing Between State, Business and the Public Sphere" 
in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y. N., Russian Media Challenge, Helsinki, Kikil110ra 
Publications, 2001, p. 170. 
632 Rantanen, T., op. cit., p. 29. 
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Journal teaming up and launching the newspaper Vedomosti. 633 Itogi is another example of a 
joint venture enterprise, with Newsweek. 634 
On occasion, foreign influence or intervention in the Russian media industry makes 
headlines. One ofthe first of such occasions, after Putin came to office in March 2000, 
happened in the wake of the Media-Most controversy. As the company was collapsing, offers 
were made by foreign interests to acquire the assets of Media-Most. Both U. S. media 
magnate Ted Turner (founder of CNN) and businessman George Soros (of the Soros 
Foundation, a group that campaigns for media and freedom of speech issues in the former 
Eastern Bloc) expressed an interest in gaining up to 60% of NTV.635 
Turner and Soros were acting in response to Gusinky's attempt to find a foreign investor for 
the heavily indebted media company (to the state-owned Gazprom), to prevent it from falling 
into the control of the government. Gusinsky stated that he would only sell his stake if the 
independence of the TV station was guaranteed. Putin also cleared the way for foreign 
involvement to begin by stating that he had no objections to Turner taking a stake in NTV.636 
These actions laid the path for a very complicated series of events, which eventually saw the 
control of the station eventually taken over by Gazprom and other 'partners' slowly excluded 
from the company. 
The Swedish Modern Times Group (MTG) has been another active commercial participant in 
the Russian media market. They have also been active throughout the former Eastern Bloc, 
buying up media assets. In April 2001 MTG announced plans to buy into Darial TV. At the 
time, Darial TV was one of eight commercial TV stations with a licence to broadcast 
nationally, with a potential audience of20 million viewers.637 
On 16 June 2001, Norway's ambassador to Russia, Ogvind Nordsletten told RIA Novostei 
that Norwegian and Swedish firms were eyeing more prospective media assets in the Russian 
633 Zassoursky, Y. N., "Media and the Public Interest: Balancing Between State, Business and the Public Sphere" 
in Nordenstreng, K, Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y. N., Russian Media Challenge, Helsinki, Kikimora 
Publications, 2001, p. 173. 
634 Zassoursky, I., "Media and Power: Russia in the Nineties" in Nordenstreng, K, Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, 
Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 81. 
635 Foreign Consortium Bids to Save Russian TV Channel, AFP, 7 March, 2001. JRL #5138, 7 March, 2001. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Modern Times Group to Acquire 75% of Russian TV Station, Reuters, 9 April, 2001. 
www.europeanintemet.comlrussia/investorinsightlbusiness.php3?id=333316&brief=html, 10 April, 2001. 
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Federation. He announced that planned future investments included Izvestiya, Komsomolskaya 
Pravda and other press outlets.638 
4.2 The Internet 
Rafal Rohozinski of the University of Cambridge argued that the legacy of Soviet ideology 
still has an influence on the internet in Russia, setting Russia apart from the Western 
experience. 639 This argument would appear to support my contention of the existence of binary 
opposition, a division exists between east and west (between the Russian and the Western 
worlds). A distinction exists between the ideology and mentality as a result of the 
environment, which has shaped this development. Russian society was for the most part, a 
'closed society' for some seventy years. The skills acquired by Soviet citizens, which were 
necessary for survival in this climate, cannot be discarded quickly. Contemporary Russia (in 
the current political form) has only been in existence for approximately one decade. 
Rohozinski asserts that this ideology has hampered the development of the Internet. The 
central government (Soviet) wanted to create an integrated system. Lower order bureaucrats 
and officials who wanted control of such a proj ect thwarted this system's development. 640 The 
project was also seen as threat by some, to the hidden economy. Blat's very existence would 
be under threat, along with the associated personal networks if information was readily 
available. 641 It should be noted that the level of Soviet technology was somewhat less 
advanced than its Western counterparts level of technology. 
It seems as though a mixture of a perceived threat to Soviet culture (among other things the 
existence of blat) and a lack of understanding concerning the Internet's potential hampered 
the development ofthe Internet in the Soviet Union. The Internet was a very new medium of 
information dissemination and retrieval. As such, the full potential of such a medium would 
be hard to grasp and may have been considered either a lower order priority or superfluous. 
638 Scandinavians Invest in Russian Press, Radio Liberty, www.rferl.org/newsline, 20 June, 2001. 
EJC Media News Digest, 20 June, 2001. 
639 Rafal Rohozinski is a Ph.D. candidate in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Trinity College, 
University of Cambridge. His article How the internet did not Transform Russia (October 2000) is drawn from a 
previous work, Mapping Russian Cyberspace: A Perspective on Democracy and the Net. (this work is available 
at www.umisd. org/infotech/ conferen/russian) 
640 Control over such a project would give an agency or individuals access to information, which could be 
subsequently used as a bargaining chip to gain goods and services, in exchange for this infOlmation. 
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Russian media organisations, especially those that are aligned with the government are a 
constant source of encouraging news for Internet development in the Russian Federation. For 
instance, at a conference government official Andrei Korotkov used selective figures to 
announce that Russia occupied the 15th position among the world's Internet using countries.642 
A report that was disseminated by the government's news agency RIA Novosti. Is this 
portrayal of Internet use development in the Russian Federation a realistic appraisal of the true 
situation? 
4.2.1 Internet Use in the Russian Federation 
Www.monitoring.ru has been conducting an on-going survey ofInternet use ofRunet 
visitors. Internet users have been divided into two groups, 'active users' that are on the net no 
less than three hours per week. The other group studied is the 'regular users,' who spend at 
least one hour per week on the net. 643 
The survey revealed that 61 % of 'active users' and 55% of 'regular users' read news on the 
web. Internet 'chat' was the second most popular activity, 44.5% of 'active users' and 45.8% 
of 'regular users' were spending time in Internet chatrooms. According to a report from 
CNews.ru, these priorities have not changed significantly from the 2000 survey.644 
The Russian Public Centre for Internet Technologies profiled Internet users and reported their 
findings. They discovered that the audience was generally young and male. 64% of Russian 
Internet users were aged between 16 and 34, 59% ofInternet users were men.645 
In a poll conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, a snapshot of the 
disparity of computer access and use between the centre and the regions was highlighted. 
e 84% of Russians never use computers. 
e 69% of Muscovites never use computers. 
641 Blat is the giving and receiving of favours, whether they are goods or services. It works on a system of being 
mutually beneficial, of 'if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours. ' 
642 Scherbachova, 0., Russia 15,h at Internet Using Suzdal / Vladimir Region, RIA Novosti, 13 February, 2002. 
JRL #6076, 14 February, 2002. 
643 Runet Users Prefer News, Independent Media News Digest, Number 34, 1 August, 2001. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Russian Internet Audience Doubles in 2001, Interfax, 29 April, 2001. JRL #6216 30 April, 2001. 
4!1 26% of Muscovites use computers daily or at least several times a week. 
4!1 9% of all Russians use computers daily or at least several times a week. 
4!1 23% of Moscow families have personal computers at home. 
4!1 6% of all Russian families have personal computers at home.646 
229 
These poll statistics provide a poor indication on the use of computers by Russians. 
According to the poll, the vast majority ofthe respondents have never used computers, the 
figure of those who have never used computers remains high in the Muscovite category as 
well. A peculiar trait for a capital city in Europe in the 21 sl Century. The other point that 
emerges from these figures is the disparity between Moscow and the rest of Russia, in the use 
of computers. 
In February 2002 the Communications Ministry released a wealth of statistics concerning 
computers and the Internet to the news agency RIA Novosti. The data given pertained to the 
2001 year. It was announced that 400,000 personal computers (PCs) were sold quarterly in 
Russia. This raised the number ofPCs per capita from 6.4 PCs in 2000 to 7.5 PCS.647 
To try and reinforce the image of Russia being on the leading edge oflT, Korotkov stated 
that some 1.5 million experts worked in the field of information and communication 
technology and that the yearly growth of this sector was in the region of 10 - 15%.648 
Assuming these figures to be true and correct, they give a very promising indication of the 
potential for growth oflT in the Russian Federation. However, is this growth in the process of 
being realised? 
According to the Deputy Communications Minister Alexander Volokitin, Russia had 7 
million Internet users. Three million of these users are classified as being frequent users, the 
remainder are classified as occasional users. Volokitin also stated that Russians owned some 
10 million personal computers.649 
In research published by www.monitoring.ruin August 2000, approximately 9.2 million 
646 One in FOllr Muscovites, One in Ten Russians Use Computers, Interfax, 29 January, 2002. 
JRL #6048,31 January, 2002. 
647 Scherbachova, 0., Russia 15th at Internet Using Suzdal / Vladimir Region, RlA Novosti, 13 February, 2002. 
JRL #6076, 14 February, 2002. 
648 Ibid. 
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Russians have used the net. However, only 20% ofthese are regular users (Online for more 
than one hour per week). The research also established that the Internet users are mainly 
concentrated in the main cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.650 
Growth in the Internet audience over the year 2001 was spectacular, there were some 18 
million users, of which about 8 million were classified as 'regular users. ,651 Moscow and St. 
Petersburg continued as the main centres ofInternet activity. 66.3% ofthe country's Internet 
users reside these cities. A noticeable increase in Internet use from the regions is occurring.652 
In February 2002 the Communications Ministry announced the rate of Internet usage. The 
total number ofInternet users was stated at approximately 10 million (almost 7% of Russia's 
population). Runet's total traffic during the 2001 year increased by 53% to 19.1 million 
surfers (including web surfers outside Russia). Ofthis figure, 7.5 million were classified as 
'regular users. ,653 An increasing percentage of those using Runet originate from outside 
Russia. 
• 2001 - 45% (4.8 million) of Runet users were Russian residents. 
III 2000 - 60% (4.5 million) of Runet users were Russian residents. 654 
A September 2002 poll has highlighted a lack of computer and Internet use in the Russian 
Federation. This poll has generated a wealth of statistical information. 
III 7% of respondents have a computer at home (5% in 2001). 
III 11 % use a computer several times a week. 
e 3 % use a computer roughly once a week. 
• 1 % use a computer approximately once a month. 
Ell 83 % have never used a computer. 
• 4% of respondents use the Internet several times a week. 
Ell 2% use the Internet once a week. 
649 Russia has 7 million Internet Users, Interfax, 29/1112000. JRL #4659, 29/11/2000. 
650 Gerrans, Sam., Democratic Russia Goes Online, TechWeb News, www.techweb.com. 27/1112000. 
JRL #4666, 3/12/2000. 
651 Russian Internet Audience Doubles in200}, Interfax, 29 April, 2001. JRL #6216 30 April, 2001. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Naumenko, L., Net Use Leaps 39% in 200}, Moscow Times, 6 February, 2002. JRL #6063, 7 February, 2002. 
@ 1 % use the Internet up to a couple of times a month. 
• 91% of respondents have never used the Internet.655 
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The 2002 poll statistics display some improvement on the poll results from the previous 
year. However, the few gains that have been achieved are modest. In addition to computer 
use, a survey ofInternet use was conducted. As seen from the figures above, Internet use is 
still very much in its infancy. Results obtained from the poll would suggest that the use of 
computers and the Internet is very poorly developed and the Russian government has a 
monumental task in trying to promote greater use of computers and the Internet. However, it 
should be noted that these results are obtained from a poll of only approximately 2000 people 
and this may not be truly representative of real situation. 
Forecasts had predicted that Russia will have 11 million Internet users or 8% of the 
population on the net by 2003.656 However, approximately only 2.5% of Russia's population is 
online in 2001. This figure is less than 1110 the portion of American households online. 657 
World Ban1e statistics from 2000 painted a bleak picture of computer usage and penetration 
in Russia. There were only 43 computers per 1000 people in the country (4.3%). This figure 
compares poorly with many other nations. Belize had 12.5% computer penetration, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 10.6%, Fiji 5.5%, Jamaica 4.7%, Bulgaria 4.4% and the 
United States 58.5%.658 
An initiative that has been launched, with the designed intention to double the number of 
Internet users in Russia over the next five years was signed into law by the Prime Minister 
Mikhail Kasyanov on 29 January 2002. 'Electronic Russia' as the programme is called, also 
has the mission of integrating all of Russia's educational and government systems into the 
Internet. 659 
654 Naumenko, L., Net Use Leaps 39% in 2001, Moscow Times, 6 February, 2002. JRL #6063, 7 February, 2002. 
655 (l)Naumenko, L., Study Finds Just 8% of Russians has Surfed Net, The Moscow Times, 10 October, 2002. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2002110/101043.html. 10 October, 2002. 
(2) Interfax, Most Russians do not Have Modern Means of Communications - Poll, 9 October, 2002. 
JRL #6482, 9 October, 2002. 
656 Varolist, J., Russian Internet Use is Low, But Great Potential is Pushing Expansion, New York Times, 16 
July, 2001. JRL #534917 July, 2001. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Naumenko, L., Study Finds Just 8% of Russians Has SUIted Net, The Moscow Times, 10 October, 2002. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/storiesI2002/101l01043.html. 10 October, 2002. 
659 Prime Minister Launches 'Electronic Russia' Programme, www.rfer1.org, 5 February, 2002. 
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'Electronic Russia' is scheduled to run from January 2002 until 2010. Total funding for the 
project is US$2.4 billion, of which 51 % is derived from the federal budget, 30% from regional 
budgets and 19% from private sources. 660 
Some of the projects stated aims include: 
fib Creating an Internet portal for the government's economic and finance bodies. 
fib Computerising the country's schools. 
fib Creating an on-line tax payment system. 661 
The low Internet usage may reflect Russia's level of poverty, which in 1999 showed that 113 
of Russians lived below the poverty line.662 People can earn an average of between US$50-
100 per month.663 The State Statistics Committee reported on the level of poverty in the 
Russian Federation at the end of May 2002. Russia's poverty line was set at US$55 per 
month. During the first quarter of 2002, some 47.7 million Russians were classified as living 
within the poverty leve1.664 
Under such poor economic conditions a lot ofInternet access is carried out at the place of 
work. In a ROMIR poll it was found that 81.6% of respondents use the Internet at work.665 
The cost of Internet access excludes many private residences due to the cost. Estimates of net 
access in Russia vary greatly, from as low as US$120 up to between US$400 - 1500 per 
month.666 When these figures are compared with wages the net result is that the growth of net 
use is retarded by low wages. Spending priorities under such circumstances have to be 
focussed on the necessities oflife (such as housing and food) and luxuries such as computers 
and access to the net are low order wants. 
Another factor, which hampered the development of the Internet in Russia was the poor state 
EJC Media News Digest, 5 February, 2002. 
660 Naumenko, L., E-Russia Funding to be Slashed, 22 October, 2002. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2002110/22/048.html. 22 October, 2002. 
661 Ibid. 
662 Vartanova, E., "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged" in Nordenstreng, K, Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 35. 
663 Varolist, 1, Russian Internet Use is Low, But Great Potential is Pushing Expansion, New York Times, 16 
July, 2001. JRL #534917 July, 2001. 
664 AP, 33% of Russians Live in Poverty, 31 May, 2002. JRL #6283, 1 June, 2002. 
665 Cohen, N., Russian Internet Landscape Still Bleak, www.marketer.com. 21 February, 2001. 
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of the telecommunications infrastructure. Less than 20 people out of every 100 have 
telephones in Russia (in 1997). A survey conducted in September 2002 has indicated that 
currently, 43% of Russians have a phone at home (91 % of Muscovites have a phone at 
home).667 People in the regions are often placed on waiting lists, sometimes years long, before 
having a regular telephone installed.668 Experts and operators in the telecommunications 
industry have estimated that the infrastructure, which is unsuitable for modem 
communications will require many years of upgrading before reaching Western standards.669 
Some improvements in the level of technology introduction have occurred. The results of a 
survey conducted by VTsIOM in September 2002, were released on 9 October, 2002. This 
selective representative poll of approximately 2000 people has produced some interesting 
results. Two points soon become apparent, the lack of penetration by modem technology and 
regional disparity. 
A result of the survey conveyed noteworthy information regarding phone use and 
penetration. According to the poll only 9% of respondents had a mobile phone (4% in the 
2001 poll).670 However, 28.6% of Muscovites had a mobile phone, where as only 2.9% of 
rural respondents reported carrying a mobile phone. ACM Consulting estimated that 28.5 
million mobile phones were in Russia in September 2002. This differs from VTsIOM's 
estimate of 14.5 million mobile phone users.67! If technology, such as mobile phones have 
such low rates of penetration in Russia, what are the chances of achieving high rates of 
Internet use in Russia? Low penetration of mobile phone use in Russia could be, as it is with 
computers and the Internet, indicative of greater social problems in society, namely the 
question of the standard of living. 
On the surface, it appears as though the Russian government is actively encouraging a 
greater participation of its citizens in the Internet, as embodied in the 'Electronic Russia' 
667 (1) Naumenko, L., Study Finds Just 8% of Russians has SUifed Net, The Moscow Times, 10 October, 2002. 
www.themoscowtimes.comlstories12002/101101043.htm!. 10 October, 2002. 
(2) Interfax, Most Russians do not Have Modern Means of Communications - Poll, 9 October, 2002. 
JRL #6482, 9 October, 2002. 
668 Fossato, F., Russia: Joining the Cybertimes, But Slowly, 20 October, 1997. 
www.rferl.org/nca/featuresI1997110IF.RD.971020124837.html, 2 October, 2002. 
669 Ibid. 
670 Interfax, Most Russians do not Have Modern Means of Communications - Poll, 9 October, 2002. 
JRL #6482, 9 October, 2002. 
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programme. Internet usage rates in the Russian Federation are low when compared to Western 
countries such as the United States. Figures on Internet use and participation would appear to 
indicate that a growing demand for access to the web exists. 
On 21 October, 2002 the Deputy Economic Development and Trade Minister, Andrei 
Sharonov announced that funding for next years 'Electronic Russia' would be greatly 
reduced. 672 He was unspecific on the exact figures of the cuts, but this would appear to 
contradict the government's stated commitment to developing the Internet further. 
Speaking at the same news conference was Communications Minister Leonid Reiman, who 
said that the programme was "in a good condition and is ready for further development.,,673 
Two different comments from two government ministers, on the same day and at the same 
venue. This gives an impression that the government is uncertain in its goals and objectives, 
and may well be implementing contradictory programmes. 
4.2.2 Political Activity on the Net 
A multitude ofInternet sites have been established, dedicated to politicians and politics. 
They range from personal websites of politicians such as Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Putin 
(www.putin2000.ru) to political discussion sites (www.polit.ru). Sometimes these sites are in 
English as well as Russian, indicating the intention to communicate to a wider audience than 
just Russia. 
Political interest in the Internet's possibilities and potential has been on the increase in recent 
years. Ella Pamfilova, a presidential candidate in the 2000 elections, used the Internet to 
spread her message and to generate publicity. However, this did not appear to be overly 
successful, due to low Internet usage. 674 
During the recent round of elections (1999 and 2000) kompromat was found in a supposedly 
'neutral' Internet environment. Several Internet sites run by The Foundation/or Effective 
672 Naumenko, L., E-Russia Funding to be Slashed, 22 October, 2002. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/storiesI2002!10122/048.html. 22 October, 2002. 
673 Ibid. 
674 Raskin, A., "Television: Medium to Elect the President" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, 
Y., Editors, op. cit., pp. 99 - 100. 
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Politics were found to have posted kompromat. 675 Gleb Pavlovsky well known as being one of 
the Kremlin's top media advisors (a position that he said he has resigned from) startedThe 
Foundation for Effective Politics. 
This spilling over of politics from the traditional media (newspapers, radio and TV) may be 
creating an adverse public perception of the Internet's informational reliability. "[ ... J Russian 
users consider the information from the Internet fairly unreliable.,,676 
The Internet's potential is being investigated and exploited with more purpose and energy 
since Putin's election to the presidency. However, the roots of the government move to 
making more use of the Internet can be traced to December 28, 1999 when the Government 
Information Department began supplying electronic information to the public and the media 
(the trafficking of hard copy material almost ceased).677 
Electronic Russia is the name ofthe government's federal programme for the development 
ofInternet technologies.678 According to the pro-Kremlin website www.strana.ru.in 2001 
President Putin and the Prime Minister supported proposals for establishing an effective 
mechanism for feedback between the government and society.679 A formation of a kind of 
'virtual public sphere,' where the public would be able to be involved in debates concerning 
public figures and issues. The agreement that paved the way for the creation of the 
Government Department ofInformation's website was reached at Moscow's Civic Forum in 
November 2001.680 
Currently, this website gives public access to Government staff, Government related 
agencies, and government plans and programmes. The contents ofthe site are arranged in 
alphabetical order. Plans exist to upgrade the site with features such as news banners carrying 
official events and government resolutions and a banner that will detail the work of ministries 
and other government dep artments. 681 
675 Vartanova, E., "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., pp. 21-72, p. 61. 
676 Ibid. 
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In keeping with the government's new policy of making the government and governmental 
ministries and agencies more accessible to the public, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has launched an increased presence on the Internet. The project was initiated with the 
participation of Inter/ax news agency on 2 September, 2002.682 
The rhetoric of the Foreign Ministry's project implies greater public accessibility, The 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced: 
"Today, the Russian Foreign Ministry together with Inter/ax are launching 
an action called 'The Russian Foreign Ministry - Russia and the World in 
Answers to your Questions.' Anyone may ask a question about Russian 
foreign policy or pressing international problems through the Internet, and 
beginning in October, the Ministry will regularly give answers to them.,,683 
Ivanov went on to explain the purpose for the website launch as ensuring a conduit for the 
official point of view. A stress was placed on the of Russian diplomacy being "correctly 
understood by the pUblic. [ ... J We should resolutely get rid of manifestations of office 
diplomacy and expand our channels of dialogue.,,684 
As with the Russian Information Department's website, this site is also interactive. 
Questions from anyone, in Russia or abroad may be posed to the Foreign Ministry. These 
questions are sent through a special window in either English or Russian via the Inter/ax 
websites (www.interfax.ru - Russian or www.interfax.com - English).685 The use of a system 
where it is possible to pose questions in two languages hints at the growing importance being 
placed by the Russian government of disseminating their stance to the domestic audience but 
to the wider world community. 
The flagship of official Russian presence on the Internet is the upgraded presidential website 
www.president.kremlin.ru. AYAXl, the company that won the tender to upgrade the website in 
681 Government Revamps Its Internet Site, www.strana.ru. 17 June, 2002. JRL #6313, 18 June, 2002. 
682 Foreign Minister Announces New Web Project With Intelfax, Interfax, 2 September, 2002. 
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237 
June 2001, expended some 15,000 working hours on a site that includes; 12,000 pages and 
over 1000 photos. This new site went online on 20 June, 2002.686 www.president.kremlin.ru.s 
importance can be appreciated by using President Putin's own words regarding its 
significance. 
"This is a bit more than the site of a specific person. It is the Kremlin's site, 
and the Kremlin is not only an architectural ensemble - it is the centre of 
power, and this is something bigger - it is the spiritual centre of the 
country. ,,687 
AYAXI completed work on the site in March 2002, however the work was subjected to an 
extensive evaluation by the Federal Agency for Government Communications and 
Information (F APSI). The government agency spent three months testing the site to evaluate 
the condition of its security requirements. 688 
The presidential website still contains some of the earlier features such as news updates and 
speech transcripts, but has come to include a variety of other information. 
~ A searchable database of laws and regulations signed by the President. 
• A list of the President's residences and partial inventory of Kremlin cars, ships and planes. 
Ell Pictures of Put in and his family, pictures ofthe First Family on vacation and the text of 
the autobiographical book 'First Person. ,689 
Putin made some suggestions for improving the site. One of the suggestions was the posting 
ofthe text of draft laws, as "a good democratic way of discussing them.,,69o This statement is 
in keeping with the government's stated desire to make society feel part of the political 
process and not alienated from it, by making government more accessible for the 'average' 
686 Naumenko, L., Putin Gets a Website With Bells and Whistles, 21 June, 2002. JRL #6319,21 June, 2002. 
687 "It is a Bit More Than the Site of a Specific Person -It is the Kremlin Site ... the Centre of Power": Putin on 
New Presidential Website. The English Language Version, However, Must not be Workfor Export, 
www.strana.ru. 21 June, 2002. JRL #6321,23 June, 2002. 
688 Naumenko, L., Putin Gets a Website With Bells and Whistles, 21 June, 2002. JRL #6319, 21 June, 2002. 
689 (1) Naumenko, L., Putin Gets a Website With Bells and Whistles, 21 June, 2002. JRL #6319,21 June, 2002. 
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citizen. Another suggestion made by Putin was what he saw as the necessity of launching an 
English language version of the site. 691 By launching an English language version, the 
intention is to spread the government's stance to an audience that includes potential audiences 
from overseas. The site attracted some 10, 000 hits on its first day of operation, including 
"several dozen abortive hacking attempts."692 According to information released by the 
Presidential Press Service to the government news agency ITAR-TASS, the old website was 
one ofthe most popular sites on the Runet with an average 50, 000 hits per day.693 
An attempt has been initiated by the Kremlin to create the appearance of pluralism in 
Russian politics and the media. A leading figure in establishing the Kremlin's presence on the 
net was their chief media advisor Gleb Pavlovsky. When the Fund for Effective Policy was 
founded, Pavlovsky heralded it as an independent source of political information. 
Pavlovsky's Fund for Effective Policy had managed to create an impressive presence on the 
web. The Director ofIntemet projects for the foundation, Marina Litvinovich listed some of 
the informational resources that are at work on the web; www.gazeta.ru, www.1enta.ru, 
www.smi.ru, www.vesti.ru, www.strana.ru and numerous others.694 
The Kremlin's chief media advisor had made the scale of his ambition clear from the outset. 
On 19 September, 2000 he stated that it was his intention to create a "Russian CNN." This 
was to be achieved by uniting all state owned or controlled media outlets at a massive, single 
multimedia site.695 Such a site would provide the government with an effective and cost 
efficient method of getting their message out across not only Russia, but also the rest of the 
world. The organisational structure of strana.ru gave a hint as to where Pavlovsky's political 
loyalties lay, which was based on Putin's newly created seven super districts.696 
In an article published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the ideology and hint at strana.ru's 
influence are portrayed in a concise manner: 
691 Naumenko, L., Putill Gets a Website With Bells and Whistles, 21 June, 2002. JRL #6319,21 June, 2002. 
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"[ ... J Pavlovsky's editions have always positioned themselves as official, 
ones reflecting and preaching nothing but the political line of the Kremlin, 
they never the less managed to preserve a definite degree of independence in 
their evaluations and judgement. [ ... J More than that, strana.ru was regarded 
not only as a well informed web publication but also a very influential 
medium reflecting a quite concrete position of definite power circles. It is 
common knowledge that many a high-ranking official used to start his 
morning Internet browsing by clicking on strana.ru. ,,697 
Pavlovsky also admitted to receiving help at gaining control of Russia's biggest news 
portals, such as www.lenta.ru, www.vesti.ru, www.smi.ru and the electronic version of 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta www.ng.ru. 698 Underthecurrentregime.itis unlikely that any official 
help would be offered let alone given to an organisation that was not considered to be 
politically 'reliable.' 
On 1 November, 2001 Pavlovsky announced his withdrawal from the Internet business.699 
Much speculation and rumour flowed concerning possible reasons for this sudden and 
unexpected departure from the Internet based news business. One of the rumours involved the 
repercussions of an article, which appeared on strana.ru on 29 October, 2001. The article 
alleged that Alexei Miller, the head of Gazprom, had been forced to resign. This was not the 
case and political 'fallout' from this error had forced Pavlovsky's resignation.70o 
Another rumour was based on the dire financial situation faced by the Foundation for 
Effective Policies. According to Kommersant, Pavlovsky announced the intention to sell the 
Internet assets to a commercial buyer as early as June 2001.701 The article went on and stated 
that the financial situation had become critical by December 2001. In a departure from 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta's assessment of Pavlov sky's Internet media holdings, a possible reason 
for a no sale was offered. 
697 Glikin, M. & Rostova, N., Pavlovsky Nationalised, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 July, 2002. 
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"Professional Internet people attributed this to the frankly propagandist and 
pro-state thrust of the media managed by the Effective Policy Foundation 
which inevitably deprived them of their competitiveness in the market.,,702 
The Kommersant article went further in describing the level of poverty faced by the 
Foundation for Effective Policies. Quoting a comment that was released by the VGTRK., it 
was claimed that strana.ru "was in a near default situation." Additionally, unofficial 
conversations of unnamed staff members suggested that wages might have not been paid for a 
period of up to three months. 703 
The approximately fifteen websites, which were under control of the Foundation for 
Effective Policy were handed over to the Internet board of the All-Russia State TV and Radio 
Committee (VGTRK).704 During an interview concerning this transaction, Pavlovsky was 
asked how he felt about the deal. He answered "I feel like a man who has given a puppy into 
good hands. ,,705 
What appears to be an emerging trend is the movement of opposition figures from the 
'conventional' media (such as print and broadcasting media) to the Internet. This has proved 
to be the case with the chief editor of the opposition magazine Itogi, who was sacked when 
the government controlled energy giant Gazprom took over control. 706 Another instance of a 
'mainstream' journalist relocating to the Internet is the infamous ex-ORT anchor Sergei 
Dorenko (www.dorenko.tv). 
The new Internet publication is called The Real Itogi. At the time ofthe new publication's 
launch, the intention was to publish online until such a time when it could once again return to 
a paper based format. 707 The Real Itogi 's actions and intentions would appear to indicate that 
some in the media industry think of the Internet as a place of refuge for media professionals 
that have been marginalized in the current political climate. 
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The political elite has come to understand the potential ofthe Internet as a means of 
spreading their message. Until recently the Internet appeared to be a relatively neglected part 
of the media environment as far as government presence and regulation is concerned. 
Attempts have been made and continue by the government to gain some measure of control 
over the flow of information over the net. 
Another tactic by the government would seem to be the creation of a 'virtual political 
opposition' through the efforts of Gleb Pavlovsky. This may be due in part to the relocation of 
genuine political opposition on the net. A new sphere for the incessant 'information war' is 
being fought in this particular part of the Russian information space. 
A possible reason for wanting to communicate to a worldwide audience, giving the 
appearance of greater government accountability and accessibility to the public is to create a 
form of 'virtual democracy.' That is, the appearance of pluralism in politics, media and 
society without the physical manifestation of this pluralism. This may be done in order to 
reintegrate Russia into mainstream world political life, to facilitate membership in world 
bodies such as WTO and GS. The appearance of pluralism would also help to deflect criticism 
from world bodies such as EU, concerning sensitive issues, for example the freedom of 
speech. 
4.2.3 Policing and Controlling the Internet 
The rapid expansion of unchecked or censored information has caught the attention of the 
Russian authorities. On March 26, 2000, the Chairman of the Russian Electoral Commission 
Aleksandr Veshnyakov, announced that his agency would "consider the Internet as a mass 
medium," and would "monitor and punish" any cyber-violations of Russian electoral 
legislation.708 
The nature of the Internet is complex and difficult to monitor, due in part to the sheer volume 
of users and information flowing through the networks. In spite of these characteristics, 
measures are being undertaken by the Kremlin to control the Internet. 
708 VaIianova, E., "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged" in Nordenstreng, K., VaIianova, E. & 
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In an effort to try and police the web Russian Internet Service Providers (ISP's) are required 
by law to linle their computers to the FSB (KGB's successor). This law was signed into effect 
in July 1998, which allows the FSB to monitor selected electronic transmissions, including e-
mails, without having to provide any warrants. 709 Putin signed another law, taking effect in 
January 2001, which has extended this requirement to include seven other law enforcement 
agencies. 710 
The implications of this law mean that the law enforcement agencies are able to supervise e-
mail and other electronic traffic. Searches can be made using keywords to seek out specific 
information, regardless of whether it is prejudicial to state security or not. Electronic 
information is accessed relatively easily by the governmental agencies after a presidential 
decree in 1995, banning the use of encryption algorithms or devices unless these were 
certified by the FSB.711 These agencies have in effect been given a free hand to act as a new 
cyber-censor. 
Such rigorous law making on a medium as the Internet implies that the authorities are very 
much aware of its potential to influence the public with an alternative source of information. 
The above-mentioned measures seem to be aimed at governmental control being secured 
before the Internet use becomes more widespread and influential. Governmental presence on 
the net has also been on the increase. Sometimes the government's actions take on the 
appearance of a counter-measure against a specific informational 'problem.' 
Under the aegis ofthe 'Electronic Russia' programme, a new series of efforts, this time they 
are aimed at 'standardisation' of Russian Internet pUblications. The standardisation will be 
attempted through a series of obligatory requirements in the format of the publications. These 
requirements are as follow: 
III Information about the publisher. 
III The publication's state issued licence. 
III A copyright disclaimer. 
709 Russian Police Take Aim at Open Internet Access, AFP, 1 February, 2002. JRL #6051, 1 February, 2002. 
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411 Content annotation.712 
Such conditions would make the work ofthe cyber-censor very easy. The information 
provided by the Internet pUblication could ultimately be used against them. As the FSB 
already possess the electronic 'key' to Russian web space they are able to use a word search, 
which would be a simplified process via the content annotation, to root out any 'unacceptable' 
information from electronic publications. All of the critical information will be more readily 
accessible and concentrated under this regime. 
In the world of wild rumour and accusation, stories may emerge (true or false) concerning an 
'impending' event. This environment seems to flourish in the Russian Federation. On 1 
February, 2002 the Russian daily Noviye Izvestiya published an article regarding an alleged 
draft law being prepared by the Ministry ofInternal Affairs. According to the article, web 
access would be restricted to individuals who have permission from law-enforcement 
agencies. 713 
The Ministry ofInternal Affairs denied this rumour and pointed to the 'Electronic Russia' 
programme, which would appear to contradict the article's argument.714 In this instance the 
rumour may have been fuelled by events occurring at a conference held in Rome. During the 
Rome conference, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov launched the concept of 
'information terrorism. ,715 
Ivanov went on to explain this new concept and its implications for a country such as Russia. 
According to him, modem society has developed a dependence on electronic databases and 
electronically transmitted information, which directly affects the defence and intelligence 
arms, law enforcement agencies, banking and public utilities. He went on to state that the 
"vital spheres of any state have become accessible to hackers, and their co-ordinated actions 
could not only paralyse a whole country, but could also result in numerous human 
casualties.,,716 
712 Prime Minister Launches 'Electronic Russia' Programme, www.rferl.org, 5 February, 2002. 
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Such statements by high-ranking politicians are bound to generate rumours. A new concept 
has been introduced, that of 'information terrorism' and the impact that this may have on 
society ifno measures are taken against such an activity. The introduction of new laws and 
regulations would be a logical first step as a means to prevent the doomsday scenario that was 
presented by Ivanov. 
Ivanov's statement was not the first such statement made by a high ranking figure in the 
government. Gleb Pavlovsky openly endorsed the adoption of the Russian Information 
Security Doctrine. Like Ivanov, he made mention of a threat to information security, although 
not specifically pertaining to electronic information and the need to adopt some form of 
protection against this 'threat.' One of the suggested methods was "that the Russian state must 
create a single information centre inside the presidential administration. ,,717 
It is interesting to note the timing ofIvanov's use of the term 'information terrorism,' which 
was in February 2002. This is a matter of only five months after the terror attacks on the US 
mainland in September 2000. The use of the term 'terrorism' has surpassed the older word for 
the pretext for intervention, 'humanitarianism' in world politics. 
Terrorism and its implications also hold an important place in the Russian psyche. After the 
bomb blasts around Moscow and other Russian cities in 1999, the suppression of Chechen 
aspirations for independence by military action was justified by suggesting the acts of terror 
would be prevented by that course of action. The word terrorism, both in Russia and the world 
as a whole, has sinister and highly emotionally charged connotations. Through the evocation 
of such strong sentiment it may be more probable for a government to 'get away with' actions 
that it would not ordinarily do so, in times of peace, security and certainty. 
The government has been able to exercise some measure of control over the conventional 
media via a raft of laws and other means. Removing their broadcasting licence or increasing 
the cost of transmission fees can silence broadcasting media. Print media are also vulnerable 
to manipulation through such levers as non-payment of subsidies or refusing or increasing the 
cost of newsprint and / or printing services. Until recently, no such mechanisms existed for 
controlling the Internet. 
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From 1995 the Kremlin has sought to monitor and control the flow of information through 
legal means. A series of laws have been passed that make it possible for the government to 
intercept electronically transmitted information (assuming that the sender has acted within the 
law). The most recent laws regarding the requirements for Russian Internet publications 
would appear to ease the burden of the Kremlin's task in the monumental task of the 
surveillance of information available on the net. 
4.2.4 Commercial Developments on the Net 
Commercial development of the Internet in the Russian Federation seems to be progressing 
steadily. There has been a remarkable rate of growth in the number of second level domains in 
the domain zone '.ru' between 1 August, 2001 to 1 August, 2002.718 On 1 August, 2001 60, 
000 domain names were registered and by 1 August, 2002 this figure had jumped to 135, 
000.719 
Approximately 60% of the Internet address users in Russia are legal entities.no This group of 
legal entities can be further broken down. Of the legal entities, 95% of this group consists of 
Russian companies and the offices of foreign firms that are located in Moscow. The remaining 
5% derive from foreign companies without offices in Russia.721 These figures demonstrate a 
growing appreciation of having a commercial presence on the Internet, not only from foreign 
companies but Russian businesses as well. 
The ratio of corporate to private users has been slowly shifting toward a greater corporate 
use of the Internet. This trend is expected to continue according to the Russian Public Centre 
for Internet Technologies: 
Ell 2000 - ratio of private to corporate users 40% / 60% 
Ell 2001 - ratio of private to corporate users 37% / 63 % 
Ell 2002 - ratio of private to corporate users 35% / 65% (estimate).722 
718 Number of Addresses in '.ru' Zone Doubles, Interfax, 1 August, 2002. JRL #6382,2 August, 2002. 
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A gradual increase in media organisations making use of an Internet presence has been 
noticeable between 1995 - 2000. 
4!1 1995 - 300 online media outlets. 
ell 1997 - 800 online media outlets. 
€I 2000 - approximately 50 TV companies, 60 radio sites, 33 Internet news agencies and 
approximately 1200 newspapers had online editions.723 
A framework for regulating and developing commercial aspects of the Internet is currently 
under construction. In January 2002 the multibillion-dollar project for IT development in 
Russia, 'Electronic Russia' and a law on the electronic signatures (important for the signing of 
deals over the Internet) were passed.724 
Tseren Tserenov, the head of the Electronic Russia programme has estimated that the IT 
sector will eventually account for 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This figure is 
currently 0.61 % ofGDP. 725 The estimated value of the sale of goods and services through the 
Internet was expected to reach US$285 million.726 
Commercial presence on the Russian Internet appears, at this stage to be growing with more 
interest being shown by companies in developing a presence on the Internet (through 
WebPages and commercial transactions being concluded over the net). The poor regulation 
framework for overseeing this activity is in the process of being formed, which seems to 
indicate that the government sees that commercial activity via the Internet is assuming a 
greater importance. 
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4.2.5 Kavkaz.org and the Information War 
One of the Chechen's most notable successes in the Second Chechen War is the use of an 
Internet based information service. The site www.kavkaz.org is the brainchild ofMovladi 
Udugov. Possibly inspired by the Zapatista's use of the Internet in their struggle727 Kavkaz.org 
was launched in the summer of 1999, just prior to the information blackout that was imposed 
by the Russians.728 
In the course of the Second Chechen War, this Internet information linle to the outside world 
has assumed critical importance. Unlike the First Chechen War, the number of foreign 
journalists reporting from the Chechen side on this occasion is a mere fraction.729 This has 
meant that, combined with the Russian jamming of radio and TV broadcasts and the lack of 
'friendly' media, the Chechens primary method of getting their information to the outside 
world came via the Internet. 
When examining kavkaz.org, it soon becomes apparent that the website is not designed to 
cater for a domestic audience, i.e. Chechens. The website is designed to influence foreign 
audiences, this is evident in the languages that are used. Information appears in English, 
Russian and other languages, but not Chechen.730 
The website contains news, interviews with Chechen leaders, fighters and civilians and 
displays numerous photographs to back their claims. Pictures of casualties from both sides are 
shown, as are photos of Russian prisoners and military aircraft that have been shot down by 
the rebels. This has proved to be somewhat embarrassing for the Russian government who has 
on occasions been forced to admit the veracity of some ofthe rebel claims. One such incident 
occurred on 7 May, 2000, when the Russian government cast doubts on the Chechen rebels 
claims of shooting down a Russian SU-24 jet fighter-bomber. After pictures were published 
on the Chechen website, the Russian government was forced to admit that the claims were 
probably true.731 
727 The Zapatista' s have used the Internet to bring to the world's attention their guerrilla war against the Mexican 
government in the Chiapas region of Mexico from 1994. 
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Possibly in response to the Chechen website www.kavkaz.org, the Russian government has 
established the Russian Government Information Centre. This organisation has attempted to 
counter information that has been disseminated by kavkaz.org, information that would 
otherwise be inaccessible to the Russian public through conventional media.732 
However, kavkaz.org has not been without its problems. The Russian government has sought 
to shut down the site, succeeding in Autumn 1999 to have the server remove the site on the 
grounds that it contained "terrorist propaganda and hate material.,,733 This has forced 
kavkaz.org to move among several different servers, where it has been successfully attacked 
by Russian hackers on at least two separate occasions. 734 
Another threat to the site comes from within the rames of the Chechen rebel hierarchy. AsIan 
Maskhadov, the Chechen President has taken the site to issue in its use of evocative language. 
The site makes reference to the term jihad or 'holy war,' an act that is aimed at bringing about 
strict Islamic law to Chechnya. This has created an atmosphere of rumour, where associations 
with Osama Bin Ladin's terrorist network have been made. A situation that makes it easier to 
dismiss the rebels as extremists. 
Kavkaz.org was successful in helping to bring the Chechen issue to world attention by 
providing information from the war-zone. By creating awareness of various issues, such as 
abuse of human rights and through successful lobbying attempts, the Chechens were able to 
bring about words of criticism and condemnation of the Russian government's actions. 
Countries and organisations, such as the United States and the Council of Europe questioned 
and criticised Russia, thereby applying some external pressure. 
However, after the events of September 11, 2001, external criticism of Russian actions has 
been muted. Russia insisted on a lime between the Chechen separatists and Osama Bin 
Laden's organisation. A convergence in the interests and political goals of the Western world 
(as represented by the United States and her allies) and Russia has seen a virtual halt to 
www.hrea.org/listslhuridocs-tech/markup/msgOOS16.html, 14 August, 2002. 
732 Ekecrantz, l, "Introduction: Post-Communism and Global Culture" in Ekecrantz, l & Olofsson, K, Editors, 
op. cit., p, 24, 
733 Guzman, D., Chechnya: Rebels use Internet in Propaganda War With Russia, 30 May, 2000, 
www,hrea,org/listslhuridocs-techimarkup/msgOOS16,html, 14 August, 2002, 
734 Guzman, D" Chechnya: Rebels use Internet in Propaganda War With Russia, 30 May, 2000, 
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criticism of Russian conduct in the Second Chechen War. 
Maskhadov's representative in Washington, Lyoma Usmanov has made it clear that this 
situation plays into the Russians hands and has tried to put some distance between kavkaz.org 
and the Chechen administration: 
"Kavkaz.org and Udugov do not represent Chechen interests at all. The 
method ofkavkaz.org about any event in Chechnya is that they report it as a 
struggle between Islamic rebels, mujaheddin, and Russians maybe 
somehow, one can see, against Christians. We can not accept it.,>73S 
As the Russian government was able to block the transmissions of broadcast media from the 
Chechens, a new method of getting their message to the outside world was needed. The 
Internet has provided a cheap and easy way of getting their message to not only a Russian 
audience, but also the world as a whole. 
Kavkaz.org has been a very successful venture for the Chechens. It has not only enabled an 
alternative view (other than the official Russian government's stance) to be disseminated to a 
very large potential audience, but has forced the Russian government to admit to the existence 
of potentially damaging information, regarding their progress in the Second Chechen War. 
4.3 Interaction Between Media And Society 
A useful insight into the inner 'guiding' philosophy of media in society can be gained 
through examining the words of those who work in or with the industry. When these 
comments begin to alter over time, an appreciation of an 'evolving' media may be developed. 
In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, an unnamed deputy editor of Moskovskoe 
Novosti was quoted in 1993 as saying; 
"[ ... J press freedom in post-Soviet Russia has not meant giving full and 
objective information to the reader. Infected by the decay of communism it 
735 Guzman, D., Chechnya: Rebels use Internet in Propaganda War With Russia, 30 May, 2000. 
www.hrea.org/listslhmidocs-techlmarkup/msgOOS16.html, 14 August, 2002. 
250 
has turned into the freedom of abuse and insult; freedom to pursue private 
ideological wars; freedom to unleash any dirt on the page and on air - in a 
word, freedom to do anything without limits.,,736 
Some five years later, Russian academic Svetlana Kolesnik noted a change in the guiding 
principles of the Russian media (with an emphasis on broadcasting); 
"We can say that modem broadcasting is treated by the new political elite as 
ideological institutions where journalists are considered ideological workers 
in service to the state and / or private owners."737 
The crux of critical theory focuses on the idea that "the image of society we are offered is of 
a powerful combination of people (not always clearly specified) reinforcing their power and 
social systems which are reproducing forms of social inequality and in which the political, 
economic and cultural spheres are inextricably mixed."738 This seems to be the case in 
contemporary Russian society, specifically in the Russian political and business (oligarchs) 
elite. 
Power play among the oligarchs, which has spilt over into the media (which they have an 
interest in). After the outcome of the 1996 elections, attributed in part to a large-scale media 
campaign, the oligarchs came to view the media as an asset. An asset, not as a commercially 
viable enterprise, but as a tool to influence government decisions in their favour or to sabotage 
their rival's aspirations. The media has been caught in the middle ofthis mixture of political 
and business conflict. 
"[ ... ] the media mediates, which means they select and edit, dramatising 
some and repressing other events according to their own standards and rules. 
They stand between the public on one side and, on the other, the official 
managers of institutions, organisations, movements, or the society' 
hegemonic elites. Media develop their own machinery and rules for 
736 McNair, B., "Pornography, Pluralism and the Russian Press" in Price, M. E., Richter, A. & Yu, P. K., Editors, 
op. cit., pp. 152 - 154, p. 153. 
737 Kolesnik, S., "Controlling Content on Television in Russia" in Price, M. E., Richter, A. & Yu, P. K., Editors, 
op. cit., pp. 188 - 192, p. 190. 
738 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 18. 
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generating convincing accounts of social reality, and of what is worth 
featuring or reporting at all. To that extent and quite apart from their 
objectivity, media must generate accounts that differ in some measure (even 
if they do not expose or criticise) from accounts rendered by social 
managers. ,,739 
Some mediums of communication are more effective in transmitting the message or setting 
an agenda than other forms. Academic, Marshall McLuhan has observed three modes of 
information exchange in the modem world. 
" Oral 
@ Print 
OlD Electric. 740 
These three modes of communication can be broken down further, in to two mediums of 
transmission; 
" Hot Mediums - high on informational content and disallows consumer participation, e.g. 
print culture. 
" Cool Mediums - leaves more opportunity for the audience to participate. This form 
exhibits lower levels of information density, e.g. the Intemet,141 
Another factor that can be used to influence the audience, is the viewers' reliance on the 
media for information and therefore images and meaning of various people, countries or 
events. If the audience's experience is remote from the issue covered, they may be more 
susceptible in believing what is offered to them by the media. 
Two points to illustrate my case are from American examples, but clearly display the 
likelihood of the above-mentioned notion. The first example is drawn from the 1991 Gulf 
War. During this conflict, 55% of news stories originated from the United States and only 8% 
739 Elderidge, l, op. cit., pp. 19 - 20. 
740 Stevenson, N., op. cit., p. 102. 
741 Stevenson, N., op. cit., p. 103. 
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were generated in Baghdad. 742 
A similarly narrow source of information was broadcast to the American public, on news 
concerning the Soviet Union. On the newscasts of three (unnamed) major American networks 
between 1972 - 1981 1/6 ofintemational news stories was about the Soviet Union. However, 
only 3.8% ofthese reports originated from the Soviet Union.743 
During the Soviet era, the media was designed to be an advocate and to instil certain traits 
into society. They were not designed to be transmitters of neutrally loaded information. This 
way of thinking and acting was part of the mass media's core identity for nearly % of a 
century. Has this behaviour been carried through into the post-Soviet period? 
"The concept of media as advocate, rather than media as an unbiased 
purveyor of information to the public, has lingered well beyond the end of 
the Soviet regime.,,744 
In such an environment, leading personalities begin to emerge and playa disproportionately 
large role. "Both the Russian government and Russian television tend to be based more on 
individual personalities rather than institutions.,,745 The popularity of a leading TV personality 
may give them some measure of protection against being fired by a government initiated 
move. But ultimately, when a personality has outlived their use they will be dismissed 
quickly. The case ofDorenko's dismissal from ORThighlights this point amply. 
4.3.1 Media as the Protector of Public Interest 
From 1987 open talk about social problems in Soviet society began to appear in the media. 
Discussion on problems such as crime, drugs, prostitution and poverty, to name a few, became 
public issues. TV was an important part of the process, the origins of investigative reporting 
and mud raking were founded at this juncture.746 
742 Tumber, H., Media Power, Professionals and Policies, New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 298. 
743 Ibid. 
744 Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, 
L. L., Editor, op. cit., pp. 164 - 165. 
745 Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, 
L. L., Editor, op. cit., p. 165. 
746 Gill, G. & Markwick, R. D., op. cit., p. 48. 
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However, by uncovering some ofthe Soviet Union's darker secrets the media also managed 
to contaminate their own image in the eyes of the pUblic. Investigative reporting uncovered 
journalism's role in sustaining the Soviet hegemony. 
"As they moved toward investigative journalism, reporters exposed the 
reality that their own work had historically served the Communist Party."747 
Yassen Zassoursky's opinion as to the time when journalism's reputation was tainted differs 
from the above-mentioned date. In Media and the Public Interest: Balancing Between the 
State, Business and the Public Sphere Zassoursky mentions that the press became popular in 
the late 1980's until the early 1990's because of the critical and independent views expressed. 
And it was not until 1994 - 1995 that the public became dissatisfied and disappointed with the 
media. 748 
Public perception of the media as a protector of public interests is somewhat tainted. Since of 
the involvement of the oligarchs in the media industry, and subsequently involving them in 
their bitter information war, the public has become somewhat cynical. The same question is 
asked and re-asked over again, 'who benefits from this?' 
The public treats investigative journalism with suspicion. The public assumes journalists to 
be 'hired guns' sent on some kind of political agenda. Many' exposes' by the media are barely 
ac1mowledged by the public.749 
A poll conducted by the newspaper Finansovye Izvestiya on September 29, 1997 revealed the 
lack of trust in media coverage of scandals by the public. 
@ 31% of respondents thought that journalists were bought by financial groups and 
highlighted specific scandals. 
• 27% thought that journalists gave objective coverage during the media war over 
privatisation.750 
747 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 131. 
748 Zassoursky, Y. N., "Media and the Public Interest: Balancing Between State, Business and the Public Sphere" 
in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., pp. 157 - 158. 
749 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 339. 
750 Hagstrom, M., "Control Over the Media in Post-Soviet Russia" in Ekecrantz, J. & 0lofsson, K., Editors, 
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Editor in chief of the newspaper Sreda Alexei Pankin offers a more detailed explanation for 
the lack of media credibility. 
"Bribery, patronage and intimidation are still very common. The outright 
payment of cash, the promise of jobs to relatives, total blindness when it 
comes to the rise of monopolies, and financial and other pressure exerted on 
competitors are all traded by those in power for positive coverage in the 
mass media.,,751 
In another article, Pankin offers some insight into the lack of press credibility in Russia. His 
comments relate, in this case to governmental attitude toward the media, but this sentiment 
can be applied in a wider setting. He made these comments during a discussion with an 
unnamed media executive. 
"Of course the government has no respect for the press, [ ... ]. But we have 
only ourselves to blame. Most of the officials in the Putin administration 
who deal with the press have worked on election campaigns in some 
capacity, so they know the dark secrets of how the press works: how much 
editors charge for favourable articles; who's working for whom; how the 
press gets involved in smear campaigns. To these officials, the criticism that 
goes public is just the tip of the iceberg. To react publicly to what this shady 
machine chums out is not just difficult, it's pointless - especially when you 
were part of it. Controlling two state-owned television stations and buying 
off, bullying or ignoring the others is a perfectly normal way for the 
government to deal with a press that it holds in disdain."752 
Studies have shown, such as those conducted by Mickiewicz, that the Russian public is a 
sophisticated and educated audience. The rules of how society operates and functions are 
known very well in Russian society, as a necessity for survival (both in a physical and an 
economic sense). Pankin's comments highlight the relationship between media and the 
op. cit., p. 239. 
751 Ekecrantz, J., "Introduction: Post-Communism and Global Culture" in Ekecrantz, J. & Olofsson, K., Editors, 
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government, but it also demonstrates what appears to be an established and entrenched social 
system, which is well known. Such knowledge is not conducive to cultivating public 
confidence in the media. 
Perhaps another part of the credibility equation has been a move toward sensationalisation of 
news and events. Although this appears to be popular in terms of sales figures, it is also 
having other effects. Postgraduate student, Boleslav Lichterman wrote on the proliferation and 
popularity of chernoukha or programmes featuring disaster and suffering on Russian TV. One 
of the more popular programmes of this type was Dorozhnyi Patrul on TV-6, which featured 
such things as murders, car crashes, fires, suicides and domestic incidents. The producer of 
this show tried to justify its content by saying that the programme performed a public health 
function by informing people about the dangers of drinking and driving or drug use. Also 
claiming that the show was more effective in communicating the message than the handing 
out of government information leaflets. 753 In spite of the stated good intentions, the shows 
success in terms of ratings seems to be a more probable reason for its content. 
Pankin asked a collection of journalists from the Soviet era, what they thought of the 
standard of contemporary journalism in Russia. The responses came from his parents (who 
both worked as newspaper journalists), Inna Rudenko and Yelena Brushkova (both worked 
for Komsomolskaya Pravda). A collection of their responses is given below. 
"It seemed to us that nothing could be more terrible than the dictatorship of 
Communist Party Central Committee. However, it turned out that the 
dictatorships of proprietors, money and ratings are no better." 
"One gets the impression that the young journalists (of today) are prepared 
to write any old rubbish if their bosses so desire. We said 'no' (to our 
bosses) much more frequently." 
"Y oung journalists are not afraid to call themselves cynics and to look 
down on their readership and the subjects of their articles. In our day, it was 
considered poor form. For all our faults, we genuinely believed that 
753 Lichterman, B., TV: Valuable Voyeurism?, BMJ 2001; 322:871, 7 April, 2001. 
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journalists had a mISSIOn, that good people had to be defended and 
progressive undertakings, aimed at improving the quality of life, had to be 
supported. We wrote about ordinary people [ ... ] Nowadays, most papers are 
full of stories about the Moscow tusovka. And there is so much violence on 
TV that it really gets you down."754 
A problem in the post-Soviet media era, which has helped to destroy credibility of the mass 
media is the widespread practice of zakazukha. That is taking money for publishing articles. 
One of the reasons for these articles is to discredit the payer's adversary, the price of such 
stories varies and quotes have ranged from US$2500 - 8000. In February 2001 a PR firm, 
Promaco, exposed this side of the media to the public by presenting the sums charged, invoice 
numbers and photocopied clips from the newspapers that published an advertisement for a 
fake electronics store that was disguised as a news story.755 Former Finance Minister Boris 
Fyodorov seized upon the opportunity and attacked the press. Fyodorov released a pamphlet 
to the press in June 2001, which stated that the Russian media; 
"[ ... ] are always talking about freedom of speech and the press, about the 
imagined or real dangers posed by the State. Yet we never hear about a 
much greater danger posed by the corruption and prostitution of sections of 
our mass media. ,,756 
In spite of all the bad news and cynicism given here, the news is not all bad. Some 
investigative journalists seem to have recognised the problem and are trying to do something 
about rectifying the problem. Andrei Konstantinov, a former military interpreter and Middle 
East expert started the St. Petersburg news agency Azhur in the mid-1990's (ca. 1995-97). It 
was founded with a team of twelve investigative reporters, but has grown to approximately 50 
reporters. 757 
Azhur investigates many, often very controversial cases, such as the 1999 murder of the 
754 Pankin, A., Journalistic Fathers, Mothers and Sons, The Moscow Times, 14 January, 2003. 
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deputy Galina Starovoitova and the 2000 killing ofthe oppositionjoumalist Georgy 
Gongadze in Ulaaine. They run a website, www.fontanka.ru and publish a weekly Vash Tainy 
Sovyetnik. Konstantinov stated the method used to gain the best and most impartial method of 
the agency's reporting. "Freedom is a myth. Our objective is to obtain the fullest information 
possible from many different sources.,,758 
The agency tries to maintain a professional footing in terms of the not being tainted as hired 
guns in an information war. A slogan used by Azhur alludes to this attempt to put the 
perception of distance, to reinforce a strictly independent image. 
"One can hire us to investigate a case, but it is impossible to commission the 
findings in advance. Our clients may sometimes get totally different results 
from what they bargained fOr.,,759 
Alexei Simonov (head of Glasnost Defence Foundation) and Leonid Kesselman of the 
St. Petersburg Sociology Institute both agree on Azhur 's independent nature when compared 
to other media. But, Kesselman added, "however they still have to operate within the limits of 
what is allowed in our country.,,760 
4.4 Opinion Polls And Public Consultation In The Russian Federation 
The recent creation of polling agencies is a new means of an old tradition, of bottom up 
communication. New technology has called for a faster medium of communication between 
the state and society. During the medieval period, a bucket was placed in the window of the 
old Kremlin Palace. Petitioners would place their grievances in this bucket. 761 
In the early post-revolutionary period, a system of consultation was established with the 
public. There were several possible avenues of communication; 
II Council of People's Commissars, which received approximately 10, 000 letters a year. 
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lID Lenin's personal mailbag. 
lID Attendance before the Communist Party Central Committee.762 
With Lenin's death and Stalin's rise to power, by the 1930's a noticeable departure from 
consultation was evident. Instead, attention was paid to the mobilising of the masses to meet 
specific objectives. Opposition to the objectives was either marginalized or ignored.763 
After Stalin and his supporters were removed from power, communication from the public 
began to receive more attention. This occurred during Krushchev's 'thaw' period. S. White 
refers to this era as a period of "consultative authoritarianism.,,764 
Gorbachev attached a great deal of importance and attention to letters, which he received 
from the public. Occasionally, he went as far as to quote passages from some of the letters that 
he received.765 The policy of dealing with personal letters in such a manner indicates that 
Gorbachev may have felt that the general public was alienated from decision making by the 
Soviet Union's elite. If the general public felt alienated from 'their' country, it may be 
concluded that they have no interest in the future viability of the state. When the impression is 
given, that the public is actively helping to sustain or build a state, the public feels as though 
they have a special interest or stake in the continued existence ofthe country. 
Early correspondence received was generally supportive of the liberalisation and a more 
market oriented economy. But, as the fruits of these reforms failed to materialise for the 
average citizen correspondence became more angry, disillusioned and anti-state.766 There 
seems to have been a link in the minds of the public, between Westernism and wealth. When a 
large proportion of the popUlation failed to benefit from the expected wealth, the response was 
a lack of faith in the system and the associated emotions (anger and disillusionment for 
example). This brought about a chain of events, which lead to the collapse of the communist 
hegemony. 
The value attached to letters and bottom up consultation did not die with communism. The 
761 Gelman, V., "The Iceberg of Russian Political Finance" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., pp. 179 - 194, p. 194. 
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765 White, S., op. cit., p. 195. 
259 
President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, received up to 1500 letters per day. These 
letters addressed a broad range of issues, such as personal questions, politics and public 
policy. A Department of Letters and the Reception of Citizens, with a staff of 100 was 
established in the Presidential Administration, to deal with the correspondence. A remarkable 
350,000 letters arrived annually, with some 25, 000 replies. 767 
Each week an analytic overview with briefings on specific topics was conducted. The 
findings of these briefings were regularly reported to Yeltsin. 768 Although Yeltsin has 
seemingly attached a great deal of importance in keeping the channels of communication open 
with the public, possibly more so than during the years of perestroika, it is not surprising. 
Yeltsin had built up his image as a 'man of the people.' He seemed to take some measure of 
pride in being able to relate to the common man. To ignore the man in the street would be to 
ignore his support base, politically suicidal for a shrewd politician such as Yeltsin. 
One of the bureaucratic avenues for citizens to communicate with President Putin is through 
correspondence with the Office for Citizens' Appeals. The office is manned by 25 staff and is 
headed by Mikhail Mironov. A department operating in the capacity of the Office for 
Citizens' Appeals, began organised work on petitions to the Tsar for the first time in 1497. 
The current department in its current form was founded in 1997.769 
In the year 2001, Putin received 565, 000 letters through the office, which equates to 
approximately twice the average annual volume received by Yeltsin. Peaks periods of 
correspondence occur during special events, such as the December 2001 televised national 
call-in show. Some 492,000 e-mail and phone messages were received in the week prior to 
the show. 770 Mironov rated the letters as serving "as a very reliable barometer of sentiments in 
society," which was "more exact as any public poll."771 
Approximately 70% of the letters are complaints about social rights such as housing and 
766 White, S., op. cit., pp. 197 - 198. 
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pensions, less than 10% of the letters have policy proposals. The Office of Citizens' Appeals 
often fOlwards the letters to lower-level agencies that are responsible for the concerns raised 
in the letter. They also prepare briefing material for Putin, before he embarks upon a tour in 
Russia. A weekly two-page summary is made ofthe letters received in the previous week by 
Mironov, every Saturday and delivered to Putin and his key aides. 772 
In October 2002 ITAR-TASSwrote on the work of Mironov and his department. Mironov 
was quoted as saying that an average of 1500 letters arrive at his department daily. During the 
celebrations around Putin's 50th birthday, some 111,000 letters arrived in one week. Statistics 
were given on the nature and amount ofletters received from foreign sources too. 122,000 
'foreign' letters arrived from January - September 2002.72,000 of these were concerning 
ecological issues and 33, 000 human rights. 773 
Lyudmila Putina also receives some correspondence, but only a fraction ofthat received by 
President Putin, averaging at some 100 letters per month. Mironov stated that the nature of 
correspondence to Putina related to mainly to charity, requests to visit an event, personal 
invitations to weddings or name-days.774 It seems as though much of the correspondence 
received by Putina is closely aligned to the public image that has been generated for her by the 
political image-makers ( and is discussed in detail in chapter 2.1.1 of this thesis). 
Another article was published by ITAR -TASS December 2002 gave an account of the issues 
raised by those who wrote to Putin. With reference to the issues of letters received in third 
week of December 2002 (two months after the hostage crisis at the Dubrovka Theatre), the 
news agency split the origin of the writers between Russians and foreigners. ITAR-TASS noted 
that 10,350 letters were received during the stated period, of which 11311etters occupied 
social issues. Some of the issues raised included cost of living and services, wages and 
crime.775 In regard to the correspondence received from foreign sources, there was a brief and 
glowing note. 
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"Most letters in foreign mail denounce the stand of some Western quarters 
on the 'Zakayev case.' For instance Chairman of the Access to Justice 
organisation P. Patton of Britain claimed that the envoy of Chechen 
terrorists, looking for refuge in Britain, should be extradited to Russia. This 
military criminal should be expelled, as the tasks of the international 
coalition in struggle against global terrorism demand, he emphasized.,,776 
Mironov claimed that the Russian department was loosely based on its U. S. counterpart, 
which gets some 18, 000 letters addressed to the American President daily. He went as far as 
to claim that the problems of the Russian and U. S. Presidents were similar. "There is no 
great difference in the work of our services, simply everything is technologically streamlined 
in the U. S .. ,,777 
The measure of 'public opinion' through the use of opinion polls can create something that 
may not necessarily exist. A form of illusion created by pollsters. Just the notion of public 
opinion in itself is a very ambiguous, volatile term and idea. There is very little agreement on 
the exact meaning. 778 
'Public opinion' can be influenced and manipulated by the government and media. For 
example, in the West during the Cold War the Soviet Union was seen as the aggressor with 
expansionist plans. NATO was portrayed as the saviour of the West. 779 In this instance a 
continuous and uniform message was delivered to the public. The message needs to be 
disseminated in this form if it is to be effective in influencing the target audience. 
Societies normally are pluralistic in nature. Therefore, public opinion in a society should be a 
heterogeneous phenomenon. However, the results of an opinion poll appear to be held as 
evidence of homogeneity. 
"Claims about opinion as well as the publicising of poll results assert or 
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imply that an 'opinion' is a clear, unambiguous belief.,,780 
By creating the appearance of public consensus, through the use of opinion poll results 
action can be taken by a country's elite. The elite can use the excuse of public opinion to 
justify their actions. 781 This gives the outward appearance of government through direct 
involvement of public input. 
The use of opinion polls in Russia has been a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1983 the 
CPSU was committed to the establishment of a national public opinion centre. Two main 
objectives drove the decision; to gauge public mood and sentiment and to create bottom up 
communication.782 
For whichever reasons, it was not until 1987 that the first national public opinion centre 
opened its doors. This centre (called VTsIOM) was primarily tasked with the identifying the 
public attitude toward "social and economic issues.,,783 
The goals and tasks of this polling centre would seem to indicate an initiative on the part of 
the political elite that Soviet society was in need of rejuvenation. Theoretically, according to 
socialist doctrine bottom up communication was the norm rather than the exception. But, by 
stating their expected outputs in the creation of public opinion centres there is an admission 
that this is not the case. Additionally, the Soviet Union's political elite seem to have had lost 
touch with the average citizen. Because there would be no need to gauge public opinion, they 
would already know the public's sentiment. 
Another centre Vox Populi was opened in 1989 and Boris Grushin was the director. This 
centre intended to specialise in work with the political elite. Results of their research were 
published in the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta and in an 'in-house' monthly bulletin. 784 
Russian Public Opinion and Market Research (ROMIR) is another well established polling 
organisation in contemporary Russia. 
780 Edelman, M., op. cit., p. 55. 
781 Ibid. 
782 White, S., op. cit., p. 185. 
783 Ibid. 
784 White, S., op. cit., p. 186. 
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In order to stimulate debate in society, Gorbachev manufactured debate in the media. 
Opinion polls proved to be an effective means of generating this outcome. Although the 
significance in terms of scientific significance of each poll was minimal, the appearance of the 
poll may have had some measure of influence on society through an effect, such as agenda 
setting. 
"These new Novosti opinion polls manipulated public opinion to 
demonstrate dissent, defining public attitudes that opposed the doctrines of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism; in other words, dissent was manufactured.,,785 
Opinion polls were used by the Gorbachev regime as a means to mobilise public support for 
the intended reforms. From this perspective, opinion polls were an extension of the traditional 
mass media, performing a similar function as laid down in Lenin's original doctrine (for the 
role ofthe mass media in society). 
"Collective agitation and propaganda remained central to the media's 
purpose, only the policies advocated had changed.,,786 
Jumping from the Soviet period to concentrate on the recent phenomenon of opinion polls 
and their use in the Putin period is necessary due to the sheer volume of poll material and 
information available. This is not to say that Yeltsin did not consider polls to be useful, just 
that time and space does not permit an adequate discussion of it. I have also narrowed the 
focus of the study of some given polls on attitudes toward Putin and attitudes toward the 
government. The period that will be briefly examined runs from 2001 - 2003. 
Many polls have been conducted during Putin's presidency, to measure his popularity, image 
and the public's attitude toward the government to name but a few of the topics tested. 
Numerous polls have been conducted, marking certain milestones in Putin's presidency, such 
as annual anniversaries of time spent in office. Periodically stories surface in the media, 
regarding polls that imply or state that Putin is seen as one of the people. No worse and no 
785 Turpin, l, op. cit., p. 126. 
786 Ibid. 
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better.787 This fits well with his projected image of being an understanding and compassionate 
leader who is in touch with his people. 
A poll conducted by ROMIR on the first anniversary of Put in taking office was conducted in 
March 2001. The poll displayed some interesting statistical hints. According to the poll 56.4% 
of respondents stated that they would vote for Putin, if elections were held on the nearest 
Sunday. Also revealed, from the poll's statistical breakdown was the origin of Put in's support 
from this sample. It showed that his strongest supporters were drawn from young (18-29 
years), old (aged over 60) and those on a low income (US$48 - 160 per month).788 
Another poll, of 1500 urban and rural respondents was conducted on 31 March, 2001 by the 
Public Opinion Foundation on a nationwide basis. Results from this poll showed that the 
majority of the respondents considered that there were more achievements than setbacks 
during Putin's first year in office. The results were 60% thought that there were more 
achievements and 14% thought that there were more setbacks.789 
Further approval rating polls were carried out in Apri12001, linked with analysing Putin's 
first anniversary in office. The Public Opinion Foundation (F01vf) conducted a poll in April 
2001, on the President's electoral rating. During the first year of office, Putin's electoral rating 
polls did not slip below 40% and his approval rating stood at approximately 45 - 46%. This 
particular poll rated Putin's electoral rating at 42% and his approval rating at 37%.790 
VTsIOM also undertook a poll on Apri120 - 23,2001, which looked at several different 
aspects of public sentiment toward Putin. Some 70% of those polled approved of the job Putin 
was doing and 24% disapproved. In March 2001 Putin had polled at a 75% approval of his 
performance in office. The February 2001 approval rating was 69%. Those who named Putin 
as the most trusted politician also experienced a drop during this period, from 47 - 39%.791 
787 RTR, "No Different From Us" - Russian Political Scientists Say About Pltfin, BBe Monitoring, 26 March, 
2001. JRL #5171,27 March, 2001. 
788 Putin Still Popular in Russia - Poll, ITAR-TASS, 19 March, 2001. JRL #5160,20 March, 2001. 
789 60% of Russians View Putin 's First Year of Presidency as Successful, www.strana.ru. 5 April, 2001. 
www.cdi.org/russia/148.html. 9 April, 2001. 
790 Grigoryeva, Y., Constant Action Needed to Keep Presidential Ratings High, Izvestia, 24 April, 2001. 
JRL #5221, 25 April, 2001. 
791 McHugh, D., Poll Shows Putin 's Popularity has Slipped a Bit, remains Sky High, AP, 25 April, 2001. 
JRL #5223,26 April, 2001. 
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The head of VTsIOM, Yuri Levada offered an explanation for the drop. 
"[ ... ] the March figures were slightly pushed up by the March 26 
anniversary of Putin's election, which got several days of prominent press 
coverage including newspaper articles reviewing Putin's record.,,792 
In late April 2001 ROMIR polled 2000 Russians as to who they thought Putin most closely 
resembled. 
@I 37.5% of respondents said Putin is unique and does not resemble any of his 
predecessors. 
@I 18% said Yuri Andropov. 
• 15.8% found it difficult to state their opinion. 
• 6.8% stated Boris Yeltsin. 
Ell 4.9% thought Peter the Great. 
1& 3.7% said Mikhail Gorbachev. 
• Vladimir Lenin 3%. 
1& Former U. S. President Bill Clinton 2.4%. 
• Nilcita Khrushchev 2%. 
• Former French President Charles de Gaulle 1.9%. 
• Joseph Stalin 1.5%. 
• Leonid Brezhnev 0.8%. 
• Mahatma Gandhi 0.5%.793 
The issue of trust in politicians was brought up again in October 2001 by VTsIOM. A 
representative poll of 1600 Russians was carried out on the end of September 2001 and again 
on 30 October, 2001. Putin's rating increased from 73% in September to 75% in October. And 
when asked to name six political figures that the respondents trusted most, 42% named Putin 
in September and 47% in October. The number of respondents who did not trust any Russian 
792 McHugh, D., Poll Shows Putin 's Popularity has Slipped a Bit, remains Sky High, AP, 25 April, 2001. 
JRL #5223,26 April, 2001. 
793 Poll Shows Over One-Third of Russians Think Putin Unique and not Like any Other Historical Figure, 
Interfax, 15 May, 2001. JRL #5258, 17 May, 2001. 
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political figure dropped from 22% in September to 19% in October.794 
VTsIOM conducted a poll in December 2001. This poll displayed Putin's continued high 
approval rating, at 73%. 19% ofthose questioned did not approve of Put in's activities. 
Additionally, Putin received 49% of those questioned named Putin as Russia's most trusted 
politician.795 
On the 16th of March, 2002 FOM organised a poll of 1500 Russians from 100 localities in 44 
of the 89 Federation constituent members. 59% of the respondents claimed that they trusted 
the President, 61 % believe that Putin has made many breakthroughs in his term in office and 
13% believe the opposite.796 The poll was held in the run-up to the second anniversary of 
Putin taking office. 
Inter/ax carried the story of the same poll about three weeks after RIA Novosti. The story ran 
by Inter/ax was a lot more statistically detailed than that of the government's news agency. 
Overall, the poll displayed a slight drop in the indexes that measured Putin's popularity. 50% 
of respondents stated that they would vote for Putin, should an election be held next Sunday. 
This represented a 3% point drop from the January 2002 poll. 36% said that they were 
satisfied with Putin's work (41 % in January 2002),35% gave Putin 'good' marks (39% in 
January 2002) and 8% gave him 'excellent' marks (no change from January 2002).797 
A poll that was undertaken by VTsIOM over the period 21 - 27 August, 2002 of 1600 
Russians showed an improvement of Put in's performance at the polls. Putin's approval rating 
saw an improvement, from 73% in July 2002 to 76% in August 2002.20% of respondents in 
July 2002 said that they disapproved of his performance, this figure did not change in August 
2002. Although a small drop was recorded, Putin still remained the most trusted politician in 
Russia according to the poll, which rated him at 50% in July 2002 and 47% in August 2002. 
But, a significant 20% said that they did not trust any Russian politician.798 
794 Russians Put Their Faith in Putin and Emergencies Minister - Poll, Interfax, 31 October, 2001. 
JRL #5519,1 November, 2001. 
795 Putin Backed by 73% of Russians - Agency, Reuters, 26 December, 2001. JRL #5617,27 December, 2001. 
796 Two Years on Tuesday Since Vladimir Putin 's Election as Russian President, RIA Novosti, 26 March, 2002. 
JRL #6157,26 March, 2002. 
797 Half of Russians Would Vote for Putin in Hypothetical Election, Interfax, 18 April, 2002. 
JRL #6196, 19 April, 2002. 
798 Russian Poll Shows Putin 's Popularity Rise, Government's Fall, Interfax, 28 August, 2002. 
JRL #6411,29 August, 2002. 
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The August 2002 poll conducted by VTsIOMbore bad news for the government though. In 
July 200236% of respondents approved of the government's performance, which slipped to a 
35% approval rating in August 2002. However, those who disapproved of the government's 
performance remained the majority. 48% of the July 2002 respondents disapproved of the 
government's performance and this figure climbed to 54% in August 2002. 799 
A FOM poll occurred on September 28,2002, which sampled 1500 village and town 
residents. 47% of the respondents said that they would vote for Putin, should an election be 
held next Sunday. 44% rated Putin's activities as 'good' and 'excellent', 10% rated his 
activities as 'bad' and 'very bad'. Although some did not approve of Putin's activities, this 
was not reflected in the statistics relating to the question as to whether they liked him or not. 
67% said that they liked Putin and 6% said that they did not like him.80o 
VTsIOM undertook a representative express poll of 1600 Russian citizens from 25 - 28 
October, 2002. In an lnterfax article the results of the September and October 2002 polls were 
compared. In September and October 2002, the approval ratings of Put in remained steady at 
77% were in favour and 19% disapproved of his activities. A slight drop was recorded in the 
most trusted politician segment though. 53% named Putin as the most trusted politician in 
Russia in September and 49% in October 2002. In September 17% of respondents trusted no 
politician and in October 2002 the figure was 18%801 
Matters improved slightly for the government's standing at the polls. In September 39% 
praised the government's work and this figure increased to 45% approval in October 2002. A 
large level of dissatisfaction remained though. 51 % of respondents criticised the government's 
efforts in September, but this dropped to 46% in the October 2002 po11.802 
A poll was conducted by VTsIOM one month after the hostage crisis in Moscow, of a 
representative sample of 1600 people on the 22 - 25 November, 2002. Putin's approval rating 
soared to 83% from the 77% that it had been sitting on in September and October 2002. Those 
who disapproved of Put in's performance fell from an average of20% to an all-time low of 
799 Russian Poll Shows Putin 's Popularity Rise, Government's Fall, Interfax, 28 August, 2002. 
JRL #6411, 29 August, 2002. 
800 Honesty and Decency are Putin 's Main Positive Qualities - Poll, Interfax, 3 October, 2002. 
JRL #6471, 4 October, 2002. 
801 Putin 's Rating Remains High - Poll, Interfax, 30 October, 2002. www.interfax.lU , 30 October, 2002. 
268 
15% in the November 2002 poll.803 
The Director of VTsIOMYuri Levada tied the jump in Putin's approval rating to the hostage 
crisis at the Dubrovka Theatre (23-26 October, 2002) in Moscow. 
"Leaders' approval ratings typically increase when a country feels itself in 
danger or under attack, as U. S. President George Bush experienced after the 
attacks of September 11,2001."804 
A wave of polls were conducted in March 2003, marking the third anniversary of Put in's 
presidency. In late March 2003 Agency for Regional Political Research (ARPI) poll showed 
that the majority of respondents were reasonably satisfied with Putin. 82% of voters who had 
voted for Putin three years earlier said that they felt they made the right choice. Only 6% 
expressed any regret for voting for Putin.805 
Interfax ran a story on a VTsIOM poll (of 1600 people). Putin gained slightly in the March 
poll over the results in February 2003 in the most trusted politician part of the poll. In 
February 49% named Putin as the most trusted politician and this increased to 51 % in March 
2003. Approximately 19% of respondents did not trust any Russian politician. Satisfaction 
with Putin's performance remained steady over February to March 2003.75% were positive 
about Putin's performance and 21 % were negative.806 
Confidence and satisfaction with the government's performance remained relatively stable, 
at a low level, according to the VTsIOM poll. 35% of respondents were positive about the 
government's performance in February and 36% were positive in March 2003. Disapproval 
was relatively steady too. 58% were negative toward the government's performance in 
February, which decreased slightly to 56% in March 2003.807 
802 Putin 's Rating Remains High - Poll, Interfax, 30 October, 2002. www.interfax.ru , 30 October, 2002. 
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In furthering the aim of projecting the image of a caring leader that is in touch with his 
people, a new phenomenon has begun in Russian politics - the live call-in TV show. Callers 
are given a platform where they can pose a question to President Putin, which gives the 
impression that Putin understands and listens to everyone. These shows are hosted once a year 
on the main state TV networks in a reasonably 'controlled' environment (RTR and TV 1). This 
format also seems to be a very popular medium for the public to communicate with their 
President. Announcements made of an upcoming phone-in can generate a massive and rapid 
response from the public. 
Journalist Andrei Zolotov Jr. of the Moscow Times put the PR value of this call-in format in 
a frank and concise manner. 
"By linking the President directly with ordinary Russians - seemingly over 
the heads of bureaucrats or journalists - the call-in show that premiered last 
December is proving to be an effective public relations tool for the Kremlin, 
which knows well that Putin's political base is first and foremost with the 
people and not the elite. "SOB 
On December 19,2001 the Kremlin's Press Office announced such a call-in scheduled for 
December 24, 2001 and the President was to be live on RTR and TV 1. That very day, 
switchboard operators took l3, 946 calls. The next day, a further 74,083 calls were placed. B09 
The volume of calls would seem to indicate the public's willingness to be actively engaged in 
the political process. 
The next call-in was scheduled for 2002, but its scope was broadened due to the popularity 
of the first call-in in 200l. As in 2001, the date for the call-in was set for 19 December, 200l. 
However, the live broadcasts were carried by the radio stations Mayak and Russia's Radio in 
addition to RTR and TV 1.B1O One of the 59 workers who were fielding the calls, Natalya 
Lyubimova claimed that the call centre for the event had taken some one million calls 
between the 14th - 18th December, 2002. This had more than doubled the number of calls 
808 Zolotov, A., Preparing/or Putin's Call-in TV Show, The Moscow Times, 19 December, 2002. 
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received in 2001 (442,689 calls) and there were still some time to run before Putin went live. 
This excluded any correspondence received bye-mail. A special website was opened for this 
occasion, www.linia2002.ru. s11 By the end of the televised call-in, some 1.4 million calls had 
been received. S12 
As in the previous year, a proportion of calls related to socio-economic issues, approximately 
30% during this round of calls. Lyubimova also estimated that as much as 90% of the 
telephone calls originated from pensioners. S13 She took a guess as to some possible reasons 
why this was so. 
"Working people don't call too much. [ ... J Why? Maybe because their life 
is better, maybe because they have no time, or maybe because they have less 
faith. Maybe they understand better what is going on."SI4 
If Lyubimova is correct in her assumptions this could pose a problem in the future, ifnot for 
Putin, then his successors. Assuming generation of pensioners, who grew up in the Soviet 
period and still have faith in the 'goodness' of their leader die out and are replaced by cynics 
who have no faith in the political leadership, at least two major consequences will be felt. 
Firstly, that the popularity and hence the effectiveness of the call-in TV show in generating 
positive PR for the President will be broken. The second possible consequence will be a 
greater level of public disengagement from political participation. 
4.5 Development Of Media As A Tool Of Opinion Manipulation 
The founder of modem PR Eduard Bernays emphasised what was at stake with regard to 
success or failure of manipulating the pUblic. "[ ... J the future of civilisation lay in the capacity 
ofthe elites to guide public opinion efficiently;"SIS It may be an overstatement, about the 
future of civilisation being in jeopardy. What is clear, an ideology will find that its governance 
JRL #6606, 18 December, 2002. 
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over a society will be more problematic, maybe even impossible if it is not able to manipulate 
public opinion. 
Even as early as the 1890's, German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies noted the potential 
power of the newspaper. 
"[ ... J the newspaper had become an unprecedented machinery for the 
manufacture and marketing of public opinion, a channel through which a 
particular faction could present its own will as the rational general wil1.,,816 
Media are one of the sources available in society, which help to generate culture within 
individuals and within society. For this reason, the media is considered to be an important 
prize, by those who wish to influence the way we think. The media is not the sole means of 
cultural production. 
"Institutions such as schools, religion, and the media help the powerful 
exercise this cultural leadership, since they are the sites, where we produce 
and reproduce ways of thinking about society."817 
The above quote is useful in helping to realise that, through the use or manipulation of these 
agencies, an actor may be able gain hegemony through the use of consent. Schools, churches 
and the media help to identify and understand who and what we are. These agencies help to 
create meaning and instil a sense of self within society. They are also forms of mass cultural 
production, which could potentially be used very effectively by an individual wanting an 
effective conduit of influence. 
American scholar of propaganda, Harold Lasswell, urged the need to co-ordinate a 
propaganda campaign to ensure the 'best' results. By this he meant that media are not a 'stand 
alone' tool of propaganda. "[ ... J the high importance of co-ordinating propaganda with all 
other means of social control cannot be too insistently repeated."818 
816 Ewen, S., op. cit., p. 70. 
817 Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., op. cit., p. 164. 
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Although the media may not be able to directly influence how we think about certain topics, 
they may be able to influence what we think and talk about. Some topics of discussion are 
highlighted and others are marginalized or neglected from public debate. In other words, the 
media has the ability to fulfil the function of an agenda setter. 819 
A major problem or obstacle faced by the sender of the message is the concept of polysemy. 
That is, multiple meanings may be present in the media's text. 820 Active media audiences 
interpret the meaning of text in three levels; 
lID Individual interpretation of media products. 
lID Collective interpretation of the media. 
e Collective political action. 821 
Individual and collective experience helps to shape the decoding of media text. The meaning 
of the text is derived from "widely shared cultural values and sets of assumptions about the 
way the world works.,,822 What the media provides though, is only the basic framework onto 
which we add meaning. Additionally, meaning is not a static element over time or space. 
"If media messages circulate verSIOns of a 'dominant' ideology, these 
messages are only the raw materials of meaning, they require construction 
and are subject to revision."823 
In writing on agenda setting by America's elite, Noam Chomsky (1989) noted a somewhat 
insightful observation; 
"[ ... J The media do contest and raise questions about government policy, but 
they do so almost exclusively within the framework determined by the 
essentially shared interests of the state-corporate power. Divisions among 
elites are reflected in debate but departure from their narrow consensus is 
819 For more detail on the nature of agenda setting in the media, please refer to; Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., 
Media / Society: Industries, Images and Audiences, Second Edition, Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge Press, 2000, 
pp. 239 - 241. 
820 Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., op. cit., pp. 266 - 268. 
821 Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., op. cit., p. 263. 
822 Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., op. cit., p. 269. 
823 Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., op. cit., p. 284. 
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rare. ,,824 
The above mentioned statement is further supported by another passage on the role of shared 
interests in generating consensus in the media. 
"When a particular version serves our interests, we are likely to define 
reality in terms of that version. [ ... J The versions that are motivated by self-
interest, moreover, are constantly reinforced as others are not: by the 
continuing need to justify one's own situation and actions and also by 
reinforcement from others whose self-interest is served by the same 
version. ,,825 
Although, as stated, Chomsky's supposition refers to social processes at work in the United 
States, It seems that there is some applicability to the Russian situation. Most media 
enterprises in the Russian Federation are under financial control or depend on financial help 
from governmental or large corporate groups. These economic-political interests have made it 
clear that certain topics are taboo and are best left 'undiscovered' by the media. The 1996 
elections are a clear case in point, indicating a convergence of state and big business interests. 
The recent breakdown of relations between elements of the oligarchy and the Kremlin may be 
an indication of a degradation of some of these shared interests. 
In 1999 a poll was conducted by VTsIOM to gauge the level of trust that the public place in 
the media. Of the respondents that answered, 53% of them had a 'fair degree of trust' in radio 
and 55% of respondents had a 'fair degree of trust' in television.826 This poll shows that, if 
properly 'managed media assets still retain a high potential to influence or manipulate public 
opinion. Interest still exists in business and governmental circles to tap into this potential. 
TV is considered to be one of the most powerful mediums with which to transmit a message 
to an audience. One reason for this is uniformity, the message is not altered or changed in any 
manner from the original product. The message can also be delivered instantly to many 
different reception sites at once. By the end of 1995 TV was available to 98.8% of Russian 
824 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 28. 
825 Edelman, M., op. cit., p. 6. 
826 Dunlop, J. B., "Sifting Through the Rubble of the Yeltsin Years" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 68. 
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households. 827 Such a large potential audience reach makes TV a very valuable asset to those 
who seek to gain influence. 
4.6 Soviet Media 
Karl Marx proposed the idea that political power was closely tied to the ownership and 
control of '''the production and distribution of ideas' - the media of mass communication."828 
As the Bolsheviks assumed power in Russia, Lenin, well aware of Marx's contention, was 
equally aware of the media's potential. Lenin' view of the hierarchy of power influenced the 
role which the media were to play in political affairs. The Party (CPSU) was considered to be 
"the legitimate representative of the proletarian class interests, should closely control and 
supervise the work ofthe media." Furthermore, the press was the "collective organiser, 
agitator and propagandist of the Party."829 
Statistics dating from the 1970's and the 1980's showed that the Soviet Union was the 
world's largest exporter of broadcast information. Every week the broadcast schedule 
included 2010 hours of programmes in some 80 different languages.83o Such a large and 
diverse industry helped to shape opinions about the Soviet Union, especially Central and 
Eastern Europe, where many of these programmes were destined to go. 
University of Edinburgh academic Dr. Lara Ryazanova-Clarke made a statement that 
supports the above claim, as to the Soviet media's function in society. "In the Soviet period 
the media was given the honourable role of, and proudly served as, a major conduit of 
ideological propaganda. ,,831 
A Russian author characterised the nature and objectives of the Soviet media in 1986. 
"[ ... ] this monotony of ritualistic slogans [ ... ] [ and ] their continuous 
repetition [ ... J [ signal] to all that the [ ... J system remains intact, and that the 
827 Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, 
L. L., Editor, op. cit., p. 147. 
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83! Ryazonova-Clarke, L., The Dichotomy of the Totalitarian and the Post-totalitarian in the Language of 
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authorities will act to block those who seek to change the system. [ ... J sheer 
repetition, Soviet ideology has managed to persuade many citizens that the 
Soviet system of economic planning is more efficient than the capitalist 
market economics, that the 'national question' has been solved in the USSR 
but remains perplexing in Western societies, that a one-party system is the 
most effective way of meeting the needs of the population, and that political 
pluralism would be counter-productive.,,832 
Under the hierarchy of the Soviet system, the media was subordinate to the state and was 
obliged to facilitate the state's wishes. This is a crucial assumption, which enables a reader to 
understand why Soviet journalists behaved as they did. The media's role in society was 
clearly defined by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, they were to be a motivation of the people's 
will and efforts in order to create a better socialist state. 
According to American academic Seymour Goodman the Soviet Style Information Society 
was based upon goals rather than trends. Goodman listed the perceived goals of the Soviet 
Union. 
@ Attain real gains in productivity and to modernise the industrial base. 
@ Improve economic planning and control mechanisms. 
• Support both military and internal security needs. 
• Present an image of a progressive society, both to the people of the USSR and to the 
outside world. 833 
Official Soviet doctrine was rigid and stressed top down communication. The masses were 
considered to be the target of the messages and readily manipulated by the official 
communications. "In Soviet times, official theory dictated that the public was a target, not the 
co-creator of media messages and was considered to be malleable.,,834 
Mickiewicz contends that the Soviet media employed a strategy involving 'saturation' to get 
their message to the public. This strategy was intended to achieve total penetration of the 
2000, Volume 25, pp. 187 - 211, p. 187. 
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potential audience. Total penetration of the intended audience was to be delivered via an 
approved message pattern and content to thoroughly infuse the output of the media, sending a 
single Party line and eliminating the possibility of counter-messages. 835 
An important point to note at this conjuncture is the role of interpretation and informal 
communication in Soviet society. The practice of the use of rum our was widespread. Downing 
states that the "role of rumour as a mode of communication operating at all levels of Soviet 
Bloc life.,,836 This method may have been used to fill in information missed by information 
conveyed via the official media channels. 
Culture and the Media in the USSR Today expand on the above notion further. The book 
states, that prior to perestroika, people consumed media product to find out the official view 
or to detect changes in the official view. The media was not used to find out what had 
happened. 837 
Mickiewicz has noted this phenomenon and has coined the phrase' Soviet-era' heuristics to 
describe it. The process involves the use of mental shortcuts when watching the news, with a 
reliance on emotion and reason. She adds that "[ ... J Russian viewers exhibit an extraordinary 
degree of media literacy and active engagement with news messages.,,838 
'Soviet-era' heuristics consists of three elements that are founded on scepticism. News 
content is 'sifted' for hints of threats and opportunities. 
GD Suspicion of broadly generalised good news. 
• Attention to sources of news as potential beneficiaries. 
• Evaluations of internal inconsistencies in news. 839 
Noticeable changes in the nature of how the Soviet media was used began before Gorbachev, 
834 Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., Editors, op. cit., p. 87. 
835 Rantanen, T., op. cit., p. 23. 
836 Downing, 1., op. cit., p. 119. 
837 Graffy, J. & Hosking, G. A., Editors, Culture and the Media in the USSR Today, London, MacMillan Press, 
1989, p. 26. 
838 Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., Editors, op. cit., p. 103. 
839 (1) Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., Editors, op. cit., pp. 115 - 116. 
(2) Mickiewicz, E. P., Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle/or Power in Russia, Durham, Duke 
University Press, 1999, p. 289. 
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with his predecessor and sponsor Andropov. He began campaigns against social undesirables, 
such as theft, corruption, alcoholism and black marketeering. "[ ... J while censorship was 
firmly maintained, a movement towards constructive social criticism was favoured.,,840 
I intend to examine the later years ofthe Soviet regime only and the media's role in the 
period of glasnost and perestroika. The identity and the role of the media was thrown into a 
chaotic state, which culminated in the division of the Soviet media by the time of the August 
1991 coup. Media organisations either joined or sided with the 'Reformers' or the 
'Conservatives,' it was difficult not to take sides at such crossroads. At the time, it may have 
seemed to be a choice between democracy or a return to the authoritarian past. 
A noticeable downturn in the Soviet standard ofliving began to develop in the 1980's. 
Shortages of foodstuffs and materials, degradation of social services, a rising crime rate and 
the infamous queues began to appear. These events had a profound impact upon the public 
perception of the Communist Party's credibility. 
Some movement toward what was to be later called glasnost occurred during the Brezhnev, 
Andropov and Chernenko regimes. Movement was slow and the nature of the reforms 
chopped and changed with the steady flow of leaders. The pace of change became more 
focused and noticeable under Gorbachev's guidance from 1985.841 
It is important to note that these changes came from within the existing power structure. The 
kingmaker of Soviet politics was the KGB. They saw the urgency to rejuvenate the economy, 
more so than the Party, government bureaucracy or the military. Gorbachev was brought to 
power under the patronage of Andropov (an ex-director of the KGB) and with the support of 
the KGB. 842 
Gorbachev took this concept further when he came to power and started to institute a form of 
bottom-up communication. 
"Gorbachev argued from the outset that popular access to honest and 
840 Lawton, A., Kinoglasnost: Soviet Cinema in our Time, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 37. 
841 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 78. 
842 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 12. 
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reliable information was crucial to generating popular activism and support 
for the party and its programmes.,,843 
This statement by Gorbachev would imply that initiatives for societal change were not 
originating from the masses, but from society's political elite. Change that is initiated in this 
manner may imply that the elite intended to manage and control any forthcoming reforms. 
"The impetus thus came from above with the implication that the boundaries 
of such discussion could be set and the room for initiative from below was 
limited.,,844 
Noticeable changes in the Soviet media occurred in the period 1985 - 1990. But, were these 
changes merely superficial 'window dressing'? 
"Most of the publications kept their Soviet-era layouts, staffs, formats and 
gemes but embraced the new ideology of market fundamentalism and a firm 
belief in democracy. ,,845 
The above mentioned quote would seem to demonstrate that the process of glasnost in the 
media was performed in a somewhat ad hoc manner. A thin veneer of democracy and 
liberalism was superimposed over a structure that was inherently the opposite of these traits. 
This situation had the potential of creating confusion through conflicting signals and lack of 
communication. 
Glasnost was not intended to contribute to the downfall of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev 
merely wanted to reform an ailing structure, this is evident in his public stance. He portrayed 
his policies as returning to 'true' Leninist ideals. Ifby some chance the reforms were going to 
fail, the blame was going to be placed on those elements of society which were resistant to the 
change.846 
843 Gill, G. & Markwick, R. D., Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, p. 33. 
844 Gill, G. & Markwick, R. D., op. cit., p. 33. 
845 Zassoursky, I., "Media and Power: Russia in the Nineties" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, 
Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 74. 
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To overcome possible resistant elements of society, Gorbachev intended to employ the 
media. He intended to ruin the reputation of resistant groups by the use ofkompromat. If the 
opposition was eliminated or rendered ineffective, then Gorbachev would be able to 
implement the reform programme. The failure of the reform programme in reaching the 
intended objectives meant that he was to become the target of the new 'free' press. 847 
The new reforms were publicised by a select number of papers initially - Ogonyok, Moscow 
News and Argumenty i Fakty. These pUblications were the flagship of glasnost. The papers 
brought with them a new style of straight-to-the-point news. 848 By allowing only a select few 
newspapers to pUblicise the reforms of glasnost, it is possible to infer that these papers were 
considered to be reliable by the authorities. A great deal of trust in the papers was needed, to 
handle such a delicate task. The limited scope of the initial release may suggest that the 
Kremlin, to test the public's response to the proposals may have conducted a 'trial run'. 
The Kremlin placed a great deal of responsibility in the hands of these select few 
publications. If they were to have 'reliable' media outlets, 'reliable' personnel were required 
to head these organisations. As the government was tasked with selection of key staff, they 
had the opportunity to place 'their' people in the top positions. 
"Individuals in key positions in mass media organisations also affect media 
production. They earn their roles because of a fit between themselves and 
various organisational agendas.,,849 
As stated above, key media personnel affected the functioning of media organisations. The 
Kremlin required a specific output from their use of the media to achieve their end goals. In 
1988, Akensov, the chair of the committee over-seeing work of broadcasting media 
(Gostelradio) described the new role of TV and radio. 
"Key factors in the renewal of society, essential tools for influencing 
millions of people, for the formation of public opinion, convictions and 
846 Turpin, J., op. cit., pp. 76 - 77. 
847 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 125. 
848 (1) Downing, J., op. cit., p. 78. 
(2) Gill, G. & Markwick, R. D., op. cit., pp. 34 - 35. 
(3) Graffy, J. & Hosking, G. A., op. cit., p.27. 
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actions, the development of healthy tastes [ ... ] they raise issues connected 
with education in matters of music, ideology, morals and aesthetics."85o 
Party credibility was further compromised by a steady flow of 'cultural contamination' into 
Soviet society, in the form of foreign ideas and images. These 'new' images and ideas 
challenged the Party as a source of knowledge and information, thus threatening the 
communist hegemony.851 
It was hard for the Soviet media to adapt to the changing reality within the existing 
framework, which constrained it. The media needed political change for it to be able to adjust 
effectively to the changing social environment. A British cultural theorist, Williams wrote of 
the dilemma faced by media in an environment where a strict political regime is in force. "The 
ideological systems of fixed social generality, of categorical, of absolute formations, are 
relatively powerless to handle changing reality."852 
In recognition of the crisis, affecting the very survival of the Soviet Union, some within the 
Party sought to reinvigorate the country culturally and economically. The intention was not to 
replace communism completely, but to introduce a new form - 'socialist pluralism. ,853 
Up to 1989 Russian glasnost progressed slowly and unevenly outside Moscow, Leningrad 
and the Baltic republics. 854 Lack of credibility in the eye of the public was a serious matter for 
the Soviet hierarchy, in need of urgent consideration. A revitalisation of the media needed to 
be attempted, to try and restore some public confidence in domestic channels of 
communication. But, by attempting a liberalisation of the media industry, they also risked 
releasing the 'democratic genie' from the bottle. 
An important aspect of the glasnost process was the origin of the reforms. It was a case of an 
"instance of liberal is at ion from above rather than democratisation from below.,,855 The Soviet 
Union's hierarchy initiated the process, in an effort to save the existing power structure from 
849 Turpin, l, op. cit., p. 132. 
850 Graffy, J. & Hosking, G. A., op. cit., p. 6. 
851 Elderidge, l, op. cit., p. 57. 
852 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 217. 
853 Elderidge, l, op. cit., p. 58. 
854 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 79. 
855 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 81 
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total collapse. 
In a legal sense, the state acted as the Soviet Union's sole gatekeeper. During the later stages 
ofthe refonn process this began to be altered. From June 12, 1990 the operation of private 
media in the Soviet Union was pennitted. This was followed by the removal of the Party's 
monopoly on radio and TV.856 
The centrepiece ofthe Soviet Union's attempt to 'liberalise' the media is enshrined in the 
1990 Law on the Press and Other Mass Media. Fyedor Buralatsky, who helped to draft the 
July 12, 1990 media law outlined the law's intent; "quite new approach to [ ... ] both internal 
and international infonnation [ ... ] and a clear cut notion of freedom of the press and freedom 
ofinfonnation.,,857 Buralatsky's comment would appear to suggest that this new concept 
revolved around the premise of creating an 'open society' in the USSR. 
Several fundamental changes to journalism were evident in the new legislation. One of the 
foremost radical changes was the virtual abolition of Party control over who should own and 
control the mass media.858 The new freedoms extended to access to unclassified official 
infonnation. Government departments had to supply infonnation to the media in a timely 
manner, as heavy fines were liable if they did not. Journalists also had new obligations, 
among these was a responsibility for the accuracy of their work. If accuracy was deficient, 
legal redress by the 'wronged' party was possible. 859 
Although censorship was in decline and journalists had a legal right to protect their sources, 
a great deal of attention was paid to eliminating the possibility of an abuse of freedom of 
speech. Clause 5 on 'Prohibition of Abuse of Freedom of Speech' was worded plainly, as to 
the media's new limits. 
"[ ... ] it shall be prohibited to employ the mass media for the disclosure of 
state secrets or of infonnation specially protected as secret under law; for 
calls for the violent overthrow of or attention to the existing state and social 
system; for the glorification of war; violence or cruelty; for the 
856 Gill, G. & Markwick, R. D., op. cit., p. 101. 
857 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 53. 
858 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 58. 
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promulgation of racial, national or religious superiority or intolerance; for 
the promulgation of pornography [ ... ] The use of the mass media to interfere 
in individuals private lives, or to infringe upon individual's honour and 
dignity, shall be prohibited and punishable by law,,860 
Journalists attained the pinnacle of their professional reputation in the final years of the 
Soviet Union. In the Russian republic "many of the most active reformers elected to office in 
the legislative elections of 1989 - 1990 were journalists."861 A peculiar occurrence, 
considering the close relationship which existed between the media and the Soviet regime for 
some seventy years. The media had dutifully served the Verkhushka, the apex of power, 
during this time. 
A possible explanation for this to occur is that those particular journalists were generally 
associated as being representative of the opposition to the largely discredited Soviet regime. 
Their articles, which exposed governmental cover-ups, corruption and other irregularities, 
may have caused the public to bestow virtues of honesty and sincerity upon the profession of 
journalism. Someone with these specific virtues could be considered to be a suitable candidate 
for government, in light ofthe recent exposes on some of the existing members of 
government. 
Journalists from some of the more popular media outlets gained public popularity, which 
enabled them to pursue public office. "Many journalists also enjoyed considerable social 
prestige." An example of this phenomenon is Y egor Gaidar, originally a journalist from the 
monthly magazine Kommunist he rose to become the First Acting Prime Minister in the first 
reform government. 862 
The passage of Gorbachev's reforms did not go through the political process unchallenged. 
A war of ideology developed between media loyal to Gorbachev and media which were loyal 
to his conservative / extremist nationalist opponents. Some of the media who were aligned to 
859 Elderidge, l, op. cit., p. 59. 
860 (1) Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 59. 
(2) Lawton, A., Kinoglasnost: Soviet Cinema in Our Time, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 
56 and 103. 
861 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 68. 
862 Hagstrom, M., "Control Over the Media in Post-Soviet Russia" in Ekecrantz, l & Olofsson, K., Editors, 
op. cit., p. 206. 
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Gorbachev included Moscow News and Ogonyok. Opposition media included Sovyetskaya 
Rossiya, Literaturnaya Rossiya and Nash Sovremenik. 863 
Glasnost's impact upon the media was significant, but the reforms never entirely reached 
their full potential. "The impact of glasnost on the Soviet press [ ... J has been considerable, but 
as the test cases show, it has been limited.,,864 This may have been partly due to the bitter 
political fighting between various factions. Each ofthese factions (the reformers and the 
conservatives) was equally determined to exert control over the media to achieve their ends. 
Some media were able to take advantage of the political split in the late Soviet period. They 
aligned themselves to various powerful political patrons, who would look after the media's 
interests if the media publicised their interests. 
"[ ... J an increasingly fractured institutional base ultimately served to 
strengthen media pluralism and autonomy. [ ... J individual media officials, 
generally at the level of newspaper editor or television department chief, 
were able to advance more radical or more conservative agendas by entering 
into working alliances with Politburo patrons of their political hue. In the 
television sector this meant dramatically different programming policies in 
different divisions seeking the protection of different Kremlin 
authorities. ,,865 
4.7 State Support to the Media 
In 1993 the ministry of finance distributed 25 billion rubbles to around 600 print outlets. At 
the same time state TV received 100 billion rubbles. 866 This disparity in state funding 
highlights the continued importance attached to TV by the state in the immediate post-Soviet 
period. The appearance is given, that the government is investing in an enterprise that may 
give them a better return on their 'investment.' 
During August 1994 50% of the 11 billion rubble subsidy went to two newspapers, 
863 Downing, l, op. cit., p. SO. 
864 Graffy, J. & Hosking, G. A., op. cit., p. 3S. 
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Rossiiskiye Vesti and Rossiiskiye Gazeta and to the magazine Rodina. These papers belonged 
to the Russian legislature. 867 These papers share of the state subsidy appears to be somewhat 
excessive, an accusation of conflict of interest could be levelled at the government's actions. 
But, did the relative security, offered by easy access to state funds, form a harmonious 
relationship between the papers and the government? 
Relations between the government and Rossiiskiye Vesti did not always run smoothly. At the 
end of 1993 the paper voted to cut ties with its founder. In response the Russian Council of 
Ministers advised the paper that they would have to close down until the 130 million rubble 
debt to the state printing company was paid in full. This pressure, exerted by the government 
on the paper was sufficient to curtail the paper's bid for independence.868 Once again, the 
government's monopoly of newsprint was a sufficient lever to ensure that the media was not 
able to exert any effective independence. 
4.8 Censorship 
Censorship can come in many shapes and forms, sometimes it is not even noticeable. The 
press can be 'persuaded' through tactics such as ownership or placing 'reliable' people in the 
essential positions of a media organisation. When these more subtle methods do not work, 
what transpires may become visible to the public. Acts such as using coercive institutions 
such as tax police, police, court system, violence or death. 
Appointing key members of media is effectively a gate keeping decision. Board members are 
usually drawn from the ruling hegemonic elite. In tum, they employ 'appropriate' or 
'compatible' staff. Thus gate keeping becomes an internalised policing process, because the 
staff members hold similar values. 869 This process is not normally visible to the public due to 
apparently tranquil surface of staff issues. 
As explained above, staff practices are not normally visible when the process is operating 
under normalised conditions. However, the process does become visible during periods of 
turmoil. For instance when staff are being replaced by staffs who hold a more 'appropriate' set 
866 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 130. 
867 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 130. 
868 Ibid. 
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of views and values. 870 
Staffing composition has a flow-on effect. The effects are associated with gate keeping and 
agenda-setting. "[ ... J news making is a process of selection, emphasis and de-emphasis.,,871 
Key staffs are at the 'coal face' of making the decisions concerning which news will be shown 
and the news that will not be disseminated. 
A homogenous media workforce is easier to manage due to less pluralism of thought present 
in the workplace. In such circumstances, it is easier to gain consensus on issues of majority of 
opinion. Ultimately, a spiral of silence will develop ensuring effect discursive management by 
the dominant elite. 
The media's "gate keeping and agenda-setting roles have the capacity to set 
in motion a 'spiral of silence.' This means that social discourse is 
progressively closed because people fall silent if their views do not coincide 
with what the media portray as 'majority opinion. ",872 
At the end ofthe communication process, the receiver could be considered to be the final 
component of the censorship process. The audience will accept or reject information after 
considering their personal experience, analysing the information to check if it agrees or 
conflicts with their present values and ideals. In 1980 British academic Stuart Hall wrote on 
the process of the potential decoding of a message in the Encoding / Decoding model; 
II» Decoders simply and unproblematically accept and internalise the 'preferred' meaning(s) 
as intended by the encoder. 
CD Decoders operate in 'an oppositional code' and reject the message. 
CD 'Negotiated' meaning, results when decoders accept some elements of 'preferred' meaning 
and rejects others.873 
If the nature ofthe news content is homogenous, this will have an effect on the manner in 
869 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 157. 
870 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 157. 
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which future information is processed. The meaning is internalised and forms part of the sub-
conscious 'pool of meaning. , 
"[ ... J our language communities (coding systems) set parameters on what we 
'look for' and hence 'see.' This in tum influences the repertoire of pictures 
already stored in our heads when we encounter the next text that we need to 
decode."s74 
Meaning is developed after images of text are internalised by the reader. The reader then 
develops a 'commitment' to this interpretation. If a text is read which contradicts the 
internalised meaning, the reader may react in a variety of ways; 
CII Avoid that information. 
• Suffer cognitive dissonance because it contradicts the existing beliefs. 
• Rationalise away the new and contradictory information.875 
American PR expert Walter Lippmann recognised the need to exercise some form of 
censorship, if a propaganda campaign was to have a chance of succeeding. The censorship is 
necessary to ensure that other senders, which may compete with the dominant ideology's 
image, send no competing images. 
"Without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strictest sense of the 
word is impossible. In order to conduct propaganda there must be some 
barrier between the public and the event. Access to the real environment 
must be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he 
thinks is wise or desirable."876 
4.8.1 A History Of Censorship In The Soviet Era 
At the height of its power, the Soviet Union maintained a relatively effective regime of 
censorship upon the media. This censorship existed not only in the official state organs such 
874 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 209. 
875 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 210. 
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as Glavlit, but also a tacit understanding between the media and the government, in terms of 
the boundaries of acceptability. In order for one of the primary functions of the media to be 
successful, the education and mobilisation of Soviet citizens, some subjects needed to be 
avoided (to pretend that they did not exist). The role of the media was to set the public's 
agenda, what they were going to talk about. This was a limited role though, as the "news 
media set public agendas, but not what people think about items on the agenda."877 
The lack of control over how information was interpreted by the public required further 
measures of control, over news content. By ensuring that some news remained hidden from 
the public's attention, resulted in "[ ... ] the stabilising social functions of ignorance [ ... ]"878 In 
other words, what the public did not know did not harm them. 
Censorship is not a one-way process that is imposed by the state on an unwilling media. 
Restricting the flow of information by the state authorities relies to a large degree on self-
censorship by the media. The rules of the game are understood by all, the media and the state 
authorities. A system or way of doing things is formulated and then passed down to the next 
generation. 879 This situation begs the question, why would the media willingly submit 
themselves to the will of the state? 
The answer to this question lies in a theory postulated by the author Haraszti. He talked of 
state relations with artists in a Soviet regime. 
"[ ... ] the state represents not a monolithic body of rules· but rather a live 
network oflobbies. We play with it, we lmow how to use it, and we have 
allies and enemies at the controls [ ... J Generosity from above will be 
matched by docility from below [ ... J It is like an empty sack that artists with 
a secure existence fill with anything that will not burst it.,,880 
Media personnel fall in to a similar circumstance as the artists, they were supported by the 
state. Newspapers, TV and radio were supplied with a reliable level of state subsidies, they 
877 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 114. 
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were required to disseminate the view of the state. The media fulfilled this obligation gladly 
and managed to enjoy a guaranteed existence, without the market uncertainties and pressures 
of their Western counterparts. 
According to Professor Ellen Mickiewicz, a list existed in the Soviet Union, which tabled 
taboo subjects for the media to inform about or debate. To list some of these subjects, they 
included; crime, drugs, accidents, natural disasters, security intelligence, organs of censorship, 
occupational injuries, travel schedules for the political leadership, crime and morale problems 
in the armed forces, arms sales abroad, hostile actions against Soviet citizens abroad and 
income and purchasing power structure at home and abroad. 881 
In addition to censoring the domestic media, the State also tried to minimise the level of 
foreign radio and TV reception in the Soviet Union, this was a very costly process. Jamming 
operations (TV and radio) in 1971 cost the Soviet Union US$300 million. To put this into 
perspective, in 1981 the BBC estimated that a four day period of jamming cost the Soviet 
Union as much as the BBC Russian Service's annual budget. 882 However, after the 1987 
Reykjavik summit, the Soviet Union ceased jamming Western radio broadcasts. 883 
By late 1990, Gorbachev had more formal powers than Stalin. However, there was no will or 
possibility to use these powers to their fullest extent. 884 The previously mentioned reforms of 
glasnost and perestroika changed the nature of censorship in the late Soviet era (1988 - 1991). 
Olavlit, the agency that had been primarily responsible for censorship, had its objectives 
redesigned. This department was previously very secretive, the government never openly 
admitted to the existence of such an agency. Consequently, no public scrutiny or 
accountability existed. The main function ofthis agency, after the 1990 Media Law was 
brought into effect, was to protect state secrets from being disseminated to the pUblic. No 
longer was the use of objections on the grounds of political or ideological incompatibility a 
valid means to impose censorship. 885 
The growth of the public's dissension with the official system has been linked to the re-
880 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 69. 
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emergence of the concept of 'Civil Society' in the Soviet Union. "Some commentators [ ... J 
refer to the growing vigour of public dissent in the later years of the Soviet system as in the 
phrase 'the rebirth of civil society. ",886 
A definition of civil society refers to "[ ... J the arena of societal and cultural interaction 
outside the realm of the state, the economic order and the family.,,887 The rebirth of civil 
society in a nation with a state-oriented ideology is dangerous for the incumbent ideology. 
These two concepts are incompatible in the same political space. 
Marxism-Leninism is by nature, a mass oriented ideology that requires individual people's 
will to be subjugated to the will of the state. Civil society is a concept, which is individualistic 
in nature, the individual is able to determine some aspects of their life, the existence of a 
measure of free will. Consequently, the existence of these two diametrically opposed 
ideologies in the same political space was going to become an escalating source of political 
conflict. 
The KGB had shown some interest in media manipulation rather than outright censorship, as 
a means to achieve their goals. Downing's findings concur, "[ ... J the close interest of the KGB 
in media during the period of attempted reforms (glasnost and perestroika), and their 
commitment to learning how to try and manipulate media coverage rather than simply censor 
Media subordination was not the result of the use of coercive force only. During the Soviet 
era the media were at the forefront of promoting the agenda of the ruling political elite, which 
placed them in a powerful position. Their importance was reflected by government support of 
the media, both in terms of financing the media directly and the privileges that were enjoyed 
by journalists. This mixture of carrot and stick approach to controlling the media appeared to 
be effective for sometime. Ultimately, journalists' well-being was dependent on the continued 
existence of the Soviet regime. 
"The privileges received by the nomenklatura, combined with coercive 
885 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 59. 
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threats, served as powerful incentives to maintain the official definition of 
reality.,,889 
The rapid advances in technology, such as faxes, photocopiers and computers were slowly 
undermining the effectiveness ofthe official organs of censorship. These technologies had the 
potential to be able to circumvent the clumsy censorship apparatus by the potential speed with 
which they could disseminate information. 
One of the effects ofthe 1990 Media Law was the 'instantaneous' creation of hundreds of 
new newspapers and journals within the first few months of its existence.89o Certainly, one of 
the objectives of glasnost was to produce pluralism and positive debate in Soviet society, at 
first glance this explosion of new publications would be a good endorsement of the reform's 
success. 
According to Brian McNair however, everything did not go according to plan. Many of the 
newly independent publications adopted a Western Liberal Pluralist model. They also 
positioned themselves in the camp of opposition to the government. 891 This situation had the 
potential to spiral out of control. Instead of producing pluralism through constructive debate, a 
destructive confrontational model began to develop. This is not what the political elite 
intended or wanted. 
The new found media freedoms unleashed an unprecedented scrutiny of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) activities and of the Soviet legacy. Much of this publicity 
was unfavourable, which caused Gorbachev to apply pressure on the media to ensure a greater 
level of 'objectivity' in their reports.892 Had Gorbachev's reforms brought some early results, 
in terms of economic success, this would have forced a more conciliatory approach by the 
press. Success in the sphere of domestic standard ofliving would have ensured a politically 
popular figure. 
A combination of the failure of Gorbachev' s economic policy, the rise of ethnic and 
888 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 135. 
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891 Ibid. 
892 Elderidge, l, op. cit., P 63. 
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nationalistic conflict throughout the Soviet Union brought about the prospect of a civil war. 
Media coverage had the potential to widen and heighten the danger. Previously such topics 
were forbidden, now they were 'front page' news. Gorbachev wanted to curb, what he saw as 
the excesses of the media.893 
Gorbachev had intended to create pluralism in the Soviet media as a means of developing 
positive public debate over the direction of the country. This would have given the public the 
perception of having some say in the system, possibly the government may have even gleaned 
some good management ideas from such public debate. But, the media's role in exposing the 
'excesses' of the Soviet era had another effect. It brought into question the very legitimacy of 
the Soviet system by highlighting its flaws. The public's belief and perception of the system 
was irreparably damaged. 894 
Author John Downing expresses a view that supports the possibility of danger in allowing 
media freedom, during a period of turmoil, when no such freedoms officially existed 
previously. 
"[ ... J unleashing freedom of communication in the glasnost era before 
making headway in solving economic problems was a recipe for chauvinist 
social movements and the ethnic and nationality confrontations which have 
scared the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe thereafter. ,,895 
A combination of economic failure and the discrediting of the ruling Communist Party 
produced discontent in the public. The revolutionary changes brought about by the reform 
programme had left the public wanting more. Instead of the reforms stabilising the political 
situation, they seemed help bring about the collapse of the Soviet hegemony. 
"[ ... J revolutionary changes usually transpire when dominant groups have 
failed to renew sufficiently their composition and / or their discourses, and 
so lose their ability to lead and organise a 
893 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p 63. 
894 (1) McFaul, M., op. cit., p. 64. 
(2) Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, L. 
L., Editor, op. cit., p. 150. 
895 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 18. 
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(changed) society. ,,896 
It is not my intention to imply that glasnost and perestroika were not revolutionary concepts 
in Soviet society. Perestroika and glasnost were intended to reinvigorate a stagnating society. 
The ruled may have viewed the changes as too few, too late. Soviet rule had been brought into 
question during the intensive scrutiny of history, especially during Stalin's years of 
leadership. Additionally, the communist hierarchy remained intact which may have been a 
source of contention for the pUblic. 
Post-August 1990 saw a relapse to 'temporary' censorship measures by the authorities. A 
series of measures were introduced, which were designed to try and reign in an increasingly 
'out of control' press. These 'temporary' measures included; 
G The Council of Ministers pressuring regional and city papers to register their papers as 
party publications. Thereby exposing them to party censorship, where troublesome editors 
could be dismissed. 
G Independent newspapers were assessed with large tax bills or other economic sanctions, 
such as hiking the price of newsprint (or not supplying it at all). Some printing shops went 
as far as to refusing to print unofficial newspapers at all. 
G A presidential decree on the definition of the term democratisation was very narrow. This 
gave the censors the right to obstruct any unsavoury materia1.897 
The catalyst, which almost changed the course of the reforms was the volatile situation 
developing in the Baltic Republics. The reforms proved to be vulnerable to the unrest, which 
developed in the Baltic Republics in 1990 - 1991. Media coverage of government 
involvement, which Gorbachev viewed as overly critical, stirred discontent in the Kremlin. 
Gorbachev wanted to bring the press back into line, to help him achieve this objective he 
appointed Leonid Kravchenko as the director of state TV. Kravchenko was a director of TASS, 
having been appointed to that position by the CPCC because of his 'reliability.' He was a 
staunch opponent of the free press and quickly closed down several TV news programmes in 
January 1991. Attempts were launched, to control the Lithuanian independence movement via 
896 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 109. 
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the stonning of TV headquarters in Vilnius by Russian Special Forces. 898 
TV was watched closely during Lithuania's 1990 declaration of independence. All news 
relating to this event went through the government's news agency TASS. The TV news bureau 
was not trusted enough to provide a 'reliable' coverage. TV news programmes, which were 
critical ofthe Soviet government's response to the crisis, were threatened and sometimes even 
closed down. Three programmes which were closed down included Vzglyad, Syem Dnyei and 
Pyatoye Kol'tso. 899 The Kremlin's reaction to the media using some of their new freedoms, 
highlights just how fragile and dependent on government attitude, the nature of these refonns. 
In crisis, the authorities seemed to revert to their old habits of strict censorship. 
A critical series of political events unfolded in mid-January 1991. The first of which 
occurred on January 15, 1991. Gorbachev addressed a closed session of the Supreme Soviet. 
During this address he urged that "the Supreme Soviet take-over control of all of television, 
radio and newspapers, to ensure that they include all points ofview.,,90o Editorial 
independence seemed to be tied to the media disseminating to the public, what the Kremlin 
wanted them to see or hear. Gorbachev threatened to take matters even further to ensure media 
acquiescence to the Kremlin's desires. 
On January 16, 1991 Gorbachev tabled a proposal to the Supreme Soviet, to temporarily 
suspend the 1990 Media Law.90l It is hard to be certain if this was a serious threat by 
Gorbachev, or a warning by conservative politicians to dissenting journalists. 
Whatever the true intention of Gorbachev's move, he was persuaded to withdraw the plan to 
suspend the 1990 Media Law.902 But, the media was not entirely 'let off.' The Kremlin began 
to focus of re-establishing some measure of control over television. A perception seemed to 
exist within the political establishment, that TV was a more 'powerful' medium of 
communication than other types (such as newspapers and radio ).903 
897 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 130. 
898 (1) Downing, J., op. cit., p. 127. 
(2) McFaul, M., op. cit., p. 90. 
899 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 80. 
900 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 64. 
901 Elderidge, J., op. cit., pp. 53 - 54. 
902 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 64. 
903 For a detailed analysis of the power of TV in Russia, please refer to Mickiewicz, E. P." Changing Channels: 
Television and the Struggle/or Power in Russia, Durham, Duke University Press, 1999. 
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Professor Ellen Mickiewicz's statement concerning the importance of TV to the Soviet 
regime adds credence to my assertion of TV's significance. "The Soviet State had 
monopolised the mass media and television in particular, was always a matter of the highest 
political importance. The Communist Party's ruling Politburo considered television at every 
one of its weekly meetings.,,904 
TV was important to the Verkhushka in three main ways; 
@ One way top to bottom communication, to a passive audience. 
III The message, which is conveyed to the audience, has uniform content. 
III The message is able to reach a large potential audience by penetrating people's homes.90s 
These attributes of TV communication are critical to the actor attempting the political 
communication. TV technology provides the potential to reach a very large audience, at a time 
when they should be relaxed and therefore possibly more susceptible to suggestions which are 
woven in the message. The communicator also has the ability to ensure that the message that 
is relayed to the audience is uniform, thus ensuring that the original meaning of the message is 
not lost or altered over time and distance. 
The state was still able to put unofficial pressure on newspapers. In the period up to the 
August 1991 coup, the CPSU still controlled 80% of the Soviet Union's newsprint 
production.906 If restricted or no supplies of newsprint reached the newspapers, it effectively 
shuts down the operation. A very effective way to censor a newspaper in a somewhat subtle 
manner (no need for armed police - a lot quieter method). 
Gorbachev did not intend to lose control of the reform process. This occurred as a flow-on 
effect of the limited reforms initiated, which took on their own momentum in the end. The 
resolve of Gorbachev to achieve a managed reform process that was kept within the confines 
of the Soviet Union is evident in his autobiography Memoirs. Concerning the Editor in Chief 
of Pravda Gorbachev wrote; 
904 Mickiewicz, E. P., Piracy, Policy and Russia's Emerging Media Market, The Harvard Journal of Press / 
Politics, Volume 6, Number 2: 30 - 51, 2001, p. 39. 
905 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 72. 
"For this important position I wanted someone who was not only a 
professional in this field (an academician and an experienced editor), but 
also someone who could be trusted. ,,907 
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It was television, which preoccupied the minds of the political establishment. TV was still 
very much under governmental influence. The governing body, which was equivalent to a 
government ministry, was the All-Union State TV and Radio Broadcasting Company. The 
Director, Leonid Kravchenko, was considered by Soviet Broadcasters to be a 'Gorbachev 
man.' During a talk with senior staff of Central TV, he was alleged to have said; 
"[ ... ] is not private television, it is state television. So of course we have to 
support the state we serve, which pays our wages. Although we do have the 
right to criticise at every level, even the government, we can only criticise 
constructively, for the good of the state.,,908 
Kravchenko's comment appears to support my earlier statement, that the media freedoms 
were not intended to signal the end of communism. The reforms intended to create pluralism 
within a socialist framework. An arena where the best ideas would flourish, thereby building a 
stronger and more vibrant socialist state. Something radical needed to be attempted, the 
traditional brand of communism was slowly dying. However, Gorbachev was unable to 
control the media in demonstrating positive criticism, which was the ultimate failure in the 
process.909 
Political tension between the reformers and conservatives finally spilled over. In a bid to 
restore the status quo (pre-dating the reforms), communist hard-liners launched a coup d' etat 
in August 1991. Inevitably media were drawn into this political conflict, with little or no room 
for neutrality. 
During their brief reign of control, the hard-line coup leaders favoured certain media outlets 
and closed others. Some ofthe media which were allowed to continue operating as 'normal' 
906 Elderidge, l, op. cit., p. 65. 
907 Gorbachev, M. S., Memoirs, New York, Doubleday, 1996, pp. 209 - 210. 
908 Elderidge, l, op. cit., p. 65. 
909 Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, 
L. L., Editor, op. cit., p. 150. 
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were; Central TV, Gostelradio, TASS, Pravda, Sovyetskaya Rossiya and Krasnaya Zvezda.910 
After the coup was eventually defeated, a decree from Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, saw 
pro-coup newspapers closed down and their assets nationalised.911 
Foreign journalists were generally left alone by the coup plotters. CNN was even able to 
function normally. A number ofthe Russian newspapers that had been banned, responded by 
banding together and publishing Obshchaya Gazeta, which was circulated in Moscow.912 The 
main focus of the coup plotters seemed to be directed toward taking control of the domestic 
TV networks. The coup plotters were defied in a variety of ways, for instance, the failure to 
edit out the trembling hands of coup plotters during a press conference and reporting 
resistance at the barricades in Moscow.913 
Upon his restoration as the Soviet Union's President, Gorbachev sacked Kravchenko. He 
replaced him with a leading reformer, Yegor Yakovlev.914 Some of the media who had sided 
with the coup plotters were closed down for one month, in retaliation for their 'misguided' 
10yalties.915 These moves were an attempt by Gorbachev to completely purge any remaining 
elements from the media, who may have been sympathetic toward the coup plotters cause. 
As the Soviet Union disintegrated and the various states emerged, Gorbachev's attempt to 
regain some control over the media played into the hands of his arch-enemy Boris Yeltsin. 
Post-Soviet TV continued to be tied to parliament, enabling Yeltsin and his supporters to gain 
control over it. 916 
4.8.2 The Remains Of Soviet Ideology And New Trends 
Herman and Chomsky generated a 'propaganda' model in 1988, although this model relates 
to a study conducted in the United States, I contend that this model is equally applicable in 
contemporary Russia. They defined the term propaganda as; 
910 (1) Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 66. 
(2) Downing, J., op. cit., p. 127. 
911 McFaul, M., op. cit., p. 132. 
912 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 127. 
913 Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, 
L. L., Editor, op. cit., p. 150. 
914 (1) Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 66. 
(2) Downing, J., op. cit., p. 128. 
915 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 128. 
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"[ ... J interacting and mutually reinforcing filters that enable money and 
power to bring it about that overwhelmingly in major media the news is fit 
to print, dissent is marginalized, and the government and dominant private 
interests [ ... J get their messages to the public.,,917 
In Russia, the existence of political and big business interests have merged. The two groups, 
the Kremlin and the oligarchs, are at times indistinguishable from one another. They both 
appear to have formed large media holdings to ensure a measure of control over the flow of 
information. To reinforce what I have been expressing throughout this thesis, media generally 
provide coverage and views of those that control them. 
The 'propaganda' model has some identifiable traits. An important aspect of this theory is 
that filters which "fix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and what is newsworthy in 
the first place. ,,918 
11& concentrated ownership of media 
• advertising, which is a primary source of revenue for media. 
(1& reliance on approved sources of information, from the government or business. 
CII PR people I spin-doctors organise an anti-media campaign directed at actual or potential 
lapses from political propriety. 
ID US national religion was anti-communism in Russia? The object of hate is often a fuzzy 
definition. It can be used to demonise opponents.919 
Most of these factors, apart from the point relating to advertising, already exist in the 
Russian Federation. The final factor, the Russian equivalent seems to be Chechens. Media 
assets are mostly owned by the oligarchs or by the government. Recent years has seen the 
emergence of specialised media people whose task is to ensure some measure of media 
compliance, Lesin and Yastrzhembsky for example. 
The point that does not fit the Russian example is relating to advertising as a primary source 
916 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 67. 
917 (1) Downing, J., op. cit., p. 221. 
(2) Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., op. cit., p. 241. 
918 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 221. 
919 Ibid. 
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of funds for media. Advertising as a source of revenue for the media is underdeveloped and a 
volatile industry. This may be as a result of the comrtmnist era, when advertising was frowned 
upon by the authorities. 
A point of continuity between the late-Soviet era and the post-Soviet period has been the 
struggle for control over television. The struggle appears to be linked to interest groups who 
wish to control the content of TV for pUblicising their agenda. Their belief in the power of TV 
to influence the minds of the audience being resolute. 
"The struggle for control of television has been a constant feature of post-
Soviet Russia because power seekers attributed to the medium a near 
magical persuasive power. This was true in the Soviet times and it continued 
to be true thereafter, especially during election campaigns."92o 
In the aftermath ofthe 1993 coup, first deputy press and information minister, Dmitri 
Tsabria summed up his thoughts on the state of the Russian media. He thought that society 
needed legal protection from anti-social media practices, on the one hand. Tsabria also felt 
that the media needed legal protection from state persecution and harassment. His final 
observation was that the arduous transition from Sovietism to democracy needed 
recognition.921 
During the 1992 - 1993 period, a series oflaws relating to media activities were passed. One 
of the first laws to be passed was the 1992 Law on Mass Media, which establishes the norms 
for owning and operating media outlets.922 The concept of private media ownership in the 
former Soviet Union was a very new and unusual concept, therefore this area needed clear and 
concise guidelines for those who would become involved in the industry. 
1993 proved to be a busy year in terms of media legislation. The new 1993 Constitution has 
a section that is relevant to the media. Article 29 of the 1993 Constitution guarantees the 
protection of freedom of speech. There are however, limits placed on this freedom. No person 
920 Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., Editors, op. cit., p. 104. 
921 Downing, J., op. cit., pp. 164 - 165. 
922 Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the DeVelopment of a New Democracy" in Kaid, 
L. L., Editor, op. cit., p. 151. 
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or institution is allowed to spread social, religious or national hatred.923 This piece of 
legislation seems to be fair at face value, but would seem to be open to manipulation. Exactly 
what constitutes social, religious or national hatred? If the definition is not exact, then it may 
be possible to use this clause to try and silence contradictory views from being expressed in 
the mass media. 
The transition saw, what appears to be a measure of protection of state activities during the 
Soviet period. Yeltsin passed the 1993 Law on Archives, which gives a great decree of 
protection to state activities. A generous period of time restriction on the opening of state 
archives was granted. 
It Any classified document in the KGB archives is not to be opened earlier than 50 years 
from the document's inception. 
It Files concerning specific individuals are to remain sealed for no less than 75 years.924 
These measures were further reinforced by an edict, which was issued by Yeltsin in February 
1994. The edict pertained to the classification of state secrets, every government department, 
excepting the ministries of culture and social welfare were permitted to classify documents. 925 
By enacting these measures, the government demonstrates a desire to cover up the past. This 
may be as a result of the 'new' democratic political elite's origins, from the rames of the 
Soviet nomenklatura. 
Andrei Fadin, a journalist summed up the contemporary media's ability to relay an accurate 
portrayal of events in society. "A peculiar freedom [ ... ] If one reads half a dozen newspapers a 
day and watches a variety of TV networks, one gets a fairly accurate picture of the news.,,926 
One of the most striking features in modem Russian politics is the extra-ordinary rise in 
political tension during elections. It seems as though the incumbent politicians will stop at 
nothing to retain their seats. The reaction of the central government to local government 
transgressions of media law varies and would appear to be limeed to where the loyalties of the 
local government lie. 
923 Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, 
L. L., Editor, op. cit., p. 151. 
924 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 136. 
925 Ibid. 
926 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 337. 
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Methods used by interest groups to silence or influence what the media say are numerous. 
Below are some of the means used in the regions to control the media: 
Ell murder and violence 
• access to government briefings denied 
Ell print-runs or essential equipment seized 
Ell libel lawsuits filed against journalists 
Ell withholding media subsidies 
• tax or fire inspectors are sent to the newsroom by authorities 
Ell regional bodies reward or punish media.927 
This list is not a complete list of stand over tactics used. As previously stated, tensions 
escalate around election time, as the political stakes are higher. Subtle methods of harassment 
are sometimes used to curtail the activities of the press. During the 1999 gubemational 
campaign in Primorsky Krai, the authorities cut power to a private radio station and then 
seized the building. In another incident they used political pressure to remove critical news 
from the local edition of Moskovsky Komsomolets. 928 It is possible for these events to go 
unnoticed in the general public. A probable motive for the disruption ofp0'vver supply to the 
radio station was to ensure that they were not able to broadcast the seizure of their building. 
The Yeltsin administration laid the framework for providing effective means of silencing 
dissenting media. Although Yeltsin, on the surface at least, did not consistently seem to 
favour censoring the mass media his legislation has left a legacy that could provide such an 
opportunity for an administration which does not exercise this amount of restraint. 
Yeltsin achieved this potential tool in a state media 'restructuring' exercise. On 
May 8, 1998 Yeltsin issued a decree that brought all local state stations and government 
owned technical facilities (such as transmitters) under sole jurisdiction of RTR. This meant 
that RTR could impose punitive measures or preferential charging for resources.929 Under such 
conditions, commercial TV was dependent on RTR for technological support. Ultimately, this 
927 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., 
pp. 340 - 341. 
928 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 340. 
929 (1) Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., Editors, op. cit., pp. 106 - 107. 
(2) Mickiewicz, E. P. (1999), op. cit., p. 282. 
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ends with an ability to censor TV broadcasting, whoever controls RTR is also able to exert 
pressure on other TV stations. And RTR is state controlled. 
The federal and local governments have other advantages that can be used to apply pressure 
on media outlets in a subtle manner. One of the few areas of industry yet to be affected by 
privatisation is the sector involved with the production and distribution of newsprint. "The 
state also dominates to a large extent the domestic production and distribution of 
newsprint.,,930 Ultimately, this means that if a print media outlet becomes involved in some 
form of conflict with the authorities they can be effectively closed down through price hikes 
or simply the denial of newsprint. 
To illustrate the effect of an increase in the price of production costs, brought about by the 
demise of Soviet-era subsidies (as opposed to deliberate price hiking) I shall use the 
circulation rates of Moscow national daily newspapers. The impact of increased production 
costs on the newspapers has proved to be very significant. In 1990 the circulation rates of 
Moscow's national dailies stood at 90 million copies, by the first half of 1996 this figure had 
decreased to 8 million copies.931 
Statistics from the State Committee on the Press are also a cause for concern over the 
mounting influence of local government in the media. The figures show a rapidly increasing 
presence of local government controlled media. "Over 80% of the papers founded on the 
district level were founded by the (local) state.,,932 
But what action does the Kremlin take to curb the illegal activities of the regional 
authorities? The answer in short is very little, unless their interests are threatened by the 
actions ofthe regional authorities. I will use two examples to illustrate my point. 
~ In November 1999, one month before the gubernational elections the federal authorities 
sought to curb censorship in Bashkortostan, following the actions of local authorities. 
930 Hagstrom, M., "Control Over the Media in Post-Soviet Russia" in Ekecrantz, J. & Olofsson, K., Editors, 
op. cit., p. 234. 
931 Zassoursky, Y., "Freedom and Responsibility in the Russian Media" in Price, M. E., Richter, A. & Yu, P. K., 
Editors, Russian Media Policy Law and Policy in the Yeltsin Decade: Essays and Documents, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp. 89 - 94, p. 89. 
932 Hagstrom, M., "Control Over the Media in Post-Soviet Russia" in Ekecrantz, J. & Olofsson, K., Editors, 
op. cit., p. 231. 
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Broadcasts of ORT and RTR produced analytical programmes were suspended by the 
regional government. The Kremlin's interests were at risk, as the regional governor 
supported the Fatherland All-Russia party. 
(II Also occurring in November 1999, federal authorities did nothing about censorship in 
Primorsky Krai. A possible explanation for this lack of action was that the governor, 
Yevgenny Nazdratenko, was pro-Unity party.933 
Yeltsin had a history of backing Primorsky Krai' s governor. In 1994 N azdratenko denied 
newsprint to critical newspapers, fired critical journalists and banned some newspapers 
altogether. He decreed that all political opponents needed to have triple the signatures to stand 
in the gubernational election. Then, four days prior to the election he cut power between 7 -
11pm. This in effect ensured that political advertising on TV, from his opponents was 
eliminated. Journalists made numerous complaints, but the government was slow and cautious 
in their reaction. Eventually, Yeltsin cancelled the elections in Primorsky Krai and left 
Nazdratenko in power.934 
Yeltsin needed Nazdratenko, he was at his lowest point in popularity rating and the governor 
was a vocal supporter of Yeltsin. The president's actions would appear to indicate that 
Nazdratenko's actions did not cause much alarm in the Kremlin and the governor's methods 
of dealing with opposition in the media were of an acceptable nature. Political considerations, 
in this case, held much more sway than the even application of Russia's law. 
Did the Kremlin remain a relatively passive participant in the censorship debate, apart from 
when their interests were threatened? The presidential elections were scheduled to be held 
some four months after the regional elections. Once again a pattern of intimidation began to 
emerge prior to the elections. The amount of conflict intensified closer to the elections. 
Media watchdog, Glasnost Defence Foundation recorded the number of conflicts between 
journalists and the authorities in the lead-up to the March 2000 presidential elections. The 
exact nature and definition of 'conflict,' as used in this sense is uncertain. 
® January 2000 63 Conflicts 
933 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 340. 
(Ill February 2000 
(Ill March 2000 
123 Conflicts 
139 Conflicts.935 
303 
Soon after the December 1999 Duma elections, NTV showed footage of Russian soldiers 
looting a 'liberated' village, where an alleged massacre had taken place.936 This break in the 
media ranles, which spoiled the previous understanding that gave the Kremlin the role as the 
country's sole gatekeeper. As a result, government pressure to curb criticism mounted. 
Economic and political pressure was brought to bear on Media-Most. The pressure to bring 
Gusinsky's media empire to follow the way as prescribed by the Kremlin had begun as early 
as June 1999. During the turbulent and unpredictable economic climate of post-Soviet Russia, 
Media-Most had borrowed heavily to finance the running of the media assets. This would 
prove to be their weak point. 
A rapid series of events in 2000 all but destroyed Media-Most, as controlled by the oligarch 
Vladimir Gusinsky. State controlled Vneshekombank, a major creditor, demanded that Media-
Most repay its large loan in cash. An allegation has been made, that Yeltsin' s chief-of-staff, 
Alexander Voloshin hinted at the possible extension of the loan. But, only if Media-Most 
supported the Kremlin the upcoming elections. Negotiations turned into a stalemate, the loan 
was eventually repaid after a court battle.937 
The result of this action did not end Media-Most's siege. Gazprom's C.E.O., Rem Vyakhirev 
met with Putin in February 2000. After this meeting, Vyakhirev criticised NTVover its 
coverage of the Second Chechen War. He followed his rhetoric with action, in March 2000 
Gazprom demanded repayment of the US$211 million, which it had paid to Vneshekombank 
on Media-Most's behalf. ORThad also borrowed a substantial sum from Vneshekombank in 
1998, US$100 million, but there was no demand for immediate repayment of this 10an.938 
Pressure pitted against Media-Most proved to be umelenting. The headquarters of the media 
group were raided in May 2000. Tax police were involved in the search. The official reason 
934 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 141. 
935 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 340. 
936 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 336. 
937 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 335. 
938 Ibid. 
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given for the raid was illegal wire-tapping by the group.939 It would seem to be strange to 
involve tax police if wire-tapping transgressions were the cause for the crackdown. As stated 
earlier in this section, a commonly used tool by the authorities against uncooperative media 
are the tax police, this action would appear to be politically motivated. Gusinsky had been a 
thorn in the side of the Kremlin for some time, decisive action was required to remove this 
irritation before the possibility of the government suffering some serious PR damage. 
In June 2000 government tactics changed and key figures in the media organisation were 
singled out and targeted personally. Charges of embezzlement were laid by the state against 
Gusinsky, this related to his purchase of a St. Petersburg TV station. During the same month, 
border police blocked Gusinsky's right hand man, Igor Ma1ashenko from attending an 
international conference in Salzburg, Austria. He was neither arrested nor charged for any 
offence. 940 
The new tactics appeared to pay dividends for the Kremlin. In July 2000 charges against 
Gusinsky were abruptly dropped. A secret deal had been brokered in which Gusinsky had 
agreed to sell the controlling stake of Media-Most to Gazprom. In September 2000, it emerged 
that Lesin had signed the secret deal promising that all charges would be dropped if the sale 
proceeded.941 
Berezovsky, a long time ally of the Kremlin and a reputed 'King maker' in Russian politics 
had served Yeltsin well in the 1996 re-election bid. Part of his reward was a 49% stake in 
ORTTV. By mid-1997 - mid-1998 a divergence of position on domestic political matters 
begun to emerge between ORT and RTR. Both of these channels were majority owned by the 
government. But, Berezovsky offered to 'help' the government by paying the salaries of the 
top executives in ORT. As a result, ORTs financial dependence on Berezovsky ensured that 
the oligarch's point of view would be expressed, even if this view was not in agreement with 
the government's stance.942 
The state sought to re-establish control of ORT soon after the March 2000 presidential 
939 (1) Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 335. 
(2) McFaul, M., op. cit., p. 324. 
940 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 335. 
941 Ibid. 
942 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 331. 
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election. Initially, prosecutors began to investigate alleged embezzlement by companies 
linked to Berezovsky. In an attempt to counter the increasing pressure, Berezovsky and media 
under his control, began to criticise Putin.943 
Negotiations soon commenced, aimed at the transfer ofBerezovsky's minority stake in ORT 
to the state. In August 2000, an attempt was made to put pressure on the government. ORTs 
Dorenko criticised Putin heavily for his handling of the Kursk incident. Berezovsky tried to 
increase pressure on the government further in September 2000, when he accused a senior 
Kremlin official of threatening him with prison unless he gave up his ORT shares.944 
Berezovsky's counter was a case of too little, too late. Within a few days ofBerezovsky's 
public outcry, ORTs director cancelled Dorenko's programme and fired the two executives in 
the news department who had been nominated by Berezovsky.945 In the new political 
environment where the interests of the state were paramount, the oligarch had failed to detect 
the change and may have though of himself as being indispensable to the Kremlin. This 
proved to be a severe miscalculation on the part ofBerezovsky and he paid the price. 
As evident in the cases involving the two oligarchs mentioned above, it has become apparent 
that the state is increasing the involvement of various security agencies in bringing about 
media acquiescence to government demands. This pressure does not necessarily originate 
solely from pro-government parties in parliament. The words of an active Communist Party 
deputy Yuri Ivanov illustrate my point; 
"I am in favour of reconsidering the law on the press. What kind of a right is 
it for journalists to be allowed to conceal their sources of information? [ ... ] 
Today that law allows the press limitless arbitrary rule [ ... ] The words of 
some radical democrats should be the subject of investigation by the security 
organs.,,946 
Berezovsky's tenure on ORTwas broken as the result of debts owed. Two other privately 
943 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 335. 
944 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., 
pp. 335 - 336. 
945 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 336. 
946 Shevtsova, L., op. cit., p. 170. 
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owned TV stations, which broadcast nationally, were also the victim oftheir financial woes. 
Both TV-6 and TVS were dissolved, using a seldom used Russian law that stipulates a 
company that runs at a financial loss for more than two years, can be wound up. TV-6 fought 
this decision and won in December 2001, but an appeal to the Presidium of the Highest 
Arbitration Court saw the decision to uphold the company's liquidation in January 2002. The 
station was 75% owned by Boris Berezovsky at the time.947 On 21 June, 2003 TVS was closed 
down by the Russian Ministry of Media and the frequency was replaced by a state-owned 
Russia Sports TV channe1.948 TVS was closed down by the authorities on the grounds that it 
was in financial trouble, if applied equally, this law would also jeopardise the future of state 
owned stations, such as RTR. The apparent arbitrary application of this law has drawn some 
criticism from media rights groups.949 
According to the annual press freedom listing released by Reporters Without Frontiers in 
October 2003 (for the year 2002), Russia ranks badly, being ranked at 148th of the 166 
countries studied. To put this ranking into a meaningful perspective; Azerbaijan rated at 113, 
Ukraine at 132, of the former Soviet republics only Belarus (151), Uzbekistan (154) and 
Turkmenistan (158) were ranked lower than Russia. In 2001 Russia ranked at 121 of 139 
countries studied. Reporters Without Frontiers cited the main reasons for Russia's ranking as 
being difficulty in getting information about the Second Chechen War and a high number of 
murders of journalists. 950 
The exact level of intimidatory and violent acts that are perpetrated against journalists is 
difficult to determine and a significant variation can exist in data from different organisations 
and groups. For instance, in the International Federation of Journalists 'Report on Media 
Casualties in the Field of Journalism and Newsgathering' in 2002 quoted a total of 70 deaths 
among this group worldwide. When broken down into a country by country analysis the figure 
given for Russia was seven journalists killed for 2002.951 The Centre for Journalism in 
Extreme Situations, on the other hand, set the number of Russian journalists killed in 2002 at 
947 Russia: 2002 World Press Freedom Review, www.freemedia.at/wpfr/Europe/russia.htm. 12 December, 2002. 
948 Too Many Crooks Spoil the Broth - Russian Observer on TVS Closure, Ekho Moskvi (BBC Monitoring), 
27 June, 2003. JRL #7243, 28 June, 2003. 
949 Belin, L., Russia's TVS: Another Failed Experiment in Private Television, RFEIRL Newsline, 27 June, 2003. 
JRL #7243,28 June, 2003. 
950 Russian Press Freedom Low, The St. Petersburg Times, #914, 28 October, 2003. 
www.sptimesrussia.com/archive/times/914/news/n 10770.htrn, 28 October, 2003. 
951 International Federation of Joumalists, Journalists and Media Staff Killed in 2002, www.ifi.org, 
January 2003. 
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4.8.3 Involvement of Big Business in Censorship 
A perception seems to exist, that links the growth of private business as being inextricably 
linked to the growth of democracy, this may not always prove to be the case. An apt quote 
sums up this notion, "[ ... J the growth of private business should not be conflated with the 
growth of democracy.,,953 Not all censorship is derived directly from local or central 
govenunent. Russia's new corporate culture demands total obedience from its subsidiaries. 
The weak state of the media industry in the wake of the Soviet collapse has left them 
vulnerable to financial take-over. Another factor that works against the media's editorial 
independence is the lack of separation and distinction between big business and politics. A 
rather apt quote gives an impression of the true significance of media assets to the corporate 
sector, "[ ... J media sponsors [ ... J view their holdings as political rather than economic 
assets. ,,954 
A series of price rises coupled with a lack of state funding threw many media companies in 
to near bankruptcy. In January 1992 there was a forty-fold increase in the price of 
newsprint.955 Which was a crippling cost for newspapers to try to bear. TV and radio did not 
escape the new market rates either. The cost of transmission and transponding, which was 
controlled by the ministry of communication, accounted for between 70 - 80% of costS.956 
Although the media were now 'free,' they continued to rely heavily on the country's 
govenunent controlled resources to be able to function. 
The problem of mass media's economic viability in the new post-communist Transition State 
is proving to be crippling. This economic struggle for survival has affected all sectors of the 
media industry - radio, TV and newspapers. There are few sources of reliable or significant 
income, which come without strings attached. Consequently, this has forced media to search 
952 Russian Press Freedom Low, The St. Petersburg Times, #914, 28 October, 2003. 
www.sptimesrussia.com/archive/times/914/news/n10770.htm. 28 October, 2003. 
953 Downing, 1., op. cit., p. 24. 
954 (1) Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 338. 
(2) Oates, S., "Russian Television, Political Advertising, and the Development of a New Democracy" in Kaid, L. 
L., Editor, op. cit., p. 153. 
955 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 128. 
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for non-traditional sources of income. For example, as other sources of income declined, TV 
stations began to actively seek advertising money. The August 1998 economic crash 
destroyed advertising as a viable source of income, 70% of the advertising market simply 
vanished. This forced a more competitive approach to capture what little was left of the add 
market. Advertising rates were discounted by as much as 80%.957 
American academic Michael McFaul has summed up the plight of private media in the 
Russian Federation well, "[ ... J it is the failure of new media companies to make a profit that 
has made them vulnerable to state control.,,958 The oligarchs were able to gain control through 
exploiting this weakness as well. Although, a lack of consideration in making media a 
profitable enterprise left both Berezovsky and Gusinsky vulnerable to the Kremlin. 
A feature of the post-Soviet era has been the rise of corporate energy giants and their entry 
into the media industry. The government can have a financial interest in these corporations, 
which ultimately can mean greater governmental control over the media, but hidden through 
indirect control. Gazprom provides one such example, this energy giant has several known 
media assets under its control. Media assets include the newspapers Trud and Worker's 
Tribune and the magazine Profil.959 
In late 1996, the newspaper Izvestiya was sold to the energy giant Lukoil. The paper's editor-
in-chief, Igor Golembiovsky insisted that editorial independence would be retained by 
Izvestiya. An article appeared in the paper in April 1997, which accused the Prime Minister, 
Victor Chernoyrdin of accumulating massive wealth while in office. It was at this stage that 
Lukoil and Golembiovsky clashed.960 
Izvestiya sought help from Yeltsin, then sold a major stake of shares to Oneksimbank to fend 
off Lukoil. Instead of assisting the paper Oneksimbank joined ranks with Lukoil and ousted 
Golembiovsky. A mass exodus of journalists from the paper followed. The end result was that 
the corporate shareholders' interests were reflected in the paper's content, editorial freedom 
956 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 130. 
95? Mickiewicz, E. P. (2001), op. cit., p. 41. 
958 McFaul, M., op. cit., p. 324. 
959 Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., Editors, op. cit., p. 101. 
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was 10st.961 
4.8.4 Bureaucratic Instruments of Censorship 
The government does not necessarily need to use physical bullying and stand over tactics to 
achieve what is wanted. As the country's law maker and administrator, the Kremlin is able to 
either alter the legal framework or call upon the might of the many bureaucratic institutions. 
One of the most powerful government institutions in Russia is the ministry of press and 
information. Its head, Mikhail Lesin has the ability and power to determine the fate of all 
media enterprises in the Russian Federation. The ministry was created in 2000, Lesin being 
appointed to head the new ministry in July of that year. Although a very new body in terms of 
its existence, the ministry has made an impact on the functioning of the media (and those who 
use or own the media). Lesin's roots can be traced back some four years prior to this event. He 
has become thought of as somewhat of a villain in the media industry, in July 2000 Lesin 
topped the 'Enemies of the Press' list. 962 The Russian Union of Journalists compiled this list. 
Lesin has been actively involved in attempting to stifle opposition to the Kremlin on 
numerous occasions. He uses his broad powers to curb or bend the media to achieve political 
ends. This is most noticeable during an approaching election. One of the most powerful tools 
at the disposal of the media ministry is the power to revoke broadcasting licences. If a TV or 
radio station receive two warnings from the media ministry, a review is initiated to determine 
whether the broadcasting licence will be extended or not. Lesin has also proposed that print 
media be subject to licensing requirements. 963 The licensing requirements currently faced by 
TV and radio ensure that the government is able to exert pressure, by threatening to revoke or 
not to renew a licence. Print media are free of this imposition at the moment, which gives a 
measure of independence from government pressure. Lesin's proposal would give the Kremlin 
an opportunity to have an enhanced ability to dictate editorial policy to print media. 
Less than one month before the presidential election in March 2000, Lesin announced that 
owing to the two warnings received by ORT and TV Tsentr, their broadcasting licences would 
961 Ibid. 
962 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 334. 
963 Ibid. 
310 
not be automatically renewed in May of that year. ORTwas able to regain the licence without 
incident. But, TV Tsentr's task was more problematic, they had a tender postponed several 
times. Then a court ruling nullified the second warning, the justification for not extending the 
licence. A series of meetings between Luzhkov and Lesin followed. Eventually, political 
considerations permitted the station to retain use of the frequency.964 
Another powerful institution, the Federal Commission on Competitions for TV and Radio 
Broadcasting, has been subjected to Lesin's influence. Lesin and other government 
bureaucrats hold half of the seats in the Commission. More importantly, Lesin has been 
entrusted with the deciding vote. In February 2000, one month prior to the presidential 
elections, two radio stations controlled by Moscow City authorities lost their FM frequencies 
in an open tender. Luzhkov decried the act as political discrimination.965 The political 
discrimination allegation relates to Moscow's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov was a co-leader of OVR 
and was running against Putin. Luzhkov's media assets, which were owned by Moscow City, 
were openly pro-OVR and anti-Kremlin. 
As I explained earlier in the work, the Kremlin has been installing trusted people into key 
posts, which relate to the flow of information (such as bureaucratic institutions and state-
owned media). I have already mentioned the role of Mikhail Lesin and Sergei Yastrzhembsky, 
other posts have been filled also. 
A long-time news director and later president of NTV, Oleg Dobrodeev, left the station in 
early 2000. He was appointed by Putin to head RTR, a state channel. The station's coverage of 
the Chechen War proved to be entirely loyal to the Kremlin. The level of trust which Putin's 
administration has placed in Dobrodeev was shown in August 2000. After the Kursk sank in 
August 2000, only RTR was allowed close to the scene of the accident and in Putin's meeting 
with the grieving relatives. Dobrodeev ensured that he would not fail his political masters in 
this very sensitive task, by personally editing anything, which may have proved to be 
politically damaging for Putin.966 
One of the constraining factors faced by the current regime stems back to the final years of 
964 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 334. 
965 Ibid. 
966 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 338. 
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the Soviet Union. The 1990 media law forbids any interference in the media carrying out their 
work, provided that the media do not break any privacy provisions or intentionally provoke 
ethnic, religious or any other forms of intolerance. 
In order to pursue the interests of the central state further, the Kremlin has needed to use 
some of these provisions of the 1990 law. Although this may be stretching the letter ofthe 
law, and goes against the spirit of the law it can provide a 'smoke screen' for the 
government's true intentions. 
The 2001 government draft budget proposed that media subsidies be labelled as 'top secret.' 
This would make state funding of the media even less transparent. Another proposal in this 
draft budget was to task the media ministry with disbursing the funds to the media's 
commercial bank accounts. Such a move would only serve to strengthen the media ministry's 
already considerable powers even further. 967 Such proposals, if brought into law would serve 
to undermine further the media's ability at any attempt to retain editorial freedom from 
government interference. Any consequences arising from these proposals would not be open 
to public scrutiny either, due to the classified nature of the information concerned. 
An increasingly commonly used method to try and bind the mass media's editorial freedom 
is through use of the law making and enforcing process. By using the legal system to enforce 
the measures of censorship, this can give the appearance of the process being conducted in a 
more objective and fair manner to the casual observer. The earlier legal measures brought into 
being by Yeltsin seemed to be aimed at regulating the new post-communist environment. 
Legal measures appeared to give some measure of protection from interference in the mass 
media's editorial freedom. By the late Yeltsin era (1998 onwards), the nature of the new laws 
give the impression that a greater proportion of the burden was beginning to be placed upon 
the media. This trend has accelerated after Putin was elected President. 
Between 1991 and 1999 approximately thirty federal statutes to regulate the mass media 
were adopted by parliament. The majority of these new legal measures generally allowed for a 
967 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., 
pp. 339 - 340. 
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free and independent press.968 As mentioned above, who bore the legal burden changed over 
time. To illustrate this point, I shall mention two specific statutes, one originating in 1991 and 
the other in 1998. 
In 1991 the statute 'On the Mass Media' was passed. To date, it has undergone revision no 
less than seven times. This statute gives an impression of offering a measure of guarantee 
against governmental interference. A series of checks and balances ensure that a licence may 
not be arbitrarily removed. 
• The state is required to issue two written warnings within one year. 
III If the alleged violations persist, the case must go before a court in order for the prosecutor 
to seek a closure order.969 
By 1998 however, the wording of new statutes started the process of placing the legal burden 
upon the media industry. Summary measures could be instituted and the wording of the new 
laws began to change. The 1998 statute 'On Licensing of Certain Types of Activity' is a clear 
example of the beginning of this new trend. 
~ Allows for the annulment of licence to broadcast without prior warnings from the 
licensing body. 
• Permits a suspension of licence for a period of up to six months if the following is 
believed to have been broken; "[ ... ] violations of conditions of the licence that could be 
harmful to the rights, lawful interests, morals and health of citizens, as well as to the 
defence and security of the state." (Article 13)970 
Examining the wording of Article 13 ofthe 1998 statute 'On Licensing of Certain Types of 
Activity' certain themes and discourses are seen to be emerging. Firstly, the broadcasting 
licence may be revoked instantly (no checks or balances) on the assumption that a code of 
conduct has been breached. No solid evidence is needed to substantiate the allegation. In 
effect, an uncooperative broadcaster can be shutdown for a period of up to six months. 
968 Richter, A., "Media Regulation: Foundation Laid for a Free Speech" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., pp. 115 - 154, p. 121. 
969 Richter, A., "Media Regulation: Foundation Laid for a Free Speech" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 126. 
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A second issue, which arises from Article 13, is the highly loaded wording of this piece of 
legislation. Themes that are now part of the contemporary discourse can be seen emerging 
from the text. One of these themes is the government's self-appointed role as the protector of 
the public's morals, rights and interests. In this role, the government is also the responsible for 
setting the parameters of what is good for the public, and what is not good. 
Lastly, the very important role of the defence of the state is openly referred to as a legitimate 
reason to curb the activities of the press. Legislation that had been passed previously had 
already addressed this issue thoroughly and made a clear statement on state security. This 
measure is somewhat different, in so far as the consequences for breaking a somewhat vague 
legal definition has more drastic repercussions on the media outlet concerned. 
The Dean of Moscow State University's Journalism Faculty, Yassen Zassoursky has given a 
good account of the legitimisation process used on the 'Etatist' approach to media control. 
"[ ... J media owners and advertisers press for commercial gains. They treat 
the freedom of the press as a licence to gain profits by attracting huge 
audiences with sensational and cheap entertainment [ ... ]."971 
An important and far-reaching piece oflegislation was passed in 2000, it gave an indication 
of the Putin administration's political strategy and orientation. The 'Doctrine of Information 
Security of the Russian Federation' appeared in full in Rossiiskaya Gazeta on September 28, 
2000 in much the same way as new laws and Communist Party activity was highlighted in the 
Soviet era press.972 
Part one section one of the Security Doctrine outlines the philosophy and reasoning behind 
the government's initiative. An extract from this part, titled 'The National Interests of the 
Russian Federation in the Information Area and their Ensuring' reads as follows: 
"The interests of society in the information area consist in ensuring the 
970 Richter, A., "Media Regulation: Foundation Laid for a Free Speech" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 127. 
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Sphere" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 159. 
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interests of the individual in this area, promoting democracy, creating a law-
governed social state, achieving and maintaining accord in society, and 
promoting Russia's spiritual revival. ,,973 
A lot of emphasis has been placed on the government's role of ensuring accurate information 
in the mass media. At face value, this would appear to be an attempt by the government to 
fulfil the role of society's gatekeeper. The government tries to justify the measures of the 
Security Doctrine by numerous mentions in the document of numerous enemies, both foreign 
and domestic. 
The government's perceived threats to information security can be classified into three broad 
categories: 
~ The influence of foreigners in the Russian media, which may threaten citizens 'spiritual' 
and 'moral' welfare as a result of an 'irresponsible' media. Non Russian Orthodox Church 
religious activity is one of the listed perceived threats. "[ ... ] to combat the negative 
influence of foreign religious organisations and missionaries."974 
Another 'insidious' spectre to emerge in the ranks of foreign threats is the resurrection of 
negative influence from foreign governmental agencies. 
"[ ... ] activities of foreign political, economic, military intelligence and 
information structures directed against the interest of the Russian Federation 
in the information area; [ ... ] a striving by some countries to dominate and 
infringe on Russia's interests in the world information space, to dislodge it 
from the external and internal information markets.,,975 
CII A second concern or threat raised is that of the internal threat. The internal threats were 
seen to be emanating from criminal organisations and a lack of a centralised government 
bureaucracy. 
972 For a full transcript of the doctrine refer to Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. 
cit., pp. 251 - 292. 
973 Appendices, "Doctrine ofInfonnation Security" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., 
Editors, op. cit., p. 252. 
974 Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 276. 
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"[ ... J the efforts of public associations to violently change the foundations of 
the constitutional regime and violate the integrity of the Russian Federation, 
to fan social, race, ethnic and religious strife, and to popularise these ideas 
in the mass media. ,,976 
III The third category is the government's view that the lack of governmental control over the 
mass media's development and direction, as another threat. Mentioned throughout the 
Doctrine is the concept of an active information war. As a result of the information war 
and the perceived foreign threat, the government has rationalised the need to exercise 
more effective control over the flow of information, i.e. act in the capacity as gatekeeper. 
These concerns are clearly expressed in the text of the Doctrine of Information Security. 
The perceived threats have been addressed with the following wording: 
"[ ... J blocking the activity of the state mass information media in informing Russian and 
foreign audiences.,,977 
"[ ... J insufficient state control over the development of Russia's information market.,,978 
The text of the Doctrine ofInformation Security puts into writing many of the newly 
emerging discourses that appear aimed at restoring a strong centralised state. During the 
course of the document, the state identifies what it perceives as the enemies of the people and 
nominates itself as the sole protector of the citizens' well-being. 
However, some ofthe justifications for creating such a policy document in the first instance 
appear to be flawed or misguided as current legislation already exists. An example of this is 
the mention made of inhibiting public associations from spreading various kinds of hatred and 
violence through the mass media. The 1993 Russian Constitution's provisions covering the 
freedom of speech already cover this possible eventuality more than adequately and in a clear 
and concise style. A stated aim of officials has been to create a responsible press, the effect of 
the recent laws will be to make the press responsible to government officials. 
975 Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 259. 
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The method of placing 'reliable' people into key areas of media organisations is becoming 
more common place again. This trend has been especially noticeable since mid-2002, in 
relation to individuals with close connections to the Kremlin being appointed to pivotal posts 
within the state-owned media. This move could be perceived as being a possible early 
preparation for the 2003-2004 electoral cycle. 
On the 17th of June, 2002 Marat Gelman announced in an interview to the newspaper Gazeta 
that he had been appointed to be the Deputy General Director in charge of political analysis 
and public relations for ORT. He was quoted as saying that: 
"I will help correctly form the policy of the programmes. [ ... J I will help 
ORT find the right tone.,,979 
Gelman has been an influential member of Moscow's artistic community since the 
mid-1990's, he has patronised a significant number of modern artists and writers though his 
assets that include an art gallery, publishing house and Internet activities. He also ran a 
political consulting business, which had among its clients the political party Union of Right 
Forces. Until late 2001, Gelman worked at Gleb Pavlovsky's Foundation/or Effective 
PolitICS and withdrew from this pro-Kremlin organisation in May 2002 when he handed back 
his shares. Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper featured an article that cited unnamed sources 
as saying the heads of ORT and RTR had been reprimanded by Kremlin officials for 
promoting Putin in a manner that was too obvious and was considered to be 
counterproductive.980 Bearing this in mind, Gelman appears to be an attempt to address this 
imbalance, applying a more sophisticated approach to promoting the President. 
Another appointment was made in the sphere of the state-owned media in June 2002. Novye 
Izvestia wrote about the appointment ofFSB Lieutenant-General Alexander Zdanovich, Chief 
for the FSB's Department for Cooperative Programmes, to a senior executive position in 
VGTRK. An official report stated the appointment in a neutral manner. 
"Lieutenant-General Alexander Zdanovich, chief of the FSB department for 
978 Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 259. 
979 Zolotov Jr., A., ORT Gets New Pre-Election Strategist, The Moscow Times, 18 June, 2002. JRL #6314, 
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cooperation programs, has been appointed deputy chair of the All-Russian 
Television and Radio Company (VGTRK), responsible for security.,,981 
Zdanovich is not the sole representative from the security services to find himself being an 
overseer of state-owned media. There are other notable examples where this has occurred. 
* General Kobaladze (Foreign Intelligence Service) appointed Deputy General Director 
of ITAR-TASS 
* General Aksionov (Interior Ministry) appointed head of TV-7 
* General Vladimir Kozlov (one of creators and leaders ofFSB Anti-Terrorist Centre) 
was appointed Deputy Media Minister 
• General Manilov (Defence Ministry) appointed to Mediasoyuz. 982 
The method of the government nominating key state media personnel from the rames of the 
security services was a well known aspect of the Soviet period. It has the effect of 
intemalising the mechanisms of censorship within a given media organisation. 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
A quote from editor of the trade magazine Sreda, Alexei Pamcin, is a fitting way to begin this 
summary. "The Press can write the truth about anybody, but not its owner.,,983 This reflects on 
an earlier remark in this work, that a media outlet reflects the values and interests of its owner. 
A certain set of unwritten rules existed during the Soviet times, mass media and the Soviet 
State were entangled in a mutually beneficial relationship, they supported each other and 
relied on each other to ensure the survival of the Soviet system. The State relied on media, as 
was reflected through Socialist Realism, to perpetuate a myth and to sustain the public's 
acceptance of the system. Mass Media relied on the State to fund their activities and were able 
to enjoy a comfortable and stable lifestyle. 
The system of mutual reliance, between the State and mass media broke down in the later 
980 Ibid. 
981 Yakov, V., The FSB On Air, Novye Izvestia, 5 June, 2002. JRL #6290,5 June, 2002. 
982 Ibid. 
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period of the Soviet Union and was dismantled in the Yeltsin era (1991 - 1999). Alliances 
were loose and were prone to shifting, changes in circumstances did at times lead to changes 
in allegiances. Individual media companies became more concentrated, in terms of ownership, 
being organised into media empires by the oligarchs who bought them, not to make financial 
profit, but for gaining what Ivan Zassoursky describes as political capital. That is influence in 
the Kremlin, to further enrich themselves during the privatisation process. During this era, 
media outlets were generally not run on a profit making basis. This was both a strength and a 
weakness. A strength being, that media did not need to rely on the goodwill of advertisers 
when covering news. For instance, if an advertising customer was unhappy with some news 
that could be potentially damaging for them, they may withdraw their advertising revenue, 
which could hurt a media outlet. Naturally, news coverage that reflected badly on the owner 
of the media outlet was understood by employees as offbounds, as were the political and 
business allies of the owner. Attacks and exposes against rivals, whether the allegations were 
or could be substantiated or not, were not discouraged. 
A significant change in relations between media and the State occurred with Putin being 
elected as President in March 2000. The previous running of the State, by concession and 
compromise with business and political figures to ensure Y eltsin' s continuation as President 
no longer applied. A new focus on a powerful and centralised State, the SUbjugation of 
individual interests for the betterment of the collective (i.e. Russia). Such policies and 
sentiment can be detected in the rhetoric and doctrine of the Putin administration. Not long 
after Putin declared the intention of bringing a 'single information space' to fruition, a new set 
of guidelines and laws sent a message to the media community, communicating the behaviour 
and relationships that were going to be expected by the new regime. 
The Doctrine of Information Security was a crucial step that sent a clear signal to the media 
industry, as to what may be expected in the future. In the year 2000 the Russian Security 
Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov, he stated the new rules of media-Kremlin relations. 
"The role of the later (the State), from my point of view, is reduced to not 
hindering the former (mass media), on the condition that they do not violate 
the law. [ ... J Since Soviet times, the mass media in Russia have traditionally 
been viewed not only and not so much as a source of information, but also 
as an effective instrument of solving important social problems. Today the 
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press, both printed and electronic, is losing its communicative function, 
which is its main function for society, and is doing so on its own initiative. 
Now the private mass media primarily reflects the interests of the political 
and economic elites. Tough totalitarian technologies predominate. ,,984 
Ivanov's speech highlights several key elements to the new relationship between the federal 
State and the mass media. The new rules put an effective end to the lack of direction from the 
centre, which characterised the Yeltsin years (an exception to this being the 1996 presidential 
elections). Mass media were expected to act within the law, laws are dictated by the State, 
therefore media accountability was being handled by civil servants who enforced the will of 
the State. So, in an indirect way, media are being made more accountable to the State. New 
laws that have come into force enhance the ability of the State to place limitations on topics 
covered and to close down media outlets immediately, without lengthy delays due to court 
hearings. The new regulations that are introduced by the authorities are promoted in a manner 
that seems logical or beneficial. For instance, private media groupings were said to be no 
more than mouthpieces of their owner, who used them to gain political capital. This is of 
course true, the solution offered by the authorities was framed that for the sake of public good 
and the mass media's good, the State could take a more active role through breaking up the 
media empires (of Gusinsky and Berezovsky). 
The role of the mass media in Russian society, from a historical point of view, is touched 
upon too. That is, mass media are viewed as a tool for public or societal education. Mass 
media are considered to be potent shapers of image and opinion, some mediums more so than 
others (TV is considered to be the more influential medium). The extent to which messages 
transmitted via mass media influence the thought and behaviour of the audience is a matter of 
debate. It is this attribute, which is attached to the media that make it an attractive proposition 
for prominent figures in big business and politics. Ivanov makes the point about these 
properties in the above mentioned quote. 
However, as alluded to in Ivanov's comments and mentioned earlier in this summary, the 
media had moved away from the business of conveying information on a profit making basis 
to conveying opinion and ideas with little regard to the economic side of business. This was a 
984 Russian Security Council Secretmy Speaks About Private and Foreign Media in Russia, Interfax, 29 
November, 2000. JRL #4661,30 November, 2000. 
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strength, but attached with this was a weakness, mass media were not profitable enterprises in 
a market economy, which meant that funds were required to sustain them. The euphoria of the 
early post-Soviet period evaporated when the realisation of having to adapt to a new system 
was thrust upon the mass media. The media outlets were forced to find funding from a source 
other than the State, which in practical terms meant the oligarchs as they were among the few 
with enough financial resources to invest in the media industry. The new owners (the 
oligarchs) did not seem to learn this lesson after they took over a share of media assets and as 
stated above, did not run them on a profit making basis. Instead money was borrowed to keep 
the media branches of the private corporate empires functioning. Due to the proximity of 
business to politics, money was often sources from state run or controlled financial or 
corporate institutions. In times of cooperation, this system worked for both parties, the 
Kremlin received favourable coverage from privately operated and owned media and the 
oligarchs were able to keep their media arm of business working. 
It is however, during times of conflict that the greatest test of a system's durability comes. 
The 1999 - 2000 electoral cycle is one such period oftension and conflict. Journalism in the 
Russian Federation is without doubt a dangerous profession, some 200 journalists have been 
killed since December 1991. Although a change in methods used to intimidate and manipulate 
media is taking place. Legal options are becoming a popular tool with which to stifle or 
silence media content on sensitive issues and topics. The electoral laws provide ample 
opportunity to control what is being said in the media, framed as an effort to ensure a free and 
fair election without undue media interference or bias. Russian Civil Law 151 is another 
example of one ofthe 'modem' tools of censorship, which can be used to intimidate media 
outlets from writing about personalities (concerning defamation of character - defence of 
honour and reputation). The habit of borrowing has come back to haunt private media too. 
NTV, Berezovsky's share of ORT, TV-6 and TVS have all been shutdown with the aid of one 
important common factor, their poor financial performance and weak economic state. 
A final point for discussion in this summary is the image of journalists and journalism in 
Russian society. During the era of glasnost journalists were seen as being responsible for the 
new changes that were occurring in Soviet society, it was an era of many high hopes and 
expectations for the future. The mass media carried many exposes of the excesses committed 
in the name ofthe State. Therefore some seemed to identify journalists as being in an 
'opposition' camp to the authorities, although they were an integral part of Gorbachev' s 
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reforms and helped carry his message to the Soviet public. The popularity of leading figures 
of the media industry was manifested in several of their number being elected to parliament. 
This 'love affair' with the media continued into the early post-Soviet period, when the nature 
of journalism in Russia began to change and follow more of a tabloid format. As big business 
bought into the media and began to use it for their own political and business purposes, by the 
use oftechniques such as 'Black PR' or otherwise known as kompromat. With such intrigues 
being conducted through the media, the audience was not so interested in the content of news 
stories, but the person(s) behind it and the purpose of the news. Such public cynicism was 
reinforced by the revelation of the common practice of zakazukha, the printing of stories 
(often hidden advertising) for a price without checking the veracity of the story and the 
source. Former ORT anchor and ally of Berezovsky, Sergei Dorenko nicknamed Telly Killer, 
epitomises what many find despicable in the standards of modem Russian journalism. 
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CHAPTER V: CHECHEN WARS. 
5.0 Chapter Objectives 
The Second Chechen War has had a profound impact, both physically and psychologically, 
upon the Russian Federation. It is the contention ofthe Kremlin not to let Chechnya secede 
from the Russian Federation. This may be due in part to a possible 'domino theory' scenario. 
If Moscow allows one region to leave the Federation, others may quickly follow. The 
Chechen problem has been internationalised by the authorities, which have sought to tie world 
problems with events in the Chechen repUblic. "The situation in the republic has become 
complicated to such a level that the territory has become a springboard for the expansion of 
international terrorism into Russia. ,,985 
The conflict has been termed as an 'anti-terrorist' operation, thus not invoking the necessary 
protocols that come with the use of the term war. Chechnya has been framed with the use of 
the a new catch phrase, that of 'national security.' This term has by no means been restricted 
to or solely used by the Russian Federation. 
"One of the most frequent and evocative terms in political discussion is 
'national security,' a symbol that generates fear of enemies of the state."986 
According to some statements, it would appear that Russia's leadership believes that to grant 
Chechnya its independence would spell the end of the Russian State. The assumption is 
formed on the basis, that other regions would want their independence too. A mentality, which 
is similar to the 'Domino Effect,' in which America became embroiled in a 'struggle' to halt 
the spread of communism, culminating in such events as Vietnam and Grenada. 
The nature of contemporary warfare has changed significantly. If public opinion is harnessed 
effectively enough, it may be able to exert significant pressure upon the political elite. 
Possibly for this reason, modem warfare is nicely 'packaged' and 'sold' to the public often 
before hostilities commence. In 1986, American president Ronald Reagan justified the 
bombing of Libya as "the peaceful mission of America to counter the savagery of the brutal 
985Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & Zassoursky, Y., Editors, op. cit., p. 259. 
986 Edelman, M., The Politics of Misinformation, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 7. 
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enemy wherever he threatens freedom.,,987 
Social analyst of war Arthur Bullard recognised the need to generate a flood of publicity to 
generate public support for war. 
"First, last and all the time, the effectiveness of our warfare will depend on 
the amount of ardour we throw into it [ ... J The prime duty of our 
government, the first step in any mobilisation, must be the awakening of our 
interest [ ... J call to arms, which will electrify public opinion."988 
Bullard went further, to create a blueprint for a government to use to accomplish the goal of 
promoting war. There were two main points to be fulfilled if the government was to be 
successful. 
~ Organise a "publicity bureau, which would constantly keep before the public the 
importance of supporting men at the front." 
~ Government must "organise propaganda campaigns to make the struggle comprehensible 
and popular.,,989 
When the Gulf War conflict occurred, the art of 'informing' the public had been 
revolutionised. Part of this 'revolution' was found in the use of language. A specialist 
technological language was used to soften the image of war. Media / PR aspects were no 
longer an ad hoc peripheral component, but had become an integral part of the overall strategy 
for prosecuting a war. 
"Warfare planning now builds into its core a media policy. Opposition 
leaderships are demonised in preparation for the war. In fact such 
demonisations are usually a good indication that a war is coming.,,99o 
One of the methods used to gain public acquiescence to going to war is to create the image 
987 Gonzalez, A. & Tanno, D. A., Editors, Politics, Communication and Culture, Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications, 1997, p. 15. 
988 Ewen, S., op. cit., p. 107. 
989 Ibid. 
990 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 178. 
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of vulnerability, which generates fear. If society feels safe in their homes, at their work and 
social gatherings they will be less inclined to wanting to be committed to war. 
"[ ... J images of enemy were built on a bedrock of fear, invoking an 
ineluctable climate of xenophobia paranoia. Many images portrayed an 
inscrutable enemy, lurking around every corner, threatening even the most 
apparently innocent circumstances."991 
S.l The First Chechen War, 1994 - 96 
The first attempt at armed Russian intervention in the breakaway Chechen republic occurred 
in 1991. Yeltsin attempted an invasion of Chechnya late in that year. This was conducted with 
no specific media strategy pre-empting the military strike, the reSUlting public outcry resulted 
in a forced reversal of government action. This in turn, caused the military to place censorship 
on all campaign coverage. Some leaks of information still occurred after censorship was 
imposed by the military.992 The government's overall planning, strategy and co-ordination was 
very poor, which affected the popularity of the conflict with the public and this flowed on to 
affect the Kremlin's ability to deal with the repUblic. They had to take into consideration 
public opinion, which was firmly against the action. The state was in a weak condition, the 
Soviet Union was collapsing and along with this the ability of a central authority to assert its 
will. 
In the prelude to the 1994 - 1996 Chechen War, Yeltsin employed a set media strategy prior 
to commencement of the conflict. The war began covertly at first. This action was partly 
obscured by large-scale governmental denial over the involvement of Russia's armed forces in 
Chechnya.993 The lessons of the abortive attempt to intervene in Chechnya had been learned. 
How was the Russian public 'prepared' for the planned offensive on the repUblic? 
From late 1993, a carefully laid government strategy aimed to vilify all Chechens. High 
profile examples were held in the public's full view. The speaker of the Russian parliament, 
Rus1an Khasbulatov was arrested on the political opposition's claim that he was linked to the 
991 Ewen, S., op. cit., p. 123. 
992 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 136. 
993 Ibid. 
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Chechen Mafia. Chechens were rounded up on Moscow's streets and summarily deported. By 
the time of the invasion, govemment propaganda had Chechnya as the heartland of organised 
crime. The propaganda had even gone as far as to influence meaning and usage in the Russian 
language. Chechens were commonly referred to as 'bandity,' in reference to thuggery rather 
than acts of banditry. There were similarities in this strategy to those used by the Soviet media 
to portray Afghani guerrillas during the 1980'S.994 
The strategy seemed to be relatively straightforward. By casting the upcoming conflict in a 
binary manner, the public may see contest in a simplistic good versus bad scenario. Chechens 
were typecast as the villains of this particular production, therefore by deduction, the Russians 
represented the hero figure. It was to be billed as an unruly, mass of banditry against the 
methodical Russian rule of law. 
On the conflict's eve, most Russian media were hostile to the Chechen cause. As a direct 
result of this bias, Russian TV was banned from Chechnya in August 1994 and the banning of 
all Russianjoumalists soon followed in September 1994.995 Chechen authorities seemed to 
have concluded that they would not benefit from having Russian media present, as the news 
would be highly critical ofthem. If the news would have been neutral or positive, the 
Chechens stood to gain a measure of sympathy from the Russian public, as had been the case 
in 1991. 
The Kremlin tried to apply a 'spin' to the war. This marked a shift from the previous tactic of 
using silence. In 1994 an information centre was established by the military, to provide the 
public with sanitised information. However, this information centre did not begin to operate 
until one week after hostilities broke out. Additionally the information provided was very 
sparse.996 An attempt was made to have media coverage of the war orchestrated, which 
succeeded up to December 1994. However, this media campaign ultimately failed, for a 
number of reasons. 
• public opinion was firmly against the invasion. They did not want to risk the lives of 
Russian servicemen and Russian civilians living in Chechnya. 
994 Downing, J., op. cit., pp. 136 - 137. 
995 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 137. 
996 Mickiewicz, E. P. (1999), op. cit., p. 244. 
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til The Kremlin was unable to silence the voices of opposition. Public figures such as deputy 
defence minister Boris Gromov, General Lebed and Yelena Bonner 
(widow of Andrei Sakharov) added weight to the anti-war cause.997 
NTVbroke ranks, by running an uncensored story, which contradicted the government's 
version of events. As a consequence of this' indiscretion,' they were threatened with the 
cancellation of their broadcasting licence. Tension between Media Most and the Kremlin was 
strained further on December 2, 1994 when the media group's offices were raided by masked 
paramilitaries who held staff and assaulted some of the staff members. The official reason 
given for conducting the raid was the group's alleged criminal connections.998 
As the federal forces prepared for their final build-up in Chechnya, a vigorous attempt was 
launched to silence opposition. Use of kompromat was employed against political opposition. 
Gromov was relieved of his authority over the air force. The Most group was criticised by 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta (which was controlled by Yeltsin). An article claimed that the Most group 
had seconded staff to Luzhkov's election campaign and claimed that the group was empire 
building by trying to acquire St. Petersburg TV, Ostanldno TV and Moskovsky Komsomolets. 
The paper went on to accuse Most of supporting Luzhkov' s political ambitions and for 
supporting the West against Russia's 'national aspirations.'999 
Both President Yeltsin and the Defence Minister Pavel Grachev were directly involved in 
trying to actively discredit NTV publicly. Among their allegations against NTV were that the 
network was unpatriotic, NTVwas making money at Russia's expense and they were in the 
pay ofthe Chechen leadership.lOoo 
These allegations are based on seemingly no substantial evidence, being made on the 
premise of throw enough mud and eventually some will stick. The meaning hidden within the 
government inspired message seems to play on deep-rooted Russian fears. By reading 
between the lines, it is possible to interpret the message in the following way; 
til Most group supports political opposition to the founder of the Russian republic. 
997 Downing, J., op. cit., pp. 137 - 138. 
998 Downing, J., op. cit., p. 138. 
999 Ibid. 
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They are going to attempt to influence the public by taking over the media. This will lead 
to a massive propaganda campaign via media controlled by the group. 
III Most are working to destroy Russia, by working for the West (the enemy) in an effort to 
further weaken the Russian State. 
The message is high on emotional rhetoric, but would appear to lack any deep substance to 
the scattering of rumour and allegation. Thus, it seems that the main purpose of this 
communication is to discredit Most in the public's mind. If this is achieved, the credibility of 
news that originates from Most controlled media may be perceived to be tainted. 
Use of pressure on state-owned media by the government was common, to ensure that they 
stayed strictly in accordance with the official viewpoint. The use of pressure issue is normally 
a difficult accusation to substantiate owing largely to the usual wall of silence from 
governmental sources. However, Premier Victor Chernomyrdin once admitted to using 
pressure on state media to stay with the official view. 1001 
Alternative tactics seemed to be the norm when dealing with private media that offered a 
point of view, differing from the official version of events. The Kremlin seemed to use public 
denunciations and threats against broadcasting licences in order to receive the desired 
outcome. In June 1995 the chairman of the Duma Chechnya Committee denounced NTV, 
Komsomolets and Komsomolskaya Pravda for their coverage of an army massacre at 
Samashki, Chechnya. He claimed that their coverage was "a revolt against the president, the 
government and the Russian people as a whole.,,1002 This rhetoric is very close to the 
denunciations used during Stalin's Great Terror in the 1930's. In this case, the media were the 
new enemies of the people, their crime being that they did not do as they were told. 
In addition to the rhetoric and threats of licence revocation on the media, a series of physical 
attacks and intimidation were directed at media personnel in Chechnya. In May 1995, Alexei 
Simonov of the media watchdog Glasnost Defence Foundation released a report on media 
'casualty statistics' up to that point in the conflict. 
1000 Mickiewicz, E. P. (1999), op. cit., p. 246. 
1001 Downing, l, op. cit., p. 139. 
1002 Ibid. 
III 105 journalists arrested 
fI 46 journalists had film or video equipment illegally confiscated 
fI 8 journalists were beaten 
611 6 journalists were killed 
III 2 journalists reported missing. lo03 
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These statistics were compiled less than one year in to the First Chechen War. The fighting 
for control of Chechnya and the media would continue in to 1996. Reading this list bears 
testimony to the intensity ofthe conflict, not only for re-establishing the Kremlin's control 
over the breakaway republic, but also for control of the nation's media assets. 
The Russian Union of Journalists (RUJ) also compiled statistics for part of the First Chechen 
War. Figures relate to the period November 1994 - December 1995. 
Ell 14 journalists killed, 3 of them from foreign press 
III 4 journalists reported missing, 1 from the foreign press 
III 146 journalists detained 
e 16 journalists had film and video or audio equipment illegally confiscated. 1004 
By the conclusion of this round of hostilities in 1996, the final statistics for the war made 
sombre reading. 
III 20 journalists killed (11 of these were residents ofChechnya) 
III 9 journalists were reported missing 
Ell 36 journalists were wounded 
III 26 journalists were assaulted 
Ell 174 journalists were arrested 
Ell 117 journalists were shot at 
GIl 34 journalists were threatened 
Ell 37 journalists were had video equipment, audio equipment, camera equipment, 
1003 Downing, 1., op. cit., p. 139. 
1004 These figures were supplied to me, via e-mail from Dmitri Muraviev of the Russian Union of Journalists on 
the 14th of October, 2003. 
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videocassettes or film illegally confiscated. loos 
There is some discrepancy in the two sets of figures. This especially pertains to the figures 
for equipment that was illegally seized. It is possible, given the different categories used by 
the two organisations (RUJ, GDF and Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situations - CJES) 
that different sampling methods or means of collecting and analysing data were used. 
Governmental credibility was slowly eroded in the eyes of the public. The contradictions, 
which began to creep in to the news even from information obtained from different 
government departments had an effect. Public scepticism that was produced in this 
environment resulted in the public having little faith in the official view of the First Chechen 
War. 
The Russian government lost the information war during the First Chechen campaign. A 
major reason for this was, when the government chose a media strategy it was the use of 
silence. Media access to military sources was banned this forced the media to seek their 
information elsewhere. Chechen sources were only to willing and ready to relay their version 
of reality to the Russian public via the Russian media. 1006 
The Chechen Information Minister Movladi Udugov was credited by some Russians as being 
responsible for defeating them in the information war that raged between the Chechens and 
Russians during the First Chechen War. Throughout the conflict he worked closely with 
foreign journalists covering the war in an effort to disseminate as widely as possible the 
Chechen side of the conflict. lo07 
Udugov's success in the information war was aclmowledged sometime later in an article 
written by Kremlin spin-doctor Gleb Pavlovsky. In the aftermath of the events on the 
American mainland, following September 11, 2001, Pavlovsky identifying himself as a 
political scientist stated that it was the aim of terrorists to initiate a worldwide war. He linked 
1005 Unpublished report on Chec1mya by the Director of the Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situations, Oleg 
Panfilov, destined for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, p. 8. Sent to me, via e-mail by 
Oleg Panfilov on the 13th of October, 2003. 
1006 Koltsova, 0., "News Production in Contemporary Russia: Practices of Power" in European Journal of 
Communication, Volume 16, issue 3, London, Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 315 - 335, p. 332. 
1007 Guzman, D., Chechnya: Rebels use Internet in Propaganda War With Russia, 30 May, 2000. 
www.hrea.org/listslhuridocs-techlmarkup/msg00516.html, 14 August, 2002. 
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events and made some comments regarding the First Chechen War and its effect and Russian 
mass conSCIOusness. 
"A strike delivered in one place will not down all the systems. Our mass 
consciousness is sufficiently stable. It got over numerous strong 
manipulations. The First Chechen War, when a serious attempt was made to 
influence the mass consciousness by creating an image of bloody events, 
included. Movladi Udugov staged his productions staged his productions for 
the entire Russian mass consciousness rather than Chechnya alone. And was 
successful enough too." 1 008 
5.2 UN and NATO Press Operations as a Model 
The disastrous results of the First Chechen War humbled Russia and forced her to rethink the 
military strategy. Their abysmal efforts in trying to maintain control over the flow of 
information compounded the government's problem. They went into a war without a clear-cut 
media strategy and ultimately they paid the price. 
The assessment of the press strategies employed by the UN and NATO are intended to be a 
gauge against the originality of the Russian media strategy employed during the Second 
Chechen War. It has taken the United States some twenty years of development, to arrive at 
the present tactics. But, has Russia developed its own original means for managing the press, 
or are they employing or modifying the American model? 
5.2.1 A Background 
After the loss of public support and the humiliation of the American withdrawal from South 
Vietnam in 1972, the American authorities began to look for what went 'wrong.' And more 
importantly, to ensure that the same 'mistake' is not repeated again. Whether this contention 
was a genuine belief or just a convenient scapegoat is debatable. 
After analysis of the events leading up to 1972, it was deduced that the decline of public 
1008 Pavlovsky, G., Terrorists Aim is World War, www.strana.lU. 12 September, 2001. JRL #5440, 13 September, 
2001. 
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support in American involvement was a major contributing factor. Those who were blamed 
for 'taking away' the crucial support were the media. The apparently unrestricted filming of 
the carnage of war and beaming these images into Western living rooms created a mixture of 
revulsion and anti-war sentiment. 
The United States' governmental apparatus considered the nature of future working 
relationships between the military and media in future conflicts. An environment with a more 
controlled release of information and access to the frontlines was envisaged. 
It is my intention to briefly investigate how press operations were conducted in the West. 
Then to compare these techniques with the new information management style used by the 
Federal forces in the Second Chechen War. For the purposes of comparison, I shall use as 
examples the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 NATO campaign against Serbia. 
5.2.2 The 1991 Gulf War 
Without involving myself in the political complexities, the 1991 Gulf War was fought by a 
broad coalition of Allied forces against Iraq. The trigger for this war was Iraq's invasion and 
annexation of Kuwait. The Allied coalition fought under the United Nations banner. 
Since the Vietnam War, technology had enabled the rapid transmission of vast quantities of 
information by the media. Some in the media industry felt that they were on a 'quest' to 
educate the viewing public. Dr. Morris, controller ofBBC Northern Ireland asserted that 
journalists' work would involve "putting a context round experience [ ... J knit together verbal 
or visual symbols into some semblance ofreality."loo9 
The 1991 Gulf War events were reported by the international press and worldwide 
broadcasters. There were two main methods used to disseminate information. News consisted 
of either 'instant news' or commentaries. 'Instant news' refers to information, which has been 
abbreviated and edited to a point bulletin. Commentaries are an in-depth discussion of a key 
issue (or event) by 'experts,' politicians and correspondents. 1010 
1009 Editor Elderidge, J., Getting the Message: Truth and Power, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 4. 
1010 Elderidge, J., op. cit., pp. 10 -11. 
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Images which, the audience drew from the information supplied during the Gulf War could 
be categorised in one of several traits. The war was shown as; 
III The "war viewed as a 'high drama. ", As the events unfolded, the situation was packaged 
to an international audience, in a manner similar to a soap opera. 
III "Personalised contest between Hussein and Bush." This has the effect of making the 
scenario 'black and white.' It is easier to create a situation of perceived binary 
opposition. 
III "A ritual of civil religion that affirms community." Continuing on from the above 
mentioned point, this is done in aid of demonising the opposition as the extreme opposite 
of one's own 'good' traits. 
III "Story of American prowess, firmness of American leaders, potency of American 
technology, and bravery, skill and determination of American soldiers." These facets 
introduce an image of superiority over the opposition's forces. Not only do they have 
moral ascendancy, but military and technological superiority as well. 1011 
During the progression of the conflict, the public was bombarded with a lot of information 
via satellite communications. Some of this information was at best uninformative and some 
'news', which was presented, was untrue. Whether these actions were deliberate will not be a 
matter for discussion in this work. Two of the untrue news stories were sensationalist and 
alarmist. One report claimed that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Israel. A second 
report claimed that Israel had retaliated. 1012 The 'fog of war' obscured the extent of untrue 
stories. 
The authorities did not equally rate Media organisations, some had more prestige attached to 
their name. The broadcaster CNN was the most influential media organisation. President Bush 
ofthe United States and President Hussein ofIraq watched CNN. Their reputation was such, 
that they became a platform for informal diplomatic exchanges. 10l3 This position potentially 
placed a lot of power in the hands of this media outlet, giving it an advantage over 
competitors. 
1011 Gonzalez, A. & Tanno, D. A., Editors, op. cit., p. 13. 
1012 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 12. 
1013 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 11. 
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Infonnation and access to that infonnation was strictly controlled by the United Nations 
forces. After the bitter lessons, which the American government had learnt in the wake of the 
Vietnam War, the UN military force hierarchy appeared to take an 'us versus them' stance in 
their relationship with the media. A British journalist, Thomson attempted to obtain a ride 
with a military convoy in order to get closer to the military action. However, a British Anny 
colonel stopped him and said "get offmy land."1014 The incident was ridiculous in itself, an 
English officer telling an English citizen to "get off his land" in the Arabian desert. But, it 
certainly illustrates the resolve of the military authorities to maintain the stranglehold of being 
the sole gatekeeper in the theatre of operations. 
The military authorities devised and implemented a cunning strategy, which effectively 
divided and ruled the media community. Journalists were supplied with infonnation by the 
military. But, the infonnation that was given to the media was already 'sanitised' by the 
censors. This situation created a dilemma for some journalists, if they were not admitted to the 
pool and attempted to independently seek infonnation, they were labelled as 'Unilateralists' 
by the authorities. lOls This method saw the creation of a system of the 'haves' versus the 'have 
nots.' Journalists could be instantly rewarded or punished by their arbitrary inclusion or 
exclusion from the pool. The outcome may possibly have depended upon the authorities 
satisfaction, or otherwise, of the content of a journalist's previously published articles. 
"Journalists were fonned into 'pools' far removed from the battlefield, 
where military PRs could feed them infonnation. Pool journalists were only 
granted access to events that were strictly controlled. Censorship was 
achieved through denial of access to military engagement and news 
blackouts at the start of the war. All interviews had to be conducted in the 
presence of military escorts, and all copies and images cleared by the 
military before transmission."loI6 
Soon a rift began to develop betweenjoumalists admitted to the combat pool and the 
'Unilateralists.' A situation that was exploited by the authorities. Two incidents in particular 
highlight a growing division among elements of the media present during the Gulf War. 
1014 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 12. 
1015 Ibid. 
1016 Louw, P. E., op. cit., p. 178. 
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• Robert Fisk (Independent) tried to report on the Battle ofKhafji. Brad Willis 
(NBC) reported him to the US Marines. Willis had complained that Fisk's behaviour 
could jeopardise their continued working (all journalists risked having their accreditation 
revoked by the authorities). 
• A French film crew obtained pictures, which differed from the official pool pictures. They 
were prepared to supply those pictures to other media outlets. An American TV reporter 
shouted "Hey! They are not members of the combat pool. Arrest them!,,1017 
By creating this division and resulting binary opposition within the media, the authorities 
also created a climate in which a 'cat and mouse' game was played out between the military 
and the 'Unilateralists.' This particular game had a certain risk for the journalists involved, 
they could lose their accreditation and be under threat of expulsion from the country. Another 
inescapable point, was the fact that journalists relied on the military for information and 
protection. lOIS From a professional point of view, it would be hard to assess the effects this 
could potentially have on the objectivity of reporting. 
The 'war' to win over the media's audience was not limited to restricting which information 
could and could not be seen, but an attempt to 'taint' the legitimacy of information released by 
the opposing side. It was a concerted attempt to take the moral high-ground, aided by the 
creation by binary opposition - UN Forces (good) versus Iraqi Forces (bad).,o'9 
Generally, information which derived from the Alliance never had its accuracy or 
authenticity questioned. But, information supplied by Iraq was rigorously examined by other 
journalists and treated with suspicion by the public. 
To illustrate this point I shall use an item aired on lTV, on 26 January, 1991. The footage in 
question was on the effects of the allied bombing ofIraq. 
"The pictures were supplied by the Ministry ofInformation [ ... J as 
propaganda it graphically illustrates the suffering [ ... J (the pictures 
are) being used as a weapon [ ... J as a means to influence world opinion [ ... J 
1017 Elderidge, J., op. cit., pp. 12 - 13. 
lOIS Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 13. 
1019 Gonzalez, A. & Tanno, D. A., Editors, op. cit., pp. 14 - 15. 
Iraqi supplied material draws natural suspicions about its authenticity [ ... J 
These people are claimed by Iraq to be recent victims of the bombing, but 
they have not been independently verified as such."I020 
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With such open scepticism displayed so openly to the viewing public it was little wonder 
that the viewing public treated Iraqi sourced material with such suspicion. By planting the 
seed of doubt in the public's mind, stories that did not follow the official line were dismissed 
as being Iraqi propaganda. 1021 This situation ensured that public support for a 'just' war was 
maintained (in Western nations, at least). 
To maintain the Western hegemony in the ongoing information war between the opposing 
forces, a new, specific language was created to emphasise the righteousness of the allied cause 
(and the 'evil' intent ofIraq, embodied by the persona of Saddam Hussein). A language was 
needed to influence public opinion and perception of the war. Consequently, a new event 
specific vocabulary came into being. 
An overwhelming emphasis was placed on the technological superiority of the Alliances 
weapons over those used by Iraq. Numerous references to the use of 'smart bombs' created a 
perception of their widespread use. An inference that may be deduced from this, is a 
surgically executed aerial bombing campaign. Only 7% of the 88, 500 tonnes of aerial 
ordinance used during 'Desert Storm' were smart bombs. Some 70% of the total figure missed 
the intended target. 1022 
The vulgarity and horror of modern warfare was also sanitised. For instance, video footage 
ofIraqi soldiers being killed by bombs was never released. Carnage as witnessed by American 
viewers during the Vietnam War era was absent in the Gulf War. 1023 This had the effect of 
'softening' the war, making the concept more palatable for the public, by removing potentially 
disturbing images, which might cause them to reconsider the necessity of waging war. 
During hostilities, the military authorities used two reasons to legitimise their censoring of 
information conveyed by the media. The reasons given for banning were; 
1020 Elderidge, J., op. cit., p. 13. 
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Elderidge, J., op. cit., pp. 13 - 14. 
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CD endangering the lives of service personnel. 
CD indirectly or adversely affecting troop morale. 1024 
These parameters were liberally interpreted by the authorities, which used them as a means 
of censorship. To illustrate this point, the media were not allowed to film the flag draped 
coffins returning to American soil, on the grounds of the second point. However, a more 
likely effect would possibly be a waning of public support for the war. 1025 
Philip Knightley, a reporter aptly summed up the intent and effects of the new language, 
employed by the UN; 
"A soft new language was brought into being to soften the reality of war. 
Bombing military targets in the heart of cities was called 'denying the 
enemy infra-structure.' People were 'soft-targets.' Saturation bombing was 
'laying down a carpet.' The idea was to suggest that hardly any people were 
involved in warfare, only machines. This explains the emphasis at Alliance 
press briefings on the damage 'our' machines have caused to 'their' 
machines, and the reluctance of briefing officers to discuss casualties - on 
either side.,,1026 
The way in which information was managed during the 1991 Gulf War, was the 
successful culmination of some twenty years of fine-tuning by the government and 
the military. Information was carefully filtered, to take away the unpleasantness of 
war to make the concept more appealing to the public. Use of force was justified in 
terms of humanitarianism, to save people from suffering, to enforce international law 
and to bring a regional 'bully-boy' to account for his crimes. 
By using a different tactic, a fully conceived plan to manage information from the 
conflict's onset, the nature of media coverage changed. Media coverage during the 
Vietnam War generated much public debate which, eventually impacted upon 
1023 Elderidge, l, op. cit., pp. 13 - 14. 
1024 Croteau, D. & Hoynes, W., Media / Society: Industries, Images and Audiences, Second Edition, Thousand 
Oaks, Pine Forge Press, 2000, p. 113. 
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Elderidge, l, op. cit., p. 14. 
governmental policy, i.e. the American withdrawal. The Gulf War media coverage 
performed a different function, what was supplied was not designed to 
comprehensively inform the public on the conflict's progress, but to give the 
appearance of informing. 
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The "Gulf War story helped to shift political focus from debate to consensus and 
from protest to rallying behind the troopS."1027 Through the use of this kind of public 
appeal the government was able to generate patriotic fervour. Ultimately, the conflict 
was far removed from the American public's experience and for many, possibly even 
irrelevant. 
5.2.3 NATO's 1999 Kosovo Operation 
Russian foreign policy analyst, Vladimir Baranovsky noted Russia's response to the events, 
which unfolded in 1999; 
"It is quite remarkable that Russia's indignation with respect to NATO 
military operations in Yugoslavia was directed predominantly, indeed 
almost exclusively against the United States - as if the Europeans did not 
participate in them at all. The fact that the EU supported the war against 
Yugoslavia and even contributed to it politically, economically and 
militarily, passed almost unnoticed in Russia [ ... ] The European states 
involved in this campaign were basically viewed as operating under 
American pressure."J028 
NATO's media strategy was absolutely meticulously planned down to the smallest detail. As 
Colonel P. J. Crowley, spokesman for the United States National Security Council put it, "you 
have to plan your media strategy with as much attention as you plan your military 
strategy."I029 
Robert Lichter from the Centre for Media and Public Affairs, Washington noted possible 
1027 Gonzalez, A. & Tanno, D. A., Editors, op. cit., p. 13. 
1028 Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 417. 
1029 Knightly, P., The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth Maker From the Crimea to 
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reasons for NATO's 'hard sell' to the public. "To sell a war in a democracy when you are not 
attacked, you have to demonise the leader or show that there are humanitarian reasons for 
going in. [ ... J George Bush demonised Saddam Hussein. We did something of the same with 
Milosevic."103o A twin strategy involving the creation of binary opposition and some 'just' 
causes for waging the conflict began to evolve. 
American academic Noam Chomsky gave a possible reason why the conflict in Kosovo 
occurred in the first instance. "With the Soviet deterrent in decline, the Cold War victors are 
more free to exercise their will under a cloak of good intentions but in pursuit of interests that 
have a familiar ring outside the realm of enlightenment.,,1031 
Wartime news could be broken down into two distinct categories; news of the fighting and 
justification for the fighting. 1032 The main justification given for NATO's intervention is 
acting to stop Serbian aggression directed at Albanian Kosovars, through massacres, rape and 
eviction. 
Dr. Jamie Shea was NATO's spokesman during the Kosovo Crisis (March - June 1999). 
Shea and a group of NATO officers were able to gain a 'moral ascendancy' over the press 
corps by the way briefs were conducted. They gave the briefs from a high standing podium 
and were equipped with a vast array of technical apparatus, to provide a visual aid to their 
briefings. Journalists sat below the podium in rows of seats (as in a school classroom). The 
journalists had to attract the attention of the podium in order to ask questions. 1033 This 
situation gave a large psychological advantage to Shea and the other briefing officers. 
A certain degree of cynicism has been directed towards Shea's role. Alistair Home, a war 
historian stated that Shea relayed "the pre-digested spin that had been chewed over at length 
by a committee of NATO ruminants." Some war correspondents referred to Shea as "NATO's 
propagandist-in -chief." 1034 
NATO had learned to utilise the power of perception to create their own reality, to great 
Kosovo, London, Prion Books, 2000. 
1030 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 502. 
1031 Duffield, M., op. cit., p. 33. 
1032 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 502. 
\033 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 503. 
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advantage. Lt. Colonel Nick Clissitt, a British Army press officer clearly relayed this 
sentiment, "we have learnt that perception as just as important as reality."lo35 
Another British officer, the former commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, General Sir 
Michael Rose, was frustrated and irritated at the level of 'new speak' in NATO's 
administration. He complained bitterly that at NATO "rhetoric has taken over from 
reality.,,1036 Complaints concerning NATO information management of the Kosovo campaign 
were not limited to military personnel. 
Kosovo was one of the most widely covered conflicts in the 20th century. When NATO's 
ground forces entered the territory, some 2700 media people accompanied them (during the 
Vietnam War the peak was 500 correspondents).1037 
It was also one of the most secretive campaigns fought. Alistair Home noted that "Kosovo 
[ ... J turned out to be the most secretive campaign in living memory. We were given lots of 
material but no information."lo38 From Home's comment it seems as though NATO swamped 
the media with numerous irrelevant accounts and information. This would bypass any 
possible criticism accusing NATO of withholding information. Additionally, such a vast flow 
of information would make researching the validity of this information difficult. 
There were several unusual aspects to the prosecution of the conflict, which did not always 
follow the conventional norms; 
III No war was declared. 
• The Serbian Information Office remained open in London throughout the hostilities. At 
times, office representatives made appearances on British TV. 
• Stated aim from the conflict's outset was not to defeat the Yugoslavian armed forces, but 
to 'degrade' them. 
III Most action taken by high-altitude aerial bombing. 
III No NATO troops killed, Yugoslavian army suffered only light casualties. But, 10,000 -
1034 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 502. 
1035 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 503. 
1036 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 504. 
1037 Ibid. 
1038 Ibid. 
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15, 000 civilians killed. 1039 
These aspects to the Kosovo crisis gave an almost surreal impression. Publicly, the Serbs 
were portrayed as enemies of civilised society. Yet, the Information office was allowed to 
continue its operations uninterrupted. NATO's objective was not to defeat Yugoslav forces 
stationed in Kosovo, but to 'degrade' them. Was this term considered more palatable for the 
Western public's consumption, because of possible negative connotations associated with the 
word defeat? The nature of the conflict, principally high-altitude bombing, removed any 
human connection with the conflict. Images from the fighting consist of hazy black and white 
film taken by a gun-camera at high altitude. This has the effect of dehumanising the 'horrors' 
of war and sanitising the unpleasant aspects inherent in warfare. 
As in the 1991 Gulf War, military authorities were able to divide the media community and 
retain control as the gatekeeper. Veteran war correspondent Robert Fisk identified several 
types of journalist working on the Kosovo story; 
E& 'Sheep' - Blindly followed NATO. 
11& 'Frothers' - Had "convinced themselves of the justice of the war and 
the wickedness of the other side." 
ED Independent- travelled to Belgrade and reported the Serbian side of 
the story. They were a source of irritation to the frothers. 104o 
NATO utilised a high level of emotional rhetoric and imagery to demonise their opponents. 
This emotionally charged material was used as a pretext and the maintenance of military 
action against Serbia. Some of the unsubstantiated claims made include the use of "systematic 
rape" and "rape camps" by the Yugoslavian armed forces. The few journalists who 
investigated the validity of these claims concluded that rape did occur, but it was not 
organised and not large scale. 1041 
The military propaganda machine also tried to revive horrors from recent history and tie 
these undesirable traits to the Serbs. Images from the Nazi past were used to further demonise 
1039 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 505. 
1040 Knightley, P., op. cit., pp. 505 - 506. 
1041 Knightley, P., op. cit., pp. 509 - 512. 
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the Serbs. Terms such as "Gestapo," "Auschwitz style furnaces" and the "holocaust" were 
used to bring about NATO's desired image of the Serbian people in the public's mind. 1042 
Although the two events (the Holocaust and Kosovo) have little in common, the earlier stated 
fact that perception is more important than reality holds true. If you tell a lie often enough, 
eventually it will come to be held as fact. 
Politicians joined the fray as well, British Prime Minister Tony Blair painted a simplistic 
picture in order to justify British involvement. "It is a battle between Good and Evil, between 
civilisation and barbarity."lo43 If someone was to oppose British involvement after such a 
speech, they would be left open to various criticism for their stance. Accusations such as 
being anti-humanitarian, anti-civil society or an apologist for Serbian aggression to name but 
a few of such possibilities. 
Tony Blair attempted to create the perception of NATO taking the moral high ground against 
the Serbs, he stated that NATO was "fighting not for territory but for values."lo44 This implies 
that no ulterior motives existed and NATO was only enforcing law and order in a new wave 
of humanitarianism. The moral value aspect to the justification for the conflict was expanded 
upon by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. 
"There are now two Europes competing for the soul of the continent. One 
still follows the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists. 
The other emerged fifty years ago out from behind the shadow of the 
Second W orId War. The conflict between the international community and 
Yugoslavia is the struggle between the two Europes. Which side prevails 
will determine what sort of continent we live in. That is why we must 
win."I045 
Robin Cook's rhetoric is clearly structured, along the lines of binary opposition. Irrelevant, 
but highly emotive content is entered into his commentary, which revives potent past 
symbolism of the representation of evil (the Nazis). The 'contest' is billed as an almost 
1042 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 507. 
1043 Ibid. 
1044 Duffield, M., Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, London, 
Zed Books, 2001, p. 41. 
1045 Duffield, M., op. cit., p. 41. 
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apocalyptic struggle for the very survival of civil society against the abyss. In reality, a 
confederation greatly weakened by years of civil war was outmatched in terms of manpower 
and firepower. NATO's resources far outclassed those that could be mustered by Yugoslavia. 
Several different methods existed, utilised either separately or in combination, to try and 
discredit information that contradicted the version offered by the NATO authorities. NATO 
wanted to retain moral ascendancy in the public's perception, this would make politicians 
more receptive to seeing the campaign to its ultimate conclusion and on NATO's terms. Some 
issues existed and arose through the course of events which NATO wanted to see removed or 
at the very least marginalized to the periphery of public discussion. These issues included; 
NATO casualties, civilian casualties and damage to civil infrastructure. 
When news of civilians, which had been bombed by NATO, reached the organisations 
bureaucracy they rigorously denied the report. An American officer then suggested that 
Serbian artillery had deliberately targeted Albanian refugees. The stories and accusations 
persisted, during a briefing Shea urged reporters to seek the facts and not to be led astray by 
their Serbian hosts. After some time NATO admitted to killing the civilians, but said that the 
Yugoslavian army had used the refugees as a human shield to protect a command post. A few 
journalists investigated the incident further, but were unable to substantiate NATO's 
claims. I 046 
NATO and Yugoslavian statistics on collateral damage differed greatly from each other. 
From NATO's perspective the campaign had been prosecuted with the utmost precision and 
with minimal collateral damage. Serbian reports stated the contrary, suggesting widespread 
and indiscriminate damage. 
The main gist of NATO's argument revolved around the premise that some 10, 000 sorties 
had been flown during the period March - June 1999. During this time "only 20 instances of 
collateral damage" occurred. This figure was stated as being acceptable. 1047 
The figure of collateral damage given by the Serbian authorities was completely different 
from NATO's account. They said that 33 hospitals and 340 schools had been hit during the 
1046 Knightley, P., op. cit., pp. 511 - 513. 
1047 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 514. 
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course of the war.!048 Exactly what constitutes as collateral damage may vary between NATO 
and Serbia, the definition is somewhat inexact. 
The true figure of damage to civilian infrastructure probably lies somewhere between the 
two sets of figures. Certainly, the Serbs would be in a better position to assess the true extent 
of the damage from the ground, whether they would accurately report these figures are a 
matter of contention. Professor Anthony Cordesman, an American military analyst asserted 
that there had been hundreds of instances of collateral damage, some of which was minor. He 
added that "lying with numbers does not really help NATO.,,!049 
One of the pretexts of waging the action in Kosovo was because of 'ethnic cleansing' 
allegedly perpetrated by the Serbs on the ethnic Albanians. Originally, the American State 
Department gave an estimate of 500,000 killed in such operations. After the war's conclusion 
this figure was revised down to 10, 000. These figures were unable to be verified.lOso 
Generally speaking, the media neglected to highlight inconsistencies in NATO's story or 
offer evidence that contradicted NATO. As media and public interest waned in the aftermath 
of the aerial campaign, some 240,000 Serbs were driven out ofKosovo by their Albanian 
neighbours. This reverse variant of ethnic cleansing went largely unnoticed in the Western 
media, largely relegated to the back pages.IOS! 
5.3 The Second Chechen War, 1999-
When fighting in the Second Chechen War broke out in August 1999, most Russian media 
outlets cover the war in either a positive or neutral manner. Chechen fighters were commonly 
branded as 'bandits' or 'terrorists.' The owners of the private media may have hoped to be 
rewarded for their support, as was the case when they supported Y eltsin' s re-election bid in 
1996. There was no evidence of any real sense of pluralism in the press at this stage. 
Unlike the First Chechen War, the government went into the conflict with a deliberate media 
strategy. The lessons of the previous conflict had been learnt. During an interview Putin 
1048 Knightley, P., op. cit., p. 514. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Knightley, P., op. cit., pp. 523 - 526. 
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confinned that the Gulf War media strategy had helped to shape Russian media policy in the 
Second Chechen War. 1052 
Mass media outlets operating in contemporary Chechnya can be divided into three different 
categories; state, non-governmental and separatist. The following are a summary of a large 
proportion of media that are active in Chechnya, which can be found on the Centre for 
Journalism in Extreme Situations website (www.cjes.ru - The Press and the Chechen 
Republic, December 2002). The editor in chief is given, along with the print run and the focus 
of distribution! dissemination. 
State Mass Media: Newspapers 
~ Vesti Respubliki (M. Khadzhiyev, 10,000) - nationwide weekly 
~ Daimokhk (L. Satuyeva, 10,000) - nationwide (published in Chechen) 
~ Vesti Groznogo (Sh. Magomayev) - Grozny 
49 Gums (Kh. Borkhadzhiyev, 7000) - Gudennesski district 
~ Marsho (S. Khozhaliyev, 10,000) - inter-regional general news, Urus-Martanovski 
district 
• Terskaya Nov (M. Alazurova) - Shyolkovski district 
• Orga (A. Barzanukayev, 2000) - Argun 
III Terkyist (A. Dukhayev) - Nadterechny district 
III Zama (M. Ilyasov, 7000) - Shalinski district 
® Terskaya Pravda (A. Damayeva, 5000) - Naurski district 
III Iman (R. Ezerkhanov) - Achkhoi-Martanovski district 
III Zov Zemli (A. Sagapiov, 15, 000) - Groznenski district 
III Khalkan Dosh (Sh. Sarakayev, 10,000) - Nozhai-Yurtovski and Vedenski districts 
• Vozrozhdenije (L. Andiyeva) - youth newspaper 
III Za Neftyannyje Kadry (R. Lalayev) - specialised newspaper of the Grozny Oil 
Institute. 
\051 Knightley, P., op. cit., pp. 516 - 517. 
1052 Ekecrantz, 1, "Introduction: Post-Communism and Global Culture" in Ekecrantz, J. & Olofsson, K., Editors, 
op. cit., p. 24. 
345 
S tate Mass Media: Magazines 
• Stela 1 ad (I. Dzhanaraliyev) - children's magazine 
• Vainakh (M. Berdukayev) - arts and literature 
• Orga (S. Yusupova) - arts and literature 
State Mass Media: Other 
• Grozny-Inform (A. Batalov) - information and photo agency 
~ State Radio of the Chechen Republic (A. Davletukayev) -resumed broadcasting on 
12 November, 2002 
• Chechnya Svobodnaya - started operating in Spring 2000 
All newspapers are state-run and are financed by the government. The newspapers are 
published on a weekly basis; nationwide press are published on eight A3 pages and regional 
press are published on four sheets of A3. They are all distributed for free. According to CJES, 
the real number of copies does not necessarily correspond to the official print run and is often 
lower. ORT, RTR and NTV can all be received in Chechnya as they have their own 
transmitters based there. 
Independent Mass Media: Newspapers 
• Groznenski Rabochiy (Musa Muradov, 2000) - oldest newspaper in Chechnya, 
pub lished since 1918 and became independent in 1995. Published on a weekly basis 
the black and white newspaper consists of four A2 sheets. Publishing moved to 
Ingushetia with the outbreak of hostilities in 1999. Regular publishing of the paper 
stopped in Spring 2001 due to lack of money. But, to start publishing on a regular 
basis from 2003 due to receiving a subsidy for further operations. 
CD Obyedinyonnaya Gazeta ((Mansur Magomadov) - united several Chechen 
newspapers published in Moscow. Since 2002 has been published in Chechnya. A 
black and white newspaper that consists of eight A3 sheets and is published 
irregularly. 
The independence of these newspapers are tenuous at best. Newspapers do not make profits 
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in Chechnya. This problem combined with the low purchasing power of Chechens and 
competition from state-run newspapers (free of charge) causes many problems. The 
newspapers that exist are often published thanks to government subsidies, which can be 
perceived as coming with strings attached. 
Separatist Mass Media: Newspapers 
iii Ichkeria (3000) - newspaper of Maskhadov's government. Consists of 12 sheets in 
A4 format 
iii Ichkeria (2nd version, 3000) - newspaper of Maskhadov's government. Consists of 
four sheets in A4 
III Sign of Jihad - wahhabi newspaper printed on 16 sheets in A4 format 
III Way of Jihad - wahhabi newspaper printed on 16 sheets in A4 format 
iii Mekh-Khel (10,000) - printed on 16 sheets in A4 format 
III Varis (2000) - printed in Chechen language on four sheets in A3 format 
iii Kavkaz-Centre, Chechenpress, chechen.org, Daimokh and Kavkazski Vestnik-
Internet news agencies 
Mekh-Khel and Varis call for an independent Chechnya and are anti-Russian, rather than 
Ichkerian in their views. These newspapers are produced 'illegally' and refer to the Russians 
as 'aggressors' and 'occupiers.' The pro-Moscow administration are referred to as 'traitors.' 
The papers are published on a weekly basis and distributed throughout Chechnya. Rebel 
sources have said that bribes as low as US$2 can get them past Russian checkpoints. 
As the war dragged on, some media changed their stance. The state owned TV channels, 
ORT and RTR continued to support the so-called 'anti-terrorist operation.' 1053 Pro-Kremlin 
media reported the steady progress of the campaign and the high morale of the troops. These 
optimistic images were tarnished in November 1999 when NTVand TV Tsentr openly 
questioned official casualty figures and offered more pessimistic reports of the campaign.1054 
With the presidential elections looming in March 2000, the government sought to curb media 
1053 The Kremlin has referred to the campaign as an anti-terrorist operation, to use the term war requires certain 
protocol and obligations to be fulfilled. 
1054 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 336. 
347 
criticism by using pressure tactics. Any bad publicity could have the potential to jeopardise 
success in the elections, which may have proved costly for Yeltsin after his retirement from 
politics. If Yeltsin' s chosen successor was not chosen, the newly elected president may have 
decided to bring Yeltsin to account for any discrepancies during his period in office. Where as 
an heir would be bound by a feeling of moral obligation to overlook any such irregularities 
which may have been committed by their patron. 
Government agencies began to act against 'rouge' elements of the media, and 'reliable' 
people were appointed to key governmental posts to ensure a more predictable outcome. 
Loyal 'crusaders' from the Yeltsin era occupied two critical positions. They have proved to be 
very diligent in ensuring that the Kremlin's viewpoint is the sole truth. 
Mikhail Lesin was appointed as the minister of press and information in July 1999, one 
month before hostilities occurred in the break-away republic. \055 In mid-January 2000, Mikhail 
Lesin summoned the head of Elcho Moskvi radio (part of the Media-Most group) and relayed 
to him his agitation. The source of conflict was over an interview, which the radio station 
broadcast, with the rebel Chechen spokesman, Movladi UdugoV. 1056 An earlier call by the 
Press Ministry had forbade any Russian media organisation from relaying the Chechen rebel's 
point-of-view. Now, the Kremlin began to enforce this arbitrary demand. 
Putin appointed a trusted member of the Yeltsin administration, Sergei Yastrzhembsky to be 
in charge of managing all government information regarding the Chechen campaign. Upon 
assuming his position Yastrzhembsky made his position very clear, what he expected of the 
media community. In an interview he stated "when the nation mobilises its forces to solve 
some task, that imposes obligations on everyone, including the media.,,1057 Those journalists 
who did not fulfil their expected civic duty found gaining access to the frontlines more 
problematic. 
At the same time these key people began to put the pressure on the media, they needed a test 
case which could be used as an example. Andrei Babitsky of Radio Liberty had often quoted 
Chechen military sources in his stories, which angered the Russian authorities. 
1055 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 333. 
1056 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 336. 
1057 Ibid. 
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In January 2000, Babitsky disappeared for a period of two weeks. He 'mysteriously' 
reappeared in the hands of Russian authorities, and was promptly exchanged for Russian 
POWs. He was handed to Chechens who were pro-Moscow, which was not explained at the 
time. Babitsky was given false documents and sent to Dagestan. He was later arrested on 
charges of using false documentation in July 2000. He has since been prohibited from 
speaking about the nature of what has happened to him during this period. los8 
The deputy media minister, Mikhail Seslavinsky put an end to any hopes of pluralistic 
debate on the Second Chechen War in March 2000, by warning journalists that they broke the 
law on terrorism by quoting rebel Chechen sources. IOS9 This act shattered any pre-conception 
about freedom of the press and clearly defined the expected 'rules of the game,' which were 
now clearly decided by the Kremlin. 
Government strategy in the Second Chechen War has involved actively constructing an 
official version of events in Chechnya combined with the setting of strict conditions for the 
dissemination of this information by the media. This can be seen in actions such as the 
establishment combat pools. The idea was borrowed from the 1991 Gulf War, where it is hard 
for journalists to obtain information from sources other than the press pool. 1060 By difficulty, I 
not only refer to the 'spoon feeding' of information by the governmental press centre, but also 
accessibility to the war zone due to risk of death or injury (brought about from either side 
involved in the conflict). An important point to note, with regard to the accreditation scheme 
for foreign mass media representatives, the Russian Foreign Ministry simply denied visas to 
many of those that had covered the First Chechen War. 1061 
The focal point of the military's frustrations at the lack of resolution to the Chechen conflict 
spilled over into the media once more in July 2001. Anatoly Kvashnin, Armed Forces Chief, 
criticised reporters for focusing purely on 'bad' news. 
"You are not doing a very good job and therefore we have decided to set up 
1058 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., 
pp. 336 - 337. 
1059 Belin, L., "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media" in Brown, A., Editor, op. cit., p. 337. 
1060 Koltsova, 0., "News Production in Contemporary Russia: Practices of Power" in European Journal of 
Communication, Volume 16, issue 3, London, Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 315 - 335, p. 332. 
1061 Panfilov, 0., Failure of Infol7nation Policy in Chechnya. Official Sources Replace Objectivity With Lies, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 August, 2003 (BBC Monitoring). 
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two (media outlets) of our own. [ ... J We will have a military television 
station broadcasting here [ ... J Why are you always so eager to report on 
military operations? [ ... J You are working for the sake of war and we are 
working for the sake ofpeace.,,1062 
Kvashnin's comments seem to highlight an annoyance over attempts to portray the 
'anti-terrorist' operation in Chechnya as a successful effort at reconstructing civil 
infrastructure in Chechnya rather than an on-going effort to suppress rebel activity. His words 
give the image that the federal forces in Chechnya are engaged in a mission of peace, whereas 
the media are attempting to stir discontent and conflict. 
Officials also talked of further limiting journalists' ability to travel in Chechnya. Head of the 
Interior Ministry Press Centre in Khankala, Fyodor Asalkhanov stated that journalists would 
be, from then on accompanied by press service officials. Asalkhanov refused to be drawn to 
the question, as to who would decide what was newsworthy or not and gave a somewhat 
illusive answer. 
"We usually agree on this. If our interests coincide, then we go together with 
the journalists and prepare material on the relevant subject. [ ... J As far as 
we, Interior Ministry people, are concerned, if journalists accredited in 
Khankala prepare materials on police-related topics, they should leave the 
town accompanied by a member of the staff of the Interior Ministry's Press 
Centre.,,1063 
Asalkhanov's comments would seem to indicate that greater restrictions on movement, on 
top of the current accreditation scheme lie ahead for journalists working in Chechnya. The 
issues surrounding the remark on police matters are also very open to interpretation. A 
'government friendly' classification of the suppression of rebel activity in and around the 
Chechen Republic is that it is a 'Police' operation. Thereby rendering the requirement for a 
press service representative to accompany journalists almost mandatory. The fact that the 
JRL #7287, 13 August, 2003. 
1062 Russian Army Cracks Down on Media in Chechnya, Reuters, from NTV story, 26 July, 2001. 
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press centre in Khankala has only three cars at its disposal, only one of which can be driven 
out oftown1064 is another important factor. This greatly restricts the number ofjourrtalists in 
the field at anyone given time, which makes them a lot easier to monitor and control. 
The events of September 11, 2001 in the USA provided Putin with a unique and valuable 
opportunity to mute international protest over Russian actions in the break-away republic. In a 
televised address to Russia Putin made some strong statements on the situation. 
"As we see it, Chechen developments ought not to be regarded as outside 
the context of efforts against international terrorism. [ ... ] As I also 
acknowledge, there are people in Chechnya to this day who took up arms 
under the impact of false or misrepresented values. Now that the entire 
civilised world has determined it stance on the anti-terror cause, it is the 
duty of every person to determine his or her stance too. The Chechen 
fighters who have not surrendered to this day also must have their chance to 
do so. That is why I call all paramilitaries and self-styled political activists 
urgently to sever whatever contacts with international terrorists and their 
organisations [ ... ]."1065 
In November 2001 Yastrzhembsky revealed casualty statistics for the federal forces in the 
two years of fighting. 3438 servicemen were reported killed and 11661 reported as being 
wounded. 1066 These figures seem to be relatively costly for the Russians, considering that no 
end of the conflict is in sight yet. Journalist Dmitri Muratov of Novaya Gazeta has suggested 
that the war continues because it is in the interests of the military leadership. He states that the 
Generals are making profit from 'business' enterprises in Chechnya (such as oil) and a 
successful conclusion to the conflict will see an end to these money making schemes. 1067 
On 17 February, 2003 the Northern Caucasus military district headquarters released casualty 
figures. According to the figures 4739 servicemen were killed, 13, 108 wounded and 29 listed 
1064 Russian Army Cracks Down on Media in Chechnya, Reuters, from NTV story, 26 July, 2001. 
JRL #5367, 27 July, 2001. 
1065 Putin Determines Russian Stance on Anti-terror Cause, RlA Novosti, 24 September, 2001. 
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as Missing in Action for the period 1999 - 2002. Defence Ministry personnel accounted for 
2752 of the dead, 6471 wounded and 27 listed as missing. 1257 servicemen from Chechnya 
were in military hospifa1s at the time of the report (February 2003), most ofthem wounded. 1068 
Some level of suspicion is linked to these figures being accurate as they are released by the 
government and may be considered as being too low. The above-mentioned report from 
ITAR-TASS was later retracted and lowered the casualty figures to 4572 killed and 15, 549 
wounded after the Ministry of Defence issued an official denial report.1069 
An Army News Agency report dated 26 March, 2002 gave an official quote of the number of 
rebels fighting for the Chechen separatists that had been killed. The figure given for the 
number of rebel fighters killed was put at 12, 760 since the beginning of the conflict on 8 
August, 1999.1070 
The official statistics have been questioned, on the basis that they are too low. Valentina 
Me1nikova, chief ofthe Soldiers J Mothers Committee, which bases its figures on information 
gained from wounded troops and soldiers' relatives estimates 14, 000 federal troops were 
killed in the 1994-96 war (official figures were 5500 dead and 700 missing) and another 
11, 000 killed in the current conflict. To put these figures into perspective, the approximately 
decade long Soviet involvement in Afghanistan cost 13, 000 dead and 35,000 wounded. 1071 In 
addition to the military deaths and wounded statistics, non-combatants have also suffered 
significantly, some 600, 000 have been made homeless by the conflict in Chechnya. 1072 
In March 2001 a statement was signed by a group of reporters from the local branch of state-
owned media, GTRK, complaining about biased coverage and only giving one side of the 
story. This protest action was the first of its kind, which has been recorded in the Chechen 
conflict. The journalist's statement was clear and concise. Part of the statement went as 
follows: 
1068 Russian Troops Casualties in Chechnya Exceed 4700 in 2002, Prime-TASS, 17 February, 2003. 
JRL #7065, 17 February, 2003. 
1069 Venyavsky, S., ITAR-TASS Retracts Casualty Report, AP, 18 February, 2003. 
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"Since the very start of the anti-terrorist campaign in Chechnya, the Russian 
media, in particUlar ORT and RTR television, purposefully kept quiet about 
the true number of civilian casualties. [ ... J The truth, even if it is bitter and 
not always pleasant, must appear on our TV screens.,,1073 
The significance of the slanted coverage was explained by some polling agency 
representatives. Pavel Pavin ofthe Public Opinion Foundation commented that; "every 
terrorist act [ ... J boosts the warmonger spirit." But, "every time Russian troops seem to fail 
sparks a fall in the ranks of the war's supporters," explained Lev Gudkov of VTsIOM. 1074 
The first public signs that the war may be starting to be considered a liability for the Kremlin 
also came in November 2001. No immediate response came forth from the Chechen rebel side 
to Putin's September 24,2001 call for finding ways to disarm rebel formations and to 
reintegrate them into civilian life. The presidential envoy for the southern region in Russia, 
Viktor Kazantsev announced to a news conference that he held a two-hour meeting with 
Akhmed Zakayev the Chechen representative (of AsIan Maskhadov, the former Chechen 
President) near Moscow. 1075 However Kazantsev dismissed the rebels' commitment to ending 
the conflict, describing Zakayev's proposals as being; 
"[ ... J more like slogans and stereotypes. [ ... J If they are not gomg to 
propose conversations of a theoretical nature, then it is not clear if there is 
any point in continuing [ ... J Let us first wait for real, concrete 
proposals." 1 076 
At the same time as the Russian government and the rebels were meeting to discuss a 
possible solution to the conflict the government downplayed the possibility of another 
'Khasavyurt Agreement' (which ended the First Chechen War). One ofthe points in the 
Russians' favour was the declining international opposition to the Russian military 
www.themoscowtimes.com!storiesI2003/06118/012-print.html, 27 June, 2003. 
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involvement in Chechnya. Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo summed up 
the federal position and the impact of the international community's change of position. 
"The only issue currently being discussed is the disarmament of the rebels 
and the termination of combat operations against federal forces. [ ... J The 
rebels and mercenaries fighting in Chechnya now find it extremely difficult 
to complain to the international community about the federal authorities 
illegal actions. I must say that the leaders of very many countries have 
changed their attitude to the developments in Chechnya, especially after the 
world realised the importance of combating international terrorism. [ ... J 
Many are departing from double standards in assessing the terrorists. It is a 
serious change which we assess very positively. ,,1077 
The website www.pravda.ru announced a victory for the Russian government over how 
Chechnya was framed by the outside world in January 2002. Pravda.ru stated that an RIA 
Novosti correspondent had reported an official spokesman for the US Department of State, 
Richard Boucher as saying that a lime between At Qaeda and the Chechen rebels did exist and 
that the US described the situation in Chechnya is Russia's internal problem. 1078 
Russian journalist and author of Odnako news programme, Mikhail Leontiev described a 
possible reason behind the 'change of heart' by the Americans. 
"Russia has finally understood how to talk about Chechnya with the West. 
We know the way to send Europe and the rest of the world a message to be 
read in the letters they understand.,,1079 
However, is this simply a matter of the Russian authorities becoming more skilled and 
competent in political communications and PR in an international context? Certainly an influx 
of foreign PR expertise has helped Russian authorities in the past, such as with Boris Yeltsin's 
presidential campaign in 1996. But, a convergence of interests between Russia and the West, 
1077 Russia Appreciates West's Change of Heart on Chechnya - Security Chief, Interfax, 22 November, 2001. 
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especially America, occurred with the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. It is a matter of 
convenience to ignore some aspects to facilitate the prosecution of new foreign policy 
objectives, as seems to be the case with the US. 
January 2002 saw the Russian military publicly renew their convictions that the war would 
be soon over. Kvashnin claimed that the winter 'mopping-up' operations had proved to be 
successful and "only insignificant pockets of militants now remain in the North Caucasus 
Republic." The General went on to spell out the significance ofthis 'victory'. "There will be 
no more mistakes. Our position is clear, no more concessions to bandits.,,108o 
Kvashnin's statements seemed to contradict some of the government's public statements 
over finding a political solution to the conflict. The military claimed that lOO rebels had been 
killed in the operations that were launched in late December. Human rights group Memorial 
claimed that the federal forces had "killed several dozen civilians in the process.,,1081 And 
when put into a larger context, the claims seem somewhat premature. Official casualty 
statistics, a figure that has been contested as being too low, list more than 3000 soldiers and 
policemen as being killed. In addition to this, the military had estimated that some 2000 rebels 
remained active in the region. 1082 
A January 2002 article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta provides another interesting angle in the 
apparent contradiction between the rhetoric of the military and that of the Russian federal 
government. The article alleges that the pretence of wanting to talk peace is made by Moscow 
to placate international criticism of Moscow's handling of the conflict. "This was the 
Kremlin's way of showing the world that it does not refuse to talk peace." The newspaper 
went on to accuse the government of a 'window-dressing' exercise, which will not see any 
tangible results.l083 
An ITAR-TASS report in February 2002 appeared to show support for Putin from other 
Russian political factions, which were as much for an international audience than a domestic 
one. Former President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev gave Putin a message of support for 
his Chechnya policy. 
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H[ ... J (world community) should acclaim President Vladimir Putin's earnest 
intention and steps to switch the Chechnya problems to political rails [ ... J 
shows that Russia has to deal there both with bandit organisations of 
Chechen origin and international terrorism. I back President Putin, who, in 
spite of the present conditions, is not neglecting the main task of restoring 
normal life to Chechnya. Thanks to the support of the Russian President 
[ ... ] republican and local administrations are being formed, lessons were 
resumed at local schools, the refugees are beginning to return home, and 
work to restore Grozny is under way."I084 
Means to convey the message of a 'return to normality' in Chechnya have taken place 
overseas too. In February 2003 the Russian Consulate-General in New York hosted an 
exhibition called Chechnya. International Terrorism. A Thorny Path to Peace. After New 
York, the exhibition was intended to be shown in Berlin, Copenhagen, Paris, Brussels and 
possibly Israel. In an RIA Novosti article, the stated aim of the exhibition was to "destroy 
Western stereotypes about Chechnya, inform the foreign public on both the invigorating 
positive process of bringing back peace to the republic and remaining obstacles on the way to 
stability. ,,1085 
The Russian President's spokesman on Human Rights in Chechnya, Abdul-Hakim Sultygov 
described the significance of the exhibition; 
"For the first time the exhibition reveals the evolution of the Chechen drama 
since 1991 when extremists violently disrupted the constitutional process in 
Chechnya and ousted the legitimate authorities. [ ... ] (roots of the crisis lie 
not in the ) relations between Chechnya and Russia, but in the relations 
between criminals and the Chechen population. The photographs show the 
evolution of the bandit regime and it so-called self-proclaimed governing 
bodies, its degradation into a system of infringement on the rights and 
liberties of over a million Chechens, a hideous denigration of separatists into 
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explicitly terrorist organisations, the establishment of terrorist dictatorship, 
and the foundation of international terrorist bases in Chechnya.,,1086 
Efforts in the infonnation war intensified in the run-up to the Chechen referendum in March 
2003. In a well publicised pre-publication announcement, a brochure was to be produced for 
foreign media primarily, but also the wider public. The brochure titled Chechnya: Questions 
and Answers was produced in many different languages. Chechnya: Questions and Answers 
focused on a variety of issues including; the two Chechen military campaigns, about current 
and planned governing bodies, law enforcement refonn and rehabilitation efforts that are 
underway.lo87 This action seems to be an pre-emptive attempt to saturate the world 
'infonnation market' with a government friendly version of events. A demonstration that the 
Russian infonnation capability is not only reactive, but proactive in their approach to the 
Chechen infonnation 'problem'. 
Although the Chechen referendum and Chechen presidential elections are very important 
aspects to the situation in Chechnya, I will not be covering them. There is simply not enough 
room in this work to devote what I would consider to be adequate coverage for these crucial 
and complex events. I will state however, that these events are in line with the official 
comments of the republic returning to 'nonnality' under the 'careful' guidance of the federal 
centre. 
Official Russian government responses to the idea of negotiation with the separatists seem to 
have hardened in opposition to the notion. The public is still being 'sold' on the idea of a 
drawn out conflict, with the twist that the worst of the fighting is over and the republic is 
slowly returning to a 'nonnal' state of existence. Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, made some 
very strong statements regarding the government's position on Chechnya in July 2003. On the 
subject of negotiating with Maskhadov, there was no room for misunderstanding on the 'new' 
policy direction. 
"I absolutely exclude this - it is really not possible. To those who 
recommend we launch talks with Maskhadov, I always invite them to start 
1086 Klimentov, D., New York Hosts "Chechnya. International Terrorism. A Thorny Path to Peace, RIA Novosti, 
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357 
talks with Mullah Omar (leader of deposed Taliban regime in Afghanistan). 
It is the same thing. 
Currently on Chechen territory there are around 1200 to 1300 active rebels, 
uncompromising bandits, with whom you can only have one conversation -
their destruction. If we are talking about the possibility of large battles in 
Chechnya, I practically exclude this."J088 
Ivanov's spin on the Chechen war has been echoed by others. During a 'drive' to raise 
finance from European financiers, the Presidential Envoy Plenipotentiary to the Southern 
Federal District, Victor Kazantsev, told delegates from the European Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development not to be afraid of Chechnya. He reassured them that "the Chechen war is as 
good as over - it is rather virtual than actual."I089 Kazantsev's and Ivanov's statements closely 
resemble Baudrillard's theory of simulation. An attempt to make some concept or theory 
'real' in the minds of the public and eventually to tum that 'reality' into a fact. 
Reporter for the new site www.gazeta.ru. Art yom Vernidoub, wrote an article that suggested 
that there may be a change in the official classification of the conflict. On the 6th of May, 2003 
he quoted an unidentified source in the Defence Ministry, who stated that the military was 
considering a change in classification of the Chechen 'anti-terrorist' operation to a less 
threatening or offensive term. Without elaborating the official said: "possibly, instead ofthe 
counter-terrorist operation it will be granted the status of a peacekeeping mission."lo9o 
The change in the term used seems to be related to a desire by the Kremlin to want a less 
threatening and hostile association with the events occurring in Chechnya. 'Peacekeeping' 
could imply that the Russian forces would be engaged in keeping two warring sides apart in 
the conflict and not actively involved. 'Counter-terror' operation implies that Russian forces 
are actively involved in the fighting. At face value this appears to be a 'window-dressing' 
exercise and attempt at bringing to life Kazantsev' s 'virtual war.' 
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A serious challenge to the Kremlin's Chechnya stance, on the flow of information and of 
reintegrating the republic into the Russian Federation, was challenged by Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty in early 2002. The station had planned to broadcast news in the 
Chechen language. The Russian government response was swift and hard. 
The Deputy Head of the Russian Government Administration, Alexei Volin warned of 
possible negative consequences and manipulation by the rebel Chechens. Volin was 
interviewed and quoted by various Russian media sources, including Izvestia and Ekho 
Moskvi. 
"[ ... J not rule out the possibility that the broadcasts could be used by 
Chechen radical groups." - Ekho Moskvi 
"The start of broadcasting in the Chechen language can be considered a 
step, but not in the direction of stabilising the situation in the North 
Caucasus. [ ... J It is fraught with possibilities of encouraging extremism not 
only in Russia but in other friendly countries due to Chechen terrorists' 
contacts with international terrorist organisations." - Izvestia J09J 
Yastrzhembsky gave a clear warning to the radio station, regarding the decision on the 
broadcasting of news in Chechen. On 2 April, 2002 he stated that the Russian authorities 
would closely monitor the station and may revoke its right to broadcast in Russia, should any 
pro-rebel bias be detected in the programming. !On The warning seems to be in keeping with 
Russian government demands upon domestic media outlets. It is however, unusual for such a 
threat to be directed against foreign media. Objections from the Russian government did play 
a role on the introduction of the broadcasts, which were scheduled to begin in February 2002, 
but were delayed as a result of requests from the US State Department (the station receives 
funding from the US government) on the grounds that it could jeopardise efforts in starting a 
dialogue on ending the conflict. 1093 
FSB Lieutenant-General Alexander Zdanovich was responsible for the 'cleansing' of the 
1091 Vickery, T., Radio Liberty Worries Russian Government, AP, 3 April, 2002. JRL #6167,3 April, 2002. 
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Chechen information space. This was explained by Alexander Cherkasov of the human rights 
group Memorial. 
"That means making sure the media does not mention any uncomfortable or 
sensitive topics. Many times, he has voiced things which are not true to 
reality.,,1094 
Zdanovich did not conceal his thoughts as to what role should be played by the press and the 
consequences for media that did not follow what was expected of them. 
"[ ... J the FSB will fight everything that threatens Russia's interests, 
including in the world of media." 
And went as far as to threaten publicly releasing a list of journalists who he 
considered to be engaged "in waging information warfare against Russia." 
He equated such journalists as being equivalent to international terrorists 
except they "have a pen in their hands and sit at a computer.,,1095 
Information going into and out of Chechnya is subjected to strict measures, which 
attempt to control its flow. During a visit to Grozny, journalist Fred Weir described 
the situation faced by foreign journalists operating in Chechnya. The journalists are 
assigned guides, but in the off-chance that journalists are able to 'lose' their guides, 
they are shadowed by several plain-clothed agents. These agents attempted to tape 
conversations with people that the journalists were permitted to meet. Weir made 
some concluding remarks as to the significance of the security precautions.1096 
"One must accept the military's claim that some security precautions were 
necessary. But many of the measures had the distinct effect of undermining 
the main claim the Kremlin wanted to make by bringing us to Grozny in the 
first place: that the war is over and life is returning to normal in 
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Chechnya."lo97 
One of the thorns in the side of the government's attempt to paint a picture of 
Chechnya returning to 'normality' are the complaints of abuses against Chechen 
civilians by the Russian military and security services. Human rights groups claim 
that these abuses usually go unpunished and are ignored by the authorities. The trial 
of Colonel Yuri Budanov, accused of raping and murdering a young Chechen woman 
in March 2000, caused a great deal of controversy during its course. 
Budanov went to trial at the end of February 2001, initially charged with 
premeditated murder, abduction and abuse of office. In July 2001 the trial was 
postponed for a long period of time while psychiatric assessments were made of 
Budanov and a series of legal technicalities were debated. Court proceedings 
resumed again in May 2002. 1098 
A psychiatric report, which seemed to support the defence's case that Budanov was 
not criminally responsible as he was temporarily insane at the time swayed a court 
ruling in December 2002. A Rostov-Na Donu military court ruled in favour of 
Budanov. However, the Supreme Court overturned this decision in February 2003 
and ordered a new trial. In July 2003 the Lower Court, on the basis of a new 
psychiatric report, Budanov was sentenced to ten years in a maximum-security prison 
for the murder of 18 year old Heda Kungayeva.1099 
In an apparent effort to try and stem criticism levelled at a lack of accountability 
among military and security personnel for their actions, presidential aide 
Yastrzhembsky wrote on the subject. In his article, he acknowledges the fact that 
crimes are committed by federal servicemen in Chechnya. But, refutes the accusation 
that they get away with their actions. Statistics are used to back Yastrzhembsky's 
claim. 
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"Since the start of the counter-terrorist operation the Military Prosecutor's 
Office has opened investigations into 162 cases; so far, 97 investigations 
have been completed, of which 57 (including 14 murder cases) proceeded to 
a full court martial. At present, 47 servicemen, including seven 
commissioned officers, have been convicted for offences against the 
Chechen people."lloo 
In addition to their accountability for their crimes, Y astrzhembsky also stressed the 
role played by the military in the reconstruction of the republic, especially in terms of 
the education system and housing. Yastrzhembsky's message is one of a republic 
slowly returning to normality, assisted by the Russian military's efforts and 
resources. 
In December 2002, Fred Weir a journalist from Christian Science Monitor was 
taken on a government tour of Grozny. During the tour, Colonel Shabanov admitted 
"some violations" were committed by federal forces, but labelled most of the 1630 
official complaints as being "fictitious." He went on to explain his position. 
"We have evidence that these cases (of missing people) are mostly bandits 
who have died fighting our forces, and their families later claim they were 
taken by the federals."llol 
Various sources in the Ministry of Defence have also had discipline problems, 
especially relating to alcoholism. The problem has been made public in various 
Russian media outlets and concerns alcohol related problems with contract soldiers 
and officers serving in Chechnya. In an item broadcast on Ekho Moskvi the findings 
of a Defence Ministry commission on the conduct of contract troops in Chechnya, 
which found many of them to be "morally degenerate" and were dismissed from 
service. Among the main infractions committed by these troops was "constantly 
1100 Yastrzhembsky, S., International Terrorism and the Crisis in Chechnya: A Russian Perspective, 
www.inthenationalinterest.com!ArticleslV o12Issue4IV o12Issue4Yastrzhembsky.html, 29 January, 2003. 
JRL #7040,30 January, 2003. 
1101 Weir, F., Life Among Grozny's Ruins, Christian Science Monitor, 16 December, 2002. 
JRL #6602, 16 December, 2002. 
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consuming alcohol."II02 
A total of 56 men had been discharged from the military, across Chechnya for 
breaking their contracts. In Chechnya's Naursky district, the military commandants 
office, which normally has a staff of 45 officers, fired 49 officers in the first half of 
2003. 1103 Such figures represent not only a significant discipline problem for the 
military, but also an issue concerning the effectiveness of its fighting force is put into 
question as a result of the Defence Ministry commission report findings. 
More recent stories by media outlets that are aligned to the Kremlin, occasionally 
publish an alarmist story that is designed to 'show' the rebels true intentions. One 
such article appeared in the April 28, 2003 Moscow issue of Izvestia. The article's 
title was The Time has Come to Attack Russia and it alleged that the goals of the 
rebels have changed. 
"They used to fight for liberation from 'occupiers' in the past. These days, 
they fight to physically exterminate the Russians a.k.a infidels."1104 
The conflict in this particular article has been framed as a fight for survival. It 
claims that the conflict is prosecuted on a ethnic basis by the rebels and therefore, it 
could be concluded is a threat for all ethnic Russians. Such imagery appears to be 
trying to summon unity, for the continuation of the war on the basis that a threat for 
all Russians exists as long as the rebels are active in Chechnya. 
An article in a June 2003 issue of Profil not only provided reasons for Russia's 
defeat in the First Chechen War as a result of the "Khasavyurt Capitulation", but also 
provided 'good' reasons for continuing the fight. The article claimed that "Like the 
Yankees in Vietnam, we were defeated by our own men, not by guerrillas.,,1l05 The 
blame for the loss ofthe 1994 - 96 war is laid on a lack of will to win the war on the 
part of Russia's people. Justification for the war is provided, once again a reference is 
1102 Saradzhyan, S., Report: 56 Soldiers Sacked in Chechnya, The Moscow Times, 21 October, 2003. 
www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/1 0/2110 Il-print.html, 21 October, 2003. 
1103 Ibid. 
1104 Getmansky, K. & Rechkalov, V., The Time has Come to Attack Russia, Izvestia, 28 April, 2003. 
JRL #7159,29 April, 2003. 
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made to an American scenario. 
"Paradoxically, this war in Chechnya is more just for the Russians that the 
war in Iraq for the Americans. And yet, the Russian media stopped depicting 
a romantic image of the criminals but never stopped trying to explain to 
Russian servicemen that they are committed to a battle 'for somebody's 
capitals.' Demoralising the army, it only leads to new and new casualties. 
The goals are anything but unjust, the country needs triumph in the war. 
Particularly since the Dudayev's and Maskhadov's regime cannot be 
allowed to exist.,,]]06 
A major thrust of the work is that, ifleft alone, the separatists will engage in 
criminal activity across the Russian Federation, such as kidnapping, killing and other 
acts ofterror. This will leave no one with security and peace of mind in Russia. 
Therefore, concluding it was better to continue the war. The incursion by Basayev 
into Dagestan in 1999 was used as evidence for this hypothesis. 
One of the notable successes achieved by the federal government over the separatist 
rebels in the 'information war' concerned the death of one of the prominent rebel 
field commanders known as Khatab. The Kremlin announced on the 25th of April 
2002, that its special forces had killed the Arab-born commander of the Chechen 
rebels and that they would soon provide documentary proof of this fact. Rebel 
sources at this time denied the Russian claim. Zdanovich said that I<hatab had been 
killed in March 2002 and would soon provide documentary evidence to back his 
claim. Yastrzhembsky stated to Russian TV that Moscow had firm grounds in 
believing I<hatab to be dead. ]107 
Khatab, the head of the Islamic Army of Dagestan and a leading commander of 
Shamil Basayev was shown on RTR from video footage obtained by the FSB. The 
body seemed to be that ofKhatab, but this was denied by rebel sources who said that 
it was just Moscow's propaganda. It was not until 29 April, 2002 that a radical 
1105 Khramchikhin, A., Behind the Frontlines, Profil, No 21, 2 June, 2003. JRL #7207,3 June, 2003. 
1106 Ibid. 
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branch of the Chechen rebel leadership confirmed Russian claims that Khatab was 
indeed dead, through a statement to the separatist news agency Kavkaz-Centre. In a 
statement from the "Command Headquarters of the Chechen Mujahideen" announced 
that Khatab was killed by a poisoned letter on March 19, 2002 and that "the death of 
the Chechen commander has been officially confirmed.,,1108 
An equally fierce 'information war' is occurring in tandem with the military operations. 
Kavkaz-Centre has stated that three pro-independence Chechen radio stations exist, two of 
which are located in Chechnya and one abroad. Russian authorities are engaged in trying to 
jam the transmission of these stations. 1109 Radio Ichkeria, a rebel radio station uses 
homemade broadcasting equipment that enable it to transmit as far as 200 kilometres. A 
network of amateur broadcasters keep each other informed about the presence of Russian 
interceptors. A mobile broadcasting unit is available to the rebels, located in the mountains 
TV Ichkeria broadcasts irregularly for thirty minutes. llio 
On 2 February, 2003 Maskhadov broadcast a denunciation of the March 2003 constitutional 
referendum and added a warning that rebels were preparing to launch a new series of attacks. 
The broadcast reached Chechnya's western border with Ingushetia. A broadcast at a later 
date showed footage of Chechen fighters preparing for battle. Musa Khasanov, a journalist 
with RFEIRL's Russian Service, who lives and works in Grozny described the broadcast.1111 
"The last programme was clearly seen and heard in the Achoi-Martan and 
Shunzhevski regions of Chechnya. It was a one-hour programme in which 
AsIan Maskhadov spoke about the readiness of the Chechen resistance 
forces and the situation among the armed resistance. [He] said that now, on 
his orders, large detachments off Chechen fighters have split into small 
groups and are waiting for the end of winter and that with spring big 
operations against the Russian forces in Chechnya are planned."Ill2 
1107 Filipov, D" Chechen Guerrilla Leader Was Killed, Russia Says, Rebels Dispute Claim; Kremlin Alleges 
Proof, Boston Globe, 26 April, 2002, JRL #6210, 26 April, 2002, 
1108 Chechen Rebels Confirm Arab Warlord Khatab Dead, AFP, 29 April, 2002, JRL #6215, 29 April, 2002. 
1109 Moscow to Jam Chechen Radio Station, www,rferLorg/newsline, 30 July, 2001. EJC Media News Digest, 30 
July, 2001. 
1110 Mite, V., Chechnya: An Information War Rages Alongside Militmy Campaign, RFEIRL, 7 February, 2003, 
JRL #7053, 8 February, 2003, 
1111 Ibid, 
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A May 2003 article appeared in The Moscow Times, which gave details of 
governmental plans to 'beef-up' the media assets in Chechnya, so that they could 
compete effectively against the separatist media. Official sources refer to this idea as 
building "the national information shield." In April 2003 the federal Press Ministry 
dedicated a meeting to the situation of the Chechen media. Vladimir Kozlov, Deputy 
Press Minister, stated that only 30 million of the planned 54.34 million rubles were 
spent reconstructing Chechen media during 2002. He announced that the government 
planned to allocate 115 million rubles in 2003 to various tasks; building a new TV 
and radio studio, buying printing presses, training journalists (many of whom have 
little or no experience) and building new antennae. II 13 
Ismail Munayev, Press Ministry representative in Chechnya, described the current 
situation and what the government planned to do to 'develop' Chechen media assets 
in more detail than that given by Kozlov. As of May 2003, 20 newspapers and 31 
television stations were registered in Chechnya. Three of the TV stations had permits 
to broadcast throughout the repUblic. But, most of the TV stations have weak signals 
and can only broadcast capacity to cover a local village. Munayev boasted that new 
media outlets were due to open in Chechnya; "by the end ofthe year, we will have at 
least·10 independent newspapers, three magazines and at least ten television 
stations."1114 
However, there appear to be problems in the Chechen media and their ability to 
conduct their business independently can be hampered by several factors. Currently, 
according to the May2003 article in The Moscow Times, there are 20 newspapers 
operating in Chechnya, of these nine are funded by the State and have print runs of 
approximately 15, 000 - 20,000 copies. Five ofthe newspapers are published by 
State agencies or ministries and six are independent. But, federal money often arrives 
late and both the Chechen as well as federal authorities are not forthcoming with 
giving out information. 11 15 
JRL #7053, 8 February, 2003. 
1113 Aliev, T., Moscow has Big Plans for Chechen Media, The Moscow Times, 27 May, 2003. 
www.themoscowtimes.comlstoriesI2003/05127/003-print.html. 27 May, 2003. 
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In addition to the problems listed above, faced by media workers in Chechnya, other 
more potentially lethal problems exist. As a result, a culture of self-censorship has 
developed as a means to try and saves one's life, but this affects the independence or 
objectivity that Munayev talked about. Satsita Isayeva, editor of Golas Chechenskoi 
Respuhliki stated that; "living here, you simply 1mow what you can write about and 
what you can not. ,,1116 The manager of Chechnya' s branch of VGTRK, Be1kyis 
Dudayeva echoed Isayeva's concerns: 
"We have to cover political news, but we do not lmow who to expect 
troubles from afterward. It is dangerous for us during the shooting of a 
report and afterward. ,,1m 
Since the death of freelance British cameraman Roddy Scott on the 26th of 
September, 2002, a total of 27 journalists had lost their lives while covering the 
Second Chechen War. To put this figure into perspective, statistics from other 
conflict zones need to be examined. 62 journalist were killed covering the conflict in 
Bosnia, 23 killed in Kosovo in 1999, 9 killed covering events in Afghanistan during 
2001-2002 and 4 killed in the 1991 Gulf War. A total of274 journalists have been 
killed while in war zones from 1990-2002. 1118 
5.4 Language And Symbolism 
"[ ... ] human beings are part of an intersubjective linguistic community. [ ... ] 
the very fact that we are language users means that we are communicatively 
able to reach an understanding of one another.,,11l9 
Habermas's theory of Communicative Action is a useful tool to apply to this section. This 
theory stipulates that there are two types of action: 
www.themoscowtimes.comlstories/2003/05/27 1003-print.html, 27 May, 2003. 
1116 Ibid. 
1117 Ibid. 
1118 Byrne, c., Media Casualties in Other Conflicts, 
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Ell Instrumental action - depends on egocentric forms of calculation and strategy. 
Ell Communicative action - actors are prepared to commit themselves to norms that are the 
outcome of rational agreement. 1120 
Of these two variants, communicative action provides the best means of achieving consensus 
over; 
Ell The objective world. 
e social world of institutions, traditions and values. 
Ell own SUbjective world. 1121 
Three validity claims, which map onto objective, social and subjective worlds, "allows us 
intersubjectivity to investigate questions of truth, justice and taste.,,1122 The three validity 
claims in question are; 
Ell propositional truth claims. 
Ell normative claims related to appropriateness. 
€I claims connected to sincerity.1123 
The relevancy of Communicative theory to the Chechen issue is also bound in the larger 
shifts currently at play in Russian society. Vladimir Putin can be viewed as coming to power 
due to his representation and association of the person with bringing about law, order and the 
restoration of Russia's power. 
By voting him into office, the people have committed themselves to a form of agreement, 
which binds the peoples' loyalty to the president to enable him to carry out what he has 
pledged. The first round election victory may also bestow an element of personal power, 
relating to his sincerity and trustworthiness. 
Education Ltd., 1999, p. 13. 
1120 Stevenson, N., The Transformation of the Media: Globalisation, Morality and Ethics, New York, Pearson 
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The effective spread of dominant ideologies depends on the strategic use of image systems. 
In this particular case, the dominant ideology (the incumbent political structure) wanted to 
engineer public support for another campaign against the Chechen republic. But, how is the 
message communicated to the audience? 
"Image systems entail articulation of layers of ideological representation and 
the tactical employment of modem communications technology to distribute 
the representations, which when successful, encourage audience acceptance 
and circulation of the dominant themes."1124 
In the above I made mention of image systems, there are two types of image system in 
existence. These structures are referred to as Ideational and Mediational systems. 
Ideational Systems 
Mediational Systems -
Representational Units 
Internal Organisation 
Suggested Interpretations 
Technological Mediation 
Social Mediation. 1125 
Ideational image systems are projected imagined situations, which are grounded in an over-
arching value structure, with which the public is already familiar. 1126 This may mean that old 
images or prejUdices could be manipulated to achieve political goals. Highly emotive rallying 
points under the banners of patriotism or nationalism might be used increase the amount of 
emotion involved in the situation. An audience that is highly emotionally charged may be 
prone to an increased level of manipulation, because emotion distracts clear and rational 
thought. 
Mediational image systems effectiveness is based in the use and interpretation of language. 
The success or otherwise, depends on the use of technology and current values at play in 
society. 
1124 Lull, J. (1995), op. cit., p. 9. 
1125 Lull, J. (1995), op. cit., p. 10. 
1126 Lull, J. (1995), op. cit., pp. 10 - 11. 
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"Media transmitted ideology in any political- economic - cultural context 
is represented partly in language and articulated and interpreted through 
language and other highly elaborated codes and modes - including visual 
forms and music - which are then further interpreted and used by people 
routine social interaction. These processes are all part of the ideological 
effect. They comprise mediational image systems, [ ... J technological 
mediation and social mediation."1l27 
At this point it is necessary to define two other concepts which have been introduced in the 
above-mentioned quote. 
Social Mediation - the mass media's ideological representations are recognised, 
interpreted, edited, and used in audience members' social construction of daily life. 1128 
Technological Mediation - is the intervention of communications technology in social 
interaction. 1 129 
With regard to the functioning of an ideational media system, it is not a difficult task for a 
sender to communicate to a Russian audience that Chechens are a hostile people. Warfare 
between the Russian centre of power and Chechen separatists is not a new event. Renowned 
Russian poet Alexander Pushkin (1799 - 1837) wrote about war in the region. Such a long 
history of conflict may make the Chechen appear to be a 'natural' enemy of Russians. 
Connected to Social Mediation's construction of daily life is the role of the metaphor. The 
metaphor is a specific part of language that brings members of a specific community together 
through meaning. "Use of metaphors is another commonality [ ... J the content of a metaphor in 
each instance is culture or case specific.,,113o 
The progress of technology has meant that this, until now, localised war can be broadcast 
into households across the world. When the apartment bombings occurred in Moscow, the city 
was sent into a state of panic and then anger. TV coverage was able to highlight various 
1127 Lull, J. (1995), op. cit., p. 16. 
1128 Lull, J. (1995), op. cit., p. 18. 
1129 Lull, J. (1995), op. cit., p. 16. 
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fragments and inflame sentiment even further. 
The current debate over whether Chechen terrorists or the Russian government carried out 
the bombing shall be a test of the government's credibility in the eyes of its citizens. If the 
Russian government's version of events is believed, their credibility will remain intact and 
they will continue to be the dominant hegemony. However, if the conspiracy theory is to be 
believed by the public, this may initiate a series of events that could rock to survival of the 
current dominant political elite. A lot is at stake, which is to be decided in a war of words, 
waged through the media. In this respect, the hegemonic force is fragile in such a challenge 
requiring further reinforcement and the reassertion of its power. 
Ultimately, this contest will boil down to credibility. Who is to be believed will be decided 
by whom gets the most exposure in the press. As outlined in the beginning ofthis thesis, I 
stated that the media represent the views and values of their owners. In contemporary Russian 
society, the Russian government through ownership and use oflaw is able to exert an ever-
increasing pressure on the editorial content of the domestic media. 
Challenges to the Kremlin's gatekeeper role in Chechnya face a rhetoric which is highly 
emotionally charged, but bare on facts to back up the counter claim by the government. Some 
elements of the Russian media have hypothesised that the 1999 apartment bombings in 
Moscow were carried out by Russian Special Forces, seeking to create a suitable public 
opinion, in which a popular war could be waged. Putin has refuted this claim and has attached 
a somewhat irrelevant theory to his reply, claiming that it is "nothing but part of an 
information war against Russia."l!3l 
This highly emotive answer seems to be aimed at suggesting that those making the claims 
want to harm Russia. This stance raises some important questions. Who seeks to wage an 
'information war' war on Russia? Why do these people want to wage an 'information war,' 
what are the end goals? Putin's answer is somewhat enigmatic and open-ended, which leaves 
a lot of interpretation via innuendo and suggestion. Where is the proof, which supports his 
contention of an information war? It may be a difficult allegation to refute due to its 
vagueness. 
1130 Gonzalez, A. & Tanno, D. A., Editors, op. cit., p. 15. 
1131 Putin, V., op. cit., p. 144. 
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News from official media sources in Russia have gone some way in trying to reinforce 
existing stereotypes and prejudices held about the' other.' In this particular case the' other' 
refers to the Chechen people. The parties in the conflict are given value laden mythic 
identities, the Chechens have been branded as terrorists and bandits. Following on from this 
given stereotype, it is easier to portray a terrorist as an aggressor, which means that the 
Russian federal forces are reacting in a defensive manner. 
The very specific language that was invoked in describing the Chechens as 'bandits,' 
'terrorists' or 'kidnappers' worked to reinforce existing stereotypes and prejudices against 
people from the Caucasus region. Gudov of VTsIOM detailed the consequences of employing 
this language and the assignment of blame upon the Chechens, in terms of public mobilisation 
in society. 
"These attacks (1999 apartment bombings) sparked fear, aggression and a 
powerful anti-Chechen sentiment on top ofintemal insecurities still strong a 
year after the 1998 economic crisis. [ ... ] nearly 65% of Russians wanted 
war until victory (end of 1999), and only 20% were for peace talks. ,,1132 
Further efforts were launched in April 2002, to discredit the 'conspiracy theory' approach to 
the apartment bombings. This coincided with Berezovsky's showing of a film that he financed 
Assassinat en Russie, described by Sergei Markov, the Director of the Moscow Institute of 
Political Studies as "a well-made professional example of the propagandist and psychological 
war that Boris Berezovsky is notorious for.,,1133 Other candidates were sought by RIA Novosti 
to provide credible testimony against the conspiracy theory. They 'found' another 'expert' in 
the American publicist Paul Murphy, who laid the blame squarely with the Chechen rebel 
commanders Khatab and Shamil Basayev, as Basayev had in the fight against Russia allowed 
the use of "any acts and methods, including terrorism.,,1134 
By 2001 it was becoming apparent that the expected rapid capture of the rebel leadership 
1132 Russian State Television Ensures LopSided View ofChechen War, AFP, 2 October, 2002. 
JRL #7350, 3 October, 2002. 
1133 Orlov, A., Russian Political Scientist Calls "Assassinat En Russie" an Example of Propagandist and 
Psychological War, RIA Novosti, 25 April, 2002. 
JRL #6209,26 April, 2002. 
1134 Orlov, A., American Publicist Paul Murphy Says: The Explosions of the Houses in the Autumn of 1999 were 
Organised by Chechen Militants, RIA Novosti, 25 April, 2002. 
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had failed and the campaign was proving to be stressful for Russian commanders. Rash 
comments began to be expressed in the Russian media, quoted from high-ranking Russian 
officers. Lieutenant-General Gennady Troshev, commander of the North Caucasus military 
district made one such comment, which was quoted in the newspaper Izvestia. 
"Here is what I would do, collect them all in a square, string the bandits up 
and let them hang, and let everyone see them. The word bandit is too good 
for them. They are scum.,,1135 
Troshev dehumanises the rebel Chechens even further when he states that the word 'bandit' 
is too good for them. His new term, 'scum' removes every trace of humanity from their 
persona. It appears as though the change in the term, from 'bandit' to 'scum' justifies may be 
a justification to hang the rebels. 
The emotional nature ofthe conflict and the interests involved make the Chechen conflict a 
very volatile war that is accompanied by emotionally charged rhetoric. The rhetoric is aimed 
at justifying the beginning and the continuation of the military operations in Chechnya. In 
June 200 1 Putin stated that the war was a battle to stop international terrorism from invading 
Russia. 1136 
On the eve ofthe war in 1999 when he became Prime Minister, Putin vowed to crush the 
'rebellion' within two weeks. However, the war still drags on. Approximately one year after 
this declaration, Putin declared victory. A further six months after this declaration he 
announced victory again and large scale troop withdrawals in the near future. 1137 Such claims 
have now been dropped in favour of preparing the Russian public for a protracted war in 
Chechnya. 
Government spokesman on Chechnya Sergei Yastrzhembsky echoed this change in 
information policy concerning the Chechen conflict. 
JRL #6209, 26 April, 2002. 
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"The historical parallel is Northern Ireland. [ ... J It would be naIve to 
forecast the finish of this situation in some foreseeable future. It is necessary 
to prepare public opinion for quite a long period of time. There is no 
medicine for a quick treatment ofthis crisis."JJ38 
The Chechen rebel factions have been continually lumped together as a collective group, 
rather than as individuals belonging to one of a number of different clans. If a distinction is 
made, it can be on the basis of vilifying the rebel leadership a little more than the rank and file 
members. 'The evil genius leading the mindless masses' type of scenario is painted for the 
audience. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov expressed part of this sentiment, in 
addition to the characteristic dehumanising aspect of the 'other' in a vow he made to the 
Russian public on TV on 6 December, 2001. 
"This winter we will seek to finish off the remaining bandit groups, and 
capture or destroy their ringleaders. This I promise yoU.,,1139 
An 'indignant' response was the Russian government answer to allegations over the shooting 
of villagers in Starye Atagi, Chechnya in March 2002. General Alexander Zdanovich of the 
FSBdescribed these allegations as "a pre-planned provocation against the federal forces.,,1140 
Instead, Zdanovich blamed the rebels for planting 'evidence' of 'atrocities' committed by 
government forces. He claimed that federal forces had 'destroyed' a group of 'bandits' the 
night before and these were the bodies used for the evidence of the 'atrocities'. To back his 
claims, Zdanovich stated; 
"I was personally present in this operation. [ ... J I wholly confirm the 
correctness and legality of actions by the federal units. [ ... J Village elders 
thanked for the destruction of the bandits, which terrorised villagers.,,1141 
Zdanovich's words would seem to reveal several underlying assumptions. Firstly, that the 
1138 Glasser, S. B., Putin 's War Persists as Sentiment Shifts Kremlin Likens Chechnya to Northern Ireland, 
Washington Post, 27 July, 2001. JRL #5369,28 July, 2001. 
1139 Russia Vows Winter Campaign Against Chechen Rebels, Reuters, 6 December, 2001. 
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1140 Reports on Shot Stmye Atagi ill Chechnya is a Provocation Against Federal Force, RIA Novosti, 13 March, 
2002. JRL #6133, 14 March, 2002. 
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federal forces are the 'righteous' side in the Chechen conflict. And conversely, the Chechen 
rebels seek to spread conflict, terror and chaos. Another point is that Zdanovich is considered 
to be a reliable and 'impartial' observer in this incident. Yet, there may in this instance appear 
to be a conflict of interest between Zdanovich's official duties as a high-ranking FSB officer 
in Chechnya and his imparting 'neutral' information regarding this act of 'disinformation'. 
Raw emotion on the part of officials who deliver public statements, does at times manage to 
make headlines in the media, Putin is no exception to this observation. Putin's language has 
been interweaved with criminal andlor military slang on occasion, two incidents in particular 
highlight this point. He is prone to using the slang when pressed by journalists over the 
Chechnya issue. The first occasion under consideration occurred in October 1999, when he 
threatened to "waste (the Chechens) while they sit in their outhouses.,,1l42 
During Akhmad Kadyrov's swearing in as the Chechen republic's new President on 19 
October, 2003, he echoed Putin's words from 1999. He made a firm and clear statement on 
the direction that the republic will take. 
"I am not a religious leader, or the head of an Islamic state [ ... ]. We shall hit 
the terrorists in the outhouse and nip terrorism in the bud.,,1l43 
Kadyrov's statement seems to indicate that he will not change the course of events in 
Chechnya. His statement would appear to underline a possible escalation of anti-rebel activity 
by the government forces. The language used is very specific in its reference to non-religion 
and the piece pertaining to the separatists denigrates them as 'terrorists' who are to be found 
in unsavoury places, which should be destroyed before being allowed to fully establish 
themselves. An emphasis of strength is given to the federal side, "we shall hit [ ... J" 
One of the first official acts of the new Chechen President has been to initiate an inquiry into 
the events of 1991 - 92. Kadyrov has created a nine member commission, whose task is to 
analysing the events that lead to the separatists rise to power and declaration of independence 
1141 Reports on Shot Stmye Atagi in Chechnya is a Provocation Against Federal Force, RIA Novosti, 13 March, 
2002. JRL #6133, 14 March, 2002. 
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from the Russian Federation. The primary focus being to "establish a legal assessment of 
events that built up to the First Russo-Chechen war in 1994."1144 According to Rudnik 
Dudayev the commission head and head of the republic's Security Council, the work of the 
commission would not lead to legal action being taken against office-holders. 
"It will be virtually impossible to prove the guilt of office-holders at the 
time, as such an approach would involve taking action against several 
people who held high office in the country subsequently and are still 
influential. ,,1145 
Kadyrov explained the purpose of the commission further. He also emphasized the no 
repercussions aspect to the commissions findings. 
"My purpose is not to set off legal action against anyone. However, it is 
necessary to lmow what was behind all of that, who inspired it and what it 
was exactly.,,1146 
However, in spite of the pledge of no repercussions from the commission findings, some do 
not believe the official line and this was expressed in an article that appeared in Izvestia. The 
Chechen Minister for Nationalities Affairs, Information and Foreign Relations, Taus 
Dzhabrailov, saw matters differently than the initial official explanations. 
"This commission is a serious business. Not only will names be named. 
There is the judicial system [ ... J, People who are guilty are now making 
statements in the name of the people. An assessment must definitely be 
made. Kadyrov has stated that the Chechen most guilty of this is Ruslan 
Khasbulatov.,,1l47 
Other political figures from the Chechen republic also point to the possibility that Ruslan 
JRL #7374, 19 October, 2003. 
1144 New Chechen Leader Orders InquilY into 1991 Independence Bid, AFP, 21 October, 2003. 
JRL #7380,22 October, 2003. 
1145 Ibid. 
1146 Ibid. 
1147 Maksakov, I., New Extraordinmy Commission Being Set up in Chechnya, Izvestia, 22 October, 2003. 
JRL #7382, 24 October, 2003. 
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Khasbulatov could become a victim of the commission. A senator from Chechnya Aldunar 
Zavgayev also hinted at the prospect. 
"Everywhere today we are naming only the perpetrators - the gunmen and 
Basayev. But nobody is speaking about those who brought them into being, 
fund them, and ideologically support them. We must make an assessment of 
all the events of the last 12 years. For instance, Khasbulatov was behind 
this. ,,1148 
On another occasion that provoked a strong response from Putin, which was broadcast by 
TVS, republished in several major Moscow newspapers and appeared on Internet sites 
happened in November 2002. A Danish reporter asked Putin why Russia was using mine 
warfare and killing civilians in Chechnya during a press conference. Putin's response was 
somewhat undiplomatic. 
"They (the Chechens) talk about killing non-Muslims and if you are a 
Christian, you are in danger. And even if you are an Atheist, you are in 
danger. [ ... ] If you decide to become a Muslim - even then you are not safe, 
because traditional Islam contradicts the conditions and goals that they (the 
Chechen rebels) set. But, if you are prepared to become the most radical 
Islamist and prepared to get circumcised - I invite you to Moscow. We have 
specialists that deal with this problem. I suggest that you do such an 
operation that nothing grows out of you again.,,1149 
Realising the PR damage done by Putin's remarks, some Kremlin 'friendly' media outlets 
started to try and rationalise the answer to the Danish journalist's question. The Duma owned 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta attempted to portion some of the blame on the journalist, whose question 
the newspaper described as having been "formulated rather provocatively.,,115o The article then 
deals with the 'correctness' of Put in's answer. 
1148 Maksakov, 1., New Extraordinmy Commission Being Set up in Chechnya, Izvestia, 22 October, 2003. 
JRL #7382,24 October, 2003. 
1149 Putin Tells Reporter to 'Get Circumcised', www.abcnews.com. 12 November, 2002. JRL #6548, 12 
November, 2002. 
1150 Tretyakov, V., Why was the Russian President so AnglY?, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 14 November, 2002. 
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"If it comes up in conversation with him, then he answers aggressively, but 
extremely concisely. However, on this occasion the President gave not only 
an aggressive answer, but also a very long one. He does this when the 
answer to the question is crystal clear to him, right down to the last detail. 
[ ... ] The aggression came from the fact that Putin is irritated by openly or 
intentionally stupid questions though camouflaged as the search for truth. 
Putin considers that stupid questions, like stupid answers to important 
problems, should not come from the mouths of people who form public 
opinion."1151 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
The American government and military learned a very important and valuable lesson 
regarding information strategy during the Vietnam war. In the various small wars that 
followed a careful and calculated strategy was worked out. The belief was that the media had 
lost the Vietnam war by sapping the American public's will to be engaged in the conflict. In 
the 1991 Gulf War, the information strategy employed by the Coalition Forces, fighting 
against the Iraqi forces employed a set-piece series of manoeuvres long before the first shots 
of the war were fired. The campaign began with the demonisation of the Iraqi leadership, this 
was an attempt at creating the 'Other,' which could be readily identified and hated by the 
public, thus providing a moral justification for prosecuting hostilities. Media personnel were 
also given restricted access to the area, on the grounds of safety and not impeding the military 
operations. The media that were allowed into the war-zone were shepparded around in groups, 
which allowed the military better control over access to information and what could be 
writtenlbroadcast. 
The 1999 Kosovo operation by NATO saw the pinnacle of information control, thus far 
attained by a side during the course of a conflict. Saturation coverage of events was designed 
to not only bewilder the viewing public, but was also used to convince them that they were 
being kept fully informed of events. The vast majority of the coverage was however, relatively 
meaningless in terms of its newsworthiness. Media were kept under tight control by the 
JRL #6552, 14 November, 2002. 
1151 Tretyakov, V., Why was the Russian President so Angry?, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 14 November, 2002. JRL 
#6552, 14 November, 2002. 
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authorities, who scrutinised the media's every move and removed what could be construed as 
being potentially detrimental material. A very deliberate strategy in the language and images 
used was designed to demonstrate that NATO was engaged in ajust and 'clean' war where 
human casualties (unless they were refugees fleeing from the Serbs) did not occur and 
precision high-tech weaponry was used by the 'good' side. 
Russian observers watched the 1991 Gulf War with interest and duly noted the information 
strategy that was employed by the Coalition forces. Prior to the Russian intervention that was 
to culminate in the First Chechen war (1994-96), the government began to launch its attack 
against the enemy 'other.' A information campaign was waged against Chechens, who were 
identified as being the enemy and given distinct characteristics that set them apart from 
Russians. Chechens were branded as 'bandits' and criminals, a 'mass society' (collective) in a 
sea of chaos and lawlessness. Moral ascendancy was assigned to the federal forces, whose 
duty it was to restore law and order to this land. 
Russian media was generally considered to be hostile to the separatist Chechen cause and 
were banned from rebel controlled Chechnya by September 1994. In a shift from methods 
used in the past, namely using silence, the Russian authorities decided to apply a 'spin' to the 
war. The Russian military, as had been done in the Gulf War, decided to open an information 
centre before the outbreak of military action. However, for reasons unlmown this centre was 
not operational until one week after the fighting broke-out. Additionally, unlike the tactic of 
overwhelming the media and public with a vast amount of information, the information 
provided by the Russian military information centre was sparse. 
The Kremlin's 'control' of the information war was short-lived. Media organisations started 
to break ranlc from the official position of events in the war and public opinion started to tum 
firmly against the war. One of the notable cases of this was NTV, which had their offices 
raided by armed masked men. The use of blunt and brutal methods by the authorities, such as 
the use of physical force was complemented by the use of kompromat in an effort to try and 
discredit 'rogue' media in the eyes ofthe Russian audience. Journalists were still free to travel 
in and around Chechnya without restrictions. 
A combination of Russian government incompetence, media outlets breaking from the 
official view and capable Chechen separatists working on counter-information saw the federal 
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efforts in the information war fall apart. The lack of federal credibility in terms of technical 
competence and in telling the truth saw them discredited and public opinion tum firmly 
against the war. Upcoming elections in the Russian Federation and Yeltsin's low poll ratings 
saw a humiliating withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya in 1996. 
Experiences of the First Chechen War were taken in by both the military and the 
government, additional lessons were absorbed by the events of the 1999 Kosovo campaign. 
As in the previous campaign, the coming of the Second Chechen War was heralded by an 
information war against the Chechen people, who were identified as being criminals, 'bandits' 
and religious extremists bent upon the destruction of Russia. The incursion into Dagestan and 
the Moscow apartment bombings were used by the government to back up their claims that it 
was not just the military who were the target, but Russian people in general. 
The government operated a military information agency by the time ofthe Russian offensive 
against the Chechen rebels. Media generally supported the Russian government's point of 
view on the Chechen campaign. As in the NATO and UN operations, media coverage of this 
early stage of military operations showed Russian military forces as being modem, competent 
and winning. The war was shown in a clean and clinical manner, as in the NATO and UN 
missions, which kept the image of 'friendly' human casualties to the bare minimum. 
Language employed by both sides in this conflict is very specific and emotional. The 
rhetorics of the conflict focuses on demonising the opposition as the' evil other' that is bent 
upon the destruction of 'their' people. Language usage, in the way it is employed is also 
designed to assign blame to the 'other' and absolve oneself of any guilt or wrongdoing in the 
conflict. A lot of emotional and patriotic cues are used to heighten public feeling and 
encourage attachment to the continuation of the war. These cues are designed to instil a sense 
of collective identity, which is necessary to remain committed to continuing the struggle and 
to psychologically survive the rigors of this conflict. The latest indications from the Russian 
military is that there may be a change in the language employed, which is designed to make 
the conflict seem less violent and push the image of Russian neutrality. In doing this, it may 
be easier for the authorities to 'sell' the war to the Russian public and to neutralise any 
opposition to the war. 
Unlike the First Chechen War, media personnel in the Second War face restrictions on 
380 
freedom of movement in and around the Chechen republic. The so-called accreditation 
scheme allows the government to vet journalists entering Chechnya and block those 
journalists that have written 'unfriendly' views and may be a potential threat to the 
government monopoly on the flow of information from Chechnya to the outside world. Press 
representatives were taken to areas approved by the military for 'battle-zone' tours and were 
not allowed to undertaken independent travel. A method that was taken from the Gulf War. 
One of the most prominent and significant aspects of political communications that are sent 
from the Russian federal government or sources controlled by them is the expectation that 
these communications will be believed. It seems to revolve around the concept that 
predominates within the pro-Kremlin circles, that what they say should be taken as the truth 
and nothing less. Pro-Kremlin state and media workers feel or publicly demonstrate that the 
'bandits' have been thoroughly discredited and their strategy is centred on a spiral of 
misinformation, deceit and lies that are designed to trick 'ordinary' Russians and sap their will 
to fight and win the Second Chechen War. As a result of this, some communications from 
government sources have been, to say the least, a little bizarre. At the beginning of the Second 
Chechen War, the state-owned news agency ITAR-TASS cited a leader of the North Caucasus 
Military District as saying "the Chechen bandits themselves mine residential buildings and 
blow them up when federal aviation appears in the sky.,,1l52 
The authorities are locked in another information war with the rebels. All forms of media are 
involved in the conflict on both sides, that have seen the conflict internationalised by both 
sides. The separatists want to internationalise the conflict to highlight Russian attrocities and 
bring about pressure from the international community against the Russian government. On 
the other hand, the Russian authorities want to internationalise the conflict to demonstrate that 
the Chechen rebels have links to international terrorist organisations and that Chechnya is 
returning the a state of 'normality.' The events of September 11, 2001 have a major influence 
on this internationalisation ofthe Chechen war. Russia's contention that the rebels have links 
to international terrorists has been accepted by the international community and international 
criticism of Russian actions has all but stopped. This is also linked with American foreign 
policy goals, which requires a measure of either support or neutrality from the Russians while 
prosecuting the 'War against Terrorism.' 
1152 Panfilov, 0., Failure of Information Policy in Chechnya. Official Sources Replace Objectivity With Lies, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 August, 2003 (BBC Monitoring). JRL #7287, 13 August, 2003. 
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At the outbreak of the war, government infonnation focused on a quick war that would see 
the rebels defeated and thus removing the threat by re-establishing Russian law and order. As 
the conflict dragged on, the focus shifted to counting rebel losses in tenns of manpower and 
material. There has been yet another shift in the spin on the war, which now centres on the 
Chechens return to a nonnal society that is greatly assisted by the help of the Russian forces 
and authorities. This last change takes attention away from the combat aspect to the conflict 
and instead looks at things from a point of view of restoration. 
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CHAPTER VI: FRAMING THE NEWS. 
6.0 Chapter Objectives 
Media, the language they use and the topics that are covered give an important clue as to the 
government's 'official' position on events in society. Language is a particularly powerful tool 
when utilised properly and effectively. By using a very specific language, an image or version 
of reality is created through narrowing public discourse. The process's entirety is bound 
within the existing dominant power relations. 
As such, discourse analysis is useful because "[ ... ] examining how language 
reflects its cultural origins and serves as a tool in constructing particular 
versions of social reality. [ ... ] All discourse is rooted in power relations.,,1153 
Changes in the way news was conveyed in the media was a useful indicator to the public 
that wider changes in society may be about to be initiated by the government. This was 
especially the case during the Soviet era, when the media were the bearers of the official view 
only. Earlier in this thesis I have used quotes from renowned academics such as Mickiewicz, 
whose studies seem to indicate that the Russian public is very perceptive in recognising these 
subtle cues. 
"The Soviet press played a critical role in Soviet society historically and was 
the vehicle through which changes in the political climate were most clearly 
reflected. ,,1154 
The case of the news agency Novosti illustrates the important role played by the media in 
attempting to build a particular version of reality. Novosti was created in 1961, with the 
intention of supplying other countries with information about the Soviet Union. TASS was 
considered inadequate for the task due to the close association with the Kremlin and their 
bureaucratic style of journalism being inappropriate for overseas markets. 1155 This case clearly 
illustrates the Kremlin's astute observation of the need to 'create' an 'untainted' media source 
to disseminate their information. Novosti was a purpose built creation with a specific goal in 
mind, to exert some measure of credible influence on the international information market by 
conforming to norms of journalism that differed from the domestic market. 
In this chapter, I shall begin with a comparative analysis of news from Soviet Life in two 
1153 Turpin, J., op. cit., pp. 1 - 2. 
1154 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 24. 
1155 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 19. 
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different periods in the Soviet era. The first period looks at the characteristics of this magazine 
during the Brezhnev era, then I shall take a look at the same pUblication during Gorbachev's 
period of reforms. This section is designed to give the reader a broad understanding of the 
concept of framing and not an in-depth analysis in its own right. There is simply not enough 
space available to enable it. 
The two following sections of this chapter will look at the structure and content of news on 
ORT and NTV. I will look for similarities and differences between the two channels in terms 
of news content and the importance associated with various individual news items. The 
importance of news items can be reflected by how often a particular news item is referred to 
and its position in a news programme (if it is the leading item, great importance is associated 
with that particular story). 
Debate has emerged over the extent to which news is independent of governmental 
interference in the Russian Federation. Some leading academics have argued that a measure of 
continuity from the Soviet State has survived and exists in the modem broadcasting industry. 
A leading mass communications academic, Colin Sparks has argued this point. 
"The old state broadcasters of the Communist epoch have survived as 
institutions and many of their staff remain the same. Their legal positions 
have been transformed [ ... J In reality, however, they are everywhere 
subordinated to the government of the day, and this is reflected in their 
programming, in particular their news and current affairs.,,1156 
6.1 Framing Soviet News, Brezhnev Era Versus Gorbachev Era News. 
Brezhnev's reign as Secretary-General of the Communist Party is generally seen as a period 
of conservatism and Gorbachev's era as a period of liberalism and reform. How were these 
changes reflected in Soviet Life? 
When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 he initiated a series of reforms that were designed 
to simulate the Soviet Union. The change came with a rigorous PR campaign, which was 
designed to give the outward impression of the great changes that were to occur. The 
messages were designed for foreign as well as domestic audiences. 
"To captivate foreign readers and show them that the Soviet Union was truly 
1156 Vartanova, E., "Media Structures: Changed and Unchanged" in Nordenstreng, K., Vartanova, E. & 
Zassoursky, Y., Editors, Russian Media Challenge, Helsinki, Kikimora Publications, 2001, p. 43. 
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changing, the media required a new face. The new image was developed not 
simply through strategic impression management; but rather by adopting 
Western styles of media presentation [ ... ]."1157 
The 'Western' styles of media presentation that were adopted by the Soviet media included 
changes such as; 
qJI Snappier headlines 
~ More vibrant photos 
@ Controversial stories 
~ Investigative reporting. 1158 
The Brezhnev era of Soviet politics, sometimes referred to as the period of zastoi 
(stagnation) was marked by inertia and arguably even the beginnings of the Soviet Union's 
decline. During the period, the role of the media was to support and sustain the status quo by 
encouraging the view of the system being in good working order. 
Media stories featured certain dominant themes, encouraging the public to work for the 
bettennent of socialism. A stress was placed on an idealised collective society. During 
Brezhnev's epoch some hero stereotypes came to dominate the magazine Soviet Life. 
• The worker who toiled for the bettennent of the state and not for material gain. 
~ Responsible youth. 
• Elderly citizens who had fought for Bolshevism, survived World War Two and were 
dedicated patriots striving for the common good. 
• A superwoman figure, shown as liberated and equal to men in her field of employment. 
@ A common worker who also served on the Supreme Soviet. This was meant to depict 
the Soviet government as being truly representative of society by including all elements 
of society. 1159 
Soviet Life was designed to influence a foreign audience, but was done so in a manner that 
was not overly different from the way in which the domestic audience was 'educated.' The 
advent of the hero figures was designed to demonstrate the superiority of Soviet society over 
the West. Framing (establishing the topic) organised the above-mentioned heroes into five 
media categories. 
1157 Turpin, l, op. cit., p. 127. 
1158 Ibid. 
1159 Turpin, J., op. cit., pp. 37 - 38. 
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fJ Effectiveness of socialism, increased literacy and decreased poverty were used to support 
this claim. 
" That the Soviet Union was a democracy and was humanitarian and fair. 
(II The co-operative nature of the Soviets was emphasised, evidenced by the importance of 
East-West co-operation. 
" That foreign policy differences between the Soviet Union and the West, firmly 
established the Soviets as having taken the moral high ground. 
fJ The so-called 'hail Lenin' frame, Lenin's words were used in an effort to lend credibility 
to the articles. 116o 
The recurrent topics consist of themes with a positive spin on topics about the Soviet Union. 
There is no hint of any impending political crisis, it was a 'business as usual' approach. This 
differed greatly from the content of Soviet Life under Gorbachev. Gone were the days of 
heroes only, the media was now being used to try and purge obstacles from the path of reform 
and the news featured a more dualistic approach to its stories. New actor stereotypes featured 
in the magazine, which included; 
" The entrenched, who were resistant to change and are responsible for bringing about the 
crisis in socialism in the first place. 
fJ Those striving for change and the betterment of society, with in the framework provided 
by the policies of perestroika and glasnost. 1161 
News had transformed from a solely positive spin approach, to a more confrontational 
approach that featured' good' citizens versus 'bad' citizens. The media frames were in 
keeping with the role ofthe media in the late Soviet Union (see chapter 4.8). Seven basic 
media frames existed in Soviet Life under Gorbachev. 
fJ The continuous nature of the revolutionary process. This was achieved through 
improving socialism and returning the ideology back to its roots (away from the Stalinist 
'perversions'). 
III Catharsis, the process of de-Stalinisation. 
" The purging of elements of the Brezhnev era from society. 
" Highlighting of rampant social problems, which had been a taboo topic previously. 
" Urging that reforms are needed to rescue the Soviet Union from its ills. 
" Promoting the policy of glasnost. 
fJ The new culture frame. The idea that the Soviet society was evolving, re-emerging with 
1160 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 39. 
1161 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 56. 
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old forms mixed with new ideas from the West. 1 162 
The new frames stressed the need to reform Soviet society, this was to be done through a 
mixture of purging the past and looking to the future. By blaming the past for the current 
problems Gorbachev may have wanted to distance himself from the crisis should it spiral out 
of control. He urged new reforms to help bring about a 'pure' form of socialism. Through 
engaging in this tactic he ran the risk of shouldering personal blame should the reform 
programme not bear visible results within a short span of time. The public may not have 
'seen' the crisis, therefore saw no need to change something that appeared to be working. 
6.2 Framing News Content on ORT I TV 1 
TV 1 (previously known as Public Russian Television - ORT) was established in 1995. It 
broadcasts a wide variety oflocal and foreign programmes for 19.5 broadcast hours daily. The 
station's signal reaches some 98.8% of Russia's population and in terms of audience and 
ratings it is ranked number one in Russia. Konstantin Ernst is the General Director of TV 1 
and is a close ally of President Putin.1I63 
The source of the news material for ORT I TV 1 has been provided by the Luba 
Schwartzman a Research Analyst and Moscow Office of the Centre for Defence Information. 
It consists of daily summaries of news items broadcast on the ORT I TV 1 programme. 
Transcripts were received during the period 2001 until 2003. However, transcripts have not 
been received for every day during this period. 
Due to the length of the period covered, approximately three years for the ORT I TV 1 news 
coverage, graphs in this section will be for a three month period. This is to minimise the 
number of graphs to; correspond with the number in the section on NTV news coverage and to 
save on space in the thesis. 
Graphs are used that have a list of topics, some of which are broad in nature. Each category 
has a score of the number of times it was raised in the month under assessment. The final part 
of the graph then places the general slant of the topic as positive, neutral or negative. This 
refers to whether is news topic concerned is pro-government (positive) or according to the 
official line or policy. Negative, in other words, that the topic is generally presented in a 
manner that is contra to the official line. Or the news is generally presented in an impartial 
manner (neutral). When I add a combination of two classifications, for example 
1162 Turpin, J., op. cit., p. 60. 
1163 Russian Broadcasting at a Glance, National Association ofTY and Radio Broadcasters of Russia. 
www.nat.ru/eng/rb/tv.php. 17 June, 2003. 
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POSITIVEINEUTRAL, this signifies that the news is split relatively evenly between these 
two groupings. The rating that comes first, states that there are fractionally more of this 
category than the other stated group. 
During the months of January to June 2001, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; June -7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19,20,21,22,25,26,27,29. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR JANUARY - JUNE 2001. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 4 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 7 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 31 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
CHECHNYA 42 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 14 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 
° 
N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 16 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 11 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 1 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 57 POSITIVE 
MILITARY 11 POSITIVE 
PUTIN 14 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 18 NEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 2 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 1 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
e Crime - a lot of mention is made of violent acts against government officials, 
especially police and the consequences for those who do (often death). 
@ Chechnya - an image of support of the Russian Federal forces in destroying the rebel 
groups is painted. Clearing operations and measures designed to limit or destroy the 
rebels are also announced. 
iii Foreign News - much of the foreign news is from areas within the former Eastern 
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Bloc and the bulk ofthese stories are from countries in the CIS. 
e Life and Economy - Governmental successes in the area that affects the civil 
population is popular. Such as the halting of the price increase of electricity and an 
increase in income. 
During the months of July to September 2001, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; July - 2,3,5,6,9, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,23,24,25,26,27,30,31. 
August - 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17,20,21,22,23,27,28,29,30. 
September - 3, 4,5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,20,21,24,25,26,28. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR JULY - SEPTEMBER 2001. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 1+2+1=4 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 3+12+6=21 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
CRIME 8 + 24 + 22 = 54 POSITIVE 
CHECHNYA 27+36+40=103 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 35+51+31=117 POSITIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0+1+0=1 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 11 + 16 + 33 = 60 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2 + 5 + 9 = 16 POSITIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 13+6+15=34 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 0+0+1=1 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 62+71 +37= 170 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
MILITARY 5 + 18 + 15 = 38 POSITIVE 
PUTIN 28+29+44=101 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 40 + 30 + 47 = 117 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 1+1+0=2 POSITIVE 
SPORT 0+1+1=2 NEUTRAL 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for July, second for August, third for September and 
the final is the total count for the three month period. 
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Comments: 
@» Crime - prison escapes and talk of the need to tighten security around strategic 
installations are the focus of the news. 
@» Crises and Disasters - weather related disasters in the Russian Far East and the lifting 
of the Kursk form the bulk of the items covered. Coverage is more focused on the 
efforts by the authorities to facilitate a speedy clean up operation and not so much 
about the magnitude of the disaster. The government is seen in an energetic mode of 
action. 
@» Putin - is shown to be actively involved with all areas of government activity, 
ensuring that everything runs smoothly and the interests of the Russian people (both 
nationally and internationally) are upheld. 
@I Politics - much attention has been paid to the law making activities of the Duma and 
the Federation Council. During the month of September, discussions on the effects of 
the September 11 attack on the U. S. and its aftermath are widely debated (such as the 
American military's use of bases in the Central Asian Republics). 
During the months of October to December 2001, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; October - 1, 2,3,4,5,9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,22,23,24,25,26,29, 
30,31. November - 1, 2, 5,6, 7, 8,9, 14, 15, 16, 19,21,26,27,28,29. December - 3, 4,5, 
6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19,20,21,27,28. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2001. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 0+1+3=4 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 15+10+9=34 POSITIVE 
CRIME 15 + 17 + 10 = 42 POSITIVE 
CHECHNYA 20+25+19=64 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 41 + 10 + 15 = 66 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0+0+0=0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 40 + 21 + 10 = 71 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 9+3+6=18 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 13 + 8 + 6 = 27 POSITIVE 
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HUMANITARIAN 4+4+3=11 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 42 + 42 + 56 = 140 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
MILITARY 20+12+19=51 POSITIVE 
PUTIN 41+26+33=100 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 34 + 31 + 33 = 98 POSITIVE 
SCANDALS 0+0+0=0 N/A 
SPORT 1+1+0=2 NEUTRAL 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally colullUl- first set for October, second for November, third for December 
and the final is the total count for the three month period. 
Comments: 
411 Foreign News - the political situation in Georgia and tensions between Georgia and 
Abkhazia are closely followed in the news. These themes form the bulk of the foreign 
news stories. The news is biased against Georgian President Edvard Shevardnadze 
with accusations of his efforts in supporting the rebel Chechen cause and working 
against Russia's national interest. 
Ell Government - the work of the government in passing laws and performing other 
'governmental' duties are highlighted. 
• Military - news focus on new technology entering service in the Russian armed forces, 
international defence agreements and the military draft. The news gives the impression 
of a progressively modernising organisation with an international perspective. 
• Putin - a lot of attention was paid to the President's discharge of professional duties 
during the month of October. He is portrayed as a very dedicated and energetic 
worker. 
During the months of January to March 2002, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; January - 3,4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18,21,22,24,28,29,30, 3l. 
February - 1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19,20,22,25,26,28. March - 1, 4, 11, 12, 
13,14,15,19,20,21,22. 
ORTITV 1 NEWS FOR JANUARY - MARCH 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 1+1+0=2 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 13 + 9 + 7 = 29 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 20 + 13 + 11 = 44 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
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CHECHNYA 25 + 26 + 14 = 65 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 28 + 15 + 8 = 51 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 1+0+0=1 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 13 + 22 + 18 = 53 POSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 10 + 7 + 6 = 23 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 13+10+6=29 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 6+2+0=8 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 30+37+25=92 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
MILITARY 12+28+7=41 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
PUTIN 30 + 41 + 24 = 95 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 24 + 33 + 31 = 88 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 0+0+0=0 N/A 
SPORT 1 + 5 + 6 = 12 POSITIVE 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for January, second for February, third for March and 
the final is the total count for the three month period. 
Comments: 
• Courts and Law - the progress toward establishing a comprehensive legal framework 
is closely monitored, in terms of the discussion and passing of laws especially. 
Additionally, the verdicts of major trials are and legal decisions are followed. 
CD Military - the modernisation and integration of the Russian armed forces into the 
world community is still the focus of attention. But there are also stories on conscript 
deserters and some technical failures in the sector of military aviation. 
• Putin - positive comments are made about Putin's activities in office, his contacts with 
overseas nations and organisations, domestic politics and his helping people who made 
personal requests to him in a televised show. It seems to be oriented toward 
demonstrating that Putin cares for everyone, including the average citizen with his or 
her local problem. 
• Sport - controversy at the Salt Lake City Olympic Games are highlighted, a possible 
anti-Russian sentiment at the Games is aired. The reports are nationalistically oriented, 
that is touting the achievements of Russian athletes and explaining failure in terms of 
conspiracy theory. 
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During the months of April to June 2002, news transcripts were received for the following 
days; April- 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 15, 17, 18, 19,22,23,24,25,29. May - 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 
16,20,21,22,23,24,28,30. June - 3, 4,5,6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19,20,21,24,25,26. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR APRIL - JUNE 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 3+0+1=4 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 8+2+7=17 POSITIVE 
CRIME 21 + 19 + 21 = 61 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 18+30+21=69 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 6 + 19 + 27 = 52 POSITIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0+0+0=0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 17 + 13 + 14 = 44 POSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5+7+6=18 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 9 + 9 + 17 = 35 POSITIVE 
·HUMANIT ARIAN 1+3+0=4 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 39 + 45 + 62 = 146 NEUTRAL/POSITIVE 
MILITARY 16+12+12=30 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
PUTIN 31 + 30 + 48 = 109 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 27 + 31 + 36 = 94 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 0+1+0=1 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 1 + 5 + 8 = 14 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for April, second for May, third for June and the final 
is the total count for the three month period. 
Comments: 
«I Crime - in addition to criminal acts that have been perpetrated, such as murder, 
hostage taking, robbery and poaching, inter-departmental and international 
cooperation efforts receive a lot of attention. 
«I Freedom of Speech and Media - a lot of mention is made of professional and 
academic conferences taking place on Russian territory. Anniversaries of media 
organisations and media awards are also a popular topic. Little mention is made of 
conflict or tension in the media community. 
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• Putin - is shown to be hard working by the amount of time he spends meeting 
members of the government and foreign dignitaries and the agreements and work 
priorities that arise as a result of the meetings. 
• Sport - Russian involvement in the soccer world cup is the popular issue covered in 
this particular category. 
During the months of July to September 2002, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; July - 1, 2,8,9, 10, 12, 16. August - 1, 3,4,5,6,7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,24, 
25,26,27,28,29,31. September -1,2, 7, 8,9,10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19,25,26,28,29. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR JULY - SEPTEMBER 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 0+3+1=4 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 9+6+2=17 POSITIVE 
CRIME 5 + 15 + 18 = 38 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
CHECHNYA 6+61+42=109 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 25 + 35 + 28 = 88 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 1+0+0=1 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 3+17+16=36 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2+0+3=5 POSITIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 3 + 10 + 9 = 22 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 1+1+1=3 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 15+41+32=88 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
MILITARY 4 + 19 + 5 = 28 NEGATIVEIPOSITIVE 
PUTIN 20 + 31 + 25 = 76 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 12 + 13 + 23 = 48 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
SCANDALS 0+0+0=0 N/A 
SPORT 1 + 6 + 3 = 10 NEUTRAL 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for July, second for August, third for September and 
the final is the total count for the three month period. 
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Comments: 
<II Chechnya - increased rebel activity is publicised as are the increasing tensions with 
Georgia over rebel activity in the Pankisi Gorge. References are also made to 
successes by the federal forces in killing and capturing rebel groups and infrastructure. 
@ Crises and Disasters - a series of natural and man-made disasters occurred, both in 
Russia and abroad (involving Russian citizens). Such as the highly publicised air crash 
over Southern Germany in July, involving a group of Russian schoolchildren. 
<II Life and Economy - many professional holidays were announced and celebrated as 
well as other 'feel-good' news as anniversaries of artists, actors and other renowned 
Russians. 
<II Military - some 'bad news' concerning the military was covered, which included 
prosecutions against high-ranking officials for theft and desertions by conscripts. This 
was balanced somewhat by news of international cooperation and joint exercises. 
During the months of October to December 2002, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; October -7,9, 10, 14, 15, 16,21,22,29,30,31. November - 2,3,4,5, 11, 
13, 14, 18,20,23,24,25,28,30. December -1,3,7,8,9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,21,22, 
23,24,25. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 2+6+1=9 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 3+2+4=10 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 6 + 22 + 12 = 40 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 56 + 58 + 25 = 139 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 16 + 16 + 14 = 46 POSITIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0+1+1=2 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 14+ 12+ 10=36 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2+11+4=17 POSITIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 8 + 6 + 12 = 26 POSITIVE 
HUMANIT ARIAN 1+0+0=1 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 25 + 37 + 66 = 128 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
MILITARY 7 + 8 + 11 = 26 NEGATIVEINEUTRAL 
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PUTIN 28 + 30 + 36 = 94 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 26 + 31 + 28 = 85 POSITIVE 
SCANDALS 0+0+0=0 N/A 
SPORT 7 + 7 + 6 = 20 POSITIVE 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for October, second for November, third for December 
and the final is the total count for the three month period. 
Comments: 
@} Orthodox Church and Religion - some stories on other religions, such as Buddhism, 
appeared in the news. But, the Russian Orthodox Church received the most coverage, 
which was overwhelmingly positive for the Church. 
@} Chechnya - after the October 2002 crises at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow, news 
items on the incident and its after effects carne to dominate the news. 'Good news' 
stories on Russian successes in tackling the insurgency problem continued. 
@! Life and Economy - December saw a significant increase in the number of these 
stories, this may be as a result of the saturation coverage of the terrorist attack in 
Moscow in October, to give the viewers some 'softer' or less depressing news and to 
negate the effects of 'news fatigue'. There were many examples of upbeat cultural 
news in addition to coverage of strikes over the non-payment of wages. 
@! Politics - various international meetings and agreements between Russia and other 
nations formed an important part of this category. Various local elections and the 
Russian Central Electoral Commissions statements and decisions were also covered. 
During the months of January to March 2003, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; January - 13, 14, 15, 18, 19,20,21,24,27,28,30. February - 1,2,3,4,5, 
6,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,22,23,24,25,26,27. March - 1, ,2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 
12,14,19,20,21,24,25,26,27,31. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR JANUARY - MARCH 2003. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 2+5+3=10 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 3+3+4=10 POSITIVE 
CRIME 10+ 15+ 11 =36 POSITIVE 
CHECHNYA 23 + 33 + 33 = 89 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 11 + 26 + 17 = 54 POSITIVE 
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EXCHANGE RATE AND 0+1+1=2 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 5 + 11 + 8 = 24 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7+1+2=10 POSITIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 3+14+6=23 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 0+0+5=5 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 50 + 58 + 34 = 142 POSITIVE 
MILITARY 11 +9+ 10=30 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
PUTIN 25 + 51 + 43 = 119 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 30+30+31=91 POSITIVE 
SCANDALS 0+0+0=0 N/A 
SPORT 5 + 6 + 1 = 12 POSITIVE 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for January, second for February, third for March and 
the final is the total count for the three month period. 
Comments: 
III Orthodox Church and Religion - a focus that was almost primarily dedicated to 
Russian Muslims attending the Hajj in Saudi Arabia. This may possibly be an effort to 
divert any accusations of bias against the authorities towards Muslims (and Chechens). 
III Crime - a lot of news on crime prevention and the breaking of organised crime in 
various parts of the Russian Federation and smugglers entering Russian territory. 
III Military - a mixture of good news and bad. The military image was somewhat further 
tarnished by a series deaths in training accidents, desertions and charges being laid 
against officers. This was offset a little by stories concentrating on the 'success' of 
training exercises and an increase in conditions and wages of service personnel. 
III Politics - the main points of political discussion revolved around the issues of the Iraq 
War and the new visa regime for Russian citizens travelling to and from the 
Ka1iningrad enclave. Political congresses and political party events, especially 
involving the United Russia party are well covered. 
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During the months of April to June 2003, news transcripts were received for the following 
days; April-I, 5, 6, 7, 8,9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19,20,22,24,26,27,28,30. 
May - 3,4,5,6,7,8, 12, 13, 14, 15,31. June -1,2,3,4,5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 
19,21,22,23,24,25,26,28,29. 
ORTITV 1 NEWS FOR APRIL - JUNE 2003. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 1+0+4=5 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 5 + 3 + 5 = 13 POSITIVE 
CRIME 17 + 10 + 15 = 42 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 25 + 12 + 35 = 72 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 33 + 24 + 25 = 82 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0+0+0=0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 12+5+14=31 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4+1+1=6 POSITIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 5+6+10=21 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 3+0+0=3 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 57 + 37 + 83 = 177 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
MILITARY 13 + 8 + 18 = 39 POSITIVE 
PUTIN 41 + 24 + 46 = 111 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 28+ 16+31 =75 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 0+0+0=0 N/A 
SPORT 0+0+5=5 NEUTRAL 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for April, second for May, third for June and the final 
is the total count for the three month period. 
Comments: 
• Crime - most of the crime stories concern cases solved, suspects apprehended or 
efforts to crack down on crime. It would seem as though a picture is being portrayed 
along the theme that 'crime does not pay.' The use of specific real-life examples in 
state-owned or controlled, in order to try and discourage criminal activity was used 
during the late Soviet Union. 
@ Crises and Disasters - a lot of attention was focused on the threat posed by SARS to 
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Russia and the best ways to prevent this from occurring. There were stories concerning 
natural disasters associated with spring, such as floods and forest fires as well as 'man-
made' accidents. 
€iD Life and Economy - many of the stories featured the preparations for and the 
celebrations of victory day (against the Axis powers in the Second World War). This 
category also featured numerous stories of cultural value, such as the birthday 
celebrations of renowned actors and artists, galleries, shows and exhibitions. 
€iD Putin - is shown as being a very active and energetic leader. Many reports refer to his 
busy schedule of meetings across the entirety of Russia and around the world. Some 
attention is focussed on the criticisms and goals, which Putin levels at various 
members of the government and ministerial and departmental heads of the government 
bureaucracy. 
During the months of July to September 2003, news transcripts were received for the 
following days; July - 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19,20,21,22,23,30,31. August - 2,3, 5,6, 7, 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,21,23,24,26,27. September - 1,2,3,6, 7, 8,9, 10, 
11,13,14,15, 16. 
ORT/TV 1 NEWS FOR JULY - SEPTEMBER 2003. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 3+3+3=9 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 6 + 4 + 2 = 12 POSITIVE 
CRIME 15 + 19 + 3 = 37 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
CHECHNYA 20 + 43 + 22 = 85 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 17+33+18=68 POSITIVEINEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0+0+0=0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 10+18+3=31 POSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4+6+5=15 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 5+10+10=25 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 0+0+0=0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 39 + 59 + 28 = 126 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
MILITARY 15 + 12 + 7 = 34 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
PUTIN 25+31+25=81 POSITIVE 
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POLITICS 16+21 + 19=56 POSITIVE 
SCANDALS 0+0+0=0 N/A 
SPORT 1+4+3=8 NEUTRAL 
Please note: four sets of figures in tally column - first set for July, second for August, third for September and 
the final is the total count for the three month period. 
Comments: 
~ Crime - July 14 was the first indication of the approaching public conflict between 
Yukos and the government. Surveillance and eavesdropping equipment were allegedly 
found in the Yukos bUilding. This quickly spread to investigations of financial 
irregularities. This has the striking similarity with the opening of the highly publicised 
conflict between Media-Most and the government in May 2000. 
~ Chechnya - August 2003 saw the suicide bombing of the Mozdok hospital, during 
which the hospital was extensively damaged and many Russian servicemen wounded 
in the Chechen campaign lost their lives. The terrorist act and the aftermath are 
extensively covered, including the sacking of the local administrator, the naming of 
heroes and the search for those who planned and perpetrated the act. The Chechen 
presidential elections and the reopening of schools in the republic also received a lot of 
attention during this period of review. 
~ Putin - Putin is seen to be very active in his civic duties, such as urging greater 
achievements from state bodies (for the benefit of the citizens) and initiating 
investigations into the disasters/crises that took place (for example the Mozdok 
bombing and the continuing problems with a possible energy crisis). He is shown to be 
in charge of the situation by being firm, resolute and decisive. 
~ Politics - in the run-up to the December 7, 2003 State Duma elections, the 
pro-Kremlin United Russia party is beginning to be given a lot of airtime. Although, 
the category of the news items is often varied, such as financing the refit of a navy 
destroyer and talking with small businesses on creating mechanisms to protect them 
from petty officials and organised crime. 
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6.3 Framing News Content on NTV 
NTVwas founded in 1993. Until 2001 NTVwas part of the oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky's 
media empire, but was subsequently taken over by the state-controlled Gazprom. The station 
transmits through 86 of its own transmitters and 103 local partner stations. A potential 
audience of 112 million viewers can receive NTV in Russia, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and the Baltic States. Daily broadcasting hours of the station amounts to 
18 hours. 1164 
The source of the study material has been provided by the newsroom at NTV. It consists of 
daily summaries of news items broadcast on the Segodnya programme, which screened daily 
at 19:00 hours. Transcripts were received during the period January 2002 until January 2003. 
However, transcripts have not been received for every day during this period. 
Material will be divided into months, January 2002, February 2002, March 2002 ... etc. I 
wi11list the dates for material that has been received. Summaries will be made of the main 
topics that were raised in each of the months. This is done with the aim of 'discovering' which 
agenda were raised in each month studied, this will enable at a quick glance, to see what news 
was considered important and 'worthy' by the NTV news team and their owner. 
During the month of January 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 
8,9,10,11,14,15,16,17,18,21,22,23,24,25,28,29,30,31. 
NTVNEWS FOR JANUARY 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 4 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 16 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 24 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 29 NEGATIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 22 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 2 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 48 NEUTRAL 
1164 Russian Broadcasting at a Glance, National Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters of Russia. 
www.nat.ru/eng/rb/tv.php. 17 June, 2003. 
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH 24 NEGATIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 2 NEUTRAL 
HUMANITARIAN 2 NEUTRAL 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 17 NEGATIVE 
MILITARY 9 NEUTRAL 
PUTIN 11 NEUTRAL 
POLITICS 16 NEGATIVE 
SCANDALS 9 NEGATIVE 
SPORT 4 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
III Chechnya - news relating to foreign involvement in or about Chechnya was 
pro-official line. However, inefficiencies and incompetence in the Russian effort in the 
republic were highlighted. 
III Foreign News - most was neutral. Some items were not necessarily pro-government, 
but were pro-Russian, such as the problems faced by ethnic Russians living in the Near 
Abroad. 
III Life and Economy - much has been made of the increasing hardships faced by 
ordinary Russians, such as the increased cost ofliving, the degradation of utilities and 
social services. 
III Military - for the most part neutral. However, the appalling social conditions of 
servicemen are discussed, such as the condition of military housing. 
During the month of February 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 
1,5,6, 7,8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19,20,21,22,26,27,28. 
NTV NEWS FOR FEBRUARY 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 2 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 8 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 5 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 13 NEGATIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 15 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0 N/A 
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MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 41 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 13 NEGATIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 0 N/A 
HUMANITARIAN 0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 10 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
MILITARY 17 NEGATIVE 
PUTIN 5 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 13 NEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 11 NEGATIVE 
SPORT 13 POSITIVE 
Comments: 
III Foreign News - some of the foreign news was reported in a neutral manner, especially 
news relating to the U. S. involvement in Afghanistan and the 'War on Terrorism.' 
News such as the deteriorating situation in Moldova was reported in a pro-government 
manner. This is perhaps due to the threat against 'fellow Russians' and is not strictly 
pro-government per se. 
III Military - coverage relating to problems within the armed forces, especially issues 
relating to morale. Cases where desertions have been made public and the 
incompetence ofthe military hierarchy in dealing with this are highlighted. 
411 Putin - comments made about the President paint a picture of him working tirelessly 
for the benefit of the people. 
ED Sport - the focus of the increased sport coverage was the Salt Lake City winter 
Olympic games. 
During the month of March 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 4, 5, 
6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 18, 19,20,21,25,26,27,28. 
NTV NEWS FOR MARCH 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 0 N/A 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 10 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 8 NEUTRAL 
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CHECHNYA 19 NEGATIVE/POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 15 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 3 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 38 NEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 9 NEGATIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 0 N/A 
HUMANITARIAN 0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 19 POSITIVE 
MILITARY 12 NEGATIVE 
PUTIN 4 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 16 NEGATIVE 
SCANDALS 8 NEGATIVE 
SPORT 3 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
• Foreign News - the news focus has shifted away from 'injustices' being committed 
against Russians in the Near Abroad to American involvement in Afghanistan and the 
Israe1ilPalestinian conflict. 
~ Life and Economy - news is not so much pro-official line, but more nationalistically 
oriented. This is so in the case of the trade war with the U. S. over tariffs. 
• Crises and Disasters - the theme of natural disasters (fire, floods earthquakes ... etc) 
and the Kursk tragedy are the main events raised. 
• Scandals - a focus has been on political scandals in the month of March 2002. 
During the month of April 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 1,2, 
3,4,5,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,22,23,24,25,29. 
NTVNEWS FOR APRIL 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 3 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 13 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 20 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 16 NEUTRAL 
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CRISES AND DISASTERS 5 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 54 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5 NEGATIVE 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 2 NEUTRAL 
HUMANITARIAN 1 NEUTRAL 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 37 NEGATIVE 
MILITARY 11 NEUTRAL 
PUTIN 9 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 30 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
SCANDALS 10 NEGATIVE 
SPORT 3 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
.. Crime - skinhead attacks on non-white Russians (from the Caucasus region for 
example) and foreign nationals were reported. 
CD Life and Economy - hunger strikes and work strikes over wage arrears are covered. 
• Politics - the discussion on the move to outlaw the Communist Party and the possible 
repercussions were the subject of much discussion. 
CII Scandals - voting irregularities in the provinces has become the centre of attraction in 
the news. 
During the month of May 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 1,2,3, 
4,6,14,20,21,22,23,27,28,30. 
NTVNEWS FOR MAY 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 4 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 6 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 11 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 11 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 6 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0 N/A 
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MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 54 POSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2 NEUTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 1 NEGATIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 29 NEUTRAL 
MILITARY 4 NEUTRAL 
PUTIN 2 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 23 POSITIVE 
SCANDALS 4 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 10 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
It Orthodox Church and Religion - a focus on the activities of the Roman Catholic 
Church, especially visits by the Pope to the CIS (such as Azerbaijan). 
It Foreign News - substantial attention was paid to the activities ofU. S. President 
George VV. Bush and the War on TelTol1sm. Another impoliant news item was 
coverage of May Day parades throughout Europe. 
• Politics - coverage of political in fighting in the Communist Party continued. 
• Sport - increased coverage of sport was due to the World Cup Championship in 
soccer. 
During the month of June 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 3, 5, 
6, 10, 14, 17, 19, 24, 25. 
NTVNEWS FOR JUNE 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 1 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 7 POSITIVE 
CRIME 15 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 5 NEUTRAL 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 11 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 1 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 21 NEUTRAL 
406 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNNMENT 1 NEUTRAL 
HUMANITARIAN 0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 22 NEGATIVE 
MILITARY 2 NEUTRAL 
PUTIN 6 POSITIVE 
pOLITICS 17 POSITIVE 
SCANDALS 3 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 11 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
4@ Courts and Law - much attention was centred on the trials of oligarchs, such as 
Berezovsky and Anatoly Bykov (Aluminium oligarch) and the possible outcomes of 
the trials. 
EI Crime - the Moscow soccer fan riots and booby-trapped anti-Semitic posters 
appearing around Russian cities are tvv'O of the most prominent incidents dealt with in 
the news. 
• Chechnya - the trial of Colonel Yuri Budanov, accused of murdering a Chechen 
teenager was still receiving a lot of attention in the news. 
EI Life and Economy - the rapidly increasing cost of living via the rise in prices is 
focussed on. One of the main issues is the increased cost of petrol. 
During the month of July and August 2002, news transcripts were received for the following 
days; July 1, 3,4,8,9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 19,23,25,29,30 and August l. 
NTVNEWS FOR JULY AND AUGUST 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 2 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 17 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 15 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 11 NEGATIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 49 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 4 NEUTRAL 
MONEY 
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FOREIGN NEWS 26 NEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 1 NEUTRAL 
HUMANITARIAN 0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 30 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
MILITARY 3 NEUTRAL 
PUTIN 4 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 9 NEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 4 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 5 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
€!I Crime - the wave of booby-trapped anti-Semitic posters is focused on and is coined 
with the expression Poster Terrorism. 
CD Chechnya - renewed fighting was covered in the news as well as investigations into 
the 1999 apartment bombings. 
E9 Crises and Disasters - a lot of negative news of natural disasters occurring in Russia 
and the ineptitude of the authorities to deal with them. Also, findings of the Kursk 
disaster inquiry are made pUblic. The air crash over Switzerland is also of high news 
value. 
CD Putin - although much has been made of the authorities inability to deal with disasters 
occurring in Russia, Putin distances himself from blame by publicly criticising the 
efforts of the authorities involved. 
During the month of September 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 
5,9,16,17,18,24,25,26. 
NTVNEWS FOR SEPTMBER 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 1 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 4 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 9 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 16 POSITIVEINEGATIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 16 NEUTRAL 
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EXCHANGE RATE AND 
° 
N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 30 NEUTRALIPOSITIVE 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 3 NEUTRAL 
HUMANITARIAN 
° 
N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 7 NEUTRAL 
MILITARY 4 POSITIVE 
PUTIN 6 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 17 NEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 
° 
N/A 
SPORT 2 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
CD Chechnya - increasing tensions between Russia and Georgia over alleged Chechen 
rebel activity in the Par..kisi Gorge is covered. 
CD Crises and Disasters - the peat bog, forest fires and the effects of these incidents 
around Moscow are discussed in detail. 
CD Foreign News - increasing tensions between Iraq, U. K. and the U. S. are a topical 
issue. The Ukrainian election results and the uncertainty of the true nature of the end 
result are featured. 
• Putin - extensive coverage of Put in discharging his duties as President in an 
international capacity with leaders of other CIS states, especially the proposed 
Russian-Belarussian union and negotiations with Georgia. Putin is shown as holding 
moral ascendancy over his counterparts. 
During the month of October 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 2, 
3,4,7,8,9,10,11,14,15,16,17,18,22,23,24,28,29,30,31. 
NTV NEWS FOR OCTOBER 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 5 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 4 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 18 NEUTRAL 
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CHECHNYA 73 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 22 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 73 NEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 1 NEUTRAL 
HUMANITARIAN 0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 30 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
MILITARY 4 NEUTRAL 
PUTIN 9 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 42 NEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 5 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 6 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
l!I Crime - the murder of Magadan governor Valentin Tsvetkov made the headlines on 
many occaSIOns. 
l1li Chechnya - renewed fighting and the search for traitors and defectors from the 
pro-Moscow administration form the centre of attention. The terrorist act in seizing 
hostages at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow was given saturation coverage. Putin 
was shown to be cool, calm and 'in control'. Chechen separatists are demonised. 
l1li Crises and Disasters - the actions of the Emergencies Ministry in North Ossetia are 
focused upon. 
l!I Politics - the elections ofthe regional governors and the outcomes of those elections 
were discussed. 
410 
During the month of November 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 
1,5,6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19,21,25,26,27,28,29. 
NTVNEWS FOR NOVEMBER 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 4 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LAW 6 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 9 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 43 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 21 POSITIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 77 NEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5 NEUTRA..L 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 3 NEUTRAL 
HUMANITARIAN 3 POSITIVE 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 25 NEUTRAL 
MILITARY 5 NEGATIVE 
PUTIN 11 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 20 NEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 0 N/A 
SPORT 1 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
• Chechnya - news about the hostage taking at the Dubrovka Theatre, which was 
showing the musical Nord Ost continued. Additionally, a lot more coverage of fresh 
government action in the Chechen province is shown. 
@! Military - the ever present problem of desertion of conscripts from the Russian armed 
forces is discussed in detail. 
@I Putin - is shown in several capacities as Head of State; hosting international 
dignitaries, discussing terrorism and pledging swift action on the problem and 
discussing and comforting victims of natural disasters. 
@ Politics - the deteriorating diplomatic relations between Russia and Belarus are 
focused on. 
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During the month of December 2002, news transcripts were received for the following days; 
2,3,4,5,9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,23,24,25,26,27. 
NTV NEWS FOR DECEMBER 2002. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 3 POSITIVE 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 10 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 10 NEUTRAL 
CHECHNYA 27 POSITIVE 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 9 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 72 NEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 3 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 0 N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 57 NEUTRALINEGATIVE 
MILITARY 15 NEGATIVE 
PUT IN 10 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 22 NEUTRAL 
SCANDALS 1 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 10 NEUTRAL 
Comments: 
4& Chechnya - 'good news' stories about the death of prominent rebel figures and the 
government's attempts to restore a 'normal' life in the break-away province form the 
basis of the news. An increasing tendency to attribute crime to Chechen people is also 
noticeable. This is contradicted by the end of the month when the Chechen 
Administration Headquarters in Grozny was bombed. 
(II Foreign News - items about politics in the CIS and a possible war to occur in Iraq 
occupy news in this category. 
• Life and Economy - problems with work strikes due to poor working conditions and 
non-payment of wages common. Also covered is the problem of energy companies 
discontinuing service in winter due to municipal authorities not paying the bill. 
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@I Military - stories concerning desertion in the armed forces continues to dominate news 
about the military. 
During the month of January 2003, news transcripts were received for the following days; 8, 
9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. 
NTVNEWS FOR JANUARY 2003. 
TOPIC NUMBER OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE 
OCCURENCES OR NEUTRAL 
ORTHODOX CHURCH 2 NEUTRAL 
AND RELIGION 
COURTS AND LA W 7 NEUTRAL 
CRIME 3 POSITIVE 
CHECHNYA 9 NEUTRAL 
CRISES AND DISASTERS 4 NEUTRAL 
EXCHANGE RATE AND 0 N/A 
MONEY 
FOREIGN NEWS 50 NEUTRAL 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3 NEUTRAL 
AND MEDIA 
GOVERNMENT 1 POSITIVE 
HUMANITARIAN 
° 
N/A 
LIFE AND ECONOMY 18 NEGATIVE 
MILITARY 3 NEGATIVE 
PUTIN 4 POSITIVE 
POLITICS 15 POSITIVE 
SCANDALS 1 NEUTRAL 
SPORT 2 POSITIVE 
Comments: 
@I Life and Economy - reporting on the energy problem, that is heating switched off to 
towns due to non-payment of energy bill by city authorities, features in headlines. 
@I Foreign News - a lot of news concerning conflict and fighting, such as the coming 
Iraq War, tension between Israel and the Palestinian Authorities and the North Korean 
nuclear dilemma. 
@I Putin - the President enters the energy supply debate personally and publicly. 
@I Politics - political actors and factions also join in the energy supply debate, seeming to 
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be actively trying to do something about the situation. 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
ORT/TV 1 and NTV, both capable of nation wide transmission, represented two very different 
styles of conveying the news to the Russian public. Both of these electronic broadcasting 
organisations went through a series of radical structural and ownership changes during the 
years of 2000 to 2002. NTV was initially a privately owned station, the only private station 
with national broadcasting coverage. The company was taken over by a state-owned company 
Gazprom after a very public battle between the authorities and the owner/workers of NTV. 
Subsequently, there was a reshuffle of the hierarchy at Gazprom after the take-over of Media-
Most's assets was successful. This ultimately gave the government greater control over what 
was shown on NTV. 
ORT/TV 1 also went through a series of upheavals during this time frame. Prior to the 2000 
presidential elections, the government owned 51 % and the oligarch Boris Berezovsky owned 
49% (given as a reward for his support ofYeltsin during the 1996 presidential elections) of 
the station. However, a gulf developed between the interests of the government and the 
interests of Berezovsky that resulted in conflict. Although the government maintained a 
controlling stake, Berezovsky was able to control the content of the station due to the fact that 
he paid the salaries of the top executives and was able to nominate some of the executives. 
Debts owed by Berezovsky were called in, after a lengthy battle he lost control and had 'his' 
people removed. The government installed their choices for executives, thereby restoring 
editorial control over the station. This was further cemented by changes to the structure in 
which state owned media and media assets were placed and arranged. Broadcasting media 
became subordinate to the trusted state channel RTR and all broadcasting facilities were put 
under the direct control of RTR. This affects privately owned media equally as state owned 
media. 
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned similarities and differences, differences should also 
appear in the manner in which the news is framed by the two stations. Both stations have a 
national broadcasting capability, which also extends to areas of the Near Abroad and the 
Baltic States. But, do these differences narrow to some extent after the government is able to 
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exact some measure of control over both NTV and ORT/TV J? Is it possible to observe if the 
news is aimed toward a similar audience or a different one, based upon the content of the 
news? 
I will begin by summarising the results of my findings derived from the ORT/TV 1 data. This 
will be done by summarising some of the dominant themes that have emerged from the study 
of the news briefs. Additionally, I will give the reader an idea of the most common types of 
story that the news programme begins with, which hints at the relative importance of the 
topic. The same will be done for the NTV news programme. 
As the period of the ORT/TV 1 news briefs progressed, from 2001 - 2003, the nature of the 
message was slightly altered and modified. This is probably an indication ofBerezovsky 
slowly losing control ofthe station. Over the period assessed during the year 2001 (June-
December 2001) some key topics emerged, in which the station maintained a constant stance. 
These topics included Orthodox Church and Religion, Chechnya, Government, Putin and the 
Military. They were all portrayed in a positive manner and could be regarded as being 
important or key topics. The topics Exchange Rate and Money, Scandals and Sport were 
almost entirely neglected by ORT/TV 1. This would appear to denote the relative lack of 
importance attached to this particUlar topic by those who decide what topics to cover. 
The topics of the leading news stories tended to change over time and depended to an extent 
upon the prevailing political 'hot' topic or political objectives. There were some consistencies 
though, news stories concerning the President are often placed among the leading news 
stories. Another topic that has seen a disproportionate share of the leading stories is news 
concerning events in Chechnya, these stories are not always negative in nature (such as deaths 
of Russian servicemen and acts of terrorism). 
During the course of the ORT/TV 1 news briefs in 2001, some certain kinds of deliberate 
stereotyping became observable. 
@ Chechnya - the thrust of the news was directed toward demonstrating Russian success 
in 'liquidating' the forces and resources of the Chechen 'terrorists'. An international 
dimension, which links the Chechens with international terrorist groups is floated. 
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These alleged links are pushed more intensely following the events of September 11 in 
the United States. 
It Crises and Disasters - a lot of attention was paid to the raising of the Kursk. The 
initial apparent lack of interest by the military and political elite in the interest of the 
trapped submariners is replaced by a stated official determination to do right by those 
lost on the Kursk and their families left behind. 
It Life and Economy - a greater attention and focus is made of the 'achievements' of 
Russian culture and technology. Those involved in the arts and culture are celebrated 
and commemorated. The 'marvels' of Russian technology are also heralded as being 
world leading. 
It Putin - the President is portrayed as being a hard-working and diligent leader who 
only has the nation's best interests at heart. He is also used as a role model too, in 
much the same manner as leading by example cases were used in the Soviet Union to 
modify the behaviour of the people. 
During the year of 2002 noticeable trends emerged that suggested that the topics of Courts 
and Law, Crime, Chechnya, Crises and Disasters, Foreign News, Government, Life and 
Economy, Military, Putin, Politics were critical or important subjects. SUbjects or topics, 
which seemed to be ignored during the same period included Scandals and Exchange Rate 
and Money. There were two topics that seemed to gain greater prominence during 2002, these 
were Sport and Orthodox Church and Religion. 
Topics seemed to fluctuate in terms of relative importance at a given point in time. The 
manner in which the topics were broached seemed to reflect the official view of the incident 
or accident, be it at a national or an international level. A good example of this concerned 
ORT/TV 1 's reporting of news concerning Georgia. Tensions between the Russian Federation 
and Georgia increased in 2002. This was driven by several factors; the war in Chechnya and 
Russian accusations that Georgia was in some way aiding and abetting the rebels, Georgia's 
stated desire to close all Russian military bases in Georgian territory and to send those troops 
back to Russia and Georgian debts (energy debts for example) owed to Russia. 
ORT/TV 1 presented the image that Georgia was a weak and corrupt state that was working 
against Russia's national interests and was aiding Russia's foes. Many stories that slated 
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Georgia for her handling of the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. Russia accused Georgia of 
allowing Chechen rebels to move freely between Chechnya and Georgia through the Pankisi 
Gorge (in Georgian territory), thereby offering the rebels some measure of protection by the 
rebels being able to shelter in Georgian territory and out of reach of the Russian forces. 
This criticism was accompanied by attacks on Georgia'S political leadership. The main 
accusations were that the leadership was weak, ineffectual and corrupt. Shevardnadze came in 
for some sharp personal criticism, accusing him of being out of touch of reality and being 
anti-Russian. 'Evidence' used to back up this claim included the demand of withdrawal of 
Russian peacekeeping forces from Georgia and the closure of all Russian military bases 
located there. 
The main angle of the news seems to be directed at creating and perpetuating what the 
Russian academic Ivan Zassoursky refers to as Great Russia. 1165 That is the perception and the 
effort to create a strong Russian state. It seems that the first step in the process is for the 
political elite to try and convince the public that Russia has the foundations for creating a 
leading nation in the world in terms of resources (human, natural and technological) at its 
disposal. It is a matter to persuade the Russian public to believe this, in order to motivate them 
and bring this perception to reality. 
Certain images and stereotypes with selected news topics became observable in the 2002 
ORT/TV 1 news programme. 
@ Courts and Law - high profile court cases are followed in the news, such as the 
prosecution against the military journalist Grigory Pasko and those involved in the 
Tsaritsino riots. The consequences of those caught and convicted of breaking the law 
or threatening the interests of those with power (Pasko) are held up for an example to 
others. A lot of attention is also paid to the passing of new laws, which gives the 
impression of an attempt to make the Russian state more 'modem' based upon the 
notion that it will be governed by a comprehensive (and impartial) set of laws and not 
the interests ofthose with political or economic power. 
1165 Zassoursky, I., Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2003, pp. 156 - 59. 
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~ Chechnya - the image of Chechnya as delivered to the Russian public is also 
developed over the course of 2002 from what was given in 2001. Limited reporting of 
casualties suffered by the security forces continues and the reporting of acts of terror in 
and around the Chechen Republic are covered. Possibly as an attempt to stifle any 
concern for why the Federal forces have not managed to bring the Chechen 'problem' 
to a successful conclusion, several new news angles are being developed. One of these 
concerns the restoration of 'normality' in Chechnya, such as the opening of schools, 
resumption of education, transportation and government services. An attempt is made 
to shift some blame for not being able to 'liquidate' the Chechen rebels to Georgia, as 
outlined above. 
~ Putin - as with the style of portrayal in 2001, the President is presented as a hard-
working and honest man who strives for the best for Russia and her people. A more 
paternal role seems to be in the process of being developed through the use of health 
and social messages, conveyed via Putin. An instance ofthis occurred in the area of 
health. One of the news stories featured the Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov's 
pledge to quit smoking after being constantly pressed by Putin to do so. 
• Politics - extensive coverage is devoted to high level political meetings between 
Russian officials and between Russian and foreign officials. These meetings are 
concerned with a variety of issues and tend to give an impression of Russia's 
importance (with regards to the meetings with foreign officials) and general good 
standing in the world community. Elections at the regional and local level are also 
covered. 
The year 2003 (January - September inclusive) saw the topics/issues of Chechnya, Putin, 
Politics and Life and Economy retain their position as top news stories. The issue/topic of 
Crises and Disasters was rated as a significant news item in the spring of 2003. This could be 
due to the seasonal nature of natural disasters in the Russian Federation, such as spring floods 
and forest fires. Topics/issues that received the least attention in the above mentioned period 
oftime includes Exchange Rate and Money, Humanitarian, Scandals and Sport. Orthodox 
Church and Religion received very little coverage during the period April- June 2003 (Crises 
and Disasters and Life and Economy increased its share markedly during this period). 
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Certain topics/issues retained their position as either a 'hot' topic or one that was ignored or 
deliberately omitted. As stated before, this would appear to be dictated by the incumbent 
political elite, who dictate what is to be shown and what is to be left out. The issue of gate 
keeping seems to be driven by critical and sensitive topics. Topics can be sensitive or critical, 
especially if they have the potential to affect the effectiveness of the rule of the incumbent 
power, either positively or adversely. To this end, the filtering of information can be used to 
either suppress damaging information or to use information to highlight successes or as a form 
of motivation. Consequently some news topics serve to motivate or inhibit some forms of 
behaviour, which has been seen in the news of 2003 on ORT/TV1. 
In an international context, a change of strategy has been initiated in dealing with the 
triangular relations between EU, USA and Russia. The latest Iraqi war has provided the 
Russian government some opportunities. The split between USA on the one side and France 
and Germany on the other, over American involvement in Iraq appears to have seen the 
Russian government into a game, playing one side off against the other. 
Russia stands to gain by being seen to be aligned with the power centres of the EU, France 
and Germany. Not only is a lot of trade involved, such as energy supplies to the EU, but also 
other issues of importance to Russia. The eastward expansion of the EU may see the 
Kaliningrad enclave surrounded by EU nations. If this occurs, Russia needs to be mindful of 
issues arising from this, such as the current debate on a visa regime with Lithuania and 
Russian minorities in the Baltic States. This is balanced with what Russia can get from the US 
for 'supporting' American operations, for instance aid money, and admission to international 
bodies. It is possible that Russian 'loyalties' will continue to fluctuate until a favourable 
outcome (for Russia) is achieved or the EU or USA end the diplomatic confrontation. 
2003 began with many items relating directly or indirectly to the situation in Iraq. This has 
changed as the year has progressed and new more urgent matters need attending to. Stories 
continued along the Great Russia theme, extolling Russian virtues and successes in the fields 
of technology and sport. Crime reporting seemed to lean toward a deterrent message to those 
who break the law, especially in the field of corruption in the government service. But, by the 
last period of assessment in 2003 (July - September) the main emphasis had switched. A 
definite shift to an election mode had been initiated. A variety of stories, which show both 
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Putin and the pro-Kremlin United Russia party in a favourable light are saturating the news. 
Other political parties receive very little if any coverage in the stated owned channel. 
Certain images and stereotypes with selected news topics became observable in the 2003 
ORT/TV 1 news programme. 
~ Chechnya - the Second Chechen War is already,into its fourth year now. Putin used 
this issue to help get him elected in March 2000. But, with no end in sight to this war 
of attrition, it may become Putin's millstone. The fact that currently no realistic viable 
alternative to Russia's current President exists, may save him from a defeat at the 
ballot box. The war is framed along the lines that it is part of an international war on 
terrorism. Chechen rebels are denounced as bandits and terrorists and are dehumanised 
in the language used, for instance a popular usage of '5 bandits were liquidated in 
special operations ... '(for example) is found in the language of the news. 
Ell Life and Economy - the theme of Great Russia is alive and well in this category. 
Russian cultural, sporting and scientific/technological abilities and achievements are 
very well highlighted. These may be designed to inspire other Russians to strive for 
similar or better accomplishments or perhaps to instil a sense of pride in being 
Russian. Either way, it appears as though the target result is to motivate greater 
achievements from Russian society. 
Ell Putin - the President's image as a strong, patriotic and decisive leader continues. He is 
shown to be making decisions which favour both the Russian State and ordinary 
Russians. An important aspect to Putin's public image is the continued lack of 
association with a specific political agenda. By doing this, Putin appears 'colourless' 
and therefore has a wider appeal in the public because a broader range of people can 
identify with him. This is due to the effect that people will more easily read into him 
what they want. 
Ell Politics - a shift in political news from stories about political meetings between 
international and national leaders, stories about domestic political meetings/debates to 
news concerning the activities of United Russia (Unity and the Fatherland/All Russia 
party alliance). This would appear to be timed to coincide with the scheduled State 
Duma elections. The party is shown in a very favourable light - compassionate and 
concerned about the plight of the 'average' Russian. 
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NTV news bulletins were received during the period January 2002 - January 2003. As stated 
previously, a number of significant events, such as ownership changes, took place during this 
time frame. By the time that the period of study began, NTV was already facing significant 
government pressure over the way in which the news stories were presented. In other words, 
the government wanted a more' government friendly' framing of news stories. By the finish 
of the study, it is very noticeable that the government had for the most part succeeded in 
toning down the news stories on NTV. This is especially noticeable with the manner in which 
significant and critical issues were conveyed. 
The following is a brief description of a general noticeable trend in the telling of news on the 
Segodnya news programme. Foreign News remained an important (numerically speaking) part 
ofthe news, although it was generally conveyed in a neutral manner. News categories that lost 
importance and status in the course of the takeover included; Exchange Rate and Money, 
Scandals and Sport. A news item that gained a more prominent role and place in the news was 
Orthodox Church and Religion. 
The critical and/or significant news categories that I mentioned before include; Chechnya, 
Crises and Disasters, Freedom of Speech and Media, Life and Economy and Scandals. From 
early to mid 2000 NTV took a strong stance on these categories, which countered the 
government's position. However, a transformation in the way this news was told began in 
mid-2000 and by the end of2000 the news was presented in either a neutral or positive 
manner. The basic or underlying values and philosophy of the station had been altered by the 
new financial owners of the station, which adds weight to Altschull's contention that the 
media relay what their financial owners want them to. The financial owner is effectively the 
gatekeeper and the final arbiter of what can and can not be shown. 
An important point to note at this stage is the fact that in spite of an initially negative stance 
toward the government, no such stance was ever directed at Putin. NTV news stories portrayed 
him as an industrious and energetic leader of the nation. 
During the study of Segodnya 's news programming in the year January 2002 - January 2003, 
there were noticeable trends in some of the categories. Certain types of image and 
stereotyping occurred and this changed along with the companies ownership. 
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" Chechnya - the period of study began with harsh criticism of the government's 
handling of the Chechen 'problem'. Losses, setbacks and incompetence was given 
airtime. By the end of the period of analysis, the tone of the news was neutral and 
consisted of mainly the straight telling of selected stories. The new items referred 
more to federal 'clearing' operations and acts of terror that were perpetrated by the 
Chechen rebels. 
" Freedom of Speech and Media - initial news focused on the attempts of the authorities 
to stifle the freedom of speech and control the media. High profile cases involving 
what appeared to be violations against freedom of speech and a free press were given a 
lot of attention, such as the trial of the journalist Pasko. The category had changed the 
nature of news in this category by January 2003, when news items concerned mainly 
media events, such as conferences, seminars and award ceremonies. 
" Life and Economy - early news items featured many stories about negative events in 
Russian society. Among the popular themes picked up by NTV were news concerning 
the non-payment of wages, the energy crisis and ineffectivelincompetent government 
handling of the problem and industrial action/strikes. There was a change in the way 
news in this category was told too. By 2003, a lot more cultural news was featured, 
such as birthdays of Russian celebrities, upcoming exhibitions of art and music. 
" Politics - early political news involved a significant number of stories involving 
political incompetence and misbehaviour. Political figures, especially members of the 
government, were shown involved in political squabbles and not doing much in the 
way of constructive work. Political intrigues and fighting was a favourite target of the 
news. Later on, news featured news that gave a more positive impression of political 
life in Russia by centring on political events such as Duma sessions, foreign and 
domestic political meetings. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Two of the problems that I encountered in the writing of this work include; the vast amount 
of information that was relevant to the proj ect and the hectic pace of change occurring in the 
Russian media over the three years in question (2001-2003 inclusive). These factors 
necessitated that I approach the topic, Ideology, Image-making and the Media in Putin 's 
Russia in a slightly different manner to compensate. I will begin by explaining my approach 
to the first problem, concerning the amount of available information. 
An enormous volume of information is generated in the media (nationally and 
internationally), disseminated by media rights groups (both in Russia and abroad), NGOs and 
by interest groups. For instance the Russian government and those aligned with it are taking a 
much more active approach to the dissemination of the 'official' position on various matters, 
such as information regarding Chechnya and the Yukos affair, through the use of infosuasion 
tactics. Opposition figures, such as the self-exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky, are also very 
actively trying to 'sell' their angle on the contemporary political situation. By taking in all of 
these diverse elements of information it is possible to get a reasonably good understanding of 
events, which can be quite complex, especially when the intrigues are taken into account. The 
volume of information available also means that some events, which seem and are important, 
have to be omitted to keep the project within manageable guidelines. 
The mass media industry in the Russian Federation has undergone an enormous 
transformation, a process that is still at play today. A variety of challenges and opportunities 
have been instrumental in shaping the nature and direction taken by the Russian media 
industry. In the writing of this work, the continual process of change has maintained its hectic 
pace. Prior to 1985, mass media in the Soviet Union were subservient to the interests of the 
State and provided ideological and informational support to Marxism-Leninism. They were 
expected to fill the role of educator and motivator of the masses. Some ten years later, a 
completely different media, ideologically and structurally, existed in the Russian Federation. 
Private media empires were being created by the oligarchs, to carry their business and 
political battles into the headlines of newspapers, airwaves of radio and screens of TV. It was 
an era of tabloid journalism in many cases, the lesson was learned - sensation sells, the more 
sensational the story the better. And now, less than ten years on from the mid-1990's, it seems 
as though the State is once again becoming the pre-eminent player in the media industry. 
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Ideology is making a 'come-back' in the mass media. In the Soviet era, the ideology was 
Marxism-Leninism, which was the official ideology of the Soviet Union. The mass media 
were expected to not only support the ideology, but to propagate it as well. Even during 
Gorbachev's reforms, where socialism was given a 'human face,' the transformations were 
meant to fall within the guidelines and principles that were established by the Soviet Union's 
founder Vladimir Lenin. By the time the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, 
Marxism-Leninism was a discredited ideology. The possible return of the communist spectre 
was used by Yeltsin as a mechanism to gamer votes and to gather political support. No 
organised State ideology existed during Y eltsin' s terms as President, an era that was dubbed 
bezpredel (without limits). Yeltsin's strategy was to survive politically, which required 
forming political alliances to fend off rivals to power, these were often acquired by a mixture 
of offering concessions or mutual interests. 
If the term ideology can be broken down into the simplest possible form and described as 
being a system of ideas, then it can be said that a new State ideology is coming into existence. 
New values and ideas are being diffused from the political centre to the regions and the 
Russian citizenry. A new focus was initiated during Putin's accession to power and centred 
upon the notion of recreating a strong, centralised State. A call was made to Russians to work 
together in a cooperation, to rebuild Russia and make her a great nation once more. This 
theme has been developed further by creating and reinventing a series of cultural symbols and 
ideas, which Zassoursky refers to as the notion of Great Russia. 
Image making has been shaped by a mixture of the use of both 'carrot and stick'. In the past, 
the use of force or the threat of its use against person or property. Media freedom in the 
regions is in even greater peril than the plight of the mass media in the main centres, such as 
St. Petersburg and Moscow. Local and Regional authorities, business interests and organised 
crime seem to be much more willing to use force or violence in order to suppress unwanted 
attention of their activities being publicised in the media. Since December 1991 over 200 
journalists have been killed in the Russian Federation. Other, less lethal methods of curbing 
unwanted publicity seem to be becoming more favoured by the central government, namely 
legal methods - the making and enforcing of laws. One of the manifestations of the upcoming 
government intentions with the role that they envisaged the mass media should play was 
found in the Doctrine on Information Security in the year 2000. The State wanted and needed 
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to harness of image-making power of the media to bring about the vision of the reinvigorated 
centralised State. 
During the 1999 - 2000 electoral cycle there were two distinct sets of images being cycled in 
the state owned or controlled media, the images that related to Russian identity and statehood 
that was going to be something to be proud of once more. A second set of images that was 
cycled in Russia during this time was the creation of Put in and his public personality. Putin 
needed to have his identity established and for any associations with his predecessor and 
patron Yeltsin, to be removed from the mind of the Russian public. For this to be successful, 
Putin needed to be perceived as an opposite to some ofYeltsin's well known qualities. To 
fulfil this requirement Putin was portrayed as being physically active and leading a healthy 
lifestyle (does not smoke or drink and is an active sportsman), sophisticated and educated (has 
a law degree and speaks foreign languages) and came from a relatively trusted Soviet 
institution (KGB were perceived as being among the least corrupt of Soviet institutions). 
These images can be divided into Putin the leader and Putin the person. As a leader of a 
nation such as Russia, some expectations exist relating to certain necessary stereotypical 
images for the 'job' to be done well. The position of President, places a person in charge of 
politics of a large and diverse nation and in control of the considerable military forces (as 
Commander-in-Chief of the defence forces). With the exception of the Kursk incident in 
August 2000, Putin is seen to be active and in control of crises and political1ife. TV 1 news 
sends images of Putin directing government ministers actions and publicly demanding 
answers and holding them to account for the handling of crises. An example of this is the 
annual winter energy crisis. In autumn of each year a focus is made upon the problem of 
municipal authorities not paying their energy supply bills to energy companies. The energy 
companies respond to this by shutting offthe energy supply to towns for non-payment during 
the winter. As a result, the situation can cause deaths as a result of hypothermia. This has 
become an important political issue that has been present for some time. During early autumn 
2003, Putin was shown summoning government ministers in an effort that seemed to be aimed 
at minimising the effects of this looming crisis. The Emergencies Ministry minister was given 
tasks, which included ensuring that adequate reserve supplies were available. In this light 
Putin is seen to be active and interested in the welfare of ordinary people and to be directing 
governmental resources to resolving this problem. He is also seen as being intolerant of no or 
poor responses by the government and bureaucracy to societal problems. 
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Putin's ability to relate to and mix with foreign guests and travelling abroad to conduct 
Russia's business are the focus of media attention too. As mentioned previously, Putin's 
knowledge of foreign languages gives him a certain educated and sophisticated air, a public 
display of this was his addressing the German parliament in German and his use of English 
language in his recent trip to the UK. A paternal aspect is played by Putin too, such as his 
message that a healthy body leads to a healthy mind when urging citizens to engage in 
physical exercise or the case where the Prime Minister is lectured by the President to quit 
smoking on the national news. Some of his publicly displayed characteristics that seem to 
appeal to the female constituency are; non-smoker, non-drinker, hard working, cultured, 
sophisticated, caring and compassionate (listens to ordinary peoples' problems - reinforced by 
the annual December TV call-in question sessions). The First Lady, Lyudmila Putina is also 
taking a greater role in political life and has had her profile raised in a supporting role of 
Russian culture (especially pertaining to the language debate). 
Great Russia refers to the use of image and symbols that are significant or invoke meaning 
in the realm of Russian identity. The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 also meant that 
some 280 million people needed to search for or establish an identity that was not Soviet. This 
is not a new question for the Russian people and has been in the process for centuries. During 
Y eltsin' s presidency there was no concerted effort to search for 'Russianess' apart from the 
sporadic use of some aspects, such as the Russian Orthodox Church. The focus of the 
administration was on its own political survival, therefore the use of symbols was used to 
gamer support. As a consequence of this focus, societal cohesion and direction was woefully 
lacking. Matters changed in the 1999 - 2000 electoral cycle, when Yeltsin needed a 
nominated successor to win the elections, which would also secure his legacy when he was 
President. The selected use of symbols and meaning was initially executed as an election ploy 
to lift Putin's appeal to the voting pUblic. However, this aspect has matured and developed to 
embrace broader goals and objectives for Russian society. 
With the passing of more time in office, the Putin administration has become more 
experienced and entrenched. The centres of cultural production are in the process of being 
mobilised; beginning with the media, then extending into other branches such as religion, the 
armed forces and the education system. This process is using a mixture of symbols and 
meaning from both the Soviet and Imperial period, selective periods of history and symbols 
that have great achievements associated with them are being recycled in contemporary society 
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in the manner of Baudrillard's theories of simulation and simulacra, where the distinction 
between image and reality becomes blurred. Life for the majority of Russians has been very 
difficult, officially some 30 - 40 million people live below the poverty line. The Great Russia 
phenomena is not about nostalgia for the Soviet Union or about attempting to recreate the 
Soviet Union, but about forging the will of the nation's people toward strengthening the State 
and as has been said so often before, about once again making Russian capable of making 
great achievements. This is being done by firstly attempting to re-establish a collective 
mentality in society, which makes the process of motivating and directing politically designed 
goals for society. A process that is realised by creating a common heritage, so that the people 
have something in common to bind them together, such as culture, religion and history to 
name a few of the possible elements. State media provide support in this sphere, state TV 
devotes a lot of time to Russian achievements in the areas ofthe arts, medicine, technology 
and sport where an emphasis is placed upon Russian superiority or competitiveness in these 
and other fields. 
As the Putin administration has become more established and felt more secure with their 
political position, a new wave of images started to be directed toward both the Russian public 
and a wider international audience. A technique that has been dubbed as Managed Democracy 
was launched, the appearance of pluralistic politics. This facet of contemporary Russian 
politics has been executed most notably through the media. Allies of the administration and 
those who appear to have close links have established NGOs and media organisations, Gleb 
Pavlovsky founded the Foundation for Effective Politics (which had a significant media 
branch at one point), Media Soyuz was founded with governmental funds and was heralded as 
a worthy alternative to the Russian Union of Journalists. On the surface, the impression is that 
pluralism of opinion exists and flourishes in all aspects of society - the media and politics 
especially. Elements of pluralism do exist in the media, this is evidenced by conflict, there 
would be no conflict if all media were under total control of one interest group. There is less 
pluralism in some forms of mass media than others, for instance national TV is state 
controlled. Once again, the informal rules (and unwritten) that are understood by media 
workers and were a feature of the Soviet system (in the pre-perestroika era) are returning. The 
issues that are raised or debated in the mass media appear to be non-critical issues, critical 
issues that could affect the survivability of the dominant political force are left alone as a rule. 
It has become a question of freedom of opinion and not information, it could be argued that 
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opinion is based on information, so therefore there could be an eventual convergence between 
information and opinion in the future. 
Internet usage is on the increase in Russia, but the current rate is still well below many 
other countries in the Central and Eastern European region. This is due in part to the Soviet 
legacy, which concentrated on heavy industry and neglected the high technology sector. A 
result ofthis is a poorly developed communication infrastructure that is in need of massive 
investment. The majority ofInternet usage is found in the main urban centres, however, recent 
studies have shown a rapidly increasing rate of use in the regions. Some political opposition 
that has been squeezed out of the conventional media (papers, TV and radio) have relocated 
and found themselves a niche in cyberspace. Such growth and potential, which can be found 
on the Internet has caught the interest of the government who are both trying to increase the 
rate of use and control what is on the Internet. 
The media business has become more focused on broadcast and electronic media. Falling 
readership of national newspapers has been highlighted by studies conducted by academic and 
media industry researchers. In 1990 national newspapers had runs of 8-14 million. The weekly 
Argumenty I Fakty reached a peak circulation of 32 million copies. By 1994, although the 
number of newspapers was approximately constant, total print run had almost been halved. 
The number of different national newspapers grew from 43 in 1990, to 222 in 1992 and 285 in 
1999. However, many of these new papers have little or no serious political content. National 
newspapers did experience some growth in readership in the second half of the 1990's. Local 
newspapers faced another fate. The print run for local newspapers declined until 1993, but by 
1997 the print run was 2/3 above the 1990 leve1.1166 
Recent research appears to show that newspaper readership is continuing to decline, with 
some notable exceptions in the newspaper industry. A Gallup Media National Readership 
Survey showed that daily newspaper readers were declining. In 1999 the dailies had 4.7 
million readers, but by July 2003 this figure had dropped to 3.3 million. Izvestiya suffered the 
greatest readership loss in this period, dropping from 843, 000 to 319, 000. Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, the most popular federal daily readership declined from 2, 147,000 to 1, 778, 000. 
Sovetski Sport, on a more cheerful note actually increased it readership base by 27% during 
1166 Dubin, B. Y., The Changing Shape of Russian Media, Research and Analytical Supplement, JRL #6309, 
15 June, 2002. 
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this period. 1167 Broken down into a year by year basis the gradual decline is more easily 
appreciated. 
YEAR READERSHIP AS % OF RUSSIANS 
OVER 16 YEARS OLD 
1999 4,795,400 8.9 
2000 4,178,000 7.9 
2001 3,838,200 7.2 
2002 3,517,400 6.6 
2003 3,324,100 6.3 
NOTE: 2003 figures cover the period from March - June 2003. 1168 
Differing views have been put forward to explain the decline in newspaper readership. The 
Managing Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sociology Institute Sotsioekspertiza 
Research Centre, Mikhail Chernysh told Kommersant the reasons why he thought the decline 
has occurred. 
"General stabilisation within the country, the reduction in the number of 
risks which people could find out about in the press, the increased level of 
competition with other mass media, mainly television and the emergence of 
the Internet. The young generation increasingly prefers using the Internet as 
its window on the world, and when we ask young people why they don't 
buy newspapers, they reply that everything that they need is on the Net.,,1169 
Yelena Vartanova, Deputy Dean of Moscow University's School of Journalism holds a 
different opinion on this matter. 
"The tradition of reading newspapers on the Internet is helping the revive 
newspapers, and not to attract increasing numbers of people to the Internet. 
The daily press readership in Russia is declining because such is the global 
1167 Russia: Main Newspapers Readership Falling, Kommersant (BBC Monitoring), 17 October, 2003. 
JRL #7377,21 October, 2003. 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 Russia: Main Newspapers Readership Falling, Kommersant (BBC Monitoring), 17 October, 2003. 
JRL #7377,21 October, 2003. 
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trend, added to which are our country's special peculiarities - the tradition 
of newspaper reading has died out, no efficient newspaper delivery system 
has been created, and newspapers have not finalised their formats.,,1170 
Other forms of print media have faced a similar decline to the national newspaper category. 
Magazines are a category that has been even more adversely affected by a downturn than 
national newspapers. Between 1990 and 1999 the total number of different magazines more 
than doubled to 2546. By 1995 though, the total print run was 6% of the 1990. There was a 
slight improvement in the print run in the later part of the 1990's, but it was still only 20% of 
the 1990 level. Books are another form of print media that has faced the problem of increasing 
diversity, but reducing print runs. According to VTsIOMthe number of titles in 1990 was 
41,234, which increased to 50, 085 in the year 2000. The average print run fell drastically in 
this time period, from 38,000 in 1990 to 8000 in 2000. 1171 
The number of radio stations during the period 1997-2002 increased significantly, over 900 
radio licences were granted during this period. There were some 30 radio stations in Moscow 
alone. lin An urban survey that was conducted in October 2000 showed that 68% of 
respondents listened to the radio and 91 % watched TV every day. Other results that emerged 
were; only 2% watched TV less than twice a week and 113 of respondents leave their TV sets 
on all day long.1173 An advantage, for the sender of a message is that TV provides a medium 
where a uniform message can be broadcast simultaneously across a vast area. As a 
consequence of this asset, the battle for control of the mass media has started and centred 
around broadcasting media in particular. Broadcast media are considered to be the most 
influential medium of communication by the political and economic elite. The struggle for 
control of NTV, TV 6 and TVS exemplify the importance attached to the perceived power of 
persuasion of information that is disseminated by TV. 
1170 Russia: Main Newspapers Readership Falling, Komrnersant (BBC Monitoring), 17 October, 2003. 
JRL #7377,21 October, 2003. 
1171 Dubin, B. V., The Changing Shape of Russian Media, Research and Analytical Supplement, JRL #6309, 15 
June, 2002. 
1172 ORT TV News Review, 7 May, 2002. JRL #6231, 8 May, 2002. 
1173 Dubin, B. V., The Changing Shape of Russian Media, Research and Analytical Supplement, JRL #6309, 15 
June, 2002. 
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